


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THE
COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

ON THE
TIMÆUS OF PLATO,
IN FIVE BOOKS;

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF
PYTHAGORIC AND PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Ἐμοὶ πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἐστὶ φίλια· πρὸς μὲντοι σοφιστὰς, ἢ γραμματιστὰς, ἢ τοιοῦτο γένος ἑτέρον
ἀνθρώπων κακοδαίμωνων, οὔτε νῦν ἐστὶ φίλια, μῆτε ὑστέρων ποτε γένοιτο.
Apollonius Tyaneus.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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INTRODUCTION.

OF that golden chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato, Proclus is indisputably the largest and most resplendent link. Born with a genius transcendently great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. The eulogium therefore of Ammonius Hermias, "that Proclus possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity,"¹ will be immediately assented to by every one, who is an adept in the writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Corymphan philosopher; though unfortunately like most of his other works, it has been transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain a third part of the *Timæus*; and from a passage in Olympiodorus *On the Meteors* of Aristotle,² there is every reason to believe that Proclus left no part of the

¹ Εὰ δὲ τί καὶ ἡμεῖς δυσηθέημεν εἰσενεγκεῖν περὶ τὴν τοῦ βιβλίου σαφήνειαν, ἀπονημιονευσάτες τῶν ἐξηγήσεων τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν διδασκάλου Προκλου τοῦ πλατωνικοῦ διαδοχοῦ, τὸν εἰς ἄκρον τῆς αἰθρωπίνης φύσεως τὴν τε ἐξηγητικὴν τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἔναρμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων κρίσιν ἀσκεσάτους, πολλὴν αὐτῷ λογίῳ θεῷ χάριν ὁμολογήσασμεν. Ammon. de Interpret. p. 1.

For important particulars respecting this extraordinary man, see my translation of his *Commentary on the first book of Euclid*. He was born about the year 412 of Christ.

² See this passage in the notes to my translation of the *Meteors* of Aristotle.

Timæus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable, from what Marinus says in his life of him, "that he was a man laborious to a miracle;" for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater part of one of the most important dialogues of Plato unelucidated, and particularly as these Commentaries were written by him (as the same Marinus informs us) in the flower of his age, and that he preferred them beyond all his other works.¹ Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved; or that part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic ratios, and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too, is here shown to be connected, according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal, and such as are vital. For partial souls such as ours, are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected. The progression of the elements likewise from their first incorporeal subsistence to their subterranean termination, and the nature of the heavens and heavenly bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific reasoning, it is shown that every planet is surrounded with satellites,² that the fixed stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is to us unknown; and that the stars, which at times disappear and again become visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the splendors of which they are occasionally concealed.³ These and many other most interesting particulars, are unfolded in these Commentaries, with an accuracy and perspicuity which have seldom been equalled, and have never been excelled.

¹ The late Dr. Charles Burney, on being once asked by me, whether he had ever read these Commentaries, candidly replied, "that they were too much for him;" at the same time exclaiming, "What a giant was Proclus compared to Longinus!" This confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philosophy of Plato, displayed a degree of good sense, which is seldom to be met with in a grammarian and philologist, on such an occasion; and his candour is still more remarkable, when it is considered that he had been a Reviewer.

² See p. 270. Vol. 2. in which it is said, "that in each of the planetary spheres, a number analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsists with appropriate circulations." See also p. 280 and 281, of the same volume, in which this is more fully asserted.

³ See p. 299. Vol. 2.

When I speak however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are developed, I do not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be obvious to every one, or that they may be apprehended as soon as read; for this pertains only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day; but my meaning is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capable of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy¹ of Plato can desire. And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since the revival of letters, has been generally entertained of the writings of Proclus and other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter Platonists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this, that Plotinus and his followers, or in other words, all the Platonists that existed from his time to the fall of the Roman empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, corrupted the philosophy of Plato, by filling it with jargon and revery, and by ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they profess to have detected; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom they so grossly defame. This however is very far from being the case. For since the philosophy of Plato, as I have elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior, and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euclid, certain preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doctrines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathematics, have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted with physics. He must also be an adept in the writings of Aristotle, as preparatory to the more sublime speculations of Plato. And in addition to all this, he must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic; viz. he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance. Since the revival of letters however, this philosophy has not been studied by men, who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

¹ It is well said by Petwin, alluding to this philosophy, "that there are certain truths acquired by a long exercise of reason, both in particular, and likewise in those subjects that are most general, as much, perhaps, out of the reach of the greatest mathematician, as the speculations of Newton are above the capacity of some that are now called mathematicians."

necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it, in this regular and scientific method. Hence, they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works, with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being sufficiently strong to bear the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes, ¹ "it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, but in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also, the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself, wrote some things conformable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zeno calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life." The men therefore, who have defamed the latter Platonists, being thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing adopted by the great ancients, finding from a superficial perusal of the most genuine disciples of Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them were delirious, and that they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them, will in vain attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain. By the latter Platonists however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will find the arduous sublimest of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly

¹ Οτι δε απρεπη τα θειωτατα των δογματων εστιν, εις ακους φερομενα των πολλων, ουδεν δει λεγειν, αυτου Πλατωνος εισφοτος, ως πασα ταυτα καταγεμιστα μεν εστι τοις πολλοις, θυμασιως δε αξια τοις σοφοις. ουτω δε και οι Πυθαγορειωι των λογων τους μεν εφασκον ειναι μυστικους, τους δε υπαιθριους, και οι εκ του Περιπατου, τους μεν εσωτερικους, τους δε εξωτερικους, και αυτος Παρμενιδης, τα μεν προς αληθειαν εγραφε, τα δε προς δεξιν, και ο Ζηνων δε τους μεν αληθεις εκαλει των λογων, τους δε χρειωδεις.

Procl. MS. Comment. in Parmenid.

luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniquitous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists; for the authors of it, I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe, that I have endeavoured to the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original. Independent of the difficulties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this work, the original abounds with errors, not of a trifling, but of the most important nature; errors, which so materially affect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be convinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will find upwards of eleven hundred *necessary* emendations. I call them *necessary*, because they are not the offspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably demands. Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for of the whole of it there are none; and a Latin translation of a part of the 3d book, by Nicholaus Leonicius Thomæus,¹ is the only aid that has been afforded me in this arduous undertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original, and not unfrequently to add to it, not only particular words, but entire sentences that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others who have laboured greatly for the good, not merely of their country, but of all mankind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours; and that though on this account I am not much indebted,² yet I sincerely wish well to my native land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influenced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multitude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them, to the most careless observer. The most perfect conviction indeed, that a greater good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

¹ This translation forms the last part of the Opuscula of Thomæus, printed at Venice in the year 1525; which work is so scarce, that Fabricius in his account of the Life and Writings of Proclus, (Biblioth. Græc. Tom. 8.) says, he never saw it.

² According to Plato in the 7th Book of his Republic, "that which springs up spontaneously, should not be forward to pay any one for its nurture."

to man, and the consequent persuasion, that I could not confer a more real benefit on the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native tongue, as they induced me to engage in such a difficult undertaking, have also been attended with the purest delight, from a conviction that I was acting rightly, and therefore in a way pleasing to divinity. Hence in accomplishing this Herculean task, I have been satisfied with exploring myself, and imparting to others, the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavouring to deserve the favourable regard of that ineffable principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honour that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable and substantial gain.

NAMES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS QUOTED BY PROCLUS
IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

- ADRASTUS APHRODISIENSIS, one of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplicius On the Categories of Aristotle.
- AGLAOPHEMUS, one who initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.
- ALBINUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished about the time of Galen.
- ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under the Emperor Severus.
- AMELIUS, a Platonic philosopher, and a disciple of Plotinus.
- AMMONIUS SACCAS, the preceptor of Plotinus.
- ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.
- ANTONINUS, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas.
- ARISTOTLE, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad.
- ARISTOTLE, the Rhodian.
- ATTICUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
- CHRYSIPPUS, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, died in the 143rd Olympiad.
- CRANTOR SOLENSIS, the first interpreter of Plato, also a fellow disciple with Xenocrates of Plato, and an auditor of Polemo.
- DEMOCRITUS, the celebrated philosopher of Abdera, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.
- EMPEDOCLES, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of Pythagoras.
- EPICURUS, was born in the 109th Olympiad.
- EUDEMUS, the Rhodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian Ethics.
- EURYMACHUS, the Epicurean.
- GALEN, the physician, who was also a Platonist. He wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adrian.
- HARPOCRATION, the Platonist, an Argive, and the familiar of Augustus Cæsar.
- HERACLIDES PONTICUS, a disciple of Plato and Speusippus.
- HERACLITUS EPHESIUS, surnamed *the obscure*, flourished about the 70th. Olympiad.
- HERMES TRISMEGISTUS.
- JULIAN, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
- IAMBlichus, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed *the divine*, flourished under the Emperor Constantine.

NICOMACHUS, the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of Antoninus Pius.

NUMENIUS, a Pythagoric and Platonic philosopher, flourished prior to Plotinus.

OCELLUS LUCANUS, an auditor of Pythagoras, and one of his most eminent disciples.

ORIGEN, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus.

PARMENIDES, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

PEREGRYDES, the Syrian, the preceptor of Pythagoras.

PHILOLAUS, of Tarentum, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher, and an auditor of Pythagoras.

PLATO, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the 108th Olympiad.

PLOTINUS, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers, flourished under the Emperors Gordian and Galienus.

PLUTARCH, of Chaeronea, in Bœotia, the preceptor of Trajan, and the celebrated biographer.

PORPHYRY, a disciple of Plotinus, and distinguished by the appellation of *the philosopher*.

POSIDONIUS, a Stoic philosopher, flourished under the reign of Julius Caesar.

PRAXIPHANES, a disciple of Theophrastus.

PROCLUS MALLOTES, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers.

PYTHAGORAS, the father of philosophy, flourished about the 60th Olympiad.

SEVERUS, a Platonist, but the time in which he flourished is not known.

SOCRATES, the celebrated preceptor of Plato, was born in the 4th year of the 77th Olympiad.

SOCRATES, the Platonist, was posterior in time to Amelius.

SOLOON, the Legislator, flourished about the 46th Olympiad.

STRATO LAMPSACENUS, an auditor and successor of Theophrastus.

SYRIANUS, the preceptor of Proclus. See the notes to this work.

THALES, was born in the first year of the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad.

THEODORUS ASINEUS, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamed *the great*.

THEOPHRASTUS, the celebrated disciple and successor of Aristotle.

XENARCHUS, a Peripatetic philosopher, and the friend of Augustus Caesar.

XENOCRATES, a disciple, and successor of Plato.

XENOPHANES, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic method of reasoning, flourished in the 60th Olympiad. For an account of this method, see the additional notes on this work.

ZENO ELEATES was an auditor of Parmenides, and flourished about the 86th Olympiad.

N. B. The Olympic games were restored by Iphicus, 442 years after their first institution, and about 777 years before Christ. From this last institution the Greeks began to reckon by Olympiads, each of which contained the space of 4 years. And this continued even to the reign of Constantine.

AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

- το αναγωγικόν. **THE ANAGOGIC.** That which elevates the soul from sensibles to intelligibles.
- αλλοιωσις. **ALLIATION.** Change in quality.
- αποκαταστασις. **APOCATASTASIS.** Restitution to a pristine form, or condition of being.
- το γενεσιουργικόν. **THE GENESURGIC.** That which is effective of generation.
- ο δαιμονιος Αριστοτελης. **THE DÆMONIACAL ARISTOTLE.** This philosopher was thus denominated by the ancients, from his transcendent physiological knowledge; nature being proximately governed by dæmons, or those powers that subsist between Gods and men.
- γενεσις. **GENERATION.** A flowing condition of being, or a subsistence in becoming to be. Hence, το γιγνισθαι signifies an extension in subsistence, or a tendency to being.
- δημιουργος των όλων. **THE DEMIURGUS OF WHOLES.** The maker of the universe is thus denominated, because he produces the universe, so far as it is a *whole*, and likewise all the *wholes* it contains, by his own immediate energy, other subordinate powers co-operating with him in the production of parts. Hence he produces the universe *totally* and *at once*.
- διανοια. **DIANOIA.** The discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.
- δοξα. **OPINION.** Is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows *that* a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or *why* it is. For the knowledge of the *ὄντι*, or *why* a thing is, belongs to διανοια.
- το επιθυμητικόν μέρος της ψυχης. **THE EPITHYMETIC PART OF THE SOUL,** or that part of the soul which is the principle of all-various desires. But *desire* is well defined, by the Pythagoreans, to be a certain tendency, impulse, and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive energy. They add, that there is also a desire of the contraries to these, and this is a desire of the evacuation and absence, and of having no sensible perception of certain things.
- εικονικως. **ICONICALLY.** A thing is said to subsist *iconically*, when it subsists after the manner of an image.
- ειδολικως. **IDOLICALLY.** Adumbratively.
- ενθεαστικως. **ENTHEASTICALLY.** In a divinely-inspired manner.
- ενιαιας. **UNICALLY.** In a way conformable to the nature of *the one*.
- το ετεροκίνητον. **THE ALTER-MOTIVE.** That which is moved by another thing, and not by itself.
- θυμος. **ANGER.** An appetite of the soul directed to the avengement of incidental molestations.
- λογοι. **REASONS.** Productive principles or powers; and they also signify forms.
- μορφη. **MORPHE.** Pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.

- πολυδυναμος. **MULTIPOTENT.** Possessing much power.
- νοερα επιβολη. **INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION.** The immediate energy of intellect is thus denominated, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the intelligible.
- νοος. **INTELLECT.** In the human soul is the summit of dianoia, and is that power by the light proceeding from which, we perceive the truth of axioms. But in divine natures it is a self-subsistent, impartible, eternal essence, perceiving all things at once.
- ολοτης. **WHOLENESS.** A whole which has a perpetual subsistence, and which comprehends in itself all the multitude of which it is the cause.
- πληρωμα. **PLENITUDE, OR COMPLETENESS.** Is a whole which gives completion to the universe.
- το νοητον, η νοερον, ο ψυχικον πλατος. **THE INTELLIGIBLE, OR INTELLECTUAL, OR PSYCHICAL BREADTH;** i. e. the extent of the progression of the intelligible, of intellect and of soul, and of each of these according to its own order, and not according to a progression into an inferior order.
- το συνθετον. **THE COMPOSITE.** I have used the word *composite* instead of *compounded*, because the latter rather denotes the mingling, than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former through its derivation from the Latin word *compositus*, solely denotes.
- τελεστικη τεχνη. **THE TELESTIC ART.** Is the art pertaining to mystic operations.
- φιλοπολεμικος. **PHILOPOLEMIC.** An epithet of Minerva, signifying that she is a *lover of war*; just as she is also called *philosophic*, as being a *lover of wisdom*.
- υπαρξις. **HYPARXIS.** The first principle, or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

PROCLUS

ON

THE TIMÆUS OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

THAT the design of the Platonic Timæus embraces the whole of physiology, and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this from the beginning to the end, appears to me to be clearly evident to those who are not entirely illiterate. For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus *Concerning Nature*, is written after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato being thence impelled, applied himself to write the Timæus, according to Sillographus.¹ On this account we have prefixed the treatise of Timæus to these Commentaries, in order that we may know what the Timæus of Plato says that is the same with what is asserted in the treatise of Timæus [the Loerian], what it adds, and in what it dissents. And that we may investigate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagreement. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology for its scope, surveying the same things in images and in paradigms, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautiful boundaries² of physiology, assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal causes of nature uninvestigated.

¹ *Viz.* Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comic poems.

Tim. Plat.

VOL. I.

² *I. e.* Final intentions.

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But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has prosecuted with great subtilty the proposed doctrine,—ought to be considered by those who are more sagacious and acute. For since, in short, physiology receives a threefold division, and one part of it is conversant with matter and material causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these have not the relation of causes, but of concauses, and admits that there are other causes, which are properly so called, of things generated by nature, viz. the effective, paradigmatic and final cause;—this being the case, among the multitude of physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there was a diversity of opinion respecting the subject of things. For Anaxagoras, who appears to have seen, while the rest were asleep, that intellect is the first cause of generated natures, made no use of intellect in his explanation of things, but rather employed certain airs and aethers as the causes of things that are generated, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*. But of those posterior to Plato, who were the patrons of a sect, not all, but such of them as were more accurate than the rest,¹ thought fit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the principles of bodies to matter and form. For if they any where mention the producing cause, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather take away its efficacious and properly effective power [than allow the existence of it] by not granting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles] of the things effected by it, but admitting that many things are generated casually. To which we may add, that they do not acknowledge that there is a pre-existing producing cause of, in short, all physical things, but of those only that are borne along in generation. For of eternal natures they clearly say, that there is no effective cause; in asserting which they are ignorant that they must either give subsistence to the whole of heaven from chance, or evince that what is casual is itself productive of itself.

Plato however alone, following the Pythagoreans, delivers indeed, as the concauses of natural things, a universal recipient, and material form, which are subservient to causes properly so called, in the generation of things. But prior to these, he investigates principal causes, viz. the producing cause, the paradigm, and the final cause. Through these also, he places a demiurgic intellect over

¹ Viz. Aristotle, and his followers.

the universe, and an intelligible cause in which the universe primarily subsists, and *the good*, which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order of the desirable. For since that which is moved by another thing, is suspended from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to produce, or perfect, or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and is conducted by it. It is therefore, that the concourses of natural things, should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with a view to which they were fabricated by the father of all things, and for the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered, and investigated with accuracy by Plato; and the remaining two, form and the subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the intelligible or intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms; but one thing in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject. But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the world, viz. *the good*, the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject nature, is evident from the following considerations. For if he had spoken concerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that *the good* alone is the cause of these; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that *the good* and the intelligible are the causes¹ of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from the intelligible unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the supermundane Gods, he would have produced them from the intellectual and total fabrication, from the intelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things. For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are generative, but in a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner. But since he discusses mundane affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form, descending into it from the supermundane Gods, suspends it from the total² fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to be a God by the participation of *the good*; and thus he renders the whole world an intellectual, animated God. This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the scope of the *Timæus*.

This however being the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indicated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it,

¹ Instead of ἀντι ρουτων in this place, it is necessary to read αιτιας ρουτων.

² For ολης here, it is necessary to read ολη.

the whole fabrication of the world is delivered; and in the end, partial natures, and the extremities of fabrication, are woven together with wholes. For the resumption of the discourse about a polity, and the narration respecting the Atlantic island, unfold through images the theory of the world. For if we direct our attention to the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that the polity which Socrates summarily discusses, is an image of their union, establishing as its end the communion which pervades through all things; but that the war of the Atlantics with the Athenians, which Critias narrates, is an image of the division of mundane natures, and especially of the opposition¹ according to the two co-ordinations of things. But if we divide the universe into the celestial and sublunary regions, we must say that the [Socratic] polity, is assimilated to the celestial order; for Socrates says, that the paradigm of it is established in the heavens; but the war of the Atlantics, to generation, which subsists through contrariety and mutation. These things therefore, for the reasons we have mentioned, precede the whole of physiology.

But after this, the demiurgic, paradigmatic and final causes of the universe are unfolded, in consequence of the pre-existence of which, the universe is fabricated both according to the whole and the parts of it. For the corporeal nature of it is fashioned with forms, and divided by divine numbers; soul also is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons, and divine and demiurgic symbols; and the whole animal is woven together conformably to the united comprehension of it in the intelligible world. The parts likewise of it, are arranged in a becoming manner in the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital. For partial souls being introduced into the world, are arranged about their leading Gods, and through their vehicles become mundane, imitating their presiding deities. Mortal animals likewise, are fabricated and vivified by the celestial Gods; where also man is surveyed, and the mode of his subsistence, and through what causes he was constituted. Man indeed is considered prior to other things, either because the theory respecting him pertains to us who make him the subject of discussion, and are ourselves men; or because man is a microcosm, and all such things subsist in him partially, as the world contains divinely and totally. For there is an intellect in us which is in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same² father, and the same vivific Goddess, as the soul

¹ For *antitheta* here, it is obviously requisite to read *antithetoi*.

² For *αὐτῆς πατρὸς* here, it is necessary to read *αὐτῶν πατρῶν*.

of the universe; also an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is co-ordinate. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be surveyed multifariously, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world, paradigmatically, iconically, totally and partially, it will be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed in the theory of the universe.

You may also say that conformably to the Pythagoric custom, it is necessary to connect the discussion of that which surveys with that which is surveyed. For since we are informed what the world is, it is requisite I think to add also, what that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational admiration. But that Plato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident from what he says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of him who intends to obtain a happy life, should be assimilated to the object of his intellection. For the universe is always happy; and our soul will likewise be happy, when it is assimilated to the universe; for thus it will be led back to its cause. For as the sensible man is to the universe, so is the intelligible man to animal itself. But these secondary natures always adhere to such as are first, and parts subsist in unproceeding union with their wholes, and are established in them. Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates his paradigm after an appropriate manner, becoming a world through similitude to the world, and happy through resemblance to that blessed god [the universe.] The ends also of fabrication are subtly elaborated by Plato, according to genus and species, and also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the earth, and in animals, such things as are preternatural, and such as are according to nature; in which part of the *Timæus*, likewise, the principles of medicine are unfolded. For the physiologist ends at these; since he is a surveyor of nature. For a subsistence according to nature, exists together with nature; but the preternatural is a departure from nature. It is the business, therefore, of the physiologist to understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. But it is the province of the medical art to unfold such particulars as are consequent to these. And in these things especially, Plato has something in common with other physiologists. For they were conversant with the most material, and the ultimate works of nature, neglecting the whole heaven, and the orders of the mundane Gods, in consequence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade farewell to forms and primary causes.

It also appears to me that the demoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concerning nature, perceiving that the things which are common to every thing that has a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of motion is derived, motion, time, and place; all which are delivered by Plato in this dialogue, viz. interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is consubstantial with the universe; the various species of motion; and the concauses of things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in the first place such as pertain to the heavens, in a way conformably to Plato; so far as he calls the heaven unbegotten, and a fifth essence. For what difference is there between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth world, and a fifth figure, as Plato denominates it? But in the second place, he discusses such things as are common to every thing that has a generated subsistence. And with respect to things of this kind, Plato deserves to be admired, for having surveyed with much accuracy the essence and powers of them, and for having rightly preserved their harmony and contrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors, Plato has delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine respecting them beyond what is fit. But such as pertain to the theory of animals, are distinguished by Plato according to all final causes and concauses, but by Aristotle are scarcely, and but in few instances, surveyed according to form. For his discussion for the most part stops at matter; and making his exposition of things that have a natural subsistence from this, he shows to us that he deserts the doctrine of his preceptor, and thus much concerning these particulars.

In the next place it is requisite to speak of the form and character of the dialogue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus, which was composed by him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Timæus. Again, it is also acknowledged by those who are in the smallest degree conversant with the writings of Plato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If, therefore, he has any where mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the Pythagoric custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired, the suspending every thing from intelligibles, the bounding wholes in numbers, the indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending

partial conceptions, and the enunciative or unfolding into light. But from the Socratic philanthropy, the sociable, the mild, the demonstrative, the contemplating beings through images, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is a venerable dialogue; forms its conceptions supernally from the first principles; and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to understand physics, not only physically, but likewise theologically. For Nature herself who is the leader of the universe, being suspended from, and inspired by the Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a Goddess, nor is without a divine peculiarity, but is illuminated by the truly-existing Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, as Timæus himself says, it will be fit that this dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological; imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation. Farther still, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intelligibles, things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually called mathematical. But all things may be appropriately surveyed in all. For such things as are media, and such as are last, presubstist in intelligibles after a primordial manner, and both these substist in the mathematical genera; first natures indeed iconically, but such as rank as the third, paradigmatically. In physical entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, being the case, Timæus, when he constitute the soul, very properly indicates its powers, its productive principles, and its elements through mathematical names. But Plato defines its peculiarities by geometrical figures, and leaves the causes of all these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. And thus much concerning these things; since when we descend to particulars, we shall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypothesis of it is as follows:

Socrates having come to the Piræus for the sake of the Bendidian festival and solemn procession, discoursed there concerning a polity with Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, Glauco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymachus the sophist. But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Piræus, as it is laid down in the Republic, in the city, to Timæus, Hermocrates and Critæas, and to another fourth anonymous person. Having, however, made this narration, he calls upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and speakers assembled together

on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Piræus. For in the Republic it is said, "I went down yesterday to the Piræus;" but in this dialogue, "Of those who were received by me yesterday at a banquet of discourse, but who ought now in their turn to repay me with a similar repast." Not all of them however, were present at this audition, but the fourth was wanting through indisposition. What, therefore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about the whole world? I reply, that it is fit the father of the discussion should be considered as analogous to [the Demiurgus, or] the father of works. For the fabrication of the world in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according to intellect. But the triad of those that receive the discussion of Timæus, is analogous to the demiurgic triad which receives the one and total motion of the father; of which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately conjoining himself to Timæus, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to the father, who is prior to the triad. These things, however, if the Gods please, we shall render more manifest through what follows. As we have therefore spoken concerning the scope and management of the dialogue, have shown how admirable the character of it is, and what is the whole of the hypothesis, and have indicated the adaptation of the persons to the present discussion, it will be proper that, betaking ourselves to the words of Timæus, we should investigate every particular to the utmost of our power.

Since, however, the word *nature*, being differently understood by different persons, disturbs those who love to contemplate the conceptions of Plato, let us in the first place show what it appeared to him to be, and what his opinion was of its essence. For the knowledge of what nature is, whence it proceeds, and how far it extends to productions, will be adapted to the dialogue, which has for its object the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Antipho, called matter nature; but others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called the whole of things nature, as some prior to Plato, of whom he speaks in the Laws. Others' denominated nature things which subsist by nature. But others gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and levity, rarity and density, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient physiologists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of God; others soul; and others something else of this kind. Plato, however, does not think fit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

* For *οτι δη* here, it is necessary to read *οι δη*.

form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul. Placing, however, the essence of it in the middle of both, I mean, between soul and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in consequence of being divided about bodies, and incapable of being converted to themselves, but nature surpassing things posterior to it, through containing the reasons or productive principles of all of them, and generating and vivifying all things, he has delivered to us the most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions, nature is one thing, and that which subsists according to, and by nature, another. For that which is artificial, is something different from art, and the intellectual soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and is inseparable from them. But the intellectual soul is separate from bodies, is established in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herself and to another. She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated, but to herself, through not verging to the participant; just as the father of soul is of himself being imparticipable, and, if you are willing, prior to him the intelligible paradigm itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, viz. *itself*; *of itself*; *of itself and of another*; *of another*; *another*. And with respect to the last of these, it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various division. But of the next to this, [viz. that which is of another,] it is nature which is inseparable from bodies. That which immediately precedes this [viz. that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or that which is of itself,] is the demiurgic intellect who abides [as Plato says] in himself in his own accustomed manner. And the next to this [or itself,] is the intelligible cause of all things, which is the paradigm of the productions of the Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks fit to call animal itself.

Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed and sensible essence. She is also the boundary of the extent of incorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she directs and governs mundane beings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence of being deified, but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine bodies Gods, as being the statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, but ruling over generation through the heavens; and every where weaving together partial natures with wholes. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [Rhea.] [For according to the Chaldæan oracle] "Immense Nature is suspended from the

back of the Goddess;" from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the subjects of its government. Hence, being suspended from thence, she pervades without impediment through, and inspires all things; so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and such things as are corruptible, remain perpetually in the world, being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the Oracle says, "Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course," &c. So that if some one of those who assert that there are three demiurgi, is willing to refer them to these principles, viz. to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, and to total nature [or to nature considered as a whole,] he will speak rightly, through the causes which have been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that there are three other demiurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus of wholes is one, but more partial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into parts. We must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether it be Amelius or Theodorus [Asinaus] who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be careful to remain in Platonic and Orphic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic art, if indeed they mean the nature which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly; but their assertion is right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him. *For we must conceive that art is triple, one kind subsisting in the artist, in unproceeding union; another, proceeding indeed, but being converted to him; and a third being that which has now proceeded from the artist, and subsists in another thing.* The art therefore, which is in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible world¹ is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on which account also it is said to be the organ of the Gods, not destitute of life, nor alone alter-motive, but having in a certain respect the self-motive, through the ability of energizing from itself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from

¹ It appears to me, that the words *τον αισθητον κοσμον*, are wanting here in the original.

these things that the dialogue is physical, which teaches us concerning the whole mundane fabrication,—it remains that we should connect what is consequent with what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because there is also a twofold world, the intelligible and the sensible, as Plato himself says in the course of the dialogue,—this being the case, the Parmenides comprehends the discussion of intelligibles, but the Timæus that of mundane natures. For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progressions of mundane essences. But neither does the former entirely omit the theory of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligibles; because sensibles are in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles iconically. But the one is exuberant about that which is physical, and the other about that which is theological, in a manner appropriate to the men from whom the dialogues are denominated: to Timæus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind about the universe; and to Parmenides, for he wrote about truly-existing beings. The divine Iamblichus, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in these two dialogues, the Timæus and Parmenides. For every thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent end in these, and no order of beings is left uninvestigated. To those also who do not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timæus to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Timæus refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the progression of all beings from *the one*. And this is effected by the former, so far as all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as beings participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of *the one*.] Farther still, as Timæus, prior to physiology, extends through images the theory of mundane natures, so Parmenides excites the investigation of immaterial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having been exercised in discussions about the best polity, to be led to the knowledge of the universe; and after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic theory of the unities [of beings.] Having however, said thus much, it is now time to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our ability.

“ [I see] One, two, three, but where, friend Timæus, ’ is the fourth

* In all the editions of the Timæus, ημιν follows after ω φιλε Τιμαιε, but is wanting in these Commentaries of Proclus.

person of those who having been received by me yesterday at a banquet of discussion, ought now to repay me with a similar repast?"

Plato here, together with the grace and beauty of the words, raises and exalts the whole period. Praxiphanes however, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames Plato, first because he makes an enumeration of one, two, three, in a thing which is manifest to sense and known to Socrates. For what occasion had Socrates to numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to this conference? In the second place he blames him, because he makes a change in using the word *fourth*, and in so doing, does not accord with what had been said before. For the word *four*, is consequent to one, two, three; but to the *fourth*, the first, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objections of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the Grecian custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction. Homer¹ therefore has said many things of this kind:

Full of the brass descending from above,
Through six bull hides the furious weapon drove,
Till in the seventh it fix'd.

And in a similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a cause. For to numerate the persons that were present, was to point them out. For to say one, two, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was absent (since it was impossible to point him out) through *the fourth*. For we use the term *the fourth*, of one that is absent. But to the former objection Porphyry replies, that if as many had been present as was requisite, it would have been superfluous to numerate them, but one of them being absent, of whose name we are ignorant, the enumeration of those that are present contains a representation of the one that is wanting, as desiring that which remains, and as being in want of a part of the whole number. Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting. For if he had known him, and had been able to manifest him by name, he would perhaps have said, I see Critias, and Timæus, and Hermocrates, but that man I do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

¹ Iliad. vii. 247.

him, he only knew through number that he was wanting, and manifests to us that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, and such others of the like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the theory of the words before us. But it is necessary to remember that the dialogue is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should be made in a way adapted to the philosophers of that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas therefore, as the following, may be derived from the present text: Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else adduces this, by giving Timæus the appellation of *friend*. In the second place, they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should be stably preserved by them; and for the fulfillment of these, Socrates desires the presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them. This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to become both guests and hosts, those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn. Others, therefore, have written arts concerning disciplines through which they think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them; but Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the imitation of the most excellent men, which have much greater efficacy than those which are deposited in mere rules alone. For imitation disposes the lives of the auditors, conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to be a true feast; that it is not such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature; but that which banquets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato about the feast of discourse. These therefore, and such particulars as these, are ethical.

But the physical Pythagoric dogmas are as follow: They said that every physical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of nature subsisted conformably to numbers. These numbers however are participated, just as all mundane forms are participable. Very properly, therefore, does the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numbers, and use numbers as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they participate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three, another. For the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in asserting, that these men considered numbers as subsisting in sensibles. For how could this be admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Gods and men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing nature? But since the dialogue is physical, it makes its commencement from participated numbers, such as are all numbers that are physical. Farther still, these men venerated physical communion, both that which is in generation, according to which all things are rendered effable and commensurate with each other, and that which is in celestial natures. For these impart to each other their proper powers. Rightly therefore, and in a way adapted to the thing proposed, does Socrates think fit, that the same persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Gods, gave subsistence to all mundane natures. Of these three, the monad, duad and triad, are indicative; so that it is requisite to begin from these, and that he who surveys nature inwardly should look to these. Farther still, the causes of natural things were also contemplated by other philosophers, as by Anaxagoras and Zeno; but the final, the paradigmatic, and the producing¹ cause, were peculiarly investigated by Plato. These causes therefore are manifested through the above numbers. The final, indeed, through the monad; for it presides over numbers in the order of *the good*. But the paradigmatic through the duad; for the difference of beings separates the primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause is signified through the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since it is the third from being through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelligible through intelligence. For as the monad is to the duad, so is being to life, father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence. But as the duad is to the triad, so is life, and also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine natures are in all, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship. The sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Gods. Hence Socrates who looks to divinity, very properly begins from communion and concord, and likewise calls the other persons of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

¹ For παρρησιος here, it is necessary to read ποιητικον.

feasting and banquet, are words adapted to the Gods, and especially to the mundane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet and delicate food, as Socrates says in the *Phædrus*: and the feasting on the nativity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore, Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutual participations of divine conceptions. And it is not at all wonderful that *Timæus* should feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and participations of powers are celebrated by theologians, divine natures filling and being filled by each other. For thus we hear from poets inspired by *Phœbus*, that the Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups the Gods each other pledge,
And while they drink their eyes are fix'd on *Troy*.*

They also know and intellectually perceive each other.

For Gods are to each other not unknown.†

But the intelligible according to the Chaldæan oracle is nutriment to that which is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting, subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating in this respect the Gods, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own proper intellectual conceptions.

“*TIM*. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.”

The philosopher *Porphyry* says, that what is apposite is delineated in these words: that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associations, viz. infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of this kind depends on circumstances and is involuntary. Another thing also is delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present

* *Iliad* iv. 2 seq.

† *Odyss.* v. 79.

words therefore, comprehend both these, indicating the manners of *Timæus*, and the necessity of one being absent; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. But the divine *Iamblichus* speaking loftily on these words, says that those who are exercised in the survey of intelligibles, are unadapted to the discussion of sensibles; as also *Socrates* himself says in the *Republic*, "that those who are nurtured in pure splendor, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavern through the obscurity which is there; just as it likewise happens to those who ascend from the cavern, through their inability to look directly to the light." Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as being adapted to another contemplation, that of intelligibles. It is also necessary that this his infirmity, should be a transcendency of power, according to which he surpasses the present theory. For as the power of the wicked, is rather impotency than power, thus also imbecillity with respect to things of a secondary nature, is transcendency of power. According to *Iamblichus* therefore, the person who is wanting, is absent in consequence of being incommensurate to physical discussions; but he would have been willingly present, if intelligibles were to have been considered. And nearly with respect to every thing [in this dialogue] prior to physiology, one of these, i. e. *Porphyry*, interprets every thing in a more political manner, referring what is said to the virtues, but the other, *Iamblichus*, in a more physical way. For it is necessary, that every thing should accord with the proposed scope: but the dialogue is physical, and not ethical. Such therefore, are the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. For I omit to mention those who labour to evince, that this fourth person was *Theætetus*, because he was known to those who came out of the *Eleatic* school, and because we are informed [elsewhere] that he was ill. Hence he is said to have been now absent on account of illness. For thus *Aristoteles* infers, that the absent person was *Theætetus*, who a little before the death of *Socrates*, became known to *Socrates*, and to the *Elean* stranger. But admitting that he had been long before known to the latter, what is there in common between *Timæus* and him? The *Platonic Ptolomy* however, thinks that the absent person was *Clitophon*: for in the dialogue which bears his name, he is not thought deserving of an answer by *Socrates*. But *Dercyllides* is of opinion that it was *Plato*: for he was absent through illness,

¹ See the beginning of the 7th book of the *Republic*.

² For *ελεγκτικόν* here, it appears to me to be necessary to read *ελεγκτικόν*.

when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit; since it is well observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, likewise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For to say that it was either Theætetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. But to say it was Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day, when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference in the Piræus; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were with Timæus. Hence Socrates asks Timæus where that fourth person was; and Timæus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was necessary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is said by the more ancient interpreters.

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says, therefore, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished. But the discussion in the *Timæus* becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and arcane. Hence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the Piræus, the hearers were many, and those who had names were six. But in the second conference, which is narrated by Socrates, those who receive the narration are four in number. And in the present conference, the fourth person is wanting; but the auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors contracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad.—But at one time, it is accompanied with contention; on which account also, the auditors have the indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which the odd is complicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative, yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the auditors are four in number; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness; but through the nature of the even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time¹ the discussion

¹ It is necessary to supply in this place, the words *οὐρανὸν δὲ*.

is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively, and narratively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number, and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of which are in a state of hostility to each other, and measure the hostility of these parts; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated from it; and others are entirely separated from it;—thus also of discussions, some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain respect media between both. Some, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tranquillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul; but others to doxastic energies; and others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects, are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such as are more venerable. Thus also with respect to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues.

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should be fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different measures of auditions? For of those who came to the homacoion [or common auditory of the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more superficial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity as the cause of the absence of this fourth person? For the imbecility of the soul with respect to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated conferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which benefits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But the falling off which not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Timæus says, that this fourth person was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not absent in such a way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in greater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a

polity. But it is among the number of things impossible, that one who is adapted to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was absent through indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power. And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others to him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbecility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend from the speculation of sensibles, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet he who becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a transcendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of physics. It likewise appears to me, that the words "*has befallen him*," sufficiently represent to us the difference between him and those that were present, with respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being *anonymus* also, seems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscribed by those that were present, but the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato, therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Phædo, he does not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He also mentions indefinitely,¹ the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the discussion of the subjects that were then considered; and likewise very many others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain² have been present at these discussions; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says something; but Hermocrates is silently present, differing only from him who is absent in a greater aptitude to hear, but being inferior to all the rest, through his inability to speak.

"Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timæus, and that of the company present, to fill up the part of this absent person."

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the numbers within, than those posterior to the decad: And in short, that which is

¹ For *ἄριστος* here, it is necessary to read *ἀοριστος*.

² Instead of *ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος ἀκροατῆς, οὐ μάτην αὖ παρεγένετο τοῖς λόγοις*, it appears to me to be necessary to read *ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος ἀκροατῆς οὐκ, μάτην κ. λ.*

nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more primordial is more powerful; since all power is antecedently comprehended in the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things. If, therefore, the principle of things was multitude, it would be requisite that what is more multitudinous, should be more primordial and powerful than what is less so. Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more excellent and more powerful than things which are more separated from their cause. Hence Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to be a symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to power all secondary natures, and fills up their deficiency. But since, as we have before observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the image of demiurgic Gods, it is worth while to observe, how he exempts Timæus from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole discussion. He conjoins, however, the other auditors to himself, as being inferior to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the first of the [demiurgic] triad is united to the primary monad, and extends the other parts of the triad to it. It also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things, therefore, are conformable to what has been before said. But according to Porphyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their wants, and cause them to be unindigent, by filling up their deficiency.* For these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. Iamblichus, however, having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligibles, says, that Socrates indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly-existing beings, yet a certain similitude is divulsed from these beings. And conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates in a certain respect of the science of intelligibles, and this the filling up the part of the absent person manifests.

17 B “TIM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment

* For το κρείων here, it is necessary to read το ελλείπων.

unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight."

The manners of Timæus are indicated by these words; for they are shown to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic. For the words "*Entirely so,*" indicate his promptitude respecting the absent person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily disposed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine sincerity. But the words, "*We shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished,*" sufficiently present to our view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of discussion, conveys an image of the communion and compensation of powers, through which all things are co-ordinated, and contribute to the one harmony of the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to these indications the words, "*return the hospitality to you, by whom we were yesterday entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received,*" are similar. That which is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and fills all things, and cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his prolific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect. Moreover, the expression, *return the hospitality*, is derived from the banqueting in divine fables, according to which the Gods pledge each other:

In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad IV. v. 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, *to feast*, but *to return the hospitality* (or *to feast in return*). For a reciprocation of feasting, comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But this also is seen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through transcendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retribution of

¹ For ἀφειστικός here, it is necessary to read ἀναφειστικός.

calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice, conveys an image of the Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with Jupiter. But the *becoming* [or in such a manner as guests *ought* to be received] is an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the term *guests*, is an image of the variety which is defined according to divine peculiarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and energies. As therefore Socrates feasted Timæus with the discourses of his own philosophy, thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providential attention of the Demiurgus to the whole of things. And these particulars are exhibited as an exercise to the theory of things, which presents itself to the view¹ after the manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue.

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the Timæus, are manifest; since the one is supposed to have taken place during the Bendidian festival in the Piræus, but the other on the following day of the festival. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Piræus on the 19th of April, is acknowledged by those who have written concerning festivals, so that the Timæus must be supposed to have taken place on the 20th of the same month. But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the Panathenæan festival, it is evident that this was the less Panathenæa. For the greater were celebrated on the 28th of June, according to the narration of those whom we have just mentioned.

“ Soc. Do you remember, therefore, the magnitude and quality of the things which I proposed to you to explain?”

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is said, of which, that concerning the multitude of those that form the conference, is the leader. The next to this pertains to the filling up the part of him who is absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication of the things proposed to be discussed. But these are in continuity with each other. And with reference to the order, it is requisite to understand the accuracy of the words. For the words “*Do you remember,*” exhibit distributed knowledge in the participations of discourse. For in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

¹ For *εμφαινομενα* in this place, I read *εμφαινομενη*.

things, is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemotrophe which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence. And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection; of both which the present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists in the universe, whole souls are established in intelligibles, and the demiurgic reasons, [or productive principles] possess an immutable and an immoveable nature; so that such¹ beings as are deprived of it, as is the case with partial souls, and the natures of things that are generated, fall off from their proper causes. But the terms "*such things*," and "*about which*," are indicative of the quantity and quality of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and also proceed from more partial Gods. And with respect to the words "*which I proposed to you to explain*," if they were addressed to Critias and Hermocrates, it is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabrication of the world; but if also to Timæus, they are not a symbol of transcendence [in Socrates], but of an evocation of the intellectual conceptions of Timæus. Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timæus.

"TIM. Some things indeed, I recollect; but such as I have forgotten, do you recall into my memory."

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to be this, as Porphyry says, that they are a medium between irony and arrogance. For Timæus does not say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing; but that he recollects some things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is the province of dialectic. The physical indication of the words is this, that physical productive principles always remain, and are always reflexive, just as the present remembrance [of Timæus] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theological indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] possesses indeed from itself, the immutable and undefiled in its generations; but through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself separate; these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

¹ For *οσα* here, it is necessary to read *οσα*.

through placing secondary powers over the subjects of its government. Farther still, *the recalling into the memory*, brings with it an image of the renovation of the productive principles in the universe. For that which is effluxive in them, is circularly recalled to the same, and the similar. And the order of generation remains never-failing, through the circular motion of the heavens. But this motion subsists always after the same manner through intellect which connectedly contains and adorns all its circulation, by intellectual powers. It is very properly, therefore, Socrates that recalls into the memory the discussions, who is the narrator of the polity, of which the celestial is the paradigm.

176
 “Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory.”

The polity [of Socrates] being triple, the first description of it was truly difficult on account of sophistical contests; the second was easier than that which preceded it; but the third was [perfectly] easy; containing in itself contractedly every species of a polity. The recapitulation however of it pertains to physical things, through the regeneration which is in them, and the circular return to the same form; from which also, forms permanently remain in the world, revolution recalling their efflux and their destruction. Through this cause likewise, the heavens are perpetually moved, and evolving many periods, return to the same life. What, however, is the reason that in the [first] narration of a polity, Socrates neither makes mention of the persons, nor the promises, but here adds both these? It is because in wholes, paradigms indeed comprehend all the productive principles of images, but the things which proceed from them, have not strength sufficient to comprehend all the power of their causes. As, therefore, in the second description of a polity, mention is made of the persons that were in the first conference in the Piræus, thus also in the third, he commemorates those that were passed over in silence in the first. For effects may be surveyed more perfectly in their more superior causes. You may also say theologically, that Timæus, as being established analogous to the total fabrication, comprehends all the persons, the promises, and the discussions themselves. But Socrates in the Republic, being arranged analogous to the summit¹ of the triple fabrication, fashions only

¹ For ἀπλοῦρη here, it is necessary to read ἀκροῦρη.

the form of a polity, this form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in one all-perfect animal, all things are comprehended, viz. things first, middle, and last, and all the evolution of wholes. But how, and through what cause is a polity narrated the third time? Is it because the life also ' of the soul is triple? The first indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational ' part by justice, and governs it in a becoming manner. But the second being that which is converted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes, and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may be added, that " to speak " *in a cursory manner,*" brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The words also "*run over the whole*" afford an admirable indication of an elevation to the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing so to speak, of a more eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be more established, and to possess that which is more firm and more eternal about the same things.

" Soc. Let it be so. And to begin : the sum of what was said by me yesterday is this, What kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and of what sort of men such a polity ought to consist." 170

Some, considering the resumption of a polity in a more ethical point of view, say that it indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the theory of wholes, ought to be adorned in their manners. But others think that it is placed before us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indication' of the whole of theology. *For it was usual with the Pythagoreans, prior to scientific doctrine, to render manifest the proposed objects of enquiry, through similitudes and images ; and after this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication respecting them.* For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narra-

¹ For *αι της ψυχης*, it is requisite to read *και της ψυχης*.

² For *τον λογον* here, we must read *τον αλογον*.

³ In the original *οι δε αξιοσυν ως εικονα της του παντος διακοσμησεως προκεισθαι της συμπασης θεολογιας*. But this, in the latter part, is evidently defective. After *προκεισθαι* therefore, it appears to me to be necessary to add the words, *οι δε ως ενδειξιν*, agreeably to the above translation.

tion of a polity, prior to physiology, iconically places us in the fabrication of the universe; but the history of the Atlantics accomplishes this symbolically. For it is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbols. So that the physiologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue; but differently in different places, according to the different modes of the doctrine which is delivered. And thus much concerning the scope of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political science subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in the Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also Timæus says, that the world is known and is friendly to itself through virtue. Farther still, the polity of Socrates being triple, and the first being referred to the total fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly delivered here contractedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, generating and adorning the universe. These things, therefore, are capable of being still farther discussed. Let us however return to the text, and the words of Socrates. But in these, there is much contention among the interpreters, who oppose each other about a certain punctuation, and with reference to this differently explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the word *polity*, define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as a witness that it is concerning a polity. Others again, making a stop at the words *what was said*, evince that the scope of it is about justice; and that Socrates has given a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a polity. If, however, it is requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it must be said that both concur with each other. For the discourse concerning justice, is a disquisition of the polity which is within the soul. For it rightly disposes the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise, about a polity, is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. Both, therefore, pertain to the same thing. And *the same thing is indeed justice in the soul, a polity in a city, and gracefulness in the world*. Nor is it fit to separate from each other, things which are conjoined by nature. And thus much for this particular.

* By an unaccountable mistake the original has Σωπατην instead of κοσμον in this place, which latter is evidently the true reading.

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from another principle, about what kind of polity Socrates speaks, in these words; whether about the first, or the middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politically, and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is here said pertains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said respects the first polity. For in this Socrates delivers disciplines to the guardians. We however say in answer to such-like assertions, that it is not proper to divulge the one polity; nor to separate the continuity of life from itself. For the polity is one, perfecting itself, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions. But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the auxiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about the whole polity. And it is not proper to contend about these things, but rather to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate to, and superior to physiology.* For so far as it has for its matter human concerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is arranged incorporeally, and immaterially, it is superior to, and more total than physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference to the intelligible world], because every body is partial. In short, the polity *pre-exists* indeed in the intelligible, but *exists* in the heavens, and subsists in the last place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very properly discussed prior to the *Timæus*; but if it is inferior to it, because it is an ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we are very properly required to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature. And both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we have said, the form of the polity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter, hence also Socrates employs the words *what kind* for the sake of the form, but the words *of what sort of men* on account of the matter.

“TIM. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very conformable to intellect.”

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor

* Here also the original has erroneously *θεολογιας* instead of *φυσιολογιας*.

the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirable perfection and intellectual nature of the discussion [contained in it]. And prior to this, it obscurely signifies the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one united fabrication. The word *very* too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one paternal cause of all things.

“ Soc. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandmen and other artificers from the belligerent genus?”

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in a summary way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration of the mundane fabrication. For it is possible from these as images to recur to wholes. This very thing also was in a remarkable degree adopted by the Pythagoreans, who investigated the similitudes of beings from analogies, and betook themselves from images to paradigms; which likewise is now in a prefatory manner effected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives those things which take place in the universe. For the politics of worthy men are assimilated to the celestial order. It is necessary, therefore, that we also should refer the images which are now mentioned [to their paradigms], and in the first place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera, imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal natures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their own essence, and migrate into an incorporeal hypostasis. According to which, also, mortal natures remain mortal; immortal natures eternally continue to be never-falling; and the different orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-subsisting in wholes. For if you are willing to arrange the whole city analogous to the whole world; since it must not be said that man is a microcosm, and a city not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, you will find that the analogy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according to a division of it into three parts, you may assume in the city, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian: but in the soul, the epithymetic part, which procures the necessities of the body; the irascible part, whose office is to expel whatever is injurious to the animal, and is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part, which is essentially philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every multi-

tude of souls, however, there are, that which performs the part of a mercenary about generation, that which is ministrant to the mundane providence of the Gods, and that which is elevated to the intelligible. But in all mundane natures, there are, in short, the tribe of mortals, the tribe of daemons,¹ and the order of the celestial Gods; for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of things. And again, daemons precede as in a solemn procession the fabrication of the celestial Gods, and suppress all the confusion and disorder in the world. There is likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which generates and comprehends them conformably to a divine intellect.

Farther still, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city is analogous to the Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause of generation. But the inspective guardian of the common marriages, is analogous to Venus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male with the female, and of form with matter. That which providentially attends to elegant allotments, is analogous to Hermes, on account of the lots of which the God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain. But that which is disciplinative and judicial in the city, is analogous to the Sun, with whom, according to theologians, the mundane Dice, *the elevator and the seven-fold* reside. And that which is belligerent, is analogous to the order proceeding from Mars,² which governs all the contrarieties of the world, and the diversity of the universe. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and ascends as far as to the first cause. These things, therefore, may thus be assumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city into two parts, and to have established as one genus, that which is agricultural and that which pertains to the arts, which is called demiurgic; but that which is belligerent, as another; not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as Longinus says, but because through the word *belligerent*, he comprehends the auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the former war with their hands, but the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed fights, as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian of the Greeks; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels; but the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

¹ For το δαιμον φυλον in this place, it is necessary to read το δαιμονων φυλον.

² For γεωργικη, which occurs here by a strange mistake, it is obviously necessary to read αρμηη.

peculiarly makes mention of the military tribe, because he wishes to narrate the warlike actions of a polity of this kind.

170
 “ Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that which is accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each of the arts,¹ we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only.”

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is “ And when we had prescribed one employment conformable to nature to each of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work,” or, “ When we had prescribed to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, which is adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature.” In the next place, it must be enquired through what cause Socrates makes such a division, or on what account he says, “ *that each employment is rightly pursued by him who is naturally adapted to it, and who in a becoming manner engages in it.*” For neither is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude any thing perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into energy. The end, therefore, is from both. If, however, this be the case, it is not possible for him who engages in many works, to be similarly adapted to all of them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardor being divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the citizens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right, one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom it is distributed is adapted, and he should be ordered to extend all his care and attention to one thing. For he who is properly adapted to this particular life, and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, it is likely, perform in the best way his proper work. In human politics, therefore, it is easy to survey a division of this kind; for our nature is partible. But how is this true with respect to the Gods? For a divine nature is all-powerful and all-perfect. Or may we not say that with the Gods all things are in all of them, but that each is all things according to the peculiarity of himself, and possesses the cause of all things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner? For peculiarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences, through divine souls, and through the bodies of these souls. Hence of these,

¹ The words *εκαστη τεχνη* are omitted in the text of Proclus.

some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific, others of connective, and others of a dividing power. And after this manner they energize about generation. In divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities according to the infinity which is there, and the divine duad. But in intellects, difference is pre-existent, which separates wholes and parts, and distributes intellectual powers, imparting a different peculiar order to a different intellect, through which the purity of intellects is not confounded. In souls progression and division pre-subsist, according to a different life in different souls, some of them being allotted a divine, others an angelic, others a damoniacal, and others a different hyperaxis. But in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing different powers in different bodies. For in these, there are ultimate representations of intelligibles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another of that. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, but another sympathizes with something else. As, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act upon; thus also in the city, the employments of the citizens are divided, and each is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore, the works are of the military tribe, Timæus clearly shows in what follows:

“I mean that they ought to be only guardians of the city, so as to protect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceness towards their enemies in battle.”

In these words Plato is willing that the guardians and auxiliaries should be judges of those that act ill within the city, but contenders against those that are out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have before observed. To be *only guardians*, however, is not a diminution of power. For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds; since neither is that which is *only* the most excellent, diminished by being so. But on the contrary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution; so that by asserting *not only* of a thing which was such from the beginning, you diminish its excellence. And thus much for such-like particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how we may survey what is now

said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe? And how can it be said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not reply, that evil has a two-fold subsistence in the world, viz. in souls and in bodies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and disorder from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, but should be antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may be said to be *internal*, and to belong to the extent of the intelligible universe; but others, being material and remote from the Gods, are in a certain respect aliens, strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplishers of justice, use the former mildly, as being naturally friends; but are severe to those that are borne along in bodies in a confused and disorderly manner, as being incommensurate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and amputating the inexhaustible avidity of matter. For some things, indeed, cannot sustain ornament of this kind, but immediately vanish into non-entity. But others which are moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible¹ strength of the order of guardian powers. Hence he now says, that they are *severe* to those who are hostile to the city. For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. In short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and also inspective guardians of judgment and justice. And it is evident, that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to auxiliaries. About bodies, too, some are connective, but others dissolving powers: and it is manifest that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are belligerent. For these powers expand into the universe, things which are no longer able to remain in their proper series, in order that all things may have an arrangement, and that nothing may be indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the Demiurgus himself of wholes, and to the immutable and invariable nature of the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have in the father [of the universe] the pre-existent cause of these two-fold genera. For through the demiurgic *being* which he contains, he adorns all things; but through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter. For Justice follows him, being

¹ For ἀταγώσιστον here, it is necessary to read ἀναταγώσιστον.

the avenger of the divine law. At the same time too, you may perceive the ordered order with which he arranges the universe, as those assert who have written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall hereafter discuss.

The words, however, *external* and *internal*, may be understood as follows: The confused and disordered flux of bodies, at one time arises from the impotence of the reasons, [or productive principles participated by bodies,] and at another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are familiar and allied to producing causes; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself, and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence, the invincible strength of the Gods, and the immutable guard of fabrication, all-variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and remedies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indefiniteness it flies from ornament, it is vanquished by forms through the demiurgic guard, against which nothing is able to prevail. But it is necessary that all things in the world should be obedient to it, in order that they may perpetually remain, and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

“Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philosophic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be mild to their friends, and severe to their enemies.”

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, viz. the auxiliary, and that which is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the epithymetic accords with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For because Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city; just as if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say that in the former there are dæmoniacal and divine orders, and should call both of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is guarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by dæmons. By the former indeed totally, unically, and exemptly; but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and in a manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about every God a multitude of dæmons is arranged, which divides his one and total

providence. The term philosophic, therefore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they are united to the intelligible, and so far as they are filled with being. But the irascible pertains to demons, so far as they exterminate all confusion from the universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred institutions of Adrastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by nature, but severe to those that are external [i. e. to those that are strangers to them] as abolishing the indefiniteness of their nature, in an exempt manner, and according to supreme transcendency.

“ Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all other becoming disciplines?”

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types, extending to all things, according to the demiurgic allotment, and divine difference, defining employments adapted to every one, and distributing powers appropriately to the recipients. But in the present words, the life of the citizens is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end. What then is education, and how is it assimilated to the universe? For in the [Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the strength of anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it as it were elegant and commensurate with anger, in consequence of its being vehemently remiss, and through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privation of life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which have something of an attractive nature, are capable of exciting in us the recollection of true being, and elevate our intellectual part to that which is itself the most splendid of being. All which is evident to those who are not entirely forgetful of the arrangements in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, gymnastic and music are in the universe, and what the disciplines are of the guardians of the universe. Perhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions and providential

energies. But with respect to music and gymnastic, that the former causes the lives in the universe to be harmonious, and the latter renders divine motion rythmical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immutable habit of the divine vehicles. For through these things Plato elsewhere calls divine souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant; for gymnastic is indeed in them. But medicine is in things sublunary in consequence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these things, we shall, as I have before observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers proceed supernally from intelligibles to all heaven, and impart to the celestial lives by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecaying strength. But the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and surveying number characterized by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you may say, that the most true arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are in them. For they behold swiftness itself, and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual circulation, divine number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually perceive the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of all the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say, that through such like disciplines they energize about first natures; but through gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undefiled purity; and through music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes.

“Soc. We likewise established, that those who were so educated, should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property.”

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equitable laws, have an evident cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic. But how can we transfer them to the heavens? Must it not be by surveying through what cause men pursue the acquisition of gold and silver, and from what conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love? It is evident that it is because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as may administer to their pleasures. *For on this account, they are stupidly astonished*

about much-beloved wealth. They say, therefore, conformably to Cephalus, that the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the perfection of the celestial Gods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent self-sufficiency, nor does it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar utility; but being established remote from all indigence and material necessity, and replete with good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe. Moreover, it does not admit partible and divided good. But it pursues that which is common and impartible, and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized according to this. Hence it harmonizes with what is now said, "*that those who are so educated should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property.*"

If you are willing also, it may be said, that *gold and silver, and each of the metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Gods, and from an effluxion thence derived.* It is said therefore that gold pertains to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, and iron to Mars. Hence these are generated from thence. But they subsist in the earth, and not in the celestial Gods who emit the effluxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures. And all things there, are indeed from all, but at the same time a different peculiarity has dominion in a different divinity,—here, in a Saturnian, but there, in a solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a different power. These things, therefore, are not the private, but the common property of the Gods; for they are the progeny of all of them. Nor do they subsist in them. For as they produced them, they are not in want of them; *but the metals which are here, derive their concretion from the effluxions of the celestial Gods.* Why, therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men in a partible manner? It is because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, apostatizing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of *mine* and *not mine.* But they abandon the union and communion of life.

“ But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for temperate men. That besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-

mon, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting other pursuits should pay attention to virtue alone."

It is not at all wonderful that in human lives there should be donation and retribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Republic, that the mark at which he aims is to render the whole city happy, but not one particular genus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this be right, it will be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by their providential care and prudence, but that others by ministrant aid and servitude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessaries of life; just as the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the organ, prepares milk for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there be, or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods? For may we not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not possessing self-sufficiency, but that every God is sufficient to himself, and in conjunction with the self-sufficient is superfull?¹ Hence through the union of superplentitude with self-sufficiency, he fills all secondary natures with good, but receives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives nothing, as being sufficient and unindigent, yet at the same time he requires certain remunerations from us, retributions of beneficence, the acknowledgment of thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are filled with greater good. For being good,² he is desirous that all things should look to him, and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspended from a divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner, referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgment of thanks, how can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend a remuneration of this kind? It is better, therefore, to understand remuneration in a more physical way. For since effluxions proceed from the heavens to the mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of the Gods about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls such-like mutations and transitions of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from sublunary matter,³ which are perfected by the heavens, in order that generation

¹ It is necessary after *την αυταρκειαν* here to supply the word *υπερπληρης*.

² For *αγαθων γαρ ουκ*, it is obviously requisite to read *αγαθων, κ. λ.*

³ Instead of *απο της ολης* in this place, I read *απο της ολης της υποσεληνης*.

may never fail. But it must be said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one conspiracy of divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance of the celestial divinities; to which also Timæus looking says, "*that the whole world is friendly and known to itself through virtue, and that its corruption is the source of its nutriment, in consequence of effecting all things in, and suffering all things from itself.*"

What then is the end of this one and common life of the citizens! Socrates says virtue, viz. divine virtue. For virtue subsists first with the Gods; afterwards from them, in the genera superior to man; and a certain portion of it descends also to us. The guardians of the world, therefore, living conformably to this, are also unoccupied by other pursuits. For they do not look to convenience, nor to externals; for all things are within themselves. They likewise are the saviours of all things, and fill them with what is beautiful and good, being ministrant to, and co-operating with the one father and Demiurgus of wholes. Since, however, they give measure to the mutations of the earth, not in so doing departing from, but being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account Socrates says, "*a recompense such as is sufficient for temperate men.*" For being temperate and prudent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary natures, comprehending their all-various mutations in the simplicity of their own life. Thus therefore what is said may be explained in this way. But in another way we may say, that piety and a conversion to the Gods, especially contain a measure, and are occupied by *the good*. This measure, however, is defined by the Gods themselves according to divine prudence, since the Gods are able both to save themselves and others.

180
 "Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be similar to those of men; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life."

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common, since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the female another. For things which have a different perfection according to form, are also different in species. But things which are the same in species, have like-

wise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who assert that there is a difference according to form between men and women, though Plato has shown that it is both possible and advantageous for women to have the same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history confirms. For there have been found well-educated women, who have been far superior to men. But it is advantageous, because it is better to have double than half the number of those who exhibit virtue in their works. As therefore we form the male guardians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus also we form the female guardians from the same: and in a similar manner, the female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of Plato, we must betake ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where we may survey a wonderful conspiracy of the male and female nature. For in the Gods, indeed, these are so commascent with each other, that the same divinity is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and certain other Gods. Where also they are distinguished from each other, the works of the male and female that are of the same order, are common, so as that they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female. Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imbecile in all things than the male. Whatever, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female also can produce in a diminished degree. Hence Juno proceeds together with Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. Hence, too, she is said to be equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Rhea with Saturn. For this Goddess is the bosom of all the Saturnian power. Earth also is equal in dignity with Heaven. For Earth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven is the father. And prior to these elements, if we direct our attention to bound and infinity, which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever, which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have therefore, in the intelligible, in the intellectual, and in the supermundane Gods, the harmonious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same in the heavens. For the whole of generation is governed by the Sun and Moon; in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter. Hence also, the Moon is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. *And among the male divinities in the Sun, there are likewise lunar Gods, and analogous orders.* But if you direct your attention to daemons, you will every where see the providence of these two-fold genera conjoined. For divine female daemons, unitedly effect all

things in a secondary degree, which are accomplished by divine male dæmons primarily. Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal dæmons, have to the males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they generate all things with diminution, which the males produce paternally and unitedly. If therefore we before rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods, but the auxiliaries to dæmons their attendants, and who are ministrant to their providential energies, Plato very properly embraces in these genera, a similar conjunction of the male with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and common employments; just as Nature binds these genera to, and causes them to procreate the same things in conjunction with each other. But she does not divide the one from the other, since whatever is generated from both is unprolific, when either of them is separated; though there is a greater difference in the physical organs than in the lives of these; yet at the same time in these also, Nature makes the work of them to be common. Much more, therefore, does the communion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, deserve to be honoured.

“ Soc. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you easily remember this on account of its novelty.’ For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly careful that none might be able to distinguish their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. That hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

“ TIM. These things indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.”

If some one should inquire why that which is unusual is easily remembered, it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy in a greater degree as being unexpected; and inserts in us a clearer impression of itself. Moreover, it is easy conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children being common, applies to women. For he wished, according to the intention of

¹ In the text of Proclus, ἀληθειαν is erroneously printed for ἀληθειαν.

the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times, accompanied with sacrifices and prayers; and that the woman that had connexion with a man, should not be the property of any one man, but should be separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should be copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But these things are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how they pertain to the order of the universe. For these things by a much greater priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things¹ are the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a different peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to all, in conjunction with an unmingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates directing his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know their own progeny as peculiarly their own, takes place with the Gods. On which account, indeed, their intellectual perceptions, and also their productions are common. Each of them, however, benefits and preserves that which is generated, as being the common offspring of all of them. Moreover, to consider all those as brothers and sisters that are of an equal age, those that are elder as fathers and grandfathers, and the younger as children and grandsons, originates from the Gods, and is transferred from thence to this polity. For similitude of essence, derived from the same cause, is that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause, is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efflux of essence proceeding into a second and third series, exhibits the form of offspring. For that the same Goddess is conjoined with different Gods, or the same God with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are called Sacred Marriages in the mysteries, which Plato as much as possible imitating in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages *sacred*. In physical productive powers also, we may see that there is one and the same recipient of different powers; and one productive power presenting itself to the view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles. But forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is this very thing beheld in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives! I say it is because these lives are cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible.

¹ For τὰ πάντα here, it is necessary to read πάντα.

Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to be admitted. If, therefore, some one should take away the condition of his present subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediately admit this communion, and despise the sympathy which is divided by the multitude. So far, however, as each of us is extended, and minutely distributed about a part, and thus relinquishes the whole and one, so far also he leaps to a life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and an indivisible division.

187 " Soc. But that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it does not prove prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction."

Plato particularly assumes in his Republic similitude, sameness, and geometrical, in conjunction with arithmetical equality, in order that the similitude of it to the heavens, as in sensibles, or to the intelligible, as in super-celestial lives, may be perfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves the union of the best woman with the best man, and of the less excellent woman with the less excellent man. For in the Gods likewise, primary natures are more consascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second rank; and together with union there is unmingled purity. Hence in the second genera after the Gods, a distribution of this kind conformably to the intention of the Gods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine female daemons are co-arranged with divine male daemons, psychical female with psychical male, and material female with material male daemons. And every where, the analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. To which we may add that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take place latently, sufficiently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera subsists unapparently with the Gods; being thence primarily derived, but secondarily from daemons,¹ and from the order of each, which *the lot* indicates; possess-

¹ It is necessary here to insert the words, ἀπο τῶν δαιμονίων.

ing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each is co-arranged with the similar, the divine with the divine, the material with the material, and that which has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this account, likewise, all sedition and dissension is removed from divine natures, each loving that which is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and devised; of all which, the citizens being conjoined in marriage by lot, and not looking to elegance and ornament in the connexion, is an image. For in natural things, also, receptacles are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of its own co-ordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is effected according to causes¹ which preside over the whole fabrication of things, and which are analogons to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said, for the sake of the theory of wholes.

Longinus, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are emitted together with the seed: for in order that they may become most excellent, he conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt, but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in the first place it should be observed, that Plato himself adds, "In order that they might acquire a *natural* disposition as far as possible the best." *For children receive a physical similitude from their parents, and participate of a certain dignity and excellence from their begetters, according to the physical virtues.* In the next place, it must be observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed, yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

εσθλα μὲν εσθλὸς εἴδνε, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶν ἕσκειν,²

says Homer. Farther still, *as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain symbols about statues, renders them more adapted to the participation of superior powers, thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of souls, disseminates a different aptitude in different bodies for the reception of different*

¹ For τα αἰτίαια here, it is requisite to read τα αἰτία.

² Iliad, xiv. vs. 382. i. e. "He gave the good [i. e. the brave] man, good things, but the less excellent character, things of a less excellent nature. In the text of Proclus it is erroneously εσθλα μὲν εσθλα εἴδνε, κ. λ.

souls, the better and the worse; which the politician likewise rightly understanding, pays attention to the emission of seed in the city, and to all physical aptitude, in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excellent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribution to the citizens? Shall we say it is, because it is advantageous to us to know the cause of things which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence of such as we apprehend to be evil, to be causeless, than to accuse the cause which distributes these [seeming evils] for a good purpose? For this excites to a contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which becomes to him productive of evil.

19A “Soc. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city.”

These things also are established in the Republic, but by a much greater priority take place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of Gods and Damons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation, which on this account are called undefiled; but others descend into generation, not being able to remain in the heavens without a downward inclination. And some of these are the offspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. For the term *bad* is indicative of *less excellent*. The horses, therefore, and charioteers of the Gods, are all of them good; but those of partial souls are of a mixed nature.⁴ Hence in these, there is preponderation, a verging downward, and a defluxion of wings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and damons who preside over the descent of souls. The celestial and undefiled genera of souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious food, as it is said in the Phædrus. And those that are subservient to generation, communicate with it, being latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates says, indicating by the word *latent* the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject [latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside over generation.

⁴ This is asserted in the Phædrus. See this explained, in the notes at the end of this Translation.

“ Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile ; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished.”

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were distributed from the upper into the lower city, but also from those of the golden race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who are recalled from exile. Do these things, therefore, accord with each other ? Perhaps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there determined, if we understand the word *adult*, as not only pertaining to those sent from the upper city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lower city. For, in short, the natural disposition is to be considered of those adults who were born in the lower city, or of those who were sent from the upper into the lower city, and thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. But if some one is willing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it must be said, that what Socrates now delivers is conformable to the things proposed to be considered. For descending [rational] souls again ascend, but not such souls as had their hypostasis from the beginning in generation, and about matter, such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words themselves. See, however, how the same things take place in wholes, as those which Socrates ordains in his polity. For some things always have the same order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable ; but others are always conversant with generation ; and others are in a certain respect the media between both ; at one time, indeed, being suspended from divine natures themselves, but at another being mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore, the daemoniacal genus which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of multiform lives, nor are demons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at one time conversant with generation, and at another are transferred into a divine daemoniacal allotment ; which things being known by Socrates in the Republic, he legislatively ordains that which is analogous to them. For the celestial Jupiter presides over the Gods in the heavens, over demons that elevate partial souls [to their paternal port], and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order that the ascents and descents of souls may be never failing in the universe. “ For though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

the father sends another to be annumerated," according to the divinely-inspired indication¹ about these things.

"Soc. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend Timæus, which has been omitted?"

The resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the universe is filled with the most excellent productive powers. For generated natures in it are separated from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes according to its own peculiarity. And primary, indeed, are exempt from secondary natures, yet employ their energies, as necessary to the completion of the universe. But secondary are adorned by primary natures. The most excellent, however, of mundane beings, are connascently conjoined with the most excellent, middle with middle, and last with such as are last. But the same productive powers pervade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate of many productive powers. Lives, also, at different times have different allotments, according to their desert. All these particulars, therefore, sufficiently place before our view the order of the universe. For in definite heads, Socrates has, in a becoming manner, epitomized every form of the polity, recurring to intellectual impartibility, in order that he might imitate the God who adorns the celestial polity intelligibly and paternally. But since every where measures and perfection are definitely imparted to secondary natures from [primary] causes, on this account also Socrates requests Timæus to inform him, whether he has comprehended [in his epitome] every form of the polity. For every intellect being firmly fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking to it. To which we may add, that to speak summarily is a symbol of the first parts, and the head of the universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which the Demiurgus of the universe adorns in a more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the one life of the world. And thus much respecting the analogy of partial natures to wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty, whether the words mean, "*Have we now epitomized the polity which we discussed yesterday?*" or "*Have we again epitomized to-day, the polity which we epitomized yesterday?*" For

¹ i. e. According to the Chaldean Oracles.

whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, but now summarily, or he spoke summarily in both, the divine Iamblichus approves of either of the readings, and we do not at all differ from him. Perhaps, however, the latter construction is more consonant. For again to discuss the polity summarily, manifests that it was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful, that the summary discussion which took place in the Republic, should not be brought to light. For many other things which are asserted here, as being said on the former day, are not to be found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said that the word *again*, does not refer to the *epitomizing*, but to *resuming* the *discussion*. For he *resumes*, who narrates at great length what had been before said; but he *again resumes*, who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difficulty.

“ Soc. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which we have discussed.”

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been said, he desires should take place, after the narration of the polity. Secondly, that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of the poets sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this kind to the sophists. Fifthly, that the auditors alone can accomplish that which is earnestly desired by Socrates, in a becoming manner. What, therefore, is this? For it is necessary, in the first place, to speak concerning that which Socrates desires to see after this polity, viz. to see, as he says, a city of this kind in motion, engaging in contests and labors, and warlike actions, in order that after the peaceful life which he had delivered, he might have to narrate the energies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore, is what he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyry therefore dissolves the doubt by saying, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies that are prior to habits, but also those that proceed from them. For the perfection in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will be in a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending with others. And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does not admit that the habit of virtue by itself, but when energizing, is sufficient to felicity. It may, however, be said, in answer to Porphyry, that if the end was military, it would be requisite to assert that war gives perfection to the polity. But if the end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by introducing Peripatetic explanations? Or though the end is not military, yet war exhibits the magnitude of virtue in a greater degree than peace, just as mighty waves and a tempest, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilot's art. And in short, this is effected by circumstances, as the Stoics also are accustomed to say, "Give circumstances, and take the man." For that which is not subdued by things which enslave others, manifests a life in every respect worthy. Perhaps, however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a political reason, and not to look to the whole scope of Plato, according to which the God who adorns the polity in the heavens, is willing also that generation should be governed by the celestial Gods, and that the war of forms in matter should always subsist; in order that the circle of generation may adumbrate the celestial circulation. And this it is to see the city excited to war, to see generation co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from thence. It appears likewise, that this is analogous to what is shortly after said by the Demiurgus of the universe, "*That when the generating Father understood that this generated resemblance [the world] of the eternal Gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his work.*" In a similar manner, therefore, Socrates wished to see his city moving and energizing; just as the God who comprehends the celestial polity wished to behold the natures which it contains energizing, and adorning the contrariety produced by generation. Such an analogy, therefore, as this, takes place in the present instance.

If, however, we arranged before, the lower city as analogous to generation, but now as analogous to war, you must not wonder. For the same things may be safely arranged among different things according to different analogies. For generation also, according to the lives in it which are inseparable from matter, resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult, it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions. That we may, however, co-adapt every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, prior to the consideration of every particular, let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, and see how it accords with this theory. For since Socrates is analogous to the first

of the three fathers who adorn the first of things, he says he is not sufficient to fashion what follows. For the divinity who gives subsistence to all things, is different from him who constitutes things of a middle nature; and this God again is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. Nor, in the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things in which they have been nourished; but the latter, because they are wanderers, and not at one and the same time, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore, let us see how these things are conformable to what has been before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over generation should not be separable¹ from material natures, but conversant with them. For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators. For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Nor is it fit that these powers should be inseparable,² and very mutable, at different times ascending or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who are assimilated to sophists; because they also possess all-beautiful productive powers, but at different times wander to different parts of the world. Hence it is necessary that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the heavens, should at one and the same time be philosophical and political; in order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from the subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through the political peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according to intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from matter; but the form of partial souls being sophistical, is abundantly wandering. It is necessary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable prior to mutable allotments. In the fifth place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us who those are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred from words to deeds; because the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly; the second of which fathers gives subsistence to middle, but the third to last natures. And to these Timæus, Critias, and

¹ For ἀχωριστους here, it is necessary to read χωριστους, and to supply ἀλλα, so as instead of οἷτε ἀχωριστους αὐτῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς στρεβόμενας, to read οἷτε χωριστους αὐτῶν εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ. λ.

² Hence for χωριστας in this place, it is necessary to read ἀχωριστας.

Hermocrates, are analogous. But of these, the first is praised in an admirable manner, Socrates also adding, "*in my opinion*;" but the second, in a middle way, conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, i. e. according to the testimony of others.

"For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture or really alive, but in a state of rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which pertain to bodies."

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous, and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, be said, that Plato made choice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary. For the atoms of Epicurus would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual composition. But some blame Plato for employing metaphors in the use of words; though with respect to composition, all admire him. At the same time, however, it may be inferred, not from this circumstance alone, but from such care and industry as are exhibited in the present words, that he paid great attention to diction. For Socrates does not simply say, that he desires to see this accomplished by those that were with Timæus; but he speaks like one decorating his words and alluring the hearer, when he says: "*For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose that some one on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture, or really alive*," &c. And thus much for Longinus.

Origen, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attentive to the grace of diction, not as regarding that which is pleasing, as the end of it, but that he employs this image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himself affected.

¹ The text of Proclus has, erroneously, *και ται των τοις σωμασι εδουκιστων ασηκειν κατα την αγωνιαν αθλευστων*, instead of *και τι των τοις σωμασι εδουκιστων προσηκειν κατα την αγωνιαν αθλευστων*.

And we say, that this similitude was written for the sake of the imitation of divine natures; that the grace of the words presents to us an image of the grace imparted by the Demiurgus to celestial natures; and that the artifice of the diction, which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from being and essence. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, *beautiful animals* manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beauty; but *those represented in a picture, or really alive*, indicate corporal images, and true lives prior to these imitations. For the figures of the Gods are resemblances of the animals that are in them. But those that are in a *state of rest* exhibit to us the natures that are full of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued life; those that are *in motion* such as proceed into another order, and a second fabrication; and *those which engage in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies*, are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper effluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And thus much respecting the image. But the words *whether represented in a picture or really alive*, are rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are depicted by the dodecahedron, and they possess efficacious and demiurgic lives. If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before-mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens, but exists, *if not in human, yet in true or daemoniacal lives*. Farther still, *to desire to see the city in motion*, is analogous to the words [in another part of this dialogue] "*as soon as the father saw the universe moving, he was delighted, and rejoiced to assimilate it in a still greater degree to its paradigm.*" For thus also the adorer of the heavens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the war of generation. But the words "*engaging in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies,*" are employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to bodies; and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

"In such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its education and discipline, both with respect to practical achievements, and verbal negotiations."

We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what paradigm, Socrates wished to see his republic contending in war. Because cities, however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in embassies, in compacts, in exhortations to battle, and in every thing of this kind; but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons; on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should be celebrated according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautious, magnanimous, and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, vehement, and well exercised. For thus, according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation.

“For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert.”

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of writing is robust, superb, and magnificent; but the Socratic character of diction is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the former. Hence [say they] Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however, who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Menexenus, appear to me not to have perceived the magnificence of the diction of Socrates in the Phædrus. There are also those who say it is fit that the artificer of such-like encomiums, should be skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics. But Socrates having fought at Delos and Potidea, was not unskilled in all such-like particulars. Others again assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, just as he said with respect to other things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he says, that he did not know how to praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth [i. e. of the true or intelligible polity]. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the

descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abundance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is effected through power which is transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication is assimilated to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order. For Timæus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

“ Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic genus; but it is perfectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things in which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words.”

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, doubt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambitious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions. For who speaks more magnificently than Homer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable

of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But I should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely-inspired, and the artificial. And having made this division, he refers the magnificent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated in it. For if there is any artificial sublimity in some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a panegyrist, who exhibits in his praise a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which is free from compulsion and pure; just as actions [in his Republic] have magnificence, not casually, but adapted to the education and discipline of the men. That Socrates, however, does not reject the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artificial, he manifests, I think, when he says, "*that he does not despise the poetic genius.*" The poetic genius, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet this simply; but that which is nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being in a certain respect difficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, "*that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words.*" For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act sophistically, by exhibiting virtue as far as words, but in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Will it not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, viz.: To suppose *the most excellent education* is implied in the words, *that which is foreign to the education of any one*; but to assume, *in deeds and in words*, as equivalent to, *conformably to deeds, and conformably to words*; and *to imitate well*, as having the same meaning with *to be well imitated*? And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, it is difficult indeed according to deeds, but it is still more difficult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, if he intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar to the speaker. For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions. For thus we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimilitude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. Since, also, to say of Achilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not difficult; but to narrate copiously what he said, when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much blaming Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to *imitate* the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can *delineate* their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions. So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live performing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imitate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says it is. But Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.

“ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and words.”

With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are *skilled* in them. For *skill* manifests an irrational occupation in mere words, unaccompanied with the knowledge of *the why*. Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called *wanderers*. But as they led a disorderly and inordinate life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have a *settled abode*; since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particulars, as are in a family and a city, are likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be fitly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? They are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens; but through the philosophic, their words, in consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they comprehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should be total and intellectual, in order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may possess ironically such things as the heavens primarily contain.

“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

Longinus, not disdaining to survey these words, and those that precede them, says, that in that part of them beginning with, "*But with respect to the tribe of sophists, I am afraid, as they are wanderers,*" &c. there is a difference of expression through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that follow, "*Lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns,*" &c. there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part, "*The genus therefore of your habit remains,*" &c. is perfectly unusual. For it is not at all dissimilar to the strength of Hercules, to *ιεση ις Τελεμαχου, the sacred strength of Telemachus,* and other such like expressions. But Origen admits, that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind, as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his mode of diction, so as to be adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, studies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression *you, like the strength of Hercules*; from which there would only be an ability of giving that which is adapted to the imitation of the best polity. For those who are both philosophers and politicians, by energizing according to the habit which they possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words themselves.

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that Socrates excites Critias and Hermocrates to what remains to be accomplished in the polity. But he likewise calls on Timæus to assist the undertaking. And this is the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the wisdom which they possess] a *habit*, in order that he may exempt them from sophistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science, both by nature and education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And *he designates the perfect from nature and education; lest depriving nature of education, you should cause it to be lame; or you should think that education ought to be thrown into an*

¹ Odys. II. 409.

² For *χολην* here, it is necessary to read *χολην*.

inapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has been said in common respecting the men. But if you wish to speak, proceeding to paradigms, the demiurgic genus, which is total and intellectual, *remains* to be arranged according to a providential attention to wholes. Let us, however, survey separately every particular.

“ For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours, and the highest posts of government; and, in my opinion, has arrived at the summit of all philosophy.”

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that Timæus was a political character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge [in a most eminent degree], by saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all philosophy; and adding, *in my opinion*, which places a colophon on all the panegyrics? What other image also than this among men, is more capable of being assimilated to the one Demiurgus? For, in the first place, by *the political* and *the philosophic*, the image is Jovian. In the next place, by asserting that Timæus belonged to a city governed by the best of laws, it imitates the god who was nurtured in the intelligible byAdrastia. And by Timæus excelling in nobility of birth, it adumbrates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the Demiurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting also that Timæus had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us the royal power of the Demiurgus, and which has dominion over wholes; his sceptre, according to theologians, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power. It is the Demiurgus, therefore, who also distributes honours to others. And it may be said, that the assertion that Timæus had arrived at the summit of philosophy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from images, who the Demiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual Gods; that he is full of

the first intelligibles; and that he has a royal establishment, as surpassing in dignity the other demiurgic gods. If, however, Plato calls the city of Timæus Locris, it not being usual with the Greeks thus to denominate it, but to call it Locri only, in order to distinguish it from the Locris opposite to Eubœa, we must not wonder. For Plato changes many things for the purpose of signifying in a clearer manner the thing proposed. But that the Locrians were governed by the best laws is evident; for their legislator was Zaleucus.

“ Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking.”

Critias, indeed, was of a generous and grand nature. He likewise engaged in philosophic conferences, and was called, as history informs us, an ideot among philosophers, but a philosopher among ideots. He tyrannized also, being one of the thirty. It is not, however, just to accuse Socrates on this account, because he now thinks him deserving of a certain praise. For, in the first place, we should attend to the manner in which he praises him. For he says, that “ *he is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking,*” both on account of his natural disposition, and his association with philosophers. In the next place, we should observe, that the tyrannical character is an argument of an excellent nature, as we learn from the fable in the [10th book of the] Republic, which particularly leads souls descending from the heavens to a tyrannical life. For being accustomed there to revolve with the Gods, and to govern the universe in conjunction with them, in these terrestrial regions also, they pursue apparent power; just as those who possess the remembrance of intelligible beauty, embrace visible beauty. That Critias, however, pertains, according to analogy, to the middle fabrication of things, may be learnt, in the first place, from his succeeding to the discourse of Socrates; in the next place, from his narrating the Atlantic history, the Atlantics being the progeny of Neptune; and, in the third place, from his own proper life. For the ruling peculiarity, and that which extends to many things, are the characteristics of this life. Power, likewise pertains to media, and therefore he possesses the middle place in the encomiums. For to assert of him, that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timæus, shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not entirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him.

“Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to all such concerns.”

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general, desirous of living conformably to law. Hence also he participates, in a certain respect, of the political science and philosophy. He must be referred, therefore, according to analogy, to the third fabrication of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god, who arranges the last and most disorderly parts of mundane fabrication; and *to be testified by a multitude of circumstances*, indicates an analogy to the power that produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate division. We therefore make this arrangement, in order that the men may have an analogy to the things. But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates; though the absent person was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present [at a conference], he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to him who is both an auditor and a speaker, and in this respect imitates those that are about Socrates and Timæus. In the next place, this also must be considered, that Socrates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately after Timæus. There are likewise those who attribute such an order as the following to these persons, viz. they arrange Timæus according to the paradigmatic cause, Socrates according to the efficient, and Critias according to the formal cause; for he leads into energy those that have been rightly educated; but Hermocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to hear, but not to speak. For matter receives productive powers externally, but is not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relative to the analogy of the men].

* Instead of *διο και πολιτικη πως μετειχε, και φιλοσοφιας εσκεν ουν κ. λ.*, it is necessary to read *διο και πολιτικη πως μετειχε και φιλοσοφιας. εσκεν ουν κ. λ.*

† Timæus is analogous to Jupiter, the Demiurgus of the universe; but Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates, are analogous to the three ruling fathers, or demiurgi, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, who form the summit of the supermundane order of Gods. For, according to the arcana of the Grecian theology, there is a twofold Jupiter; one being the Demiurgus, and existing at the extremity of the intellectual order; but the other being the first of the supermundane demiurgic triad. See the 6th Book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

“ Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to a polity, I readily complied with your request ; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment ; but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a decorous manner, to receive the promised feast.”

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly constituted city. Both the concise comprehension, however, of the polity, and the Atlantic war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have before observed, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the form of the production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, therefore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence ; but excites others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As, therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Olympus, and abiding in his own accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war ; thus also Socrates, being purely established in the intelligible form of a polity, prepares those after him that are able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the science of Timæus, to the survey of wholes totally, but preparing the others to the total and concise comprehension of partial natures. For as he had discussed the polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should be celebrated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the

world, Socrates very properly says, "*that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner; to receive the promised feast,*" his words being invested with modesty, as a form adapted to virtue.

"HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we discoursed on this very particular."

It was requisite that Hermocrates should say something, and not be silently present, like the unemployed persons in a comedy. Hence also he is represented speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic [or pertaining to the art of writing]; but it is likewise adapted to what has been before said. For it represents to us, as in an image, that the last parts, of the fabrication of things, follow the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, converge to the one providence of the world. For Hermocrates, following Socrates, says, that nothing shall be wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially impediments to us in our mutual energies, viz. our indolence, and any external impediment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any excuse sufficient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in which the mandate of Socrates terminates; just as Socrates calls on Timæus, and makes himself a partaker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Hermocrates says, they discoursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Demiurgus in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, however, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic history will appear to have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are said to be adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfective of mundane natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or a triple narration

you will, from either of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the intervening medium.

“ He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

“ **CR.** It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

“ **TIM.** I assent to your compliance.”

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth the prolific powers of such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the subjects of their government; thus also here Hermocrates calls on Critias to speak, and gives completion to what was promised to Socrates. And as, among divine natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here, Hermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of Socrates. As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the universe, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here also all the persons fly to Timæus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to the discourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words “*from ancient rumour,*” if the narration is historical, signify ancient according to time. But if they are an indication of what takes place in the universe, they will obscurely signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent in souls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine causes, they show that these demiurgic causes, being supernally filled from more ancient Gods, impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

“ **CR.** Hear, then, O Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the extreme, *yet in every respect true*, which was once delivered by Solon, the wisest of the seven wise men.”

With respect to the whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato, who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not being the inventor of the Republic, but transcribing what the Egyptians had written on this subject; and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to the Egyptians this history about the Athenians and Atlantics, and to believe that the Athenians once lived conformably to this polity. Crantor adds, that this is testified by the prophets of the Egyptians, who assert that these particulars [which are narrated by Plato] are written on pillars which are still preserved. Others again, say, that this narration is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which by no means had an existence, but which bring with them an indication of natures which are perpetual, or are generated in the world; not attending to Plato, who exclaims, "*that the narration is surprising in the extreme, yet is in every respect true.*" For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partly not true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward meaning; since a thing of this kind would not be perfectly true. Others do not deny that these transactions took place after this manner, but think that they are now assumed as images of the contrarieties that pre-exist in the universe. For war, say they, is the father of all things, as Heraclitus also asserted. And of these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets: so that they assume the Athenians as analogous to the fixed stars, but the Atlantics to the planets. They likewise say, that these stars fight on account of the opposition in their circulation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one revolution of the world. Of this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Amelins, who vehemently contends that this must be the case, because it is clearly said in the Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not know of any other who is of the same opinion. Others, again, as Origen, refer the analysis to the opposition of certain demons, some of them being more, but others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in multitude, but others in power: some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others refer it to the discord of souls, the more excellent being the pupils of Minerva, but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the God that presides over generation [i. e. to Neptune]. And this is the interpretation of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and Numenius together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to demons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

with these men, dæmon has a triple subsistence. For they say, that one kind is that of divine dæmons; another, of dæmons according to habitude, to which partial souls give completion, when they obtain a dæmoniacal allotment; and another is that of depraved dæmons, who are also noxious to souls. Dæmons, therefore, of this last kind, wage this war against souls, in their descent into generation. And that, say they, which ancient theologists refer to Osiris and Typhon, or to Bacchus and the Titans, this, Plato, from motives of piety, refers to the Athenians and Atlantics. Before, however, souls descend into solid bodies, those theologists and Plato, deliver the war of them with material dæmons who are adapted to the west; *since the west, as the Egyptians say, is the place of noxious dæmons.*¹ Of this opinion is the philosopher Porphyry, respecting whom, it would be wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of Numenius. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very² excellently corrected by the most divine Iamblichus.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor Syrianus, this contrariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narration, since on the contrary, this is to be admitted as an account of transactions that actually happened; but, as we are accustomed to do, we must refer that which precedes the subject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue. Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human affairs, should, according to a similar form, be extended through the whole world, and especially through the realms of generation. That in consequence of this, we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to the variety of powers. For since all things are from *the one*, and from the duad after *the one*, are in a certain respect united to each other, and have an opposite nature; as in the genera of being, there is a certain opposition of sameness to difference, and of motion to permanency, but all things participate of these genera;—this being the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures possess the contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider the polity of Plato as analogous in every respect to the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, but war, to the powers of these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions. We must, like-

¹ For *επει και η ευστι*, here it is necessary to read *επει και η ευστι*, and for *κατωριου*, *κατωριων*.

² Instead of *κομηδει* in this place, it is requisite to read *κομηδη*.

wise, refer the polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of things; but it must be said, that war is to be assimilated to the mundane division, and to the empire of victory. Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division to the universe, by separating it into the incorporeal and the corporeal; and again divide the incorporeal into the more intellectual and the more material natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation; and heaven, into contrary periods, but generation into opposite powers; or in whatever way you assume this opposite life, whether in the mundane Gods, or in demons, in souls, or in bodies,—you may every where transfer the analogies from men to things. For of the Gods themselves, the divine Homer makes oppositions; representing Apollo as hostilely opposed to Neptune, Mars to Minerva, the river Xanthus to Vulcan, Hermes to Latona, and Juno to Diana. For it is requisite to survey generation in incorporeal natures, in bodies, and in both. *It is likewise necessary to consider Neptune and Apollo as the fabricators of the whole of generation, the one totally, but the other partially. But Juno and Diana, as the suppliers of vivification, the former rationally, but the latter physically. Minerva and Mars, as the causes of the contrariety which pervades through both existence and life; the former, of that which is defined according to intellect; but the latter, of that which is more material and passive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the twofold perfection of souls; the former, indeed, over the perfection which is obtained through the gnostic powers,¹ and the evolution into light of productive principles; but the latter, over the smooth, spontaneous, and voluntary elevation which is acquired through the vital powers. Vulcan and Xanthus, as the primary leaders of the whole of a corporeal constitution, and of the powers it contains; the former, of those that are more efficacious; but the latter of those that are more passive, and as it were more material. But he leaves Venus by herself, in order that she may illuminate all things with union and harmony, and represents her as fighting on the worse side, because THE ONE in those that belong to this side, is less excellent than multitude.* For all contrariety is surveyed in a becoming manner in conjunction with a unity, which is either prior to it, or commensurate with, or is in a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And Plato, as well as theologians, rightly perceiving that this is the case, have delivered a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts

¹ καὶ is omitted in the original, and the omission of it, renders the latter part of the sentence very ambiguous.

² For δειναμῶς here, it is requisite to read δειραμῶς.

prior to wholes. Finding, likewise, these things in images prior to paradigms, he surveys this contrariety in men, which also has an analogous subsistence in wholes, neither being in want of Titanic or Gigantic wars. For how could he narrate such wars to Socrates, who on the preceding day had blamed the poets for devising things of this kind? Receiving, therefore, transactions from history, in order that he might not assert of the Gods that they fight with each other, he ascribes these battles to men, but through a cautious and pious analogy, transfers them also to the Gods. For such like wars are delivered by divinely-inspired poets, prior to the one order of things. Their mode, however, of narrating them, is adapted to them, but the present mode to Plato; the latter, in conjunction with the political science, being more moderate, but the former, in conjunction with the teletic art, being more replete with divine inspiration. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

In what is said by Critias, however, the word "*hear*" is proverbial, and is employed in those things to which we wish to call the attention of the hearer. The word *hear*, therefore, is equivalent to *receive what is worthy of attention*. But the word "*surprising*" (ατοπον) manifests that which happens contrary to expectation, as in the Gorgias, "*It is surprising, O Socrates,*" (ατοπα γε ω Σωκρατης); or that which is paradoxical, as in the Crito, "*What a surprising dream, Socrates;*" (ως ατοπον ενιπνιον ω Σωκρατης); or the wonderful, as in the Theætetus, "*And it is not at all surprising, but it would be much more wonderful, if it were not a thing of this kind.*" (και ουδεν γε ατοπον, αλλα πολυ θαυμαστοτερον ει μη ταισυτος τυ.) But here it is assumed as that which deserves admiration. This, however, is evident from what follows, in which it is said, "*that the deeds of this city were great and admirable.*" Moreover, the word "*narration*" (λογος), manifests the truth of what is going to be related. For thus it is said in the Gorgias, that a fable differs from λογος; [because the latter is true, but the former is not.] It is also very properly said, that "*Solon was the wisest of the seven wise men;*" as being asserted of one who was related to Plato; as being said to another Athenian, and in the Panathenæic; and as indicating that the ensuing narration extends to all wisdom. Nor is it requisite to wonder how Solon is said to be the wisest of all the seven wise men, nor to be anxious to know, how he can be said to be the wisest of other men, but one of the wise men, when all of them were most wise. For what absurdity is there, in calling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order with himself? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salamis, his armed attack of Pisistratus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that

were absent, and more brave than those that were present, his conference also with Cræsus, and his answer to one who said, that he had established most beautiful laws; for he replied, that he had not established the most beautiful, but powerful laws, and that he knew laws that were more excellent than these;—all these particulars bear testimony to his wisdom. There is, likewise, a story told of a tripod that was dragged up in a net by certain young men, though it is not related by all historians, and that the oracle [of Apollo] being consulted on the occasion, the God answered, that it should be given to the wisest man. That in consequence of this, it was offered to Thales, but he sent it to another of the seven wise men, this again to another, and so on, till at last it came to Solon, all of them yielding it to him. Solon, however, sent it to the God, saying, that he was the wisest of beings.¹ Solon, also, is said to have found, that the lunar month does not consist of thirty days, and on this account he was the first that called it *εν νεοις* ² a new one, and *νεας* new. And, in short, the discovery, that the numbers of the days revert from the twentieth day, is ascribed to him. Some, also, assert, that prior to Anaxagoras, Solon showed that intellect presided over the whole of things. From all which it is evident, that he was a participant of a certain wisdom.

“Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself frequently³ relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself informed us) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time, and the destruction of mankind.”

The history of the race of Solon, and of the alliance of Plato to him, is as follows: The children of Exceestides were, Solon and Dropides, and of Dropides Critias was the son, who is mentioned by Solon in his poems, where he sings,

Bid Critias with the yellow locks,
Attention to his father pay,

¹ The same story is also told of Solon, by Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Thales.

² In the original *ενοις*, which I conceive to be erroneously transcribed for *εν νεοις*.

³ *πoλλaxov* is omitted in the text of Proclus.

For by revering what he says,
No faulty leader he'll obey.

But Callæserus and Glauco were the sons of Critias: and again the Critias of the present dialogue was the son of Callæserus. This, however, is evident from Critias in the Charmides, calling the father of Charmides, his uncle. But Charmides and Perictione were the offspring of Glauco: and Perictione was the mother of Plato. So that Glauco was the uncle of Critias, but the father of Charmides. And Charmides was the uncle of Plato, but Solon was the brother of the great-grandfather of Critias. Such, therefore, is the truth [respecting the race of Solon.]

The divine Iamblichus, however, gives a different account of the succession of his race. For he immediately makes Glauco to be the son of Dropides. But others, as the Platonic Theon, assert, that Critias and Glauco were the sons of Callæserus; though in the Charmides, Critias says, that "*Charmides is the son of Glauco our uncle, but is my cousin.*" Hence Glauco is not the son of Dropides, nor the brother of the younger Critias. To a man, however, who pays attention to things, it is of no consequence in whatever manner these particulars may subsist. Passing on, therefore, to things, you may assume from these particulars as images, that all the discord of the world, and the twofold co-ordinations that are in it, are suspended from proximate demiurgic causes, and are referred to other more intellectual and ancient causes; that the causes of this motion are continuous and united, and suspended from one cause; that the superior causes are more ancient in intellection; and that secondary receive the production of primary natures, differ from and yet have a consascent communion with them. In addition to these things also, you may assume, that *a twofold oblivion is produced in souls of the theory of great and admirable wholes, arising either from having abandoned for a long time a life of that kind, or through having fallen immoderately into generation. For this is for the real man to be truly corrupted.* But souls that have been recently perfected, and retain the memory of things in the intelligible world, in consequence of not falling into matter, easily acquire a reminiscence of the truth. And thus much for these particulars. We must not, however, wonder, if Critias calls Solon simply a *familiar*. For we not only call those with whom we associate, but also our kindred, *familiars*. But by likewise adding, "*and an intimate friend,*" he indicates, that there was not merely a communion of race, but a sameness and similitude of life, in the ancestors of Plato. The prior Critias, also, is called an *old man*, which signifies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his being adapted to many disciplines.

“In particular, he informed me of one undertaking surpassing in magnitude all the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly, and in a manner agreeable to truth.”

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narration. For he does not introduce it either for the purpose of giving respite to the auditors, or as being in want of it. And he dissolves the doubt, as he thinks, by saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to physiology, in order to allure the reader, and soften the severity of that kind of writing. But Origen says, that the narration is indeed a fiction, and so far he agrees with Numenius and his followers, but he does not admit with Longinus, that it was devised for the sake of pleasure. He does not, however, add the cause of the fiction. We, therefore, have frequently said, that it contributes to the whole theory of nature; and we likewise say, that in these words, Plato calls the one and common productive principle of the twofold co-ordinations in the world, and the one contrariety which pervades through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bonds, this fabrication consisting of participations of the contraries, bound and infinity, as Philolaus says, and as Plato also asserts in the *Philebus*. For he there says, “*that there is much bound and much infinity in the world, which are things most contrary to each other, and give completion to this universe.*” Since, however, all things that contribute to the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total causes, Critias says very properly, that it becomes him to repay his obligations to Socrates, who excited both the second and third powers. These things, therefore, may be immediately assumed [from the words before us.]

But will you not say, that the Minerval solemnity has an indication of demiurgic works? For the Goddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mundane fabrication, and possesses intellectual lives in herself, according to which she weaves together the universe, and unifying powers, according to which she governs all the mundane oppositions. The Minerval solemnity, however, indicates the gift of the Goddess which pervades through all things, and fills all things with herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety.

For in solemnities, we especially embrace a common and concordant life. If, however, we have asserted these things rightly, we may from these transfer ourselves to the various and one life of the world, and survey the difference between the Parmenides and this dialogue. For both have their hypothesis in the Panathenæa; but the former in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these solemnities. For they were celebrated about the same time with the Bendidian festival; and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total and partial, supermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible; the former of these solemnities, indeed, pertains to the exempt productions of the Goddess, unfolding into light the intelligible series of the Gods, but the latter to her subordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods about the world. And the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the contrariety externally acceding to the universe from a Barbaric tempest, by the Gods who are the inspective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have been celebrated in the Piræus, as being most adapted to the extremities, and material parts of the universe. But the Panathenæan festival, exhibits the established order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfused separation of mundane contrarieties. For this Goddess is at one and the same time, a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war. Another veil, therefore, was referred to the Goddess (in the Bendidian festival,) representing the war in which the pupils of Minerva were victorious; just as the veil in the Panathenæan solemnity, represented the Gants vanquished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddess, however, is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; *justly*, indeed, because it is necessary that every thing which has proceeded, should be converted to its proper principle; but with *truth*, because the hymn is assumed through things and through beings. And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others the providence of the Gods, and others praise the works that proceed from them, and a hymn of this kind is the last form of celebration; (for the praise of the divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet)—this being the case, the words "*celebrating as it were*," are very properly added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed by the Athenians. But that the Panathenæan followed the Bendidian festivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Rhodian. For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in the Piræus on the

¹ For $\alpha\pi'$ αυρου here, it is necessary to read $\alpha\pi'$ αυρω.

twentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed these.

“ Soc. You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement, which Critias once heard from Solon, and which is not narrated in history, but was once actually accomplished by this city.”

Socrates exciting Critias to narration, requests that he would relate the mighty undertaking which the ancient Critias said he had heard from Solon, and which though not much celebrated, yet was really performed. In which, this in the first place deserves to be considered, that many things happen in the universe of which the multitude are ignorant. And in this, worthy men differ from others, that they see things of this kind, and understand the events that take place. But it is worth while secondly to observe, that the more perfect causes, rejoice in simplicity, and proceed from things of a composite nature, to such as are first. But subordinate beings on the contrary, descend from things simple to things composite. For thus also here Socrates recurs from that which is downward as far as to Solon, in an ascending progression; but Critias on the contrary, descends from Solon to the mention of himself.

“ CRIT. I will acquaint you with that ancient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years.”

Longinus here again observes, that Plato pays attention to elegance of diction, by narrating the same things differently. For he calls the *undertaking* ἀρχαίον, but the *narration* παλαιός, and *the man*, not a youth; though as he signifies the same thing through all these, he might have denominated all of them after the same manner. Longinus, therefore, as Plotinus said of him, was a philologist, but not a philosopher. Origen, however, does not admit that Plato is studious of artificial delight and certain ornaments of diction, but that he pays attention to spontaneous and unadorned credibility, and accuracy in imitations. This mode also of expression has spontaneity, as being adapted to erudition. For it was rightly said by Aristoxenus, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers extend as far as to sounds, and exhibit in all things the arrangement which they possess; *just I think, as this mighty heaven, exhibits in its transfigurations clear*

images of the splendor of intellectual perceptions; being moved in conjunction with the unapparent periods of intellectual natures. The great Iamblichus, however, thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how in nature contraries are vanquished by *the one*; how *the one* is varied, and how great a mutation the same productive principles exhibit; subsisting in one way in the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are worthy the conceptions of Plato, and not a solicitous attention to diction.

“ For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I was about ten.”

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mythology, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias; because perfect causes precede the fabrication of the world, and perfective causes are antecedent to the subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration from Solon, one from one; from the elder Critias it was heard by the junior Critias and Amynder; and from the junior Critias three persons received it. For the monad proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes. The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. *For the decad manifests the conversion of all mundane natures to the one; and ninety the restitution again to the monad, in conjunction with progression. But both numbers are symbolical of the world.* You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to the cause of permanency; but the former Critias, to the cause which supplies progression; and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed, preserves the relation of a ruling and leading cause; the second, of the cause which comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner; and the third, of that which now pays attention to the universe, and governs the mundane war.

“ When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is known by the name of *Curcotis Apaturiorum*, nothing was omitted which

* Instead of *συγκινομενας ταις εικονων αφανει περιοδοις*, it is necessary to read, *συγκινομενας ταις εσσειων, κ. λ.*

boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new."

The Apaturia was a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between Melanthus and Xanthus the Boeotian, and the victory of Melanthus through deception; the Boeotians and Athenians waging war with each other for Ceneo. But this festival was celebrated for three days; of which the first day was called *αναρροσις*, because many sacrifices were performed in it; and the victims were called *αναρροματα*, because they were drawn upward, and sacrificed. The second day was called *δορπια*; for on this day there were splendid banquets and much feasting. But the third day was called *κορρευσις*; for on this day boys, three or four years old, were enrolled in their tribes. On this day also, such boys as were more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who retained the greater number of them in their memory. They sang, however, the poems of the ancients. But with respect to the tribes, it must be observed, that after Ion there were four families, but from Cleisthenes ten, and that after these, each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into the same family and company, as being allied to each other: the enrolment of the boys was into these tribes; and this day, as we have before observed, was called Cureotis, from the boys that were enrolled. And such is the information derived from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these in the particulars that have been narrated, as in images. The festival, therefore, of the Apaturia, which had for its pretext the victory of the Athenians, pertains to the hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantics], and all intellectual subdue material natures. *Deception*, likewise, is adapted to mundane forms, which separate themselves from impartible and immaterial principles, and become apparent, instead of truly-existing beings. But the enrolment of the boys, imitates the arrangements of *partial souls* into their proper allotments, and their descents into different generations. *The festival* is an imitation of the eternal hilarity in the world: for if it is filled with Gods, it celebrates a perpetual festival. But *the contests of rhapsody*, are analogous to the contests which souls sustain, weaving their own life together with the universe. And *the rhapsody*

itself, resembles the above-mentioned woven life of the universe. For this has an imitation of intellectual forms, in the same manner as the contests of rhapsody have of heroic actions and manners, possessing together with an harmonious conjunction, a connected series. The *many poems of many poets*, adumbrate the many natures, and many circum-mundane productive powers,¹ and, in short, the division of physical imitations. But *the new poems*, are images of forms which are perpetually flourishing, always perfect and prolific, and able to operate efficaciously on other things. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Mention, however, is made of the poems of Solon, not as of a poet in the popular sense of the word, but as of one who mingled philosophy with poetry. For of mundane works likewise, and whole productions, a royal intellect is the leader. And the praise is related as being mentioned to another person, i. e. to Amynander, because, as we learn in the Phædrus, that which judges differs from that which makes and generates. Referring, however, all that has been said, to the universe, we may infer as from images, that partial souls, partial natures, and partible forms, and of these, those especially that are always new and efficacious, contribute to the mundane war. But all these are connected together by the Gods, who are the inspective guardians of fabrication, and are co-arranged with one world, one harmony, and one kindred life.

“ But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him to be most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry, the most ingenuous and free of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it as others do a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown.”

Here again, the lovers of diction may indicate to their admirers, that Plato

¹ The word *ἀργούς* is, I conceive, omitted in the original in this place.

cautiously praises the poetry of Solon, since he represents the praise as bestowed by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who spoke conformably to intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most excellent judge of poets, as Longinus also admits. Heraclides Ponticus therefore says, that Chærilus and Antimachus being at that time most renowned, Plato preferred the poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he persuaded Heraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. In vain, therefore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was not a sufficient judge of poets. Hence, what is here said manifests the judgment of the philosopher, and it may be considered in a more historical point of view. The investigator, however, of things, will think it requisite to show how all the causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle, and how the last adhere through media to the first of things. For thus those who receive the narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon. And he, indeed, admires the poetic power of Solon; but they, through Critias as a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon. For gratifying the former [i. e. Critias], they praise the poetry of the latter. But what is it that Critias says respecting Solon? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired poets, from these two causes; because he engaged in poetry as a casual affair; and because when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedition, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to complete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history therefore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these things, however, as images, Plato manifests, that what is primarily demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies; but that their secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the confused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry¹ to the gift which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into light, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most ingenuous, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

¹ For *ἀλλὰ συμμετρῶς* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ἀλλ' ἀσυνμετρῶς*.

effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized from contraries into a visible subsistence. Moreover, the assertion that Solon was the *wisest* of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles. And his being *most free*, adumbrates the power which is exempt, and established in itself, and which fills all things in a liberated manner. A thing of this kind likewise concurs with the wise man, as being immaterial, without a master, and of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be *old*, indicates a cause which is intellectual, and remote from generation. For "*wisdom*," says Plato, "*and true opinions are most desirable things to him who has arrived at old age.*" Again, the assertion of Critias, that *he very well remembers*, exhibits to our view the salvation of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about such as are first. But *Solon engaging in poetry as a casual affair*, represents to us that productions into secondary natures, have only a secondary rank among first causes. For their first energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to the beings prior to themselves.

If, however, some one omitting the survey of things, should consider through what cause Plato introduced¹ these particulars, according to their apparent meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed. For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not deceived, and as being an intimate acquaintance, he would not deceive. It was likewise requisite, that the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narration may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Critias is supposed to have been a youth, but sufficiently able to remember, and in consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much memory is necessary.

Farther still, it was requisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit such-like narrations to very young men, lest they should appear to them to be contemptible. Hence, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might opportunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

¹ For *παρισκεκληκεν* read *παρισκεκληθεν*.

Solon precede the history; the praise being given by Amynder in order to gratify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the text.

That Solon, however, went to Egypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining the Atlantic history, but likewise that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is evident. For during this time, also, he associated with Cræsus, and sailed to Egypt; but on his return, he became master of the city, which was in a tumultuous condition through the Pisistratida. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, however, doubts how Plato calls Solon *most free*: for this is not an encomium adapted to a poet. And he dissolves the doubt by saying, that he is so called, either because he spent his money *liberally*, or because he used the greatest freedom of speech; and that on this account he was free, without any timidity in his poetical compositions. Or he was so denominated, as being in his poetry remiss and un-compelled. But Iamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that through this appellation, the *liberated* condition of the intellect of Solon, the *un-servile* nature of his virtue, and that which was venerable in his character, and which transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also says, that the *laughter* of Critias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect, and rejoicing in its progeny. But the *remembering well*, indicates the salvation of effective principles in the world. Why, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver the Atlantic war in verse? Because, says he, all natural works and the mundane contrariety subsist through imitation. For this is analogous to its effective and primary causes; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes. But why was he prevented by sedition? Because material motions and material tumult become an impediment, as we have before observed, to the productive powers of mundane causes.

“ In consequence of this, Amynder enquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair, which ought most justly to be the greatest and most renowned which this city ever accomplished; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age.”

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete

For the word *considered* is wanting to the words *most justly to be*, because these are required in what follows, but not the word *οπισθεν*, *being*. Porphyry, however, says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking being the greatest, but not yet celebrated, Plato adds, "*ought most justly to be most renowned.*" But we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it *the greatest undertaking*, as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending itself every where. And that he denominates it *most renowned*, as contributing to the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by Orpheus *renowned*.

Boundless eternity, and nature's works
Renown'd, remain.

"Relate this affair, O Critias, says Amynder, from the beginning, and inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it as a fact."

I. e. Relate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner it was performed, how it became known to, and by whom being preserved, it reached the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole form of contrariety, how it was effected, or may be known, and from what causes, to us invisible, it is suspended. Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives to the narration of Solon; but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or, that I may speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of this contrariety. And by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes of it.

"There is, then, says he, a certain region of Egypt, called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in which there is a province called Saitical."

In the first place, it is worth while to observe how the narration always delivers things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive; from Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saitic province, and from this Sais, sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be

proper to ascend through the analogy of these things, to the first and most comprehensive causes of fabrication. For you may perceive this supernally comprehended by more total causes, and proceeding as far as to the last of things; comprehending causes every where preceding such as are comprehended; the more total, such as are more partial; and the impartible fabrication, that which is partible, and is denominated recent; to which also the present words refer the father of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and particularly participates of the undefiled power of Minerva. For, in short, since we refer this war, for the sake of which the whole narration is excited, to the mundane contrariety, it will be well, proceeding in the same way, to assimilate all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrication, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe; but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the more novel fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mundane natures. We shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the difference between human and divine fabrications becomes apparent; and how, in these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the development of ancient transactions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the Greeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in divine fabrications, that which is *recent* or *junior*, is converted to that which is more ancient, and is perfected by it; but the latter antecedently comprehends the causes of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intellectual perceptions and powers. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular. With respect to Egypt, therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as being divided analogously to it; and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible essence. But we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated to the whole invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta also, it is produced from the Nile, being divided about the Saitic province, so as to make its egress from one right line to the right and left, and to the sea, the sea forming the hypotenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Saitic province; indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile is divided. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life, and, in visible natures, to the *celestial triangle which is connective of all generation*, being proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

of Ammon having the face of a ram, and also because *the ram is the principle of generation, and is moved with the greatest celerity*, as being among the constellations established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very appropriate : since the triangle, as we shall learn in what follows, is the principle of the hypostasis of the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged analogous to the zodiac, as being situated under it, having an inclination similar to it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it, and its division about the equinoctial points. *The Nile also is a symbol of the life which is poured on the whole world.* Moreover, the two sides of the Nile, which run into the sea from the summit [of Delta], may be, in a certain respect, assimilated to the two co-ordinations, which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which generation is the recipient. So that a triangle is produced from them and their common receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Saitic province, which forms a great part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions. Saïs, therefore, must be sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear, not because it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but as participating of a certain peculiar efflux of the God [who presides over that constellation]. Hence likewise Saïs is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a firm establishment on account of the place about the pole.

“ Of this province, the greatest city is Saïs, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is, in the Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom also they said they were after a certain manner allied.”

The word *νομός*, or *province*, derived its appellation from the distribution of land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But from the city the whole province was denominated Saitic, just as Sebennytic is denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is now assumed analogous to Solon. For he paid attention to wisdom and justice beyond all the [other Egyptian] kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon, and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens ; in order that we may survey the cities and the men adorned by the Goddess [Minerva] as from one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more per-

fect. Callisthenes, however, and Phanodemus relate, that the Athenians were the fathers of the Saitæ. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were a colony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the history through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Sais came to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But Plato only says thus much concerning them, "*that the Saitæ were very friendly to the Athenians, and after a certain manner allied to them.*" It is possible, however, that he might say this on account of the tutelar Goddess of the city being the same with the Minerva of the Athenians.

With respect, however, to this Goddess the guardian of the two cities, it is requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through the supercelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and terrene distributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious government of herself, but antecedently comprehending the essence and form of it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself. That the government, however, of this Goddess extends supernally as far as to the last of things, the Greeks manifest by asserting that she was generated from the head of Jupiter. But the Egyptians relate, that in the adytum of the Goddess there was this inscription, *I am the things that are, that will be, and that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which I am concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun.*¹ The Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent and unapparent, has an allotment in the heavens, and illuminates generation with forms. For of the signs of the zodiac, the ram is ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where especially a power motive of the universe is established. She is very properly, therefore, called by Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he now denominates her the leader of these allotments in the earth. In the first place, likewise, he honours the Goddess in the language of his country. For the Athenians denominate the tutelar Goddess of the city *Archegetes*, or the leader, celebrating her surname, and her presiding power. In the next place, he indicates the uniform pre-established comprehension in herself, of the allotments which are governed by her. And besides this he clearly represents to us, that it is possible for the same

¹ The former part of this inscription is to be found in Plutarch's treatise on Isis and Osiris; but the latter part of it, viz. *the fruit which I brought forth was the sun*, is only to be found in these Commentaries of Proclus. The original of this part is, *ὃν ἐγὼ καρπὸν ἑτέρον ἡλίου ἐπέγετο*.

things to be signified through many words, since words are images of the things signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing from different materials; so that the Egyptians preserve the analogons,⁷ because they call the Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks. Nor is it at all wonderful that both should denominate her rightly, in consequence of establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one tutelar Goddess of the two cities Saïs and Athens, the inhabitants of Saïs are very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being in a certain respect allied to them: for the affinity is not wholly perfect. For some may participate more and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one, but others of another power contained in the Goddess. *For again, it is likewise necessary to know this, that a variation is produced in different nations from the places which they severally inhabit, from the temperature of the air, from habitude to the heavens, and still more partially from spermatic productive powers. But you may say, that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the diversities of the tutelar powers, from which you will find a difference in colour, figure, voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other countries frequently change, by dwelling in those countries, their colour and voice; just as plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are transplanted in a foreign land.*

“ In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge of such particulars superior to others, he perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the Greeks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this kind.”

Solon, on account of his political wisdom, and on account of the dignity and worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honor to the priests of Saïs. But he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

⁷ For *δωσουσιν απολογον* in this place, I read *οωζουσιν αναλογον*.

periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose the priests, found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of this kind. These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication or workmanship, is called by theologists *recent*. But this is particularly honoured [as being suspended]¹ from the father of wholes, and from the intelligible Gods, with whom there are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things, and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual perceptions are more partial and less excellent, which are in secondary natures. And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial forms. And some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with reference to them, and possess a subordinate power.

“ Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of pristine transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe; and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have taken place.”

Of such a nature as this are all divine causes: for they call forth more divine powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more divine and total intellections; such as is now also effected by Solon. For extending to the Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he in a certain respect leads them to the narration of their antiquities; *of which the Egyptians participate in a remarkable degree, as they survey without impediment the celestial bodies, through the purity of the air, and preserve ancient memorials, in consequence of not being destroyed either by water or fire. But the Assyrians, says Iamblichus, have not only preserved the memorials of seven and twenty myriads of years, as Hipparchus says they have, but likewise of the whole apocatastases and periods of the seven rulers of the world.* So that this being admitted, there is still less reason to compare with these memorials the much-celebrated archæology of the Greeks: from which

¹ The words $\omega\iota\ \epsilon\lambda\eta\theta\eta\sigma\eta\sigma\eta\iota$ appear to me to be wanting in this place in the original.

likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is small, but to the whole and the universe.

Farther still, the archaeology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian cities]. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a native of Athens: but with the Argives, as far as to Phoroneus and Niobe. For these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from Niobe; but from him Iasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated Pelasgic. The particulars, however, respecting Deucalion and Pyrrha, that a deluge taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how migrating from thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with the Thessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolic race begins from Inachus, but that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and such-like particulars, causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see, what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. And these things, indeed, will be evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at Saïs with a priest called Pateneit; but at Heliopolis, with a priest called Ochlapi; and at Sebennytus, with one whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the histories of the Egyptians. And perhaps it was the priest of Saïs, who says as follows to Solon:

“ But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there an aged Greek among you.”

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reproves he may not be intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archaeology. But he employs a repetition of the name of Solon, not only as striving beyond measure in what he is about to say, but also for the purpose of indicating the circulation of things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things generated in the universe, comprehend stably and intellectually, through indelible knowledge; to which causes the priest is analogous. He accuses, however, the Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all-various wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. *Juvenility*, therefore, indicates their want of wisdom. Or this privation of wisdom arises from the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

become again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are not preserved by them ; but their knowledge is always confined to present events, and such as sense apprehends. But with the Egyptians, past transactions are always present through memory, as if they were recent. And the remembrance is through history. But the history is from pillars, in which things paradoxical and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. Why, however, it may be said, does this priest accuse the Greeks with such severity ? For what is there admirable in his narration, since, as the noble Heraclitus says, *a very learned knowledge of past transactions does not produce intellect* ? But if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians call a month a year, the enumeration of many of these years, will not be attended with any thing wonderful. It was idle, therefore, in the Egyptian priest to think highly of himself for the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, *though, as Aristotle says, it is impossible that memory and sense should be effective of science, yet at the same time it must be admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes.* For by relating in many things many similar circumstances, we produce one form of them, and finding frequently from history concordant apocatastases of many things, we recur to the one cause of them. For thus the observations of the affections of the air were framed by Calippus, and the knowledge from astrology of the celestial motions. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

Again, however, let us recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey *the junior fabrication*, held together by Minerva, and filled from more ancient and primogenial causes. For from thence this fabrication possessing stability proceeds,¹ on account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundane contrariety. For every thing in the demiurgic progression which is distributed into parts and multiplied, proceeds on account of that principle. As, therefore, there are causes in the world, some of which are effective of the regeneration of things, but others are guardians of the coherence of productive powers, the priest, indeed, must be assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but Solon to the former. Hence, the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to have related various mutations, generations, and corruptions. It likewise appears to me, that the arrangement of the elder prior to the younger person, is assumed in a way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrication of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other ; just as the

¹ Instead of *προς το εζηρημενον* here, I read, *και προςαι δια το εζηρημενον αιτιον.*

Elean guest [in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed from being older to being younger; but those that live in the period of Jupiter, proceed in a contrary direction. And in this dialogue, Timæus says, respecting the soul, that the Demiurgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this account constituted it of a more principal nature. Now, therefore, the priest, who is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which pertains in a greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

“To whom the priest:—Because all your souls are juvenile; neither containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time.”

Juvenility of soul, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to more partial causes; but *remote tradition*, to stable intelligence, and to more ancient principles. And *hoary discipline* is analogous to the comprehension, which is united and always the same, of the nature and composition of all that the world contains; through which, indeed, the first and most divine of mundane natures comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternally and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures; but comprehend things more proximate to the universe partially and subordinately, as falling short of the unical intelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the Gods *hoariness* is adapted, but to others *juvenility*. For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and an undefiled life, and which is remote from generation; but juvenility of more partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

“But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be: the greatest of these, indeed, arising from fire and water; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies.”

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children, but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of time? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,

through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated? Before, however, he discovers the cause of such-like doubts, he first discusses the periods in the universe, and points out the variety of them; of which the first principles of the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent knowledge, stably and unitedly; but the second principles partially, and in such a way as to come into contact with the nature of the things which they govern; for this it is always to know what is present. But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is analogous to the perception of wholes separately and stably. There are, therefore, certain various periods of things in the world; but it must be admitted, that there is always generation and always corruption in the universe. For that which is sensible is rising into existence, and tending to corruption, but never *truly* is. This generation, however, and destruction, must be surveyed in one way in the heavens, and in another in material natures. For, in the former, a mutation of figures, and the motion of perpetually generated bodies, pre-exist. But generation, being governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its own circle. In this circle, however, different elements have dominion at different times. And wholes, indeed, always preserve the same and a similar order according to nature; but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either conformably to nature, or preternaturally, in a becoming manner. For¹ either the wholes and the parts always subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the other a natural subsistence, and this in a twofold respect. If, therefore, all things [perpetually] existed according to nature, the variety of generation would be dissipated, perpetual natures would be the extremities of beings, and the first essences would be the last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternaturally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of subsistence might be present with mutable natures; nor would the circle of generation be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural, but parts a natural, subsistence; for parts follow wholes, and wholes are comprehensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time, exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature. For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

¹ *Γὰρ* is omitted here in the original.

It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the parts at one time following the wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is indeed always generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than another, and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence, some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are more adapted to sustain deviations into a preternatural condition of being; this, indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the position being different of different parts, and in the next place, on account of habitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations]. And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspective Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted different peculiarities; some rejoicing more in motion, but others in permanency, some in sameness, but others in difference; abundant corruptions likewise of partial natures being produced in different places; the forms or species of the universe have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always, and each of the elements always is. For since corruption and generation proceed from the celestial figures; but these are imitations of divine intellections, and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stability is derived;—this being the case, continuity is produced in mundane forms, and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corruptive of parts, so as to cause things which are generated in time, to be also dissolved in time, according to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things as are able to exist in conjunction with it; but that which is incapable of being administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of Jupiter, however, expels^a from essence every thing of this kind as disgraceful. For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the universe. But that which is deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. We have shown therefore why^b abundant and partial corruptions are produced in different places of the earth.

^a For *εμβάλλει* here, it is necessary to read *εκβάλλει*.

^b For *έστιν* in this place, read *έτιν τι*.

In the next place it must be shown why the greatest of destructions are through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements, is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet is more difficultly passive than air. And by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able to operate; but through being passive with difficulty, it is not affected by violence, nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that violent, and the greatest destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations. You may also say, that the remaining two elements are more adapted to us. For we are pedestrious, and allied to earth; and as we are on all sides comprehended by air, in which we live, and which we respire, it is evident that our bodies are of a kindred nature with it. Hence these elements, as being more allied to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring with them more violent destructions. Farther still, according to another mode of survey also, these elements earth and air, together with suffering themselves, and suffering prior to us, appear to operate on us. For air when it becomes putrid, produces pestilence; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions. But pestilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth. Fire, however, and water are able to operate on us, without being previously affected themselves; the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion. Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more vigorous and powerful than the other elements, in consequence of not corrupting through being themselves distempered. Deluges, therefore, and conflagrations are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars, and other such-like partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times produces the generation of different things. *For this is asserted by the fables of the Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the sun, that he assumes different forms in the signs of the zodiac.*¹ It is not, therefore, at all wonderful, if though there are many destructions, and in many places, yet man and every form always exist, through the immutable progression of divine forms. For through these, the productive principles in the universe possess an invariable

¹ See this explained further on, in one of the notes on the 4th book;

sameness of subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is always suspended from its cause.

“ For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself blasted by thunder, is indeed said to have the form of a fable.”

That the first principles of beings comprehend' indeed things which are moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well known, that theologians refer the causes of periods, and of the psychical ascents and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is now said, refers the mythology about Phaeton to the Greeks, and the knowledge of Solon. For all such-like corruptions and generations derive their completion from the junior fabrication, [or the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,] from which also the circulation of forms, and the variety of corporeal and psychical periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining, perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian preserving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things of which he had a knowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration obscurely signify? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, have still multiform mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically delivered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much has been said by us for the sake of the whole theory, and in order to show that the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to be discussed.

The fable respecting Phaeton, however, requires a manifold discussion. For in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place, physically; and in the third place, philosophically. History therefore says, that

* For *παρεχοναι* here, it is necessary to read *περιεχοναι*.

Phaeton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean, and that driving the chariot of his father, he deviated from the proper track. That Jupiter also fearing for the safety of the universe, destroyed him by thunder; but he being blasted by thunder, fell about Eridanus. The fire likewise proceeding from him burnt every thing that was nourished by the earth; and his sisters, the Heliades, lamented his fall. And such is the historical account of the fable. It is, however, necessary to admit that a conflagration took place; for the whole narration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an impossibility, nor a certain thing which may easily happen. But it will be impossible if some one fancies that the Sun at one time drives his own chariot, and at another time being changed ceases to drive it, and commits his proper employment to another. And it will be among the number of things which may be easily accomplished, if it is supposed that this Phaeton was a comet, which being dissolved produced an intolerable dryness from vehement heat. For this supposition is generally adopted. *Porphyry therefore says, that certain signs may be assumed from the motion of comets. For when this motion is towards the southern parts, it is indicative of tempests, towards the north, of dryness from excessive heat, towards the east, of pestilence, and towards the west, of fertility.* The disappearance likewise of the comet, is said to be the destruction by thunder.

If, however, it be requisite to dissolve the fable in a more physical way, it is better to adopt the explanation of our associate Dominicus, that sometimes so great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to be easily enkindled by the solar heat. But this being enkindled, it is not at all wonderful, that it should burn all that part of the earth which is situated under it, and produce such a conflagration as that of which the fable speaks. In consequence, therefore, of the inflammation being produced by the Sun, the authors of fables were induced to call Phaeton the offspring of the Sun; denominating this offspring a male, on account of the efficacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it is usual to call fire a male, in the same manner as earth a female; and to denominate the one matter, but the other form. But because this exhalation did not proceed in a path parallel to that of the Sun, Mythologists assert, that Phaeton did not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. The dissolution of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall of Phaeton; and the extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter. But the abundance of rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place after great conflagrations) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, in as much as

those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. But to the latter the female pertains, and to the former the male. These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime; that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, but are disseminated about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only be intellectual, come into contact with intelligibles, and recede from bodies, but also that they may have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and dæmoniacal souls are arranged under secondary leaders; some indeed under the divinity of the Earth, others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but those sown in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that of offspring, some express the peculiarity of places, but others the similitude of the mother. Hence also, souls that are disseminated about their kindred stars, receive a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovian, or Lunar. For whether the God is of an immutable characteristic, or is demingic, or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes to the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning likewise must be extended to the other Gods.

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always suspended from the Gods to whom they are allied, and govern the universe in conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. For this is the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are truly sons of the Gods, as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remaining within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called sons of the

¹ For *υπο τας υποταγμενας αυτης ψυχας*, it is requisite to read *επι τας υποταγμενας, κ. λ.*

Gods, but receive also a secondary life, and become the sons of Gods and men. And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the Gods, but are not called genuine sons, as not preserving the form of their proper God, but verge to matter, and become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore, the authors of fables call Tityus the son of Earth, or Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, or Musæus the son of the Moon, they thus denominate them after this manner, and others differently conformably to the before-mentioned causes. With respect to other sons of the Gods, however, we shall elsewhere speak.

But again, Phaeton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as being of the solar series. Hence also he has a solar name. Since however, abiding on high, he revolved and governed the universe in conjunction with his father, he is said to have driven the chariot of his father. For the vehicle of Phaeton belongs to the solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. But when he fell into generation, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is said to have been destroyed by the thunder of Jupiter. For thunder (i. e. lightning) is a symbol of fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact,¹ and vivifying all things; but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spirit in which the soul is carried. But there are many transpositions of souls into different politics, and from one element into another; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of fire; but others from the sphere of fire to earth; and some in order; but others heaped together, and accompanied with much tumult and disorderly motion, such as Phaeton is said to have suffered. For being borne along on high collectively, and attracting empyrean vestments, he was moved through these in a disorderly manner, when he proceeded to earth, and produced in certain parts of it a conflagration. For souls in descending become invested with many garments aerial or aquatic; and some have empyrean vestments. Of these also, some have the vigorous,² but others the vehement and the percussive, from fire. And some indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume others that are more gross, but others preserve them even as far as to the earth. I know, therefore, that the Cheronean Plutarch relates, that in one of the islands of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigious rains or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent natures

¹ For *αερος* here, it is necessary to read *αεφης*.

² Instead of *αμωδρον* in this place, I read *αμωιου*.

fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more excellent natures.* It must not, however, be denied that such-like circumstances befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that are magnificent, and are allotted a more daemoniacal essence, such as the fable obscurely signifies the soul of Phaeton to have been. But it is not at all wonderful, that descending souls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which are analogous to their presiding Gods, and should attract and become invested with a greater number of such-like elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls should in a greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar souls in such as are pyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the Gods also employing these as organs, in the same manner as they use material demons, in their productions about the earth. Through these souls likewise the Gods produce conflagrations, or pestilence, or inflict certain other calamities on those who deserve to suffer them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of the effects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect. For it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the same things, some producing in one, and others in another way. Phaeton therefore, being borne along about the earth, and after a certain daemoniacal manner, burning those places to which he approached, through the stream of fire (for partial souls effect many things out of the body, being then the instruments of avenging or purifying demons); he was lamented by the *Heliades*, who were certain solar souls, whence also they were said to be the sisters of Phaeton. But they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they might in an undefiled manner pay attention to things which are generated and corrupted. For the river Eridanus, and the falling into it, indicate the lapse of the soul into the river of generation; in which being situated, she requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologians also signify the extension of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

The much-enduring race of men thy tears
Excite.

* Plutarch relates this, in his treatise *On the Failure of the Oracles*.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner, the providential attention to Phaeton of souls that are of the solar order. Again, therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise their vehicles participate of the peculiarity of their leading Gods; so that from these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and others receive an appellation from some other God. It may also be inferred that destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phaeton. And likewise, that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things. Hence Timaeus teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

“ But the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and signifies that through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire.”

The Egyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contributes to the proposed discussion, that abundant destructions of terrestrial natures are produced through fire, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth. But through mutation he signifies either the incommensuration of things in the earth to celestial natures: for all things while they subsist commensurately to the celestial effluxions, are able to remain, but when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are able to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but such as are too imbecile to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as if your eye not being able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some other eye may be capable of looking directly to it without pain. And a similar reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other Gods and their configurations. For the universe is one animal, and its parts sympathizing with each other, it preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father, who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

chastise him for the sake of his good; for in so doing he will appear to have changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may be the various configuration of the celestial bodies. For these are the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth, and at different times exhibit different figures, through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls. *For the configurations are the letters of these souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced through them.* Again, however, both these are true. For the mutation of these bodies, and the incommensuration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of such-like destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phaeton from the heavens to the earth, a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, it is not at all wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is one thing, since this is an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls that revolve together with them, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from a life without habitude; and that of places about the earth, is different from either of the former, since it is a certain corruptive mutation; according to which neither souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Such-like corruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are effected through partial souls; but are also effected through daemons alone. And as through these, destructions adapted to their series are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through long periods of time; is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary in order that such a destruction may take place? For it is requisite that there should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a conspiracy of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one thing, should be preservative of another? It is also necessary that there should be an aptitude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take place in partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common; and this reasonably. For it is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly arranged among things which are corrupted with difficulty, and which become destroyed in long periods of time. For wholes which remain during the

mundane period, are incorruptible and indestructible. For no configuration of the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution. Copious destructions, however, of partial natures are effected through long periods of time; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there is a life of a certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less extended.

“Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or the sea.”

This is likely to happen in the visible destructions through fire: for those who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The philosopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the phenomena to souls; and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time effervescent, and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer represents the eyes of Agamemnon when he was enraged with Achilles, as “shining like fire.” But at another time, the epithymetic part, being deluged by genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as Heraclitus says, “another death of intellectual souls is occasioned by moisture.” But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the perturbations arising from anger, who have the irascible part in a relaxed condition, and commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For this is signified by *hollow places, and such as are near to water*. But those are inexperienced in the perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetic part in a more strenuous condition, and excited from the somnolency of matter. For this is indicated by *lofty places*. For in a certain respect, the irascible part is adapted to be easily moved, and to be efficacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore, will be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and give intention to the inertness of desire. The philosopher Iamblichus, however, thinks fit to survey these things physically, and not ethically. He says, therefore, that when a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water; for these exhalations are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist substance.

Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire, which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all heavy substances naturally tend downward.

“To us, indeed, the Nile is a saviour in other respects, and also because it liberates us from this destruction.”

According to the apparent signification of what is here said, the Nile is the cause to the Egyptians of many and all-various goods, viz. of geometry, of the generation of fruits, and likewise of avoiding conflagrations. Its water also preserves their bodies, and the divinity that connectedly contains this body, elevates their souls. But from these things you may assume, that first causes, being full of life and prolific power, connect themselves, and remain eternally, and also think fit to impart connexion from themselves to other things, which are in a flowing and dissipated condition; so that the name of *saviour*, adumbrates divine and exempt providence; from which also the light that is in the intelligible' Gods, illuminates all the intellectual and demiurgic causes.

“But when the Gods, purifying the earth by water, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while those that dwell in your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuous inundation of the rivers.”

In what is here said, the efficient cause is clearly ascribed to the Gods. And this also may be asserted of conflagrations. For purification is at one time effected through water, and at another through fire. But every where purification to secondary is from primary natures. Hence likewise in Orpheus, Jupiter is exhorted to bring purifications from Crete. *For it is usual with theologists to arrange Crete for the intelligible.* But the material cause of purification is here ascribed to the incursion of water. For each of these [i. e. fire and water] produces without deliberation and involuntarily, being borne along according to its own natural tendency. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be a pre-existent cause which employs them to beneficial purposes, and operates for

* The words *νοητός φως* are wanting in the original.

the sake of good ; which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there are certain purifications in wholes, there are also powers that preside over these purifications, operating as purifiers on wholes prior to partial natures. There are likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others being initiated ; nor will these ever desert the universe. The Egyptian priest likewise knowing this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone physiologized.

“ On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains ; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which are preserved here, are said to be most ancient.”

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive an afflux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return ? Porphyry indeed says, it was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians, that the water issued upward from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile ; on which account also they called the Nile, the waterer of the earth ; and that it returned from beneath ; manifesting by this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow being dissolved produces the quantity of its water ; but that it is loosened from its own fountains, and proceeds so as to become visible, being prior to this impeded and detained. We however understand the term *dissolved*, with reference to doubt : for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from doubt. For it is not true that from snow being dissolved the Nile is increased. For where in southern places, such as those through which the Nile flows, is there a collection of snow ? Nor does this river emerge from rarefied earth. For the rarity of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward. But it is entirely necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to lofty places. And thus much with respect to the Egyptian opinion.

Others, however, say, that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to *return* does not now signify to spring from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to

proceed above the earth ; streams of water being poured into the Nile from other places. But Iamblichus says, it is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind, but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from beneath, as equivalent to what is usually called the *ascent* of water ; and he assigns a two-fold cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dryness, from excessive heat, and deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase from rains. For he says, that the first cause of the salvation of the Egyptians, is the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication. But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are contrary to those in the antarctic ¹ regions, from which the Nile flows to these places ; and in them the generation of dryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reciprocates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, because the rains being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently happens when there is no descent [or disappearance] of the Nile. At the same time, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing increase of the water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the fountains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river. For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, viz. the pressure of clouds against a mountain. Moreover, it is not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about the cataracts. For the stream of the Nile is not first poured from these, but from the Lunar mountains, which are thus denominated from their altitude. And the clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of Aristides.

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of the increase of the Nile, when we direct our attention to certain waters and rains that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, therefore, we have concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a conflagration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful ; since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea.

¹ For ἀρκτικός here, it is necessary to read ἀνταρκτικός.

And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not impel the clouds against the mountains? What also, if the mountains should fall, in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places bursting them, *through which, likewise, the oracles say, that succeeding cities shall be destroyed?* And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and less, will be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

“But the truth is, that in all places, where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous.”

The priest has spoken concerning the mundane periods, and the different mutations [in them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is derived from the position of the region, and the providence of the Nile. Now, therefore, he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that every place which is free from deluges and conflagrations, has always the race of men remaining, more or less numerous. For the greatest destructions are through fire and water, as was before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men fail in a different way. *For at present there are none who inhabit these very places of the Attic land [which were formerly so populous], though neither a deluge nor a conflagration has happened, but a certain dire impiety, which has entirely obliterated the race of men.*¹ Or it may be said that Plato now calls *climates, places*. He says, therefore, that every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge or a conflagration, at one time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will also be saved in a deluge, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate of Greece was deluged. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning of the passage.

But according to our associate [Dominicus], Plato means, that every place has always a greater or less number of men, which is not excessively cold, or immoderately dry through heat. For mathematicians say, that there are certain places which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold. Every place, therefore, which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or less number of men. And this interpretation is reasonable, and conformable to

¹ In my copy of the original of these Commentaries, a certain annotator observes in the margin, that “Proclus alludes, in what he here says, to the Christian religion.”

the words of the text. For the words, "where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails," appear to signify, *where neither of the contraries being excessive, impedes habitation.* And, in short, since Plato had before observed, that the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert that not every climate of the earth has men, but Orpheus also, who says :

The Demirgus for th' abode of men,
A seat apart from the immortals gave,
Where turns the Sun's mid axis stretching wide ;
Between excessive cold and heat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says, "*where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous.*" With other nations, however, there is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in consequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons alone remain. But with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are said to be preserved, in consequence of every thing being committed to writing in our temples.

"But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report,—every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day."

As the situation of the country and its guardian Goddess impart safety to the Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own care and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced by time. But they are assisted in this by their temples, in which all great and wonderful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also paradoxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, "*or containing any thing uncommon.*" The history, however, of these things contributes to their knowledge of similar events; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and also to the knowledge of futurity. *For through observations of this kind, they discover the effective powers of the celestial configurations.* For assuming that certain

things happen from certain things existing, they are able syllogistically to collect, from the same signs, the causes of future events. It appears also to me, that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans which prepares souls to remember their former lives, imitates such a history as this of the Egyptians. For as it is fit to assume different lives of one man, or rather of one soul, thus also different periods must be assumed of one nation. Hence, as in the one, the recollections of the transactions of a former life are perfective of souls, so in the other, the histories of former periods afford the greatest assistance to the acquisition of wisdom. Farther still, such observations are assimilated to the orderly distribution of the universe. For they imitate the stable productive powers of nature, through which remaining immoveable, order is ingenerated in things that are mutable. If, therefore, the world is a most sacred temple, in which the productive powers that connect the universe eternally remain, the recording of ancient deeds in temples will be an image of the subsistence of these powers. And what is asserted by the Egyptians may signify, that whatever in sensibles is stable, of a firm consistence, and always subsisting after the same manner, proceeds from the intelligible Gods; but that whatever is moved, and at different times is generated and corrupted in a different manner, is derived from the junior fabrication. For the sacerdotal genus by which mention is made of ancient transactions, conveys an image of the divine order, which is connective of wholes and of stability, and which guards all things by divine memory, and from which the junior fabrication being filled, imparts by illumination to things of a very mutable nature, sameness, connexion, and permanency.

“ While on the contrary, you and other nations, commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other contrivances which cities have employed for transmitting information to posterity.”

Contrivance is a symbol of the cause which always fabricates new things, produces things which are not yet in existence, and co-adapts all things to the one perfection of the world. For in our domestic concerns, we call the preparation of every thing necessary, *contrivance*. And such also in cities, are literature and arts, forums and baths, and the like. But in the universe, *contrivances* are such things as receive a temporal and partial composition. As, therefore, temples signify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a connective and guardian nature; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases consist-

ing of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But *recent transactions only* being committed to writing, evinces that the existence of such writings and arts, is of a more recent nature.

“And so again in accustomed years, a celestial effluxion rushes on them like a disease.”

This also is evident in men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed from the celestial periods, but having water for their matter. Hence the whole of this is called a celestial effluxion, and, as it were, a disease, because it is corruptive of other things. That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial nature evil, but to the whole of things good. But Plato says, “*in accustomed years,*” because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circulations, which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to the whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature. This also seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone generated from wholes are necessarily consummated according to mundane periods, which are defined by the same number; but that such things as happen from certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you may survey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted, and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the world; and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one continued life.

“Hence those among you who survive, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those among us, as of those in the regions which you inhabit.”

For from a deluge, Plato says, that herdsmen and shepherds are left, but that the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate and without the Muses. And on account of the former, indeed, they are unable through writing to transmit memorials of the pre-existent period; but on account of the latter, they are not sufficiently capable of preserving in verse or melody the events that happened prior to the deluge. Hence they become oblivious of all

things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children. For an ignorant old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual, a certain, secondary and genesiurgic condition of being, they become oblivious of intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter. Such representations also of intelligibles, as they once had from the vision of them they lose in the progressions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from juvenility through regeneration being borne along differently at different times, in consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. Moreover, the assertion that mutations taking place, those that remain, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses, indicates to those who consider it physically, that the analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that which is formless and without morphe; and also that in this mutation, the destruction of the elements happens, which is manifested through the word *illiterate*, and the dissolution of harmony, which again the Gods who are the inspective guardians of renovation, easily remedy, and restore to a condition according to nature.

“The transactions therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables.”

The Egyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of Solon to the fables of children. For the fables of the wise are about things of an eternal nature; but those of children about temporal things and which are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed truth; but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, and which indicates nothing elevated. To the latter fables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous; but to the former, the histories of the Egyptians. For the one look to that which is small, but the other have a most extended survey. And the one are only histories, but the other contribute to science. From these things, therefore, the paradigms also of them are to be surveyed. The effects, indeed, of the junior fabrication, are called the sports of the Gods, and resemble fables. For they are the images of beings, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. But the things which primarily derive their subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual, eternal, and stable, and have the essence of themselves concealed.

* For *recapit* here, it is necessary to read *corpui*.

“ For, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, though in former times there have been many.”

For the deluge of Deucalion is much celebrated by the Greeks, though as the Egyptian says, there were many others prior to it. Thus also in wholes, the junior fabrication gives completion to wholes partially, and multitudinously, and renders that which is present in a good condition through regeneration. But in intelligibles, the causes of the first subsistence and of the circulation of forms, are antecedently comprehended unically [or according to the nature of *the one*].

“ And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most beautiful and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and the whole of your city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who for many ages were destitute of literature, and became as it were dumb.”

The Egyptian wishes to conjoin the second to the former period, and to show that there is one connexion and life of the first Athenians, and of those that now exist, through a small seed, as he says, remaining. For thus also in the world the seeds of a former period conjoin that which succeeds it to its principles, through the essence of causes, the unceasing motion of the universe, and as some one says, its immutable mutation. We must not, however, wonder if the priest now indeed says, that Solon is the offspring of those excellent men. For we must again direct our attention to the cause of all mundane contrariety. For Solon, so far as he is an animal, possesses from them the genus; but so far as he is a partial intellect, receiving the narration of a war, he is analogous to the divinity, who transports the productive principle of mundane contrariety, supernally from intelligibles to the sensible region. Nor is it proper to be disturbed by such like objections, but to know the nature of analogies; and that the same things through analogy, become first, middle, and last.

“ For prior to that greatest destruction by water, there was a most excellent city of Athenians, which surpassed all others in war, and was in every respect governed by the most equitable laws, and whose deeds and politics are said to have been the most beautiful of all that we have received the knowledge of by the hearing, under the heavens.”

Plato does not perhaps mean by *the greatest destruction*, the deluge of Deucalion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he calls the city of the Athenians most warlike, and governed by the most equitable laws, as being an imitation of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is both philosophic and philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemic, and of equitable legislation from the philosophic. By *the most beautiful deeds* he means the victory over the Atlantics. But by *the most beautiful politics* he does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, but he thus speaks, because one polity may be called the number of many polities; just as one world is connective of many worlds. For if the life of each individual is a certain polity, but the common life is the communion of many partial lives, the one polity will consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union. He also adds, *the most beautiful of all that we know under the heavens*, because it is the first imitation of the polity of the world; so that you may say, it is the best of those under the heavens; for the paradigm of it is in the heavens. And thus much for particulars.

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history; some indeed receiving what is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some asserting, that, in the first place, the development of these, and such like narrations, appeared to Plato himself to be the province of a certain laborious and not very fortunate man;⁴ and in the second place, that what is delivered by Plato is not a thing of such an enigmatical nature, as the doctrine of Pherecydes, but that he teaches with perspicuity concerning most of his dogmas. Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man proposes to instruct us without ambiguity. They also add, in the third place, that neither is a development in the present instance necessary. For the cause of the insertion of this narration is known to be the delight and allurement of the reader. And in the fourth place, that if we analyse all things, we shall suffer the same as those who in a slippery manner are conversant with Homer. Others again think that the development of this history should be referred to physical harmony, from what Plato says of the narration about Phaeton, that it has indeed the form of a fable, but that it manifests a certain natural event; *since the Egyptians also, who, as Plato says, were the fathers of this relation, obscurely signified the arcana of nature through fable*. So that the development of this narration

⁴ Plato says this in the Phaedrus of the man who does not adapt the explications of fables to divine contents, but interprets them physically.

will be adapted to him, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as Timæus himself, conformably to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, makes his discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature through images; thus, also, the Egyptian priest will teach the truth of things through symbols adapted to himself. To which may be added, that Plato himself elsewhere accuses those who speak every thing from what is at hand, in order, says he, that they may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers true assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. And such are the arguments of each.

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed, narrating the past transactions of men, but symbolically comprehending in itself those things which are comprehended in the universe, and the mundane contrariety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first intelligibles, divides the world by powers that are oppositely arranged. And if you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which are in uninterrupted succession, and survey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided into bound and infinity, or rather into things allied to bound and the infinite. For of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, but others to the latter principle. But from that which is unfolded into light as the third after these principles, the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied.¹ For there multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided into things perpetual, and things corruptible.² For the measure of existence to all things is derived from thence. From the third triad it is divided into the male and female:³ for in this each of these primarily subsists. But from the first triad of the next order, it is divided according to the even and the odd; for number characterized by unity there.⁴ From the second triad, it is divided into the partial and the total.⁵ And from the third,⁶ into the straight and the circular. Again, of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are

¹ This third thing, after the two principles bound and infinity, is *being itself*.

² This triad constitutes *intelligible life*, or *eternity itself*.

³ This triad forms *intelligible intellect*, or [*αυροζωον*] *animal itself*.

⁴ This triad is the summit of the order which is called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

⁵ The second triad of the above order is denominated *Heaven*, by Plato in the *Phædrus*.

⁶ And the third triad of this order, is called by Plato in the *Phædrus*, *the sub-celestial arch*.

in themselves, and things that are in others. According to the second, into things animated and things inanimate, into things stable and things which are moved. But according to the third, into things that are the same and things that are different.¹ And from the order of Rulers,² indeed, it is divided into things which rejoice in similitude, and things allied to dissimilitude. But from the liberated³ order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable. These things, therefore, which have an arrangement elsewhere, have now also been as it were explored by us. For according to each division, the goodness of better natures, desiring to fill things subordinate, and to take away depravity, produces war. But the desire of less excellent natures, to divulse a certain portion of beings, of a more excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition of things; since in war, also, those that contend against each other, wish to reduce into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them. These things, therefore, are evident.

We may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by making a division after the following manner, into the adorning and adorned. And, in the first place, indeed, into things super-essential and essences. For the genus of the Gods is super-essential. In the next place, by dividing essences into eternal lives, and those which energize according to time. Likewise, those which energize according to time, into souls and bodies. And bodies, into such as are celestial, and such as subsist in generation. These, likewise, we must divide into wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes. And, again, we must divide super-essential natures into the divine peculiarities, such as the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that which separates, the stable and the motive. But eternal natures must be divided into total and partial essences. And such as are total, into the divine and angelic. Souls are to be divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attention to generation. Souls, likewise, that follow the Gods, must be divided into those that follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And the division of those that are separated from them, is into those that preside over generation with undefiled purity, and those that become defiled with vice. For

¹ The intellectual triad consists of Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter.

² The order of Rulers, is the *supermundane order of Gods*.

³ The liberated which immediately follows the *supermundane order*, is itself immediately followed by the *mundane order of Gods*. See my translation of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*.

the descent is far as to these. Moreover, the celestial bodies must be divided into the inerratic and erratic. And these, into such as are moved with a simple, and such as are moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must be divided into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the division in all the above mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that which fills, and that which is filled.

If, however, it be requisite, not to look to a part, but to adhere to the intellectual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists every where. For it is in Gods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the first of these, there is bound and infinity; in intellects, sameness and difference; in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the different; and in bodies, heaven and generation. But secondary natures are always arranged with reference to such as are more excellent. Hence, also, we say that this narration is useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contrariety from energies and motions. For all the teachers of physiology begin from contraries, and make these to be principles; which Plato also knowing, delivers to us, through symbols and enigmas, what the contrariety is of the genera in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through the intellectual energy of Minerva. Farther still, Plato very properly calls the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through all things; but that total powers should by a much greater priority effect this, from which also the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane intellects, to souls and bodies, conformably to the peculiarity of itself.

“Solon, therefore, on hearing this, said that he was astonished, and burning with the most ardent desire, entreated the priests to narrate every thing pertaining to his ancient fellow citizens.”

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, viz. for such as are secondary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their undefiled intellectual perceptions; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination their own plenitude to such as are secondary, through ² unenvying exuberant

¹ For *προ των αμεινοτων*, it is necessary to read *προς των αμεινοτων*.

² Instead of *τα δε πρωτα, ενναμεινω αφθονων, και αγαθοτητι, τοις δευτεροις επιλαμπειν την αφ' εαυτων*,

power and goodness. *Wonder*, therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the beginning of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins that which wonders with the object of wonder. Hence, likewise, those who are wise in divine concerns celebrate *Thaumas*, [whose name is derived from *thauma*, wonder,] as one of the greatest of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secondary to primary natures. But *ardent request* follows, rendering that which ought to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

“That afterwards, one of the priests said:—Nothing of envy, O Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. But for your sake and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of the Goddess.”

Solon being an Athenian, has a resemblance to the Tutelar Goddess Minerva, so far as he adheres to more perfect intellectual perceptions. And the priest resembles one speaking, as it were, from a certain adytum. For he teaches what was committed to writing in the temples; and presents to us an imitation of the middle orders of the junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause; which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause, fill from that as from a certain fountain the divine order. All things, likewise, are elegantly effected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised, and the Goddess is celebrated. The ascent also is from Solon to the Goddess through the city as a medium; imitating the convertive power of the Goddess. And this, likewise, is indeed beneficent; viz. to energize for the sake of the perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates providence, and the super-plenary power of divine beings. But it is in a still greater degree beneficent, to energize for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces a greater power. Besides this, it is still more divine to extend all the narration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all which, the unenvying communication of the priest genuinely represents to us, not only indicating the privation of envy, but the divine and prompt generation of good.

Again, however, we must not be ignorantly disturbed, if now indeed the priest as being the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more divine cause; but at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon,

κληρωσιον in this place, it is necessary to read *τα δε πρωτα δια ενσταμενωσ αφθουωσ, και αγαθοτητος, κ. λ.*

¹ For *ποιεσται* here, it is necessary to read *μυρεσται*.

are more ancient than the inhabitants of Sais ; the Athenians being arranged according to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of things. For so far as pertains to the narration, they have this order ; but so far as pertains to physical progression, they bring with them an image of certain more elevated and divine orders. And if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mundane contrariety, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, together with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual lives. For again, the veil [of Minerva] is the last image of the whole contrariety of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedency, and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them ; where also it is said, Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last work of the weaving art, containing in itself an image of the mundane war, and of the demiurgic order proceeding from the Goddess into the universe ; which veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole contrariety of things, and of the works of Minerva ; which narration contributes to the whole [descriptive] fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil to the splendid procession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. *For the Pauathenica is an image of the Minerval fabrication in the universe.* The veil, however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellectual light of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the world, and the war is a part of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of Minerva arranges in a becoming manner. And prior to all these, is the veil, which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is comprehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva. For,

In weaving, all th' immortals she excels,

says Orpheus. Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the veil of the essence of this Goddess, which essence is all things intellectually, that the universe is according to a mundane characteristic. For in ruling over the war of the universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, the Egyptian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Demiurgus, about which Plato a little farther on says, "*He was good, but envy never subsists in him who is good, about any thing.*" For the orders which exist proximately with him,

have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And through this privation of envy, the priest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess; conjoining partial and total' natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and suspending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

“Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been nourished and educated.”

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the Goddess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring from a citizen through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this conversion. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily, and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of things from her divinity. Again also asserting that the participants are nourished and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it possible, therefore, that these particulars should not in an admirable manner imitate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and generate those posterior to, and convert them to the causes of themselves? And thus much concerning these particulars.

What, however, is the meaning of this *allotment*? And how are the Gods said to be distributed into the universe? Of allotments therefore, some are those of partial souls, and others, of the undefiled genera. Some are daemoniacal, others angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. For if the father of the universe was one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one father there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the subjects of government, and another providence and order about other things. *Through this cause therefore the universe is divided by demiurgic numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, ebdomad, and dodecad.* For after the one fabrication, the section of the universe into two, heaven and generation, constitutes two-fold allotments, the celestial and genesiurgic. After this, the triad divides the universe, about which Neptune in Homer³ says,

To me by lot belongs the hoary deep,
The spacious heaven to Jove, to Pluto, Hades dark.

¹ For *αἰα* here, it is necessary to read *αἰαα*.

² *Iliad* xv. vs. 190, &c.

The tetradic distribution follows the triple order; giving a four-fold arrangement to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereally, above the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the five-fold division. For the world is one, consists of five parts, and is appropriately divided by celestial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial figures, and presiding Gods. After this allotment, the division into seven parts follows. For the heptad beginning supernally from the inerratic sphere, proceeds through all the elements. And after all these, is the allotment of the universe defined in the dodecad. From the divine allotments, however, the allotments of angels and daemons are suspended and have more various distributions. For one divine allotment is comprehensive of many angelical, and of a still greater number of daemoniactal allotments. For every angel rules over a multitude of daemons, and every angelical allotment has about itself many daemoniactal allotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a tribe is to each allotment in daemons. Instead of a triad, therefore, we must assume three companies, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four numbers and twelve choirs, following their respective leaders. And thus we shall always preserve the higher allotments. For as in essences, as in powers, as in energies, progressions generate multitude, thus also in allotments, those that rank as the first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in quantity; as being more proximate to the one father, and to the total and one providence. But those that are the second in rank, are allotted a diminished power, and an increased multitude. These things therefore are to be considered in common about allotments.

Since, however, we have divided allotments according to a section into two, into the celestial and sublunary, concerning the former indeed there can be no doubt respecting the nature of them, and whether they always remain invariably the same. But the sublunary allotments are deservedly subjects of admiration, whether they are said to be perpetual, or not. For if they are perpetual, how is this possible? For how, since every thing in generation is mutable and flowing, can the energies of the powers that providentially inspect it, be perpetual? For the things that are in generation, are not perpetual. And if these energies are not perpetual, how is it that divine inspection subsists differently at different times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy of the Gods, in order that things in generation being changed into another condition, this energy may remain exempt and immutable; nor is it alone that which is governed, in order that no absurdity may follow from the allotment flowing, and sustaining all-various mutations; but it is an assigned state, providence, and unrestrained government of divinity, about these sublunary concerns. And on account indeed of the subject

of government, the definition of perpetuity cannot be applied to it; but on account of its being [always] present, it is destitute of corruption, in order that we may not ascribe to the Gods the passion of partial souls, by assigning them different allotments at different times. Hence it remains for us to show, how allotment is to be explained, so as to preserve the immutable in the Gods, and mutability to things in generation.

Perhaps therefore the discussion of this affair will be easy, by having recourse to that theory, which we have frequently elsewhere employed, viz. that every thing in generation, and generation itself, must not be considered as alone consisting of mutable and flowing things, but there is also in these something immutable, and naturally adapted to remain always the same. For the interval, which receives all the parts of the world, comprehends them in itself, and is extended through all bodies, is immoveable, lest, if it belonged to things which are moved, it should also itself require another receptacle, and this should be the case ad infinitum. The ethereal vehicles likewise of divine souls, with which these souls are circularly invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a perpetual essence, and are eternally suspended from divine souls, being full of prolific power, and performing a circular motion,¹ according to a certain secondary circle of the celestial orbs. And in the third place, the wholeness of the elements remains always the same, though the parts sustain an all-various corruption. For it is necessary that each form of the universe should be never-failing, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that being generated from an immoveable cause it may be immoveable according to essence. *But every wholeness is a form, or rather it is that which it is said to be, through the participation of one entire form.*

And here you may see, how the nature of bodies proceeds in [a becoming] order. For one thing [i. e. the interval of the universe] is immoveable according to every motion; but another thing, [i. e. the vehicles of divine souls] receives motion only according to place. For this is most remote from essential mutation. And another thing, [i. e. the wholeness of the elements] admits of other mutations in its parts, but the whole remains entirely immutable. And the celestial allotments indeed, proximately dividing the interval, divide also together with it the heavens. But with respect to the sublunary allotments, in the first place indeed they are allotted portions in the interval of the universe. In the next place, they make a distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And in the third²

¹ Instead of *οἷα πληρῆ, καὶ γοσίου ἐναρμωὶ κωησιὲ ἐγκυκλίω ποσσομετα*, it is necessary to read *οἷα πληρῆ γοσίου ἐναρμωὶ, καὶ κωησιὲ, κ. λ.*

² For *κρείττος*, read *τρίτων*.

place, they remain always invariably the same, according to the *whole* parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods therefore do not change, nor subsist differently at different times. For they have not proximately their hypostasis in that which is changed. How, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods take place in these? How are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same place, at different times occupied by different spirits? May we not say, that the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations; divine illumination,¹ at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than the then existing nature. Total nature likewise [or nature considered as a whole] produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illuminated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts different images of the divinities in different illuminated parts, in consequence of these parts being suspended from the Gods. Times also effect something, according to which the conditions of other things are governed. The good temperament of the air too co-operates. And, in short, every thing about us contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When, therefore, according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be changed, then divinity is unfolded into light, even in these mutable natures, he being before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed eternally his proper allotment, and always extending the participation of himself, but not being always received by these terrestrial places, on account of their inaptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose different lives at different times, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that has there his allotment, but others are suspended from another order. And on this account, says the Athenian guest, some are accustomed to be more prosperous, but others more unfortunate. Whether, therefore, the *teletic* or legislative art dedicates this particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the beginning, received this portion [of the earth], the life [of the inhabitants] is through this in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him [who

¹ It appears to me that the words *θεϊας ελλαμψεως* are wanting in this place.

looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great and admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from a principle of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted deity, acts with greater rectitude than he does who transfers himself to another order.

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva is allotted the city which is named after her, and also his own city Saïs; inferring this perhaps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and perhaps also perceiving that there was an allotment of this kind, from the telestic art, and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Gods, so likewise of Minerva, there is an allotment proceeding supernally from intellectual causes to the place of the earth. Her allotment therefore is first in her father; but in the ruling Gods according to a second order. In the twelve liberated Gods, it makes a third progression; but after this, it unfolds itself into light in the heavens, with unrestrained authority. In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. For there a certain allotment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it be the place about the Ram, or that about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it is unfolded into light in the Sun. For there, according to theologians, an admirable power, and a Minerval order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun. And again, in another way in the Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad¹ which is there. But in another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, about the earth differently in different places, according to the peculiarities of providence. It is not therefore at all wonderful, if one divinity should be said to be allotted both Athens and Saïs. For the same thing must not be supposed to take place about the Gods, as about partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time, because they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there is indeed a participation of the same power in different places; and in the one power there is also multitude. This power likewise is differently participated by different places. And in some, sameness is more abundantly participated; but in others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established in the universe. These likewise existing, there are different

¹ This triad consists of Minerva, Proserpine, and Diana.

temporal evolutions of them into light, according to different places. Ancient theology also manifests the perpetual essence of the allotments; as when it is said in Homer,

To me in ocean's hoary deeps to dwell,
Always, by lot belongs.¹

For the word *always* is significant of perpetuity. And in short, since it is necessary that prior to things which *sometimes*, there should be natures which *always*, partícipate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist prior to such as are temporal. For as dæmons prior to partial souls follow the Gods, thus also there are perpetual allotments suspended from the Gods, prior to partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments; the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and the aerial, such as pertain to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible bodies, ride in ethereal vehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But whether it must be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for what has been said, is sufficient for the present.

“Yours indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth.”

With respect to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not perfectly to fail in his conceptions of the power of the God? For the assertions of the multitude concerning him, belong to things which must be entirely rejected. But that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual² is indeed true, but requires no small degree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce to our discussion from theologians, credibility concerning this divinity. That Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any other series, is manifested by theologians, when they represent him as fashioning things from brass, employing the bellows, and, in short, when they call him the artificer. But that he is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

¹ Iliad xv. vs. 190.

Instead of *αἰσθητόν* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read *αἰσθητόν*.

the exercise of the brazier's art, lameness, and every thing of this kind, are symbols of his productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that he is the maker of all sensibles, is evident from the same theologians, who say that he was hurled from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the mundane Gods, to have been elaborated by Vulcan. If, therefore, we admit that these things are true, *this God will be the fabricator totally of every corporeal-formed substance; preparing for the Gods their visible seats, rendering all things subservient to the one harmony of the world; filling all fabrications with corporeal life; and adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and gross nature of matter.* On this account also he is said by theologians to fashion things from brass, as being the artificer of resisting solids. And because the heavens are [said to be] brazen, as being an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise [fabled to be] a brazier. But he is lame in both his feet, as being the fabricator of things that are last in the progressions of being; for such are bodies; and also as being no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because he is the maker of the universe, which, as Timeus says, is without legs. And he was hurled from on high to earth, as extending his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. Whether, therefore, there are said to be certain physical productive principles in the universe, or whether there are spermatic principles, the cause of all these must be referred to this God. For that which nature effects by verging to bodies, this God fashions divinely and exemptly, exciting nature, and using her as an instrument to her own fabrication. For imate heat is Vulcanian, being generated by Vulcan as subservient to corporeal production. The productive cause therefore of generated natures is referred, in what Plato says, to this God.

Since however matter is necessary to things that are generated; for the Gods in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be again returned, for the generation of mortal animals; this also Plato delivers to us, in a very admirable manner, through earth. For in seed itself, there are productive powers, and a subject. And the former are derived from the art of Vulcan; but the latter from earth. For by earth, we must now understand every material cause; not that the Athenians sprung from the earth; but because it is usual to

¹ It must be carefully observed, that defects when ascribed to divine natures adumbrate transcendence: just as those whose eyes are filled with the solar light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects; for this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency of vision. In like manner, the lameness of Vulcan, symbolically indicates his exemption from any defective progression.

call all generation earth, and every thing material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a Vulcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through fire, since it is of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled, the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on this account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication¹ of sensibles. But Minerval souls, according to this energy of Vulcan, especially receive vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers of Vulcan, and the hypostasis² of earth; the productive powers receiving Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies, inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are prior to the inhabitants of Sais? This, therefore, may be said historically. But it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenians, and in short, that it is necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Saitans. For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same leader, some indeed more proximately, but others more subordinately; after the same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assimilated to Minerva, according to the highest degree of excellence; but others subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, signify this excellence. *For they are the measure of a perfect genesiurgic period, on account of a thousand being a cubic number.* Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelary Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe, you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning causes and adorned effects; some of which are more total, but others more partial. And some being analogous to the Athenians, but others to the Saitans. For

¹ Instead of το νοερον αυτης των αισθητων μιμονμενος in this place, which is evidently defective, I read το νοερον αυτης εν τη δημοσυργια των αισθητων μιμουμενος.

² For της γης υποστασιν των λογων, αθηναϊκα συνθηματα λαβαστων, it seems necessary to read της γης υποστασεως, των λογων αθηναϊκα, κ. λ.

nothing hinders, but that the same things may be surveyed analogously, in demurgic causes, in the universe, and in an historical narration.

The divine Iamblichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted certain places, according to definite times; as for instance, Minerva was first allotted Athens, and afterwards Saïs. For if, their allotment commences from a certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For whatever is measured by time, is a thing of this kind. Farther still, with respect to the place which they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, when it fell to their lot, or was it under the dominion of other Gods? For if, indeed, it was without a ruler, how is it possible that any thing belonging to the universe can be perfectly destitute of divinity? How, in short, can any place remain without the guardian protection of more excellent natures? Or how, if it is sufficient to the preservation of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not divulse the prefecture and allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the Gods alternately receive the places of each other; nor do demons change their allotments. Iamblichus having thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by saying, that the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established, but that the participants of them, at one time derive advantage from the guardianship of the rulers, and at another time reap no benefit from it. He adds, *that these are the participations which are measured by time, and which sacred institutions frequently call the birth-days of the Gods.* It has however been observed by us, that this resembles that which happens about souls. For every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And certain souls choose lives adapted to other Gods. Thus, therefore, every place is the allotment of a certain God, and there is a time when it becomes the allotment of some other divinity, who renders it adapted through a certain period, or through certain mystic rites established by men. For allotment is twofold, the one being essential, but the other subsisting according to habitude. But let us direct our attention to what follows.

“ But an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings.”

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

also from history; but to the Saitans the number eight thousand; measuring the lives of the citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples. *For by this number*, as the philosopher Porphyry says, *demons also measure time*. Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred writings; which manifests, as Iamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable reason. For eight thousand is a cube on a cube; ¹ but nine thousand is a tetragonic superficies on a cube.² Hence the one³ gives depth to a superficies, and this through the indefinite duad; but the other preserves the superficies itself in itself, in similitude and perfection from the triad.⁴ But it is the symbol of a better life, to remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them, and to be filled with a certain indefiniteness. Since however even a secondary nature is not entirely deprived of similitude to divinity, the descent is through a cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude.⁵ But it is better to imitate more excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more compounded. And a square is more simple than a cube. If however you should say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them I many artificial forms
For nine years fashion'd——

says Vulcan [in Homer,⁶]——in thus speaking, you will not wander from the truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva; since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This therefore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting these things, supposes

¹ For 1000 is a cube, and so likewise is 8.

² For 9 is a square, and 1000 is a cube.

³ 8000 gives depth to the superficies 20. For $20 \times 20 \times 20 = 8000$. and this is through the duad, because $20 = 2 \times 10$.

⁴ For 9000 is the cube of 30.

⁵ i. e. The descent is through 9000, in which there is a tetradic similitude, because as Proclus had before observed, it is a square superficies on a cube.

⁶ Iliad. l. 18. vs. 400.

Vulcan to be the intellect that presides over art, but earth to be the lunar sphere. *For this is called by the Egyptians ethereal earth.* He says therefore that souls which derive their subsistence from divinity, but participate of the artificial [or Vulcanic] intellect, are disseminated in the body of the moon; souls that give themselves to the arts, dwelling there; and that they have bodies which are effluxions of the ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to these souls, after the following manner. A myriad of years is, says he, the period of the soul, which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to conception; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives; which is obscurely signified through nine thousand years. Nincths also are performed to the dead. And in a similar manner, some give names to those that are born, in the ninth year; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production. The priest, however, does not now assume a myriad of years, but the number of nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still be terrene, but approximating to the period of a myriad of years. All this interpretation, however, the divine Iamblichus rejects, and says that the discussion here is not about lives, but about the different measures of Minerval participation. It is absurd, therefore, to make mention of the periods spoken of in the *Phaedrus*. But if it be requisite to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on high, but descends first to the conception of a political life, which is Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger, and lives ambitiously. But anger is Martial. In the next place, she proceeds in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reasons [or productive powers]. But all reasons are Hermaic. And Hermes is the inspective guardian of physical reasons. Through these, however, she is bound to body. And again, receiving a body, she first lives physically, being the supplier of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetically, exciting genesiurgic powers. In the next place, she lives under the influence of anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. Afterwards, she lives politically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she lives intellectually. If therefore she is restored to her pristine state, her life is intellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the best polity of the Athenians.

“ I will therefore briefly unfold to you the laws, and the most beautiful of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves.”

If you wish to refer what is here said to the whole order of things, the number nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. But through the word *briefly*, the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image of intellectual impartibility; but that which departs into multitude, of prolific power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through diversity. *The laws* are images of the divided fabrication, which is united according to intellect. But *the most beautiful work* is an adumbration of the orderly distribution of things which is extended to one beautiful end. For beauty subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligibles to the visible fabrication. And *the resumption of the sacred writings*, indicates the recurrence to the paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning the divided and multiplied fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial works, as may be inferred from all that has been said.

“ In the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours. For you will now find here many paradigms of things which then subsisted in your city.”

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest briefly discusses the laws of the ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have diminution with reference¹ to the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very properly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is the work of *dianoia*, but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be surveyed, so far as Socrates has described a *polity*, but the priest *laws*. A *polity*, however, is the union and common bond of the life of citizens; but legislation is order proceeding into multitude and division. And the former is more analogous to the providential cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

¹ Instead of ὑπερὶν ἕχθ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνα, it seems necessary to read ὑπερὶν ἕχθ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνα.

priest, so far as both assert that they deliver the multitude of their words contractedly.

Again, therefore, these things embrace wholes and divine causes. For the middle is suspended from the first fabrication, and is assimilated to it. And each indeed pertains to the universe; but the latter according to union, and one sameness; and the former according to progression and the difference of the things fabricated. Just as the third¹ fabrication subsists according to conversion.² And the first fabrication connects the war in generation celestially; but the second subordinately and according to diminution; just as the third¹ connects the extremities of the universe. Very properly therefore does Socrates summarily deliver the laws, and the whole life of the Athenians, in the same manner as the priest. And these things may be assumed from what the priest now says. But he calls images paradigms, because the Saïtans participate secondarily of those things, of which the Athenians participate primarily. For though archetypes rank among the first of beings, yet images have the first order with reference to our knowledge. As therefore things secondary by nature are said to be first, thus also they are said to be paradigms to the things that are elevated from them, and which know through them the natures prior to them. Here also, what pertains to the Athenians, indicates a more total, but what pertains to the Saïtans, a more partial order. These things likewise are analogous, both in partial natures and in wholes. So that the polity which is about to be delivered, pertains to the city of the Athenians, or rather to the whole orderly distribution of things; and the laws extend to the whole world from Minerva. For every law is said to be the distribution of intellect, and is rightly said to be so. But the laws of the Athenians, being established conformably to the tutelar Goddess, exhibit the distribution of the Minerval intellect. But of this kind are the laws in the universe which are defined conformably to one demiurgic intellect, and the one providence of Minerva.

“For the race of the priests was separated from the rest of the inhabitants.”

That in a certain respect all this order of the polity of the priest is more partial and more divided than that of Socrates, imitating the middle fabrication, may be

¹ For *πρωτη* here, it is necessary to read *τριτη*.

² The nature of these three fabrications is unfolded farther on.

³ Here also for *πρωτη*, it is necessary to read *τριτη*.

learnt from the multitude and quality of the genera in the city. For in the polity of Socrates, there were three genera, the guardian, the auxiliary, and the mercenary. For the triad is allied to the demiurgic monad. But here there are the double of these, the sacerdotal, and the military; the demiurgic, [or pertaining to artificers] and the pastoral; the venatic and the agricultural. For the middle fabrication has at one and the same time the duadic, and the triadic; and both these numbers are adapted to Minerva. But one of these indeed, viz. the triad, is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation. For the hexad is a triangle from the triad.¹ By the trigonic therefore, and by the hexad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the Goddess are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of Minerva, yet the first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first father, are filled from her in a more abundant degree. Thus therefore, if you alone select these genera, you will find the number adapted to the Goddess. But if you add, the presiding over wisdom, you will entirely find the heptad, which is of a Minerval characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and that it is produced from the monad alone. *The monad also, the triad, and the heptad, are said to be especially images of Minerva; the first, indeed, as being intellectual; the second, as converting the monad to itself; and the third, as proceeding from the father alone.* After this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers.

It is necessary however, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution and transcendency of these. For the sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian genus, which ascends as far as to the first cause.² For Plato himself in the Politicus arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter arranges in a becoming manner, and sufficiently disciplines the inhabitants of the city. But the former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and participates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining genera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses that of the priest, as being more comprehensive, and after a manner co-adapted to the genera prior to it. So that both from number and quality, it becomes evident to us that the polity

¹ For 6 is a triangular number, and is the double of 3.

² Plato asserts this of the guardians, in his Republic.

second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analogous to the celestial Gods. The auxiliary genus to those more excellent natures, the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature with partial souls. The first of these also, is analogous to the fixed stars, the second to the planets, and the third to material natures. We may likewise assume in the celestial Gods themselves, all these according to analogy.

Here, however, it is worth while to survey how, and after what manner, these genera [enumerated by the priest] are to be assumed in the universe. For the philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That the priests are analogous to the archangels in the heavens, who are converted to the Gods, of whom they are the messengers. But the soldiers are analogous to souls descending into bodies. Again, *the shepherds are analogous to the powers that are arranged over the herds of animals; which in arcane narrations are said to be souls that are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals.* For there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; others of cities; and others of individuals. But the hunters are analogous to those powers that hunt after souls, and inclose them in bodies. There are likewise powers who delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said to be, and another multitude together with her of venatic demons. And the husbandmen are analogous to those powers that preside over fruits. All this administration therefore of sublunary demons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in consequence of looking to the effect which now is, or is becoming to be. The divine Iamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, nor does the military genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose these to gods or demons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in the middle genus, but Gods and demons among the last artificers. Nor must it be admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect, but have a certain sympathy to animals. For the existence of demons who govern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters, who inclose the soul in body, as in a net; since the soul is not thus conjoined to which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the

to the body. *Nor is this mode of theory philosophic, but full of Barbaric arrogance.*¹ Nor are husbandmen to be referred to Ceres: for the Gods are exempt from the proximate causes of nature. Reprehending, therefore, these assertions, he considers the priests as analogous through similitude to all such secondary essences and powers, as honour and worship the causes prior to themselves. But the shepherds, as analogous to all those mundane powers, that are allotted the government of the life which verges to body, and of the most irrational powers, and who distribute these in an orderly manner. The hunters he places as analogous to those universal powers who adorn secondary natures through the investigation of [real] being. But the husbandmen, as corresponding to the powers that give efficacy to the seeds that descend from the heavens to the earth. And the soldiers, to the powers that subvert every thing atheistical, and corroborate that which is divine. After this manner, therefore, the divine Iamblichus [interprets what is said by the priest.] But it is common to both these philosophers, that they divide the fabricative genus into the pastoral, the venatic, and the agricultural; but they do not produce the four genera from one. For no one, who rightly considers the affair, can place either the pastoral or the venatic under the fabricative genus.

Will it not therefore be better to interpret the passage conformably to our preceptor, by admitting that the sacerdotal and military tribes form one duad, but the fabricative and agricultural another, and the pastoral and venatic a third duad; and assuming an order of this kind, to investigate the paradigms of them. For the sacerdotal genus subsists in the anagogic Gods, the military in the guardian, and the fabricative in the Gods who separate all the forms, and the productive principles of mundane natures. But the agricultural genus subsists in those Gods that supernally excite nature, and disseminate souls about generation. For Plato, likewise, denominates the lapse of the soul into generation, a dissemination. But to sow is most adapted to husbandmen, as is, also, to collect productions of nature. The pastoral genus subsists in the Gods that govern distinctly all the forms of life that revolve in generation. For Plato, in the Politicus, delivers to us certain divine shepherds. *And the venatic subsists in the divinities that give an orderly distribution to all material spirits. For it is usual with theologists to call these Gods hunters.* All these genera likewise pertain to the middle fabrication, viz. the convertive genus, the guardian, that which ad-

¹ It is somewhat singular, that Porphyry, who called the Christian religion *Βαρβαρον τολμημα*, a *barbarously bold wickedness*, should have adopted this theory.

ministers the psychical allotments, that which governs the genesiurgic forms of life, every thing which fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that which arranges the last order of spirits. That, however, which pays attention to wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must be considered as different from all these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above all the rest, making mention in the first place, as being a priest, of the sacerdotal genus. All the genera, therefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the hexad. And the monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intellect which connects all the fabrication of generated natures; but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders under this intellect, viz. to the anagogic, guardian, formalizing, and vivifying orders, and also to those that are the leaders of the herds of a tame life, and to those that rule over the brutal nature, which orders in the universe likewise are separated from the fixed stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be seen among men, in the first place, among the Athenians, but in the second place, among the Saitans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its proper work in a definite manner. For he manifests this by saying, *separate from others*, in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera, proceeding supernally through diminution, as far as to the last of things.

“The artificers, also, exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without mingling with that of other artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen.”

The whole of this tetractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section of the genera into three, but is now enumerated by Plato as the second; in order that through this, what is said may imitate the universe, in which the last is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more divine natures. For that which is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. For thus alone¹ can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the whole of itself by all the comprehending natures (in the universe). But again, it is here added, that the fabricative art was not mingled with the other arts, nor in a similar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself, and in its own purity. For this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

¹ For *μολι* here, it is necessary to read *μολως*.

appropriate works, but likewise effects the sympathy of the citizens. For all will thus be in want of all, in consequence of each not exercising many arts. For the builder will be in want of the husbandman, the husbandman of the shepherd, the shepherd of the hunter, and the hunter of the builder; and thus each being in want of the rest, will not be unmingled with them; hence, there is sameness in conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

“The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained to war.”

Every where indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order, which cuts off every thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and confused. Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious incursions; and this invests it with a guard from itself, imitating the guardian order. For as a guardian deity is present with the first, so likewise with the middle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may be assumed from theology. But by law in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from the one demiurgic intellection. For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic law, which is seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

“A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed by each. These we first used in Asia; the Goddess in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use.”

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms, as far as to the last genera. For there are things consascent with this energy, participating of undefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies, and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the universe. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about all these

particulars. We must however show what the armour, the shields, and the spears, are, and how these are antecedently comprehended in the Goddess. Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear. But these pertain to souls falling into generation and to material things, and are not the instruments of immutable safety, but of a genesiurgic life, corrupting the purity of intellect, and destroying the life which subsists according to reason. The divine Iamblichus, however, explains these in a divinely inspired manner. For since it is requisite that every thing divine should operate and not suffer, in order that by operating it may not have the inefficacious, which is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an efficacious power resembling that of material natures, which act in conjunction with passion;— in order that both these may be accomplished, he says, that shields are powers through which a divine nature remains impassive and undefiled, surrounding itself with an infrangible guard. But spears are the powers according to which it proceeds through all things without contact,* and operates on all things, cutting off that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgic form. These powers, however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence in the statues of her she is represented with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes all things, and according to theologians, remains without declination, and with undefiled purity, in her father. But these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval powers. For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitude, imitates its monad, and as the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitude participates of the Apolloniacal peculiarity; thus, also, the Minerval number, adumbrates the undefiled and unmingled nature of Minerva. This, also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls. For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason; but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the soul from demoniacal or fatal passions; of which powers the Athenians participate in a purer manner, but the Saitans in a secondary degree, receiving these through the measure of alliance to the Goddess.

“ You may perceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding

* For *αναφωσ* here, it is necessary to read *αναφρη*.

to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated."

A little farther on, he calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover of war, in order that the arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saitans might be produced conformably to her as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains to the exercise of war, is sufficiently indicated from what has been said; but that which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words; in order that by the one, the philopolemic, and by the other, the philosophic nature of Minerva might be adumbrated. What then is this prudence? The theory of wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life, proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed, this prudence is the source of disciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about the world, and in the last place, about human affairs. For since the Goddess herself is immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to the natures that are allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence. For with respect to divination, also, one kind must be admitted to exist in the intellectual, and another in the mundane Gods. And of the latter, one kind proceeds from the Gods, another from demons, and another from the discursive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and conjectural. In a similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed exists in the Gods themselves, and this is of a Paonian nature; but another kind, in demons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there are many demons about Love, thus also about Esculapius, some are allotted the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God. And another kind exists in human lives, being that which is imparted from theorems and experience, according to which some are adapted in a greater, and others in a less degree to divine medicine. But there is also a mixture of these two kinds of prudence, viz. the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians; because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in one divinity, and from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus much has been said in common about the *prudence* which is now mentioned.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that *law*, indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva; but *attention*,

the providence pervading from wholes as far as to material natures; and *immediately from the beginning*, the natural aptitude of Minerval souls to prudence. For that which is neither adventitious nor foreign, appears to be signified by these words. But if some one should refer what is said to the mundane order, because the distribution of things does not proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, but is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with that which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested by the words *immediately from the beginning*. The words, however, must be referred to the order of the whole world, because there are invisible causes of the natures that are arranged in the world, which perfect prudence [i. e. wisdom] primarily contemplates. For the form of prudence is not, as Porphyry says it is, artificial, or adapted to the arts. For this, as Iamblichus observes, is the gift of Vulcan, but not of Minerva. But *attention was also paid to divination and medicine*, because it is fit, in the first place, to contemplate the other powers of the mundane Gods, and thus afterwards, their prophetic and sanative production; since we are allotted the government of a generated body, and to us who are enclosed in body, futurity is immanent. For a material life exhibits much of the contingent, and of an hyparxis differently moved at different times. But by *such other disciplines as follow from these*, he doubtless means geometry, astronomy, logistic, arithmetic, and the sciences allied to these; all which the law having established, led the Athenians and Saitans to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Porphyry, however, says, that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva, because Esculapius is the lunar intellect, in the same manner as Apollo is the solar intellect. But the divine Iamblichus blames this assertion, as confounding the essences of the Gods, and as not always rightly distributing according to present circumstances the intellects and souls of the mundane Gods. For it must be admitted that Esculapius exists in the sun, and that he proceeds from that luminary about the generated place; in order that as the heavens, so likewise generation may be connected by this divinity, according to a second participation, and may be filled from it with symmetry, and good temperament.

“According to all this orderly distribution therefore, and co-arrangement, the Goddess first established and adorned your city.”

The word *all* manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all the natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thing pretermitted by

her, nor the multitude in her suffered to exist in a divided state. But the word *διακοσμησις*, indicates the orderly distribution of the Minerval providence. And the word *co-arrangement* signifies the union of these, and their alliance to one world. Farther still, the word *διακοσμησις* signifies the progression of wholes from the Goddess; but *co arrangement*, the conversion of them to herself. Since, however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others are partial, and some are analogous to monads, but others to numbers, and both participate of the Minerval providence, but primarily such as are total and monadic,—on this account what is at present said, attributes the more ancient and leading order to the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Saitans.

“Choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would produce the most sagacious men.”

Prior to this, the Goddess was said to have been *allotted* the Attic region; but it is now said that she *chose* it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the being allotted contrary to her will, nor is her choice disorderly, as is the case with a partial soul. For divine necessity concurs with divine will, choice with allotment, and *to choose* with *to be allotted*. What this place, however, is, has been before shown by us, viz. that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divisions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may be established with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time. But it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing the productive principles of all divine [mundane] natures, and being suspended from the essences prior to herself, inserts in different parts of the interval an alliance to different powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the Gods. For this interval is proximately suspended from her, and is an instrument conascent with her. As she is, therefore, a rational and psychical world, she also renders this [sensible] world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. Hence the interval itself, though it is said to be continued and immoveable, yet is not entirely without difference with reference to itself; since neither is the soul of the universe perfectly without difference in itself towards itself, but one part [as it were] of it, is the circle of *the same*, and another, the circle of *the different*. And why do I assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without difference in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For

all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, but some are more total, and others more partial. Nor is this wonderful. For the Demiurgus himself contains in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, I think Orpheus, indicating the order of his powers, says, "that his head is the refulgent heaven, but his eyes are the sun, and the opposing moon." Though, therefore, this interval should have one essence, unattended with difference, yet the power of soul, and the allotted orders of daemons, and prior to these, the Gods, dividing it, according to the demurgic order, and the allotments of justice, demonstrate that there is much difference in the parts of it. Hence it must be admitted, that the choice becomes internal, and from the essence of the Gods, and that it is not such as we see in partial souls. For the former is essential; but the latter is alone defined according to the present life. And the former is eternal, but the latter temporal.

By *place*, therefore, we must not understand the earth or this air, but prior to these, the immoveable interval, which is always illuminated after the same manner by the Gods, and divided by the allotments of justice. For these material natures are at one time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation of the Gods. And it is necessary that prior to things which sometimes participate, there should be those which are always suspended after the same manner from the Gods. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars.

With respect, however, to the excellent temperature of the seasons, which is productive of sagacious men, Panectius, and certain other Platonists, understand the words according to their apparent meaning, viz. that the Attic region, on account of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the production of sagacious men. But Longinus doubts the truth of their assertion. For the contrary is seen to be the case, since about this place, there is a great want of symmetry in dryness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather. Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet be able to preserve the immortality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent temperature of the seasons. But he says, that this excellent temperature is not to be referred to the condition of the air, but that it is a certain nameless peculiarity of the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, it is not at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute to prudence and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the circulation of the heavens; for from thence the fertility and sterility of souls are derived, as Socrates says, in the Republic. He, however, apprehends the truth in a more

partial manner. But Longinus is ignorant that he makes the peculiarity to be corporeal, and that he is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For how can one peculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits? And in the next place, a similar peculiarity still remaining, how comes it to pass that there is now no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants? But if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must be shown what it is that is corruptive of it. It is however better to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls adapted to it; that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more animated and irascible nature; that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that which is Esculapian, medical; and that which is Minerval, prudent and sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity; and Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many physical, psychical, daemoniacal, and angelical powers in each portion of place, but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unmingled manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the guardianship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose care, as Homer says, "the mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed," and according to which, the co-adaptations of souls similar to places is effected; hence Plato suspends this excellent temperature from the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its subsistence.

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is always guarded by the Seasons, is adapted to the reception of sagacious souls, selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva, but at another time was under her allotted guardianship; for the text demonstrates the contrary; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts; which aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. These powers, however, are corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As, therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proper life, acts with rectitude; after the same manner, also, the soul which is arranged in a

¹ *Iliad*. V. v. 750.

place conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than the soul which is disseminated in a foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one circulation of the heavens contributes, which introduces a fertility and sterility of souls. In fertile periods, therefore, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less number of sagacious men. Hence, as when a husbandman chooses good land for the efficacious growth of the seeds, knowing that when the season is fertile, he shall reap greater benefit, but when it is barren less, on account of the power of the earth; thus also the text says, that the Goddess chose this place, as productive of sagacious men, in order that when the period is fertile it may have more; and when the period is barren, may have less¹ of prudent and sagacious men, in consequence of falling off from a life adapted to the place. We must not however wonder, if Plato praises the excellent temperature of the visible Seasons. For there is one excellent temperature with reference to the health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious souls, such as is that of the Attic region. For though there is not always the same sagacity in those that inhabit this region, yet there is always a certain greater abundance of it through the peculiarity of the place, and the aptitude of the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion respecting these particulars.

The divine Iamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal-formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sustaining bodies by life, and comprehending all interval. For in a place of this kind, he says the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit. But whether he accords with the words of Plato, may be surveyed from what has been said. If, however, it be requisite, desisting from these things, to contemplate wholes according to the analogous, it must be said that this Goddess fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where distributes to wholes, and to things of the better co-ordination, a more perfect allotment. But these are more replete with wisdom than their opposites, and are more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval characteristic.

“The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first selected this place for the habitation of men most similar to herself.”

¹ In stead of και ηφοριαι πλεος, τω ελαττω αποικιται της κατα τον τοπον επιτηδειας ζωης, in this place, it is necessary to read, και αφοριας ηττω, τω αποικιται, &c. &c.

In what is here said, Plato delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who are sufficiently able to perceive his meaning, the indications of theologians. Different interpreters however betake themselves to different arrangements of the Goddess; some indeed narrating their opinion more enigmatically, but others more clearly, yet not confirming what they assert. For Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend from thence, which possess at the same time irascibility and mildness; and that on this account, the *mystagogues in Eleusis are lovers of wisdom and lovers of war*; since it is said that the race of those who are leaders of the mysteries in Eleusis, is derived from *Musæus, the offspring of the Moon*; and also that the *Hermes there subsists about the Moon, from which also the race of the Ceryers is derived*. The divine Iamblichus, however, blames these assertions, as not well preserving the analogy. For he interprets *war* as that which entirely subverts the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature; but *wisdom* as immaterial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this Goddess¹ is the cause of both these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and warlike life. He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the reception of such-like souls.

If, however, it be requisite that the conceptions of these men should become manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown to accord in the highest degree with theologians, we must assert as follows: deriving what we say from a supernal origin. In the Demiurgus and father of the whole world, many orders of Gods that have the form of *the one*, present themselves to the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or elevating, or connective, or perfective characteristic. But the undefiled and untamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities subsisting in the Demiurgus, according to which he himself remains firm and immutable, and all things proceeding from him participate of inflexible power; and through which, he intellectually perceives every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. All theologians, therefore, call this divinity Minerva, as being brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him; being a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as *theonoe* [*θεονοη*] or *deific intellectio*. But theologians, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

¹ Instead of *των θεων* here, it is necessary to read *της θεας*.

sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, and arranging wholes together with her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic, but through the second philopolemic. For she, who according to the form of the one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is a *philosopher*. And she, who invariably rules over all contrariety, may be properly called a *lover of war*. Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from his head,

With armour shining like a brazen flower.

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue from herself, and elevating powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undefiled life. Hence she is called *Core Tritogeneis*. She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, uniting the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the united gift of herself imparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemic power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate wisdom is pure and unmingled with secondary natures; and the one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far as to the last orders. For since wherever there are partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exhibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs of daemons, or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this Goddess. Hence also, the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these powers of Minerva, in conjunction with fabulous devices says,

The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove
Floats in rich waves, and spreads the court of Jove.
Her father's warlike robe her limbs invest. ¹

¹ For *χορευτων* in this place, it is necessary to read *χορων των*.

² *Iliad*, viii.

In which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But by the warlike robe of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence, also, I think Homer represents her as an associate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures may rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to war and contrarieties, but with a separation and division more adapted to the things themselves. Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union. Hence, likewise, she is said to be philopolemic. For,

Strife, fighting, war, she always loves.

And she is a friend to *war*, indeed, because she is allotted the summit of separation; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures having dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva.

If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, she is *philosophic* indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence, also; she is called *Metis* by the Gods. But she is *philopolemic*, as connecting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity. On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undetiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her father. She too alone shakes the ægis, without waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin;—

Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends;
Huge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns,
Whole ranks of heroes tames and overturns.*

Again, she is *Phosphoros*, as every way extending intellectual light; the *Saviour*, as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father;

* *Ibid.* viii.

Ergane, or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the theologist Orpheus says, that the father produced her,

That she the queen might be of mighty works.

But she is *Calliergos*, or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting by beauty all the works of the father; a *Virgin*, as exerting an undefiled and unmingled purity; and *Aigiochos*, or legis-bearing, as moving the whole of fate, and being the leader of its productions. We should, also, discuss the remaining appellations of the Goddess, if, what we have already said might not appear to be prolix through my sympathy with the discussion. Again, therefore, recurring to the thing proposed we must say, that Plato calls both these divinities, Love and Minerva, philosophers, not for the same reason; but he thus denominates the former, as being the middle of wholes, and as leading to intelligible wisdom; and the latter as the summit of wholes, and as the union of demiurgic wisdom. For the Demiurgus is "Metis the first generator and much-pleasing Love." And as Metis, indeed, he brings forth Minerva; but as Love, he generates the amatory series.

"The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions in a still greater degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do, who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods."

We learn from history that the affairs of the Athenians are more ancient than those of the Saitans; that the establishment of their city is prior; and that their laws are more proximate to Minerva. But in the mundane paradigms, also, wholes are prior to parts; and there is an order in them which is more divine, a power which is greater, and a form of virtue which is truly Minerval. For the genus of virtue is adapted to this greatest divinity, as being virtue herself. For abiding in the Demiurgus, she is wisdom and immutable intelligence, and in the ruling [or supermundane] Gods, she unfolds the power of virtue.

By virtue's worthy name she's called,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the universe, may be called the progeny and pupils of the Gods. For they derive

their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the fabrication of the Gods, and the undefiled production of Minerva. Every thing, therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to them, exhibits transcendent virtue. But this, also, is in wholes; since it must be admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human lives, according to a similitude to wholes. Hence what is now said is applied to the Athenians. But making the life of the Athenians to be one and continued, it conjoins Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. For it says, they "inhabited this region." For the paradigm of them is one, and in continuity with itself; since the whole of the Minerval series being one, extends as far as to the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

"Many and mighty deeds, therefore, of your city are recorded in our temples, and are the subject of admiration; yet there is one which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue."

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the Athenians, he delivered, indeed, their laws according to a division of genera; and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an encomium is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, however, of deeds there is a number, and there is also one unity comprehensive of them, according to which the whole form of the polity is exhibited, he announces that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpasses all the rest in virtue; this deed not being one of the many, but one prior to the many. For such a method of narration subsists appropriately with reference to the universe, in which wholes accomplish, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many contrarities into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and great deeds of the city, the priest very properly relates one deed which was recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigm of it, so far as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in magnitude and virtue; transcendency according to *magnitude* presenting to our view that which is *total*, but according to *virtue* that which is *intellectual*. For wholes and the more divine of mundane natures have many energies of the greatest magnitude,¹ and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all subordinate beings. After this

¹ For *μεγας* here, it is necessary to read *μεγιστος*.

manner, therefore, we must explain what is said. Porphyry, however, by great and admirable deeds, understands such as are accomplished by souls against matter, and material modes. But he calls demons *material modes*. For, according to him, there are two species of demons, of which the one consists of souls, but the other of *modes*: and these are material powers, which are noxious to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that came after him.¹

“ For these writings relate, what a mighty power your city once tamed, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia.”

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any thing of encomiastic augment, if the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics is considered as a mere history; nor fails in theological accuracy in conjunction with caution, if any one is willing to pass from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms. As it is usual, therefore, in Panathenæic orations to celebrate most amply the Persian expedition, and the victories of the Athenians both by land and sea, with which more recent orators fill their orations; Plato in praising the Athenians, neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from the external sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these parts, he informs us that the Athenians were victorious, and that they subdued this mighty power. Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the Greeks, and particularly against the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the west, in order that you may survey the city of the Athenians as from a centre, castigating a Barbaric multitude pouring against it on each side in a disorderly manner. To which may be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the Gigantic war is celebrated, and the victory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with her father she vanquished these and the Titans. Plato, however, does not think it safe immediately to introduce war against the Gods; for this is the very thing which he blames in the ancient poets; and it would be absurd that Critias or Timæus, who were auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should

¹ i. e. By the divine Iamblichus.

again ascribe wars and seditions to the Gods. But through the analogy of human to divine concerns, he delivers this Atlantic war prior to the fabrication of the world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and the Atlantics instead of the Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the same things in images as in wholes. And that I may remind you of the analogy, through the name of the Athenians, he refers his readers to the Olympian co-ordination which fought under the command of Minerva; but through that of the Atlantics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. *Theologists also after the laceration of Bacchus, which manifests the divisible progression into the universe under Jupiter from the importible fabrication, say that the other Titans had different allotments, but that Atlas was established in the western parts, sustaining the heavens.*

By strong necessity the wide-spread heav'n
In earth's extremes, by Atlas was sustain'd.

Farther still, the victories of Minerva are celebrated by the Athenians, and there is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Neptune, and from the genesiurgic being subdued by the intellectual order, and those that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after the procurement of necessaries. *For Neptune presides over generation; but Minerva is the inspective guardian of an intellectual life.* The things proposed therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athenians bearing the name of the Goddess, are analogous to her; and the Atlantics through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune, preserve an analogy to this God; so that it is evident from these things that *the Atlantic war indicates the middle fabrication, according to which the second father [Neptune] being filled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs diviner natures in a more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have a multiplied, divisible, and more material hypostasis, to intellectual natures.* For the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united; but the beings which are governed by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore, these things must be separately understood.

In order however that we may pre-assume certain definite forms¹ of the proposed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within the pillars of Her-

¹ For *rourous* here, it is necessary to read *ruvous*.

cules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them, to the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and that of this, there is one continued, and variously proceeding life. Whether, therefore, beginning from the Gods, you speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities; or beginning from intellect, of permanency and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak of the rational and irrational; or from bodies, of heaven and generation; or in whatever other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those without to the less excellent co-ordination of things. For the true sea of dissimilitude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude from *the one*, are there. Hence, whether you are willing Orphically to arrange the Olympian and Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and to celebrate the former as subduing the latter; or Pythagorically, to perceive the two co-ordinations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better adorning the subordinate rank; or Platonically, to survey much of infinity and much of bound in the universe, as we learn in the Philebus, and the whole of infinity in conjunction with the measures of bound, producing generation, which extends through all mundane natures,—from all these, you may assume one thing, that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this contrariety. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, *that war is the father of all things*, he did not speak absurdly.

Porphyry, therefore, here refers the theory to demons and souls, and makes mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what is proposed to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. The divine Iamblichus however, against those who adopt a more partial assignation of the cause of the analysis, is of opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in the preface he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of such-like narrations. May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars, and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the interpretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before-mentioned forms of analysis; and that we must arrange the Atlantics according to all the total natures of the inferior co-ordination. For in these, also, some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their *insolent injustice*, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity to matter. For matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

to, and being in a certain respect in it, they are said to have acted injuriously from insolence. For the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, through these names, when he says of them, "that their mind is replete with evil counsels, and their heart is insolent." And we must arrange *the rushing from external parts* according to a defection and separation remote from the Gods, and things of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate comprehension of powers, but an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, immaterial, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must be arranged according to matter itself, whether you call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appellations of the inferior co-ordination, being called infinity and darkness, irrationality and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad; just as from the Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receiving the analogies in order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and the more total and partial genera in it, are characterised by progression and division, and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature, viz. the divine and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however such, it is adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may properly say is Minerval, as being undefiled, and subduing through its power things of a subordinate nature. But the inferior co-ordination becoming adorned, ceases from its abundant division and infinity; the genus of the Titans being connected by the Olympian Gods; but difference being united by sameness, motion by permanency, irrational by rational souls, generation by the heavens, and in a similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that two-fold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But *the one* precedes all contrariety, as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these the monad is more excellent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, æther than chaos, the divisions are accomplished after this manner in the Gods prior to the world, and also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of things. For among the supermundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad, but the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, are under the more

ancient, but difference, motion, irrationality, and matter, are under the other of these principles. For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles proceeds. Since however *the one* is beyond the first duad, things which appear to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these two-fold genera of Gods, the oppositely divided genera of being, the various genera of souls, and the contrary genera of bodies. But the subordinate are vanquished by the more divine, and the world is rendered one, being harmonised from contraries, since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from things that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains, it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite; but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole and all-perfect form from *the one*. For it is God, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, who gives subsistence to that which is mixed.

“ For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded that true sea.”

That such and so great an island once existed, is evident from what is said by certain historians respecting what pertains to the external sea. For according to them, there were seven islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine, and also three others of an immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and the middle [or second] of these to Neptune, the magnitude of which was a thousand stadia. They also add, that the inhabitants of it preserved the remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which existed there, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred to Neptune. *These things, therefore, Marcellus writes in his Ethiopic History.* If however this be the case, and such an island once existed, it is possible to receive what is said about it as a history, and also as an image of a certain nature among

wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures. For it is possible to behold the same analogies in a more partial, and in a more comprehensive way. But it is necessary that doctrine proceeding from universals to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You must not therefore wonder, if before we assumed this analogy more generally, but now after another manner, and that we explore the same thing with an accuracy adapted to the things themselves. For since, as we have said, there is a two-fold co-ordination in the universe, which originates from the Gods, and is terminated in matter and material form; and since each possesses things more total, and things more partial, [for this we have before said]; but other things are the middles of both these co-ordinations; for the divine genera are comprehensive of all things, and the last elements are the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and psychical genera subsist between these;—this being the case, we think fit in the first place to divide in a three-fold manner the inferior co-ordination, and to assume in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the inferior co-ordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But it also has, with respect to itself, transcendency and deficiency. Hence Plato says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from *the one* and nearer to matter; but that they inhabited an island larger than both Libya and Asia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are more remote from *the one*, are diminished according to power, but transcend according to quantity; just as such as are nearer to *the one*, are contracted¹ in quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is significant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the sea was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as to the last of things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop, and that which remains beyond it is infinite. For that which in no respect has a subsistence is successive to the boundaries of being. But the addition of *those*, has an indication that total causes proceed without impediment through matter, and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

¹ For *συνεσταμενα* here, it is necessary to read *συνεσταλμενα*.

and indefinite nature. Since however the progression of things is continued, and no vacuum¹ any where intervenes, but a well-ordered diminution is surveyed from more total to middle natures, which comprehend and are comprehended; and from middles to the last and vilest natures,—on this account he says, there was a passage from the Atlantic island to the other islands, and from these to the opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other islands many, and the continent was the greatest. For the monad is adapted to the first genus in every thing; but number and multitude to the second. For multitude subsists together with the duad. And magnitude is adapted to the third genus, on account of the progression of magnitude to the triad. Since, however, the extremities of the worse co-ordination are most material, he manifests through the term *opposite*, that they are at the greatest possible distance from more excellent natures. And he does not alone use the term *external*, as he does of the Atlantics, and which evinces that they belong to the other part, but he also adds the word *opposite*, that he may indicate the most extreme diminution. But he signifies by the words *about that true sea*, the hypostasis of them about matter, and the last of mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that which is truly false, and truly matter, which in the Politicus he calls the sea of dissimilitude. Moreover, because it is necessary that these two-fold co-ordinations should be separated from each other without confusion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on this account he says, that the Pillars of Hercules separated the internal from the external habitable part. *For he denominates flourishing demiurgic production, and the divine separation of genera in the universe, the latter of which always remains stably and strenuously the same, the Pillars of Hercules.* This Hercules therefore is Jovian; but the one prior to this, and who is divine, is allotted the guardian order of the generative series. Hence from both the demiurgic division, which guards these two separate parts of the universe, must be assumed.

“For the waters which are beheld within the mouth we have just now mentioned, have the form of a port with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And the land which surrounds it may be in every respect truly denominated the continent.”

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the better co-ordination,

¹ For *μερον* in this place, the sense requires we should read *κερον*.

as being converted to themselves, and rejoicing in a stable and uniting power. For the *mouth* symbolically manifests the cause which defines and separates the two portions of mundane natures. But the port with a narrow entrance, signifies the convolved, self-converging, arranged, and immaterial hyparxis of these mundane portions. For through *the narrow entrance* it is signified that interval and extension proceed from the worse co-ordination. But through *the port* an hyparxis is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of material natures. For such are ports affording a protection from the tumults in the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more intellectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not be far from the truth.

“ In this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and besides this subjected to their dominion all Libya as far as to Egypt, and Europe as far as to the Tyrrhene sea.”

In what is here said it is requisite to recollect the Platonic hypotheses about the earth, that Plato does not measure the magnitude of it conformably to mathematicians; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it to be, as Socrates says in the Phædo; and that he supposes there are many habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Hence he relates that there is an island and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For in short, if the earth is naturally spherical, it is necessary that it should be so according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inhabited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on high. For, according to Heraclitus, he who passes through a region very difficult of access, will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, the magnitude of which is said to be so great by the Ethiopic historians, that it reaches to the æther, and sends forth a shadow as far as to five thousand stadia. For the sun is concealed by it from the ninth hour of the day till it entirely sets. Nor is this at all wonderful. For Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

but Ptolemy also says that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristotle informs us that Caucasus is illuminated by the solar rays during the third part of the night after the setting, and also for the third part before the rising, of the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, bounded by its elevated parts, will infer that it is truly immense, according to the assertion of Plato. So that we are not now in want of certain mathematical methods to the development of what is said about the earth, nor do we attempt to recur to them. *For these methods measure the earth according to the surface which is inhabited by us ; but Plato says that we dwell in a cavity, and that the whole earth is elevated, which also the sacred rumor of the Egyptians asserts.* And thus much concerning what is related of the magnitude of the Atlantic island, in order to show that it is not proper to disbelieve what is said by Plato, though it should be received as a mere history. But with respect to the power of this island, that there were ten kings in it who begat five male twins, and that it ruled over the other islands, certain parts of the continent, and some parts within the Pillars of Hercules,—all these particulars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now however, for it is proposed to make an analysis of the particulars, the power is said to be great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe, because it proceeds to every thing, and comprehends totally the whole of the second co-ordination. For it is held together by ten kings, because the decad comprehends the rulers of the two co-ordinations ; since the Pythagoreans also say, that all opposites are comprehended in the decad. But they were twins, so that there are five duads, twins being five times begotten from Neptune and Clites ; because according to the measures of justice, there is likewise an orderly distribution of this co-ordination, of which the pentad is an image. The progression of it however is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination is through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune, because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the middle fabrication. For as this God presides over the contrariety which every where exists, he likewise rules over generation and corruption, and all-various motion. But these kings subdued the Atlantic island as comprehending all the first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination. And they subdued the other islands, as likewise comprehending middles through the whole-ness of them. But they also vanquished parts of the continent, as adorning as much as possible the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts of the internal habitable region, *because the last parts of the better are subservient to the first parts*

of the worse co-ordination. Nor is this at all wonderful; since certain demons are in subjection to certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intelligible portion of things are frequently slaves to fate. Such also is the Titanic order with the Gods to which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings was called Atlas, and as it is said in the *Atlantides* gave the name to the island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader; but they subdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but terminates in the worse co-ordination; such as the essence of irrational souls, of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because *Thaumas* and *Bias* are said by ancient theologians to have belonged to this order. Perhaps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-ordination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power], just as the better co-ordination is the offspring of bound. On this account he celebrates the *power* of the Atlantics, just as he does the *virtue* of the Athenians, which belongs to 'bound: for it is the measure of those that possess it. After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says *δυναμιν τε*, through the union of the particle *τε* augmenting *δυναμιν* power. And he also adds, *great*, and *admirable*. But each of these is different from the other. For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable from other things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is vanquished, by so much 'greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

“ But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea.”

¹ *Δυναμιν* is omitted in the original.

² Instead of *προς τον περατος* in this place, it is necessary to read *προς τον περατος*.

³ For *το τουτω* here, read *τουτου*.

Plato does not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that subordinate subdued more excellent beings. But let these things indeed be true in human affairs : the present narration however, indicates, that the most total of the genera in the second co-ordination of things in the universe proceed through all things. For there are both in the heavens and every where, a separating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously, but collected into one, and with one impulse ; but this is, unitedly, and according to one and a continued life. For as in the worse co-ordination *the one* is multiplied, thus also in the better, multitude is united. Hence multitude is every where, and is vanquished through union. Of these things the Atlantics wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlantic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being vanquished by the Athenians, are an image. For multitude and separation, though they may be surveyed in the better co-ordination, yet they will be seen to subsist there unitedly ; multitude not being there victorious, but sameness, and in short, the better genera.

“Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength.”

Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantics, the power of the Athenians ; preferring this appellation, as being adapted to the middle fabrication. And he celebrates the more excellent power for its virtue and strength ; in order that through *virtue*, he may indicate its alliance to the philosophic nature of Minerva ; (for another theology, * and not the Orphic only, calls her virtue,) but through *strength* its alliance to her philopolemic nature. But he calls the power *conspicuous*, because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabrication of sensibles : and to the Atlantics indeed, he alone attributes power, and this continually, because they are arranged under infinity. But he says that the Athenians vanquished this power, through virtue. For as they belong to the co-ordination of bound ; they are characterized by virtue, which measures the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

* i. e. The Chaldean theology.

“For as its armies surpassed all others, both in magnanimity and military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved, it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules.”

As we have triply divided the inferior co-ordination, into first, middle, and last boundaries, thus also we must divide the superior, into the most total, and the most partial genera, and those that subsist between these. And having made this division, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to the first genera; but the other Greeks who were not yet enslaved, to the middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to this arrangement, those that belong to the Minerval series, vanquish those that belong to the series of Neptune; those that rank as first, subduing those that rank as second,¹ the monadic, the dyadic, and in short, the better vanquishing the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the union of themselves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. For some things indeed, are always in matter, others are always separated from it, and others, sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an arrangement in a separate life. Just as in the drama pertaining to us; at one time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian order; and at one time our course terminates in generation, but at another, in the heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably permanent providence of the Gods, which leads back souls to their pristine felicity. For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in subserviency to their will, thus also, through the prior subsistence of anagogic causes, the ascent of our souls from the realms of generation is effected. And thus much

¹ For *πρωτων* here, it seems necessary to read *δευτερων*.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. Let us however, concisely discuss each particular.

The words therefore, *surpassed all others*, manifest the total comprehension of the first genera of the more divine part. But the words *in magnanimity, and military arts*, have the same meaning as Minervally. For through *magnanimity*, they imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through *warlike arts*, her philopolemic characteristic. And the words, *whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies*, signify that first and total causes, produce some things in conjunction with second and middle causes, but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their energy. For the genus of the Gods, and that which is posterior to the Gods, do not produce equally, but the effective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater extent; since every where more divine causes energize prior to, together with, and posterior to their effects. Credibility therefore of this may be multifariously produced. But *the extreme danger* manifests the last production of the first genera. And the *trophics* signify that the second co-ordination is perfected under the first, being adorned by it; that it is in a certain respect *converted* by the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with form, material causes receding, affords a sufficient indication of the inspective care¹ of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophics. But *the most ample liberty*, is an indication of the divine and *liberated* order, proceeding from on high to all things; which liberty the Athenians imparted to the Greeks, by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the Titanic genera. For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquished by the better co-ordination; in partial natures indeed the Atlantics by the Athenians, but in wholes, the Titans by the Olympian Gods. "Though they are robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent improbity," says the theologist; whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics *insolently* proceeded against the Athenians.

"But in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

¹ For *επιστρατιας* here, it is necessary to read *επιστασιας*.

place, and bringing with them desolation, in the space of one dreadful day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. *And hence that sea is at present innavigable, from the impeding mud which the subsiding island produced.*"

That what is here said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who are not entirely ignorant of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there should have been an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed such a large island; since an earthquake that happened a little before our time, shook both Egypt and Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earthquake. For this usually happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with earthquakes, the waves are the cause of this passion. For when the spirit which produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not able to drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in a contrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops the sea by hindering its progression, it is the cause of much sea which is impelled by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the sea thus collected flowing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it in a contrary direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. But the sea deluges the place. For after this manner also about Achaia, there was an earthquake accompanied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities, Bouras and Helice; so that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who considers the affair rightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious and impervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists, according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates, [in his *Meteors*,] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth of it, and that the place there was marshy; so that if *το περιλυ καρτα βραχεος* signifies *marshy*, it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having water on their surface, are called *breakers*. Why therefore should any one contending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by

* The text of Plato in this place is in the Commentaries of Proclus very erroneous, as the learned reader will immediately perceive by comparing it with any of the editions of the *Timæus*.

Orpheus about the hurling into Tartarus, near the end of the fabrication of things.— For he delivering the demiurgic opposition between the Olympian and Titanic Gods,¹ terminates the whole orderly distribution in the extremities of the universe, and imparts to these also the undefiled providence of the Gods. Plato, therefore, knowing this, and delivering to us wholes in images, extends and leads into the invisible, these twofold genera, and through this *disappearing*, imitates the Orphic precipitation into Tartarus. For in order that the last of things may be adorned, and partícipate of divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and inferior co-ordination, should extend their production from on high as far as to the mundane extremity. Each however, effects this in a manner adapted to itself; the one being shaken, and entering under the earth, which is the same as proceeding stably and solidly; but the other disappearing, which is the same as becoming material, disorderly, and formless; *under the earth*, being a symbol of the firm and the stable; but *in the sea*, of that which is very mutable, disorderly and flowing. For in the last of things, permanency and generation are from the better; but corruption, mutation, and disorderly motion are from the worse co-ordination. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabrication receiving their completion, on this account Plato says, they happened in one dreadful day and night, *night* indicating the invisible causes, but *day* the visible, and the *dreadfulness*, signifying opposing power, the inflexible, and that which proceeds through all things. But because all these are accomplished according to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place, which are adapted to the middle fabrication. For if he wished to signify Jovian powers or energies, he would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. But since he delivers Neptunian demiurgic energies, he assimilates them to earthquakes or deluges. For it is usual to call this God *earth-shaker*, and *the source of marine water* (*κλυανόχρηστην*). And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminution, he says that all these events took place *in succeeding time*. It is not therefore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the subjects, as Homer says of the Phaeaceans, and of the wall which the Greeks raised; since the things which are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. For many parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and what he says happened is not at all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it as a mere history; but he introduces it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all things, and extends even to the last of things.

¹ Instead of *την των Ολυμπιων θεων, και την Τιτανικην παραδου, δημιουργικην ατιθεσην* in this place, I read *την των Ολυμπιων θεων, και την των Τιτανικων, κ. λ.*

In short, it is necessary to assert, since the whole orderly distribution of things receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the purpose of giving perfection to the demurgic productions of the second father, the gifts both of the better and the worse co-ordination, proceed as far as to the last of beings; the former vanquishing the subjects [of its power] through *the warlike genus*, and illuminating a stable¹ power, through *entering under the earth*, [i. e. through proceeding firmly and solidly ;] but the latter producing ultimate division, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus. But these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an impervious² and uninvestigable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly mud; and which is mentioned by Socrates in the *Phædo*, when he is teaching us concerning the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely retains the forms of corporeity, which it possesses through the inferior co-ordination subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things. For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is there contained with deiform guards.

“And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking about a polity and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history. For I perceived how divinely from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon.”

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things, the Minerval series adorning all things stably, and in a ruling and victorious manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but preserving those undeited that are separated³ from matter; and also, that the other fabrication imparts appropriately,⁴ motion, division, and difference, to the things fabricated, and proceeds supernally to the end;—all this has been sufficiently

¹ For *γαρμον* here, it is necessary to read *μονιμον*.

² For *απειρος* here, it is necessary to read *απορος*.

³ Instead of *καὶ χωρισμενα* read *κεχωρισμενα*.

⁴ For *προσφορως*, read *προσφορως*.

shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before said. Since however, he by whom this narration is made, is analogous to the God who connects this contrariety, he, in a certain respect imitates him. And through a recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the paradigm, which is filled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with demiurgic power. Farther still, since he brings with him an image of the second, which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that he recollected the history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is not a transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole fabrication of things. For since all things are in intelligibles, every demiurgic cause distributes total productions according to its proper order.

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, you will find that the Athenians are praised in an admirable manner, and that the polity of Socrates is fitly celebrated. *For that it is possible for this polity to exist, is demonstrated through the life of the [ancient] Athenians, and also that it is productive of the greatest good to those who belong to it;* which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate in his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the best form of a polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration. For those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable; since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcendently receive the whole form of their paradigms, are said to be, and are monadic; but material natures which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This therefore, which in the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, viz. to partake transcendently of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits, by applying itself in the most excellent manner to the best measure of life.

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane¹ circle. For the Egyptians are benefited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athenians are benefited by the Egyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. But in addition to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multiplied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. *For fortune and her*

¹ For το εγκωμιον here, it is necessary to read τον εγκοσμιον.

gifts are not without a scope, or indefinite ; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to what is allotted to each individual from the universe. Why then did Socrates collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, on account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of the one divinity¹ who connects the common intellect of Socrates and Solon. For, being of a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain, their tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.

“ Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I consider it therefore necessary, that I should first diligently revolve the whole in my mind.”

These things may also be surveyed in the universe ; viz. that the demiurgic cause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to his own progeny prior to that of partial natures.² And that the hypostatic cause of things generated, first³ intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from himself ; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power to secondary natures. *Conception* therefore and *resumption*, and every thing of this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

“ And on this account, I yesterday immediately complied with your demands ; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose

¹ For *μιαν θεων* in this place, read *μιαν θεον*.

² The erroneousness of the punctuation here, perverts the meaning of Proclus. For the original is, *ταυτα και εν τη παντι θεατειν, προ των μερικων, το δημιουργικον αιτιον των γιγνομενων κατα χρονον υφιστησι τα εαυτων γεννηματα*. But the punctuation ought to be as follows : *ταυτα και εν τη παντι θεατειν, προ των μερικων, το δημιουργικον αιτιον, κ. λ.*

³ Instead of *προ των* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρωτον*.

of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair."

Why did Critias *nearly* remember? For he promised to accomplish what was enjoined him. Because he did not *accurately* remember. But he first revolved the affair in his mind, conceiving that in mandates of this kind, such as that in which Socrates wished to see his polity in motion, the greatest undertaking is to find an hypothesis from which it is possible to give what is adapted to the mandates. And this Critias accomplishes, by receiving from history the war of the Atlantics and Athenians, as a thing capable of exhibiting a life productive of the best polity. He also revolved this narration by night, in order that he might impart it to his associates without error.

Again therefore, from these things, let us betake ourselves to wholes. For there the demiurgic cause being filled from an invisible cause (since all intellectual causes are there primarily, to which he is united¹ according to the highest transcendency), produces the power of himself into the visible world, conformably to their will and judgment. Farther still, not to give the narration immediately, but afterwards, is a symbol of the preparatory apparatus of nature, from which perfection is produced in physical effects. You may also consider the caution of Critias ethically. For it is not proper to attempt things of such a magnitude rashly, without first revolving the whole undertaking by ourselves, in order that we may bring them forth as from a treasury through speech, which is truly the messenger of internal reasons. Moreover, the repeating the narration to himself, imitates the conversion of demiurgic reasons to themselves, according to which [the soul] surveys in herself [by participation] the productive principles of beings. And *to present a discourse accommodated to the wishes of those who enjoined it*, indicates in the fabrication of things the suspension of visible effects from their causes.

"And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood, abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse; yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance, which I had heard in some past time very

¹ For *ωσπρ* here, it is necessary to read *ωσπραι*.

distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition of it. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory."

That children remember better than men is seen in works, and has many probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children have not an experience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor disturbed by externals, their imagination is void of impressions; but their reasoning power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater degree mingled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive, and co-mingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital; after the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of reason. And being strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving through its own power reason in a greater degree; just as the body is more powerful, in consequence of being more vital, through a more abundant communion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things appear to be greater to the imaginations of children. Hence they are in a greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co-passive with them, and on this account especially remember them. For we deposit in the memory things which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us in a greater degree. Hence as that which suffers in a greater degree from fire, preserves for a longer time the heat imparted to it; after the same manner, that which suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression in a greater degree. Moreover the imagination of children suffers more, on account of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood. Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suffering in a greater degree from the same things. And it appears to me that Critias indicates this when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, and that on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness¹ of the things which

¹ For ἀληθειαν here, it is necessary to read ἀσθησιαν.

we hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to the age of children. For every thing that occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And perhaps this brings with it an indication, that the prolific fabrication of Gods of the second rank is suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order; just as the memory of a boy is the cause of memory to the associates of Critias. If some one however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole theory of things, let him hear Iamblicus asserting, that the memory of children indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the indelibility of the letters, the perpetually-flowing and never-failing fabrication; and the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more ancient causes to secondary natures. For these things also have a place in conjunction with the before-mentioned solutions.

“ In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as in a fable; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived, as no other than those ancestors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another.”

Before, Critias made his associates partakers of his narration; but now, he calls on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them. Because in the paradigms all things indeed are united on high, and fill each other with intellectual powers; but in the demiurgic world [or in the world in the intellect of the Demiurgus,] they subsist with each other, according to a certain divine and total conspiracy; conformably to which, and through

which, all things are every where appropriately in each. Hence in the heavens the paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation there are images of celestial natures. Since, however, wholeness every where precedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account Critias first summarily discusses the war; but afterwards he endeavours to explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the Atlantics, and the principle of their generation; how they turned to injustice, how the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what legations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such things as are consequent to these. The genuine polity, therefore, [of Socrates] is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, *that it was fashioned as it were in a fable*. But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication, as in images,¹ of the second fabrication; in which that which is more partial presents itself to the view; and what remains consists of contrariety and motion, and that which is circumscribed in place. Since, however, the second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with it, hence he says, *“that the affair will harmonize in every respect, and that it will not be foreign to the purpose to assert, that the citizens in the Republic of Socrates are the very people who existed at that time.”*

“SOCRATES. But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, *that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history of transcendent magnitude*. It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient.”

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted to the festival of the Athenians; for the [Atlantic] war is an image of mundane wars; and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. *For if speech is of any advantage to men, it should be employed in hymns*. And besides this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; through

¹ For *ὡς ἐκείνων ὁρίτων* in this place, it is necessary to read *ὡς ἐκείνων ὁρίτων*.

sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration as bearing witness to the possibility of his polity. For this, in his discourse about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it was sufficient for him that this scheme of a polity existed in the heavens, and in one man; since all things that have an external, have an internal subsistence, and that which is truly law, begins from the internal life itself. If also he shows, that this polity once prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the possibility of it. This, therefore, has such-like causes as these. Again however it may be assumed from these things, that the narration about the Atlantics is not a fiction, as some have supposed it to be; but a history indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island, must not be rejected as fabulous and fictitious on account of those who enclose the earth in a very narrow space.

“Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune, but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be attentive to what you have to say.”

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies, since they are complicated with corporeal energies, according to external progression, should be inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically, but the latter may impart in a divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every one. Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signifies a divine allotment, according to which each thing is allotted an order adapted to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for Socrates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persons of the dialogue did this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

productions. For to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unmingled purity according to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures from its own peculiarity.

“CRIT. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians.”

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timæus a summit, and at the same time a middle. For he speaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Hermocrates. And thus, indeed, he is a middle; but in another respect, he is a summit, according to science, and because he generates the men, whom Socrates indeed educates, but Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication, which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is exempt from all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise, and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there. But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again summarily speaks prior to Hermocrates. *For the duadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also the whole in conjunction with parts; just as the whole [prior to parts] belongs to the first, but parts to the last fabrication.* Hence Socrates summarily delivered his polity, and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Hermocrates to accomplish after Timæus has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May it not be said that Hermocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration; for the relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Hermocrates to assist him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed. Hence in the *Atlantius*, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about the punishment of the *Atlantics*, he says "*Jupiter thus addressed them.*" And he thus terminates the dialogue, as delivering to Hermocrates the imitation of the words. But there is no absurdity in his not discussing [in the *Atlantius*] the remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose of chastising the insolence of the *Atlantics*, he has every thing consequent to this comprehended in the Gods being thus collected, viz. the preparation of the *Athenians*, their egress, and their victory. *Timaus*, therefore, generates the men, *Socrates* educates them, Critias leads them forth to actions, and Hermocrates to words; the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the supplier of stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progression to secondary natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to their principles through the imitation of reasons [i. e. of productive powers]. Thus, therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no very superfluous manner.

Some one, also, may doubt why the *Timaus* had not an arrangement prior to the *Republic*, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also of the human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as *Timaus* says, that men should be generated; and also, that they should be educated, which *Socrates* effects in the *Republic*; and that they should energize in a manner worthy of their education, which in a certain respect the *Atlantius* exhibits. And if, indeed, *Plato* beginning from the end proceeded to the *Timaus*, which is first by nature, it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first delivered; but that now he appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first as the middle. And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now *Plato* himself appears to have acted in this manner. Here, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity, as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest manner. In answer to this doubt it must be said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the

doubt should be valid, and that the Timæus is not rightly ranked in the second place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would be requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be first assumed. But since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying the universal, applies itself to the nurture and education of men, but the hypothesis consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, these are very properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement prior to the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things as divine [human] souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous vicissitudes of circulations. As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimony to Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived, and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that time. If however the Republic is inferior to the Timæus, because it is conversant with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image, yet the universal prevails in it. *For the same form of life exhibits indeed in the soul justice, but in a city a polity, and in the world, fabrication.*

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is directed to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlantius is posterior to the Timæus. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a master. Plato also manifests through these things, *that the soul when she is of herself [and does not depend on another] is superior to every physical hypostasis, and runs above Fate; but when she verges to actions, is vanquished by physical laws, and is in subjection to Fate.* In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to know this, that from the order of human life delivered in the Republic, the connexion of these dialogues, may be obtained. For in that dialogue the men are first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to the contemplation of [true] beings; and in the third place, descend from thence to a providential attention to the city. Conformably to this congruity, the Republic has an arrangement prior to the Timæus; and the Timæus to the Atlantius. For the men being instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to theory by the Timæus, will, living happily, wisely' perform such actions, as the

¹ For εφορως here, I read εμφορως.

Atlanticus narrates. After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but discussing something else, affords us the following aid in its solution; that those who wish to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to be instructed in the form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore, the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the *Timæus* ought first to have been benefited by the *Republic*, and having been adorned through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing themselves to be most similar through erudition to the excellent order of the universe. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered. *Timæus* therefore, is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the sun,* nor as being conversant with the works of Fate, but as astronomizing above the heavens, conformably to the coryphaeus in the *Theætetus*, and contemplating the invisible causes which are properly stars. Hence Socrates does not exhibit the visible man, but the man that is purely essentialized in reason; and he does this as imitating the whole demiurgus, in whom the heavens and all the stars subsist, as the theologist says, intellectually. *Timæus* begins however, from the generation of the world, and ends in man; because man is a microcosm, possessing all things partially, which the universe does totally, as Socrates demonstrates in the *Philebus*. But there are certain persons educated by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who also educates the whole city, and these are the guardians and auxiliaries. For in the universe, that which transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians were once thus governed, and established laws how children ought to be introduced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ought to be registered;

* For *μετρούρας* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read *εθελοούρας*.

† Proclus here alludes to the following Chaldaean oracle: "Direct not your attention to the immense measures of the earth; for the plant of truth is not in the earth. Nor measure the dimensions of the sun by means of collected courses; for it revolves by the eternal will of the father, and not for your sake. Dismiss the sounding course of the moon; for it perpetually runs through the exertions of necessity. The advancing procession of the [fixed] stars, was not generated for your sake," &c. See my collection of these Oracles, in No. XXVII, of the *Classical Journal*.

and likewise, by what kind of judges, they should be tried, in one place from the tribes, but in another, from other appropriate persons. As Critias therefore admits, that the men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into the polity.

Soc. "I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O Timæus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to law." 27B

The *perfection* and the *splendor* of the narration indicate the supernatural production of things on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally. And to these the words of Socrates refer. The *banquet of discussion* indicates the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms; but the *calling on Timæus*, the conversion of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived; and the *invocation of the Gods*, the fabrication supernally suspended from intelligibles. For the expression *according to law*, is not such as many of the Italic or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, but it has the same meaning as the words usually employed by the Pythagoreans, "Honor in the first place, the immortal Gods, as they are disposed by law." For law manifests the divine order, according to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are filled from them. But law thus beginning from intelligibles, extends to the demiurgic cause, and from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe. At the same time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the Pythagoric doctrine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it should not be such as that which he reprobates in the Phædo, which blinds the eye of the soul, by assigning airs and æthers as causes, conformably to Anaxagoras. For it is necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theology, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, and is divided according to the total orders of them; so that words may be imitators of the things of which they are significant. For mythologists also narrate that Vulcan who presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellectual forms, and is the supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as to this therefore, the preface of the Timæus receives its completion; of which Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does not say that the whole is superfluous, but only such particulars as are introduced

about the Atlantics, and the narration of the Egyptian ; so that he is accustomed to conjoin with the request of Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he connects with the words, "*I now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast,*" the words, "*But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion.*" But Porphyry and Iamblichus show that this preface accords with the whole design of the dialogue, the one indeed more partially, but the other with more profound intuition ; so that we also shall here finish the book in conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.

BOOK II.

THE preface of the *Timæus* consists of two heads; a recapitulation of the polity of Socrates, and a concise narration of the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics, and the victory which they obtained over them. Each of these, however, contributes in the greatest degree to the consummation of the whole theory of the world. For the form of the [Socratic] polity, considered by itself, is primarily adapted to the orderly distribution of the heavens. But the narration of the war and the victory, becomes a symbol to us of the mundane contrariety. And the former describes in images the first fabrication, but the latter the second. Or, if you are willing, the former describes the formal, but the latter the material cause. For all physiologists make principles to be contraries, and constitute the world from the harmonious conjunction of contraries. And harmony indeed, and order are derived from form, which in the recapitulation is shown to proceed from the polity in common, and to extend in an orderly progression to every multitude. For it is one thing to deliver the polity which is in the soul, another, that which is in men, and another, that which is mundane. But the recapitulation of Socrates, describing the form itself of every polity separately, exhibits to us primarily the polity in the universe, to which also it entirely hastens to refer [the polities that rank as] parts.

Farther still, if also you are willing to consider the affair after another manner, the polity may be arranged as analogous to the heavens, but the war to generation. For the polity extends as far as to the last of things; since all things are arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to mundane natures. Contrariety also pre-exists after a manner in the heavens;

either according to the two-fold circulations of the celestial bodies, viz. to the right hand, and to the left; or according to the two-fold circles of souls, the circle of sameness, and the circle of difference; or according to the genera of being, permanency¹ and motion; or according to the divine peculiarities, the male and the female; or according to any other such-like division. The polity therefore, is more allied to the heavens, but the war to generation. Hence the former is Jovian, but the latter pertains to the allotment of Neptune. After however the theory of parts, it is necessary through images to be extended to the knowledge of the whole. And after the survey of images themselves, it is requisite to adhere to their paradigms, from small being initiated in greater [objects of contemplation]. For the former have the relation of things preparatory to initiation, and of small mysteries, exciting the eye of the soul to the comprehension of the whole and the universe, and to the contemplation of the one cause, and the one progression of all mundane natures. For every thing is from *the one*, and the universe with having in different parts of it, more partial presiding powers, proceeds vice versa to the one cause of its subsistence.

Timæus however, prior to entering on the whole discussion, converts himself to the invocations of, and prayers to the Gods, imitating in this the maker of the universe, who prior to the whole fabrication of things, is said to have approached to the oracle of night, to have been there filled with divine intellectual conceptions, to have received the principles of fabrication, and there to dissolve, if it be lawful so to speak, all his doubts. To night also, who calls on the father, [Jupiter] to engage in the fabrication of the universe, Jupiter is represented by the theologian as saying,

Maia, supreme of all the powers divine,
Immortal Night! how with unconquer'd mind
Must I the source of the immortals fix?

And he receives this answer from her,

All things receive inclos'd on ev'ry side,
In æther's wide ineffable embrace;
Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n.²

¹ For *ευστασις* here, it is necessary to read *στασις*.

² For *ευρανῶ* here, it is necessary to read *ευρανόν*.

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter al but praying says,

Da mon, most fan'd, our progeny direct.

And in all that follows, he calls forth the benevolence of his father. For how could he otherwise fill all things with Gods and assimilate the sensible world to *animal itself*, [or the intelligible paradigm] than by extending himself to the invisible causes of wholes, from which being himself filled,

He from his [sacred] heart may godlike works
Again produce.

It is necessary therefore, prior to all other things, that we should know some-^{I. 204}thing manifest concerning prayer, what its essence is, and what its perfection, and whence it is imparted to souls. For the philosopher Porphyry indeed, describing those among the ancients that admitted prayer, and those that did not, leads us from one opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who are diseased according to the first kind of impiety, derive any benefit from prayer, since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those who labour under the second kind, and entirely subvert providence, granting indeed that there are Gods, but denying their providential energies. Nor are they benefited by it, who admit indeed the providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are produced by them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature have not¹ any existence. But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to all things, and that many things that are generated are contingent and may subsist otherwise, these very properly admit the necessity of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct our life. Porphyry also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it is a contact with divinity. But the similar loves to be conjoined to the similar: and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Because likewise those who embrace virtue are in custody, and are inclosed in the body as in a prison, they ought to request the Gods that they may migrate from hence. Besides, since we are as children torn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

¹ For *ἄλλως γινεσθαι οὐτων* here, it is necessary to read, *ἄλλως γινεσθαι μὴ οὐτων*.

that we may return to our true parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as are deprived of their fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray and be converted to the Gods. All nations likewise, that have excelled in wisdom, have diligently applied themselves to prayer; among the Indians the Braehmans, among the Persians the Magi, and of the Greeks the most theological, who instituted initiatory rites and mysteries. But the Chaldeans venerate every other divinity, and likewise the virtue itself of the Gods, which they denominate a Goddess;¹ so far are they from despising sacred worship, on account of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as we are parts of the universe it is fit that we should be in want of the universe. For a conversion to the whole imparts salvation to every thing. If therefore you possess virtue, you should invoke that which antecedently comprehends all virtue. For that which is all-good, will also be the cause to you of appropriate good. Or if you explore a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which comprehends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection should from thence be derived to the parts. And this is the sum of what is said by Porphyry on this subject.

The divine Iamblichus however, does not think that a history of this kind pertains to what is here proposed to be considered. For Plato is not now speaking about atheistical men, but about such as are wise, and able to converse with the Gods. Nor does he speak of such as are dubious about the works of piety; *but to such as wish to be saved by those who are the saviours of wholes, he delivers the power of prayer, and its admirable and supernatural perfection which transcends all expectation.*

It is fit however, that transferring what he says to what is more usual and more known to the reader, we should render his meaning clear, and assign arguments concerning prayer which accord with the doctrine of Plato. From hence therefore we must begin: All beings are the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist, and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the divinities. And this is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself. For a divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all

¹ For *θεω* in this place, it is requisite to read *θεω*.

things. Hence though you should assume the last of beings, in these also you will find divinity. For *the one* is every where; and in consequence of its absolute dominion, every thing receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. As all things however proceed, so likewise, they are not separated from the Gods, but radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For where can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace? For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of subsistence. But all beings are contained by the Gods and reside in their natures, after the manner of a circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be separated from the Gods; because all off-spring when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the immense vastness of non-entity. But in a certain respect they are established in them; and in short, proceed in themselves, but abide in the Gods. Since however, having proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return, imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to their cause, in order that these being arranged conformably to the perfective triad, may again be contained by the Gods and the first unities,—hence they receive from them a certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to the goodness of the divinities, in order that being at first rooted in, they may again through conversion be established in them, forming a certain circle, which originates from and terminates in the Gods.

All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to the Gods, receiving this power from the divinities, together with two-fold impressions according to essence; the one, that they may abide there, but the other that, having proceeded, they may convert themselves [to their causes]. And these things we may survey not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the symbols which they are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to *this*, but others to *that* series of Gods? For nature being supernally suspended from the Gods, and distributed from their orders, inserts also in bodies impressions of their alliance to the divinities. In some indeed, inserting solar, but in others lunar impressions, and in others again, the symbol of some other God. And these indeed, convert themselves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

* For *παρ' αὐτῶν* here, read *παρεστέ.*

the divinities. The Demiurgus of the universe therefore, by a much greater priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of their being. And through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on them stability; but through intellect, he imparted to them the power of conversion.

But to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility. For it attracts to itself the beneficence of the Gods, through those ineffable symbols which the father of souls has disseminated in them. It likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is addressed; conjoins the intellect of the Gods with the words of those who pray; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend good to the abundant communication of it; is the fabricator of divine persuasion; and establishes in the Gods all that we possess.

To a perfect and true prayer however, there is required in the first place, a knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches. For no one will accede to the Gods in a proper manner, unless he has a knowledge of their peculiarities. Hence also the oracle admonishes, *that a fire-heated conception has the first order in sacred worship*. But in the second place, there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all purity, chastity, discipline, and order, through which our concerns being introduced to the Gods, we shall attract their beneficence, and our souls will become subject to them. (In the third place, contact is necessary, according to which we touch the divine essence with the summit of our soul, and verge to a union with it.) But there is yet further required, an approximating adhesion: for thus the oracle calls it, when it says, *the mortal approximating to fire will possess a light from the Gods*. For this imparts to us a greater communion with, and a more manifest participation of the light of the Gods. In the last place, union succeeds establishing *the one* of the soul in *the one* of the Gods, and causing our energy to become one with divine energy; according to which we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed as it were in the Gods, abiding in divine light, and circularly comprehended by it. And this is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from *the one* of the Gods, may again be established in *the one*, and the light which is in us may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.

Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls. Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer; but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the Gods, which is the summit of virtue. *Nor in short, ought any*

other to pray than he who is transcendently good, as the Athenian guest [in Plato] says. For to such a one, converse with the Gods becomes most efficacious to the attainment of a happy life. But the contrary is naturally adapted to befall the vicious. For it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. Hence, it is necessary that he who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the Gods propitious to him, and should excite in himself conceptions full of intellectual light. For the favor and benignity of more exalted beings, is the most effectual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requisite to continue without intermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to the oracle] the rapid ¹ Gods perfect the mortal constantly employed in prayer. It is also necessary to observe a stable order in the performance of divine works; to exert those virtues which purify and elevate the soul from generation, together with faith, truth, and love; to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit, that thus becoming *alone*, we may associate with *solitary deity*, and not ² endeavour to conjoin ourselves with multitude to *the one*. For he who attempts this, effects the very contrary, and separates himself from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in conjunction with non-entity to associate with being; so neither is it possible with multitude to be conjoined with *the one*. Such therefore are the particulars which ought first to be known concerning prayer; viz. that the essence of it congregates and binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures. For as the great Theodorus says, all things pray except the first.

The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common ³ goods, ends in divine union, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine light. But its efficacious energy both replenishes us with good, and causes our concerns to be common with those of the Gods. With respect to the causes of prayer too, we may infer, that so far as they are *effective*, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods, converting and calling upwards the soul to the Gods themselves. But that so far as they are *final* or perfective, they are the immaculate goods of the soul, which they derive as the fruits of being established in the Gods. That so far also as they are *paradigmatical*, they are the primordial causes of beings, which proceed from *the good*, and are united to it, according to one ineffable union. But that so far as they are *formal*, they assimilate souls to the Gods, and give perfection to the whole of their life. And that so far as they are *material*, they are the impres-

¹ i. e. The intelligible Gods.

² For *αφ' ἑαυτῆς πληθους* here, it is necessary to read *καὶ μὴ μετὰ πληθους*.

³ For *κοινοτερον* in this place, it is requisite to read *κοινοτερων*.

sions or symbols inserted by the Demiurgus in the essences of souls, in order that they may be excited to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced them, and whatever else exists.

Moreover, we may likewise define the modes of prayer which are various, according to the genera and species of the Gods. For prayer is either demiurgic, or cathartic, or vivific. And the *demiurgic* is such as that which is offered for the sake of showers and winds. For the *demiurgi* are the causes of the generation of these. And the prayers of the Athenians for winds procuring serenity of weather are addressed to these Gods. But the *cathartic* prayer is that which is offered for the purpose of averting diseases originating from pestilence, and other contagious distempers; such as we have written in our temples. And the *vivific* prayer is that with which we worship the Gods, who are the causes of vivification, on account of the origin and maturity of fruits. Hence prayers are of a perfective nature, because they elevate us to these orders of the Gods. And he who considers such prayers in a different manner, fails in properly apprehending the nature and efficacy of prayer. But again, with reference to the things for which we pray; those prayers, which regard the salvation of the soul, obtain the first place; those which pertain to the good temperament of the body, the second; and those rank in the third place, which are offered for the sake of external concerns. And lastly, with respect to the division of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the seasons of the year, or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish multifarious prayers according to other such-like conceptions.

270
 TIM. "But, O Socrates, all such as participate but in the least degree of temperance, [i. e. wisdom] in the impulse to every undertaking, whether small or great, always invoke divinity."

Do you see what kind of an hypothesis Plato refers to the Timæus; what kind of an auditor of it he introduces, viz. Socrates; and what a beginning of the discussion he has described? For the hypothesis indeed, refers to the whole fabrication of things; but the auditor is prepared to be led to it conformably to the one intellect and one theory of wholes. Hence also he excites Timæus to prayer. But the beginning of the discussion, being impelled from the invocation of the Gods, thus imitates the progression of beings, which first abiding in the Gods, are thus allotted a generation from them. Since however, it is said, that "all who in the least degree participate of

temperance always invoke divinity in the impulse to every undertaking, whether it be small or great," let us see from what kind of conception they make this invocation of the Gods in every thing in which they engage. For it is not probable that those who are temperate will not make real being the scope to which they tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of their theory; who deposit the beautiful and the good in the prerogatives of the soul, and not in human affairs, nor in external fortunes; and who perceive ' the power of providence extending through all beings, and harmonizing all things to the universe, so that both the whole and the parts may subsist most beautifully, and that nothing may be destitute of the providence which proceeds from deity to all things; these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning the Gods. But again, perceiving this to be the case, they will very properly in each action, and according to each energy, call on divinity as the co-adjutor of their impulse, introducing their productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes, and establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things which appear to be small, enjoy the providence of the Gods, and are great so far as they are suspended from them; just again, as things which are great in their own nature, when they separate themselves from divinity, are seen to be perfectly small, and of no worth.

These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a certain human habit, nor approaching to what is called continence, but a divinely inspired energy of the soul, converting herself to herself and to divinity, perceiving the causes of all things in the Gods, and from thence surveying both other things, and such as proceed [into a visible subsistence], through which as auxiliaries, ² we also may be able to recur to the Gods, by means of the gifts which they insert in us. The soul also, when thus converted to herself, finds symbols of the Gods in each even of the smallest things, and through these renders every thing familiar and allied to the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the whole of our essence and gave us a self-motive nature in order to the choice of good, their producing power is particularly manifested in our external energies; though when we consult, we require their providential attention; (which the Athenians manifest by honoring Jupiter the Counsellor) and when we choose, we are in want of their assistance; in order that by consulting, we may discover what is advantageous; and that in choosing, we may not through passion verge to that which is worse; but rather, that both when acting, and when

¹ For καθάρωσι here, read καθάρωσι.

² For ἀφορμῶν in this place, it is necessary to read ἀφορμῶν.

impelled, we may perceive that the self-motive nature possesses the smallest power, and that the whole of it is suspended from the providence of the Gods. Hence Timæus also says, that those who are temperate always invoke the Gods, in the *impulse* to every undertaking. For in our elections indeed, we are more able to separate providence from that which is in our power; but we are incapable of doing this in our impulses¹ because in these we have less of the self-motive energy. For that which is in our power is not so extended as the providence of the Gods; but as we have frequently said, superior energize prior to secondary natures, and together with and posterior to them, and on all sides comprehend the energies of subordinate beings. But, says the Epicurean Eumæchus, how can we avoid proceeding to infinity,² if in the impulse to every small thing, we require prayer: for though we should pray, we shall be in want of another prayer, and we shall no where stop? And Porphyry dissolves the doubt as follows: that it is not said it is necessary to pray on account of every thing, but in the impulse to every thing. We are impelled therefore to every thing, but we are not impelled to impulses, so that there is not a progression to infinity. Or does not the doubt still remain? For we are impelled to prayer, so that in this we shall again require prayer, and an impulse to this again to infinity. Hence it is better to say, that he who prays respecting any thing, prior to this, acknowledges to the Gods, that he is allotted a power from them of conversion to them, and that to other things indeed good is imparted through prayer, but to prayer through itself. It does not therefore require another prayer, since it comprehends good in itself, and procures communion with a divine nature.

“It is necessary therefore, that we should do this, who are about to speak in a certain respect concerning the universe, whether it was generated, or is without generation, unless we are perfectly unwise.”

Timæus evinces how very admirable the hypothesis is, but elegantly preserves himself in the order of a prudent man, pursuing the medium between irony and arrogance. For having before said, that those who in the smallest degree participate of temperance, invoke divinity in the impulse to every great or small under-

¹ Instead of διακριναι γαρ επι μεν των υρεσιων, την προνοιαν απο του εφ' ημιν αδυνατουμεν, επι δε των ορμων, μαλλον δυναμεθα in this place, it is necessary to read, διακριναι γαρ επι μεν των υρεσιων, την προνοιαν απο του εφ' ημιν μαλλον δυναμεθα, επι δε των ορμων, αδυνατουμεν.

² For αφορον here, read απειρον.

taking, he very much exalts his proposed subject of discussion, by opposing a discourse about the *universe* to a *small thing*. But he cautiously says, not that he has himself arrived at the summit of temperance [i. e. of wisdom]; for this is the contrary, to the participation of temperance in the smallest degree; but that he is not perfectly unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that he may have to show, that the power and science which he possesses, are from the work itself, but not from his own discussions. His theory therefore, will be concerning the universe, so far as it is produced by the Gods. For the world may be multifariously surveyed; either according to its corporeal-formed nature, or so far as it is full of partial and total souls; or so far as it participates of intellect. Timæus however, considers the nature of the universe, not according to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression from the Demiurgus; where also physiology appears to be a certain theology; because things which have a natural subsistence, have in a certain respect a divine hyperaxis, so far as they are generated from the Gods. And thus this must be determined.

It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds *in a certain respect*: for he says, “*Those who are about to speak in a certain respect concerning the universe.*” And the more superficial indeed of the interpreters say, that the universe is *in a certain respect* unbegotten, and *in a certain respect* generated. Hence the discussion of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is unbegotten, and in a certain respect as of that which is generated. Though Plato does not co-arrange* *το πζ* in a certain respect, with the words *unbegotten* and *generated*, but with the words *about to speak*. But the divine Iamblichus says that the discussion is *in a certain respect* about the universe, and *in a certain respect* not; for matter, as being indefinite in the world, may be variously considered. To this interpretation however, it may be said, that *πζ* is co-arranged with something else, and not with the universe. Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that words are multifariously enunciated. For the demingic words proceeding from intellect are of one kind, such as the Demiurgus utters to the junior Gods: for Plato says, “*that the soul speaks, being moved to itself.*” Those words which are surveyed in science, are of another kind. And those are of another kind which are allotted the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed externally for the sake of discipline and communication with others. Hence Timæus knowing that those

* Instead of *καθ' ὅσον πληρῆς ἐστὶ ψυχικῶν τε καὶ οὐλικῶν* in this place, it is necessary to read, *καθ' ὅσον πληρῆς ἐστὶ ψυχῶν μερικῶν τε καὶ οὐλικῶν.*

† For *καὶ τὴ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ* here, it is requisite to read *καὶ τοὶ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων μὴ ἐν, κ. λ.*

are demiurgic words which the Demiurgus employs, but that those are scientific which he is now about to generate, but which he pre-assumes in himself, and that he makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this account he says that he shall employ words *in a certain respect* about the universe. For it is one thing to use them intellectually, another scientifically, and another, for the sake of discipline; and $\pi\eta$ indicates these differences of words.

Again therefore, with respect to the words, "*whether it was generated, or is without generation,*" those interpreters read the former with an aspirate, but the latter with a soft breathing, who say that Plato speaks about the universe, so far as it was generated from a cause, or is unbegotten, in order that surveying it as generated, we may perceive the nature which it contains. And the Platonic Albinus thinks, that according to Plato the world being perpetual,¹ has a beginning of generation, by which also it is more redundant than being; since this indeed always is, but the world in addition to existing always, has a beginning of generation, in order that it may exist always, and be generated. Not that it is generated after such a manner as to be so according to time; for in this case it would not always exist; but in short, it has the relation of generation, on account of its composition from things many and dissimilar. And it is necessary to refer its hypostasis to another cause more ancient than itself, through which always existing primarily, the world is *in a certain respect*, and always is, and is not only generated, but is also unbegotten. [This therefore is asserted by Albinus, though Plato no where in what follows says, that the universe is in a certain respect generated, and in a certain respect unbegotten. Others again, read both the parts with an aspirate, in order that Timæus may say, *he is about to speak concerning the universe so far as it is generated, and so far as it is unbegotten*; ering in the same way as those prior to them; unless indeed they assert that the universe was generated according to form, but unbegotten according to its nurse [matter]. For thus also Timæus says, that its nurse is unbegotten, but that the world was generated, as receiving form from divinity. But Porphyry and Iamblichus read both the parts with a soft breathing, in order that what is said may be *whether the universe was generated or is unbegotten*. For this is to be considered, prior to all other things; since it contributes in the highest degree to the consummation of the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was generated or is unbegotten. For from this hypothesis we shall be able to see what the nature is of

¹ For ἀγεννητον here, I read αἰδιον.

its essence and powers, as will be manifest to us shortly after. The discussion therefore, concerning the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will proceed from this principle, whether the world was generated, or is without generation; and from this, other things must be woven together in a consequent order.

“It is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses, we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.”

The division of male and female comprehends in itself all the plenitudes of the divine orders. For the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier of being, and that which is the first principle of conversion to all things, are comprehended in the male. But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and separations, measures of life and prolific powers, is contained in the female. Hence, Timæus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very properly comprehends the whole orders of them, in a division into these genera. Such a division, likewise, is most adapted to the proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes) the order of the male to the female; because the motion of heaven imparts productive principles and powers to every thing [sublunary]; and earth receiving the effluxions thence proceeding, is parturient with and generates all-various animals and plants. Of the Gods also in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male, but others according to the female. And of those powers that govern generation in an unbegotten manner, some are of the former, but others of the latter co-ordination. In short, the demiurgic choir is abundant in the universe, and there are many rivers of life, some of which exhibit the form of the male, but others of the female characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this subject? For from the liberated unities,¹ both masculine and feminine, various orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is entering on the discussion of the universe, very properly invokes the Gods and Goddesses, from both which the universe receives its completion, and beseeches them that what he asserts may be consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their divinities. For this is the sublimest end of theory, to run upward to a divine intellect; and as all

¹ For εἰδῶν here, it is necessary to read εἰδῶν.

things are uniformly comprehended in it, to arrange the discussion of things agreeably to this causal comprehension. But that which is the second end, and is consequent to this is; for the whole theory to receive its completion conformably to human intellect and the light of science. For the whole, the perfect, and the uniform, pre-exist in a divine intellect; but that which is partial and falls short of divine simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.

Why however, does Timæus say, that it is necessary to pray, and magnificently proclaim that the Gods and Goddesses should be invoked, yet does not pray, though an opportunity for so doing presents itself, but immediately converts himself to the proposed discussion? We reply, it is because some things have their end comprehended in the very will itself; but others, distribute¹ another energy after the will, and through action accomplish that which was the object of the will. And a life indeed, conformable to philosophy, depends on our will, and a deficiency in it, is contrary to the will. [But the consequences resulting from a life conversant with external actions, are not dependent on our will;] for the end of them is not placed in us. We may justly, therefore, rank prayer among the number of things which have all their perfection in the will. For the wish to pray, is a desire of conversion to the Gods. And this desire itself conducts the desiring soul, and conjoins it to divinity, which is the first work of prayer.² Hence it is not proper first to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to pray, will at the same time have prayer as the measure of his wish, one person indeed in a greater, but another in a less degree. Farther still, this also is the work of a true prayer, for those things for which we pray to be common to the Gods, both according to powers and energies, and for us to effect them in conjunction with the Gods.—Thus if some one should pray to the powers that amputate matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but should himself particularly endeavour to effect this, through the cathartic virtues; such a one in conjunction with the Gods, would entirely accomplish a dissolution of his material bonds. This therefore Timæus here effects. For those things which he prays to the Gods to accomplish, he himself completes, disposing the whole discourse according to human intellect, but so as to be in conformity to the intellect of the Gods.

“And such is my prayer to the Gods with reference to myself; but as

¹ For ἀποτετα in this place, we must read ἀπεσπυα.

² For εὐχῆς here, it is obviously necessary to read εὐχῆς.

to what respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn, and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made.]”

The exhortation of the auditors, is a thing consequent to the prayers¹ [of Timæus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing source being suspended from its proper causes, should previously excite its recipients, and convert them to itself, prior² to the plenitude which it confers; in order that becoming more adapted, they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it imparts. For thus the participation will become more perfect to them,³ and the gift will be rendered more easy to the giver. Moreover, this very circumstance of facility, is adapted to those that imitate the whole fabrication; from which abiding and rejoicing in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites. Farther still, to produce one series, through the contact of secondary with prior natures, adumbrates the demiurgic series, which proceeds as far as to the last of things. For if the auditors receive what is said conformably to the intellect of Timæus, but Timæus disposes the whole discussion conformably to the intellect of the Gods, it will happen that the whole conference will in reality be referred to one intellect, and one intellectual conception. Besides this also, the self-motive nature of souls is sufficiently indicated, that being moved by the Gods, they also move themselves, and produce from themselves sciences. For the words, “*what I scientifically conceive,*” exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose power is free.

According to my opinion therefore, these things are first to be considered; that Timæus being a Pythagorean, and preserving the form of Pythagoric discussions, is immediately exhibited to us as such, from the very beginning. For Socrates does not enunciatively declare his opinions to others, but having dialectically purified their conceptions, unfolds truth into light; who also said to them, that he knew nothing except to make an assertion [or give a reason] and receive one. But Timæus, as also addressing his discourse to men, says that he shall enunciate his own dogmas, not at all busying himself with foreign opi-

¹ The original of the words within the brackets belongs to the text, but is not to be found in the commentaries of Proclus, though as the reader may see, he comments on these words.

² For ψυχαι here also, it is necessary to read ευχαι.

³ Instead of προς της πληρωσεως in this place, we must read προ της πληρωσεως.

⁴ For το γαρ αυτοις, read τοις ;ηρ αυτοις.

nions, but pursuing one path of science. Moreover, the word *δοξα*,¹ i. e. *I am of opinion*, is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately to what has been before said. For of the whole rational soul, one part is intellect, another is *dianoia*, and a third is opinion. And the first of these indeed, is conjoined to the Gods, the second produces the sciences, and the third imparts them to others. This man therefore, knowing these things, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Gods. For this is manifested by the words, "that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves." But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors. For the words, *what I scientifically conceive*, have an indication of this kind. The doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from *dianoia*, delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nor divided about sensibles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in *hypolepsis*² alone; but it is filled from intellect and *dianoia*, surveys the demiurgic reason, and distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sufficiently assimilated to the paradigm³ of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes, according to which the paradigm is united to intelligibles; a *dianoia*, containing in itself the plenitudes of forms; and the first and uniform cause of opinion. Hence, *the paradigm contains intelligibles in intellect, but introduces sense to the worlds*, as the Oracle says; or as Plato, "such ideas therefore, as intellect perceived to be inherent in animal itself, so many he dianoetically saw this universe ought to possess."

Moreover, the distinction between beings and things generated, is consentaneous to what has been before said. For after the Gods and Goddesses, and the ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the separation of these two genera, i. e. of being and generation, takes place. For being is allied to the more excellent order of divine natures, which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible. But generation is allied to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after what manner was it produced? Was it made as if it were the section of a certain whole into parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence into accidents, or vice versa,

¹ This word is not to be found in any edition of the *Timæus* of Plato; but from this comment of Proclus, it appears that it originally belonged to it.

² viz. In the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism consists.

³ i. e. To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.

that of accident into essences; for these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and generation, either as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated; unless some one should say that $\tau\iota$, i. e. *a certain thing*, is thus divided by him? This division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts? But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to one composition? How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. Hence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that which is generated; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, generation also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons [i. e. productive powers]. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be *the one*. Because every genus is divided by its proper differences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that *the one* should have differences either in capacity, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures; or in energy, lest it should have multitude. But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have differences; so that neither will there in short, be a division of *the one*.

What then shall we say? Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to define separately what each of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word $\delta\iota\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omicron\nu$ has the same signification with $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\rho\iota\nu\eta\tau\epsilon\omicron\nu$. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged; and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise does the very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them from their genera. There however, bound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed through all beings of whatever kind they may be. For these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were likewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivific duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers. Here however, being and that which is generated, do not begin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior to these *the one itself* is exempt from all beings, because the first God is *one*,¹ but the other Gods are *unities*. Nor are being and that which is generated things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said to be and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as far as to the last of things. For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to suffer being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is however, [evident]² that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may discover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic cause of it. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. There is therefore a demiurgic cause of the universe. If there is a Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

¹ For *ος* here, it is obviously necessary to read *εϋ*.

² *φανερὸν* is omitted in the original.

order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology.

“What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be] but is never [real] being.”

According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction; but not all beings according to others. And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself. Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words [of Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore, $\tau\omicron$ $\tau\iota$, or the *what* is definitive. For we are accustomed to give $\tau\iota$ an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that $\tau\omicron$ $\tau\iota$ is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that *the all* is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate *that* there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry *what* it is. For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative discussions, to consider *if* a thing is previous to the investigation, *what* it is. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timæus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosophises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and truly the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly non-being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timæus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about *the good* he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region.¹ And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if

¹ See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted.

there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being : for this is united to the Gods ; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never *truly* being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the existence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being ? For if this also was generated, it must have been generated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generated. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation is in a circle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it is not lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is *the one*, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and effects. Hence it remains that [true] being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from *the one* ? Because, we reply, it is absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. It is necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from *the one*, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt is, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to physiology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hypotheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says therefore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being is. But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, he demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this particular.

With respect however, to perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe ? for it is differently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Demiurgus is not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm is not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is to be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly evident from Plato when he says, "*According to which of the paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or according to that which was generated?*" And he immediately decides by saying, "*If the world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus is good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. But if the world is not beautiful, and the Demiurgus is not good, which it is not lawful to assert, then he looked to a generated paradigm.*" If therefore it is not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evident from this; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgus constitutes, the first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiurgus, however, is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says concerning him, "*After this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning of the God.*" And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not rank among eternal beings? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual being? The divine Iamblichus, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evincing that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species of being; and establishes it at the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily participates of *the one*. But what is written in the Parmenides concerning the one being (or being characterized by *the one*), and also in the Sophista, bears testimony to these things. For there Plato arranges the one being prior to whole, and prior to the intelligible all; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however, Plato clearly calls the paradigm perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect. For he denominates it all-perfect animal; and a whole, when he says, "*of which other animals are parts according to one, and according to genera.*" So that if the paradigm is a whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily being is above whole and all, the paradigm and that being will not be the same.

Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed such an order of being, as that divine man [Iamblichus] has delivered, and such as Plato elsewhere surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every eternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful. For, *at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every perpetual and invisible nature*, as when it is said that the soul also is intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phædo. But at another time it is asserted of the natures that

are more excellent than every psychical essence, as the division in the Republic manifests. And at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is evident from what Timæus a little after says of them. After the same manner, therefore, being in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal world. For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings. For every where, that which is primarily being in its own series, has the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which it is. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the highest place in the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal itself in animals, thus also being itself which is primarily being, is the summit of all beings, and from it all beings proceed.¹ But every intelligible and intellectual being, and whatever appears to exist, has² the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity. For eternity participates of being. Hence all such things as participate of eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such things as participate of being, participate likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being, so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But perpetual being is eternal. Hence the reasoning demonstrates the very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed from perpetual being, than the one being. For this latter is better than *the ever*, as subsisting between *the one* and eternity, and prior to eternity being denominated one being.

If, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to me to be the truth, *Plato now precedaneously assumes every thing which is eternally being; beginning, indeed, from the nature of animal itself. For this is primarily eternal; but ending in partial intellects.* But the one being, he perhaps omits, in consequence of its existing as the³ monad of these, and as being ineffable, and conjoined to *the one*. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible, if that intelligible is not assumed which is occult, is the highest, and does not depart from *the one*. He says, therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the most beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to this, being

¹ In the original *ὅτι τὸ δῆλον καὶ τὸ ἀντίστοιχόν, ὁ πρῶτος ἐστὶς, ὁ κεκορημένος οὐκ ἐστὶ ἀπείριστος, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προέσται.* After *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* therefore, the words *πάντα τὰ ὄντα* must be supplied.

² *ἔχει* is wanting here in the original.

³ *Τὸν μόνα* here, read *μόνας*.

through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itself is the most beautiful of all the objects of intellect, both animal itself and the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as being *causally* ever, eternity as being so according to *hyperis*, and animal itself or the eternal, as existing *always*, according to *participation*. Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiurgus will be comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the occult cause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellectual; beginning indeed from being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not alone comprehend, as Iamblichus says it does, the summit of all beings, such as the being is which is characterized by *the one*, or the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and to which *the one itself* alone, and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. *The one*, therefore, is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, is self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through *the one*. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature, is self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed indeed into existence from a more excellent cause, but are not self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consisting of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being; for it is said to be *always* being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, that is of a contrary nature. For it appears to me that the addition of the words, "*but not having generation*," indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from all temporal mutation. For soul

* For *παρῆται* in this place, it is requisite to read *πρῆται*.

participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved according to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical *truly existing and at the same time not truly existing being*; ⁴ the sensible *not truly existing being*; and matter, *truly non-being*. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere investigate. But that the addition of "*not having generation*," is for the sake of indicating the separate essence of perpetual being, is I think evident from what has been said.

➤ In the next place, with respect to *that which is generated*, whether does it signify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we understand by it *every corporeal formed nature*, and not the soul of the universe; so far as this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe is, in a certain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intellect *that which is generated*: for this is immediately perpetual being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, *always*, and *that which is generated*, in the same manner as *being*, or *at a certain time*, in order that he might have *what is generated* entirely opposed to *perpetual being*? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, looking to the various nature of that which is generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence at a certain time, and the perpetuity of a generated nature? *For the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts at a certain time*. And after another manner [of considering the affair] with respect to forms, some are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that which is truly always; but others are in time, and depart from matter. *For corporiety, indeed, is always generated and is always about matter; but the form of fire, or of air, enters into and departs from matter, becoming separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature*. But if the perpetuity which detains matter is always *generated*, it never therefore *is*; and if the existence at a certain time is *generated*, it is never *being*. Every thing

⁴ After *οὐτως περ ἐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς πλάτος*, instead of *οὕτως ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δεξιῶτος*, it is necessary to read *οὕτως αὐτοῦ οὕτως οὐτως οὐ*.

however, which is generated, is either *always* generated, or *at a certain time*. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never [real] being.

These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether *perpetual being* in this place is asserted of all beings, or not of all. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all beings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, can be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that which contains in itself the causes of all things, unically, as it is said, and universally. For the case is as follows: one thing (i. e. being itself) is super-eternal; [another thing is eternity;] another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal. With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of *the ever*; the second, as that which is primarily always being, and *the ever itself*, and not according to participation; but the third is always, as participating of *the ever*, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this kind. For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is *being alone* according to hyparxis, but is *perpetual being* according to cause. Eternity is *perpetual being* according to hyparxis, but *being* according to participation. And the eternal is *perpetual being* according to participation, but according to hyparxis is a certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual [only]. And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane; and if this, it is either divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal.

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the universal, we must assume generation all-variously changed; but if every thing generated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are generated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it lives in time, and time is commensurate with its ener-

* The words *το δε αιων*, are wanting in the original, but must necessarily be supplied.

gies. And thus ascending from beneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our progression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person¹ rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the *Phaedrus* says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self-moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivifying itself. If therefore we say, that it is both unbegotten and generated, eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest² thinks fit to call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect only eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly existing being. For it is one thing to *be* always, and another to be *generated* always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always; for they do not possess being from themselves. But soul *is* always; for it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not *generated* from a cause, but *is* from a cause. For generation is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there is a comprehension of all beings in the before-mentioned portions of division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in them. There is not a comprehension of all beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul. And there is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being assumed, it is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time both being and that which is generated.

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is generated, are necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in the beginning, i. e. *whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated*. For if this is the first of the things to be investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first order in the axioms. For the other axioms follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the generation of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about the hypotheses, I should more fully explain what appears to me on the subject,

¹ i. e. Aristotle.

² In the 10th book of the *Laws*.

Plato in the same manner as geometricians, employs definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and antecedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are different from the principles of medicine, and in a similar manner there are different principles of arithmetic and mechanics; thus also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow :] *Truly existing being is that which may be comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is generated is to be apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive its subsistence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the paradigm is eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That, of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the world.* For from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears to me, that on this account he shows *what* perpetual being is, and also *what* that is which is generated, but does not show us *that* each of them is. For the geometrician informs us *what* a point is, and *what* a line is, prior to his demonstrations, but he by no means teaches us *that* each of these is. For how can he be a geometrician, if he discusses his own principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says *what* perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about to make, but he by no means shows *that* it is; for in so doing, he would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timæus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogue the highest science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves *that* truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is sufficient for him to admit *that* it is, preserving the boundaries of physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the producing cause; but the fourth, that he may be able to infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of *the good* and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his *Physics*, imitating Plato, assumes one

* For παράδειγμα αἰτιον here, read παραδειγματικον αἰτιον.

hypothesis, when he says, *it is supposed by us with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved.* For it is entirely necessary that there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory is to proceed with success; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his treatise *On the Heavens*, prior to every thing else, he assumes those hypotheses concerning which Plotinus says, that Aristotle will find no difficulty in his discussion if his hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five; *that the motion is simple of a simple body; that a simple body has a certain simple motion according to nature; that there are two simple motions; that one motion is contrary to one; and that the thing which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it.* From which hypotheses, he frames his demonstrations concerning the fifth body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten, from the hypotheses; but Plato that it is generated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly after be manifest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered.

Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of intelligibles, the terms *αυτο itself*, and *οτις that which*, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term *αει always*, as connascent with being. For this also is attended with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these terms, i. e. *always*, as better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that *the term itself manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, a subsistence according to *ἑαυτῶν* hyparxis, and an existence which is primary, which is asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which intelligibles are primarily that which they are, and fill secondary natures with the participation of themselves.* But the term *that which is*, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled with a contrary nature. And *the ever* manifests the eternal, the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance, when we say the beautiful *itself*, and the just *itself*, we survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the participation of the just; but that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just. But when we say *that which* is beautiful we mean that which is not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature. And when we use the term *ever* or *always* we indicate beauty which is not at one time beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the supplying all other things from themselves. For such is the beautiful *itself*, by which

all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal *itself*, by which all equal things are equal, and in a similar manner in other things of this kind. But the second of these terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undefiled. For the *that which is* is this, i. e. it is something which is not various, and which does not attract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And *the ever* manifests immutability, for *the ever* is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a permanency in eternity. For a *temporal ever* is one thing, and an *eternal ever*, another; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but the former being co-extended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter subsisting in *the now*, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in generation, or becoming to be. The term therefore *itself*, is derived to beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and of imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term *that which is*, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from non-being, and privation; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it occultly and indivisibly. And the term *ever*, is derived from eternity. For as the one being is the supplier of existence, so eternity imparts perpetuity to intelligibles. Hence, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things participated, and for this purpose had required being, he would have inquired *what being itself is*. And if he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are mingled, he would have used the term *that which is*. But since he discourses about generation and the unbegotten, and for this purpose requires these definitions, he very properly inquires *what that is which is always being*. For this distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must not be asserted that it is generated according to all causes, but that it is according to them. For it is $\delta\iota\ \sigma$, *that on account of which*, and $\pi\rho\sigma\ \sigma$, *that with relation to which*, and $\upsilon\phi'\ \sigma$, *that by which*. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not generated by itself, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be generated. For that which is generated, when it is *becoming to be is not*. Nor is it generated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite. Nor on ac-

¹ Instead of $\omega\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\pi\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\tau\ \sigma$, it is necessary to read $\omega\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\pi\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\ \lambda$.

count of itself, lest it should be imperfect. But that which is generated is suspended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes; and such is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, is that which is generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista? Not that it is non-being,¹ but that it is never truly being. Now, however, it is said to be never at any time being, because being has a prior arrangement in an eternal nature; but that which is generated, is never that which always is. If, therefore, existence, so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, it is evident that what is generated, since it has the being which is in it, of whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at any time being, so as to be genuinely being; and being which subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which has not in a certain respect non-existence in conjunction with existence, at one and the same time being and not being.

“The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness. But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”

**** To these it happens, that they err in many other respects, and that they comprehend in the definitions the things defined. For what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always subsists with invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, is to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskillfulness in dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that in each of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in the former colon, the words, “*that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason,*” are a definition; but the words, “*since it always subsists with invariable sameness,*” are the thing defined. And in the second colon, the words “*is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense,*” are given as a definition; but the remaining part of the sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor has well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: *That which always subsists with invariable sameness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated and cor-*

¹ For $\epsilon\upsilon\chi\ \sigma\upsilon\tau\ \tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\tau\ \sigma\iota\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron$, in this place, it is requisite to read $\epsilon\upsilon\chi\ \sigma\upsilon\tau\ \tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \sigma\iota\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron$.

The beginning of this commentary, is unfortunately wanting.

rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent to what was before said, "*what is that which is always being but is without generation;*" and "*what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being;*" that *which always subsists with invariable sameness*, signifying the same thing as, *that which is without generation;* and *that which is generated, but is never [real], being*, having the same signification as, *that which never truly is*, though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of *truly* Plato indicates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, "*which is always being*," in order that by the term *always* we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but *the eternal*. For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal perpetuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, "*that which is generated*," and together with it also says, "*and is corrupted*," in order that we may not understand by generations *simply* progressions, which are also ascribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as follow: *Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is generated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.*

For these definitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but distinguishes them by our knowledge. It is necessary, however, prior to this habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. But [in defence of Plato] we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energies? Neither, therefore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a genus of being. Besides, is not a definition derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demonstrations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to investigate the nature of things, itself in itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine definitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is generated, he produced the demonstrations through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manifestly survey what each of them is. For since *every thing gnostic, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object; and as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know it through the power in us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being is known to us.* After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts.

It is requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. But giving an answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in that which is generated, the negative, adding to it also, "*and which is destroyed.*" He, also, explains the words, "*but which is never being,*" through the assumption of, "*never truly is.*" For since being is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with negation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is inherent. It is not, however, wonderful, if he not only says "*which is generated,*" but also, "*and corrupted.*" For as he adds to *being*, the words, "*subsisting with invariable sameness,*" and not only says, *it is always*; so likewise to *that which is generated* he adds, "*and corrupted.*" For this so far as it is generated, is different from perpetual being; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same. For that which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of connecting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming therefore each by itself, i. e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the latter, as that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.

Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through which he composes the propositions: and in the first place, let us see in how many ways *intelligence* subsists, and collect by a reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first intelligence therefore, is the ¹intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it. This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which ²conjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity which is connective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the ³conjoined intelligence in a divine intellect¹ itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and according to which it intellectually perceives, and is what it is. For this intelligence is energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence. The ⁴intelligence of partial intellects has the fourth order. For each of these possesses this² and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellectually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the rational soul. For *as the rational soul is called intellect, thus also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive intelligence, and has time connascent with itself.* But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to connumerate this, is ⁵phantastic knowledge, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive intellect,³ because it knows such things as it does know, inwardly, and accompanied with resemblances and figures. For *it is common to all intelligence to have the objects of its knowledge inward.* For in this also intelligence differs from sense. In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks as the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sees indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once. And in

¹ In the original, *επιτη δε η εν αυτη θεωρ συζυγος νοησις.* But it is necessary after *θεωρ* to supply *εφ.*

² For *ουτων* here, it is requisite to read *ταυτων.*

³ The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence.

Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed; since this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not possess the at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natures; but it proceeds according to time. Nor must we assume total intellections; for these are exempt from our knowledge. But Timæus co-arranges intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now be assumed. For it is in conjunction with this, that we some time or other perceive real being. For as sense is in the second duad below the rational soul, so intelligence is in the duad above it. *For a partial intellect is proximately established above our essence, elevating and perfecting it, to which we are concerted when purified through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own intellectual power with the intelligence of this intellect. But what this partial intellect is, and that it is not as one to one rational soul, but is participated through souls which always energize according to it, through which also partial souls sometimes participate of intellectual light, we have elsewhere distinctly and copiously discussed. Now, however, thus much must be assumed, that it is participated indeed by all other proximate daemoniacal souls, but illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render the reason which is in us intellectual. And as in the Phædrus Plato calls this the governor of the soul, and says that it alone intellectually perceives real being, but that the soul perceives it together with this intellect, when she is nourished by intellect and science; thus also it must be said that this intelligence is prior to soul, and is truly that intelligence [mentioned by Plato] but that it is participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually. Hence Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect is indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [of men] participates of it. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the knowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence; but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former. So that when reason intellectually perceives perpetual being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, with simplicity; understanding each thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some to*

others. *It transitively however perceives intellectually every thing which it perceives as one thing, and as simple.*

After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what reason is, and how it is consascent with intelligence. In the Theætetus therefore, λογος, reason, is said to have a three-fold subsistence; for it is either enunciative, or a discursive procession through the elements [of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences of each thing with respect to others. All these significations however, are conversant with compositions and divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the similar. But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual. For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; *but I call intellect here, the summit of dianoia*; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these reason must be differently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy: for on the contrary it is conjoined to irrational knowledge. Nor is dianoia, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the variety of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form of *the one*, is established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being through alliance united to it. Hence this is the *reason* which intellectually perceives the intelligibles co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which¹ Socrates in the Republic says is intelligence; just as *dianoia is the knowledge of things which subsist between intelligibles and the objects of opinion*. If, however, intelligence is the energy of this reason, it will be a certain intellect. Plato in the following part of this dialogue says, that *this reason in the same manner as science, is ingenerated in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible*. But that science has a more various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying beings themselves. *This highest therefore, and most impartible portion of our nature, Plato now denominates reason, as unfolding to us intellect, and an intelligible nature*. For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

¹ Instead of *και ον ο εν πολιτεια Σωκρατης, νοησις ειπε την ενεργειαν* in this place, it is necessary to read *και ον ο εν πολιτεια Σωκρατης νοησις ειπε την ενεργειαν*.

it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being inherent in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the intelligible; but the intelligence of intellect always sees it, and always is; and conjoins reason to it, when reason acquires the form of intellect.

After what manner however, is truly existing being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because it is superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly, yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, is also on this account said to comprehend the whole [of an intelligible nature]. But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself, receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but reason dancing as it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis in it of all things.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to opinion, and consider what it is. That it is therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons¹ [or productive principles] of sensibles; that it this is also which knows the essences of them; and that it knows the *οτι*, or *that a thing is*, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for it is clearly shown in the Theætetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge; it is necessary that opinion being arranged between sense and dianoia, should know the essences

¹ These reasons in a divine soul, subsist both gnostically and fabricatively, and in the human soul also, they thus subsist, when it revolves on high in conjunction with the Gods: but during the union of the soul with this outward body, they subsist in it gnostically only.

of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it alone knows *that* a thing is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accompanied with passion. Hence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion. Sense however participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is illuminated by it, and partakes of the form of reason, since it is in itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indeed intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For *dianoia*, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a clearer perception than that of opinion; as Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the different kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, "*since it is an irrational thing, how can it be science?*" But it must be admitted that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but *dianoia* and reason a transitive knowledge; opinion a knowledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion only. Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it is not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one certain thing only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common sense know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the

whole thing. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic.

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased? For it is entirely evident that in these, and all such-like particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the passion is about the instruments of sense, and it is a thing of such a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, is something different from sense. Hence, there is a certain power of the soul superior to sense, which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through itself, and corrects the grossness of sensible information. And this power indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of truly existing beings. But sense is simply irrational. On this account, Plato in the Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between knowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled with irrationality, knowing sensibles in conjunction with sense. But sense is alone irrational, as Timæus also denominates it; in the first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Theætetus distinguishes it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithymetic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudition. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce it to us. In the third place, because neither does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know *what* a white thing is, but it knows through passion *that* it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,⁴ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

⁴ Instead of διακρίνεται δε το αισθητηριον in this place, it is necessary to read ου διακρίνεται δε του αισθητηριου.

irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but conjectural. In the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary of the whole series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to externals, and effects its apprehension of things through body. For all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the reasons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in contact with intelligence sees the intelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its summit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate part it verges to sense. Hence also Timæus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king, and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed, together with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence. And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, concerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible is apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not within it, as the intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is called opinable and not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the essences of things, but sense does not. Hence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows *what* a thing is, but not alone *that* it is, which latter we say is the employment of sense; and in consequence of this Timæus very properly calls that which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ¹ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

¹ Instead of *εχει και ο εν Παρμενιδει, την περι των αισθητων πραγματειων* in this place, it is necessary to read *εχει και ο Παρμενιδει, την περι των αισθητων πραγματειων*.

power of the soul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensible alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

Here however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timæus. For where is it [universally] true that what is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and corrupted? For heaven is unbegotten and indestructible, though it is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timæus in the course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was generated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and corruption subsist according to analogy in the heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not produced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. Hence it is generated as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing [different from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. For truly existing and eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature unbegotten and indestructible. If, however, truly existing being is unbegotten, and therefore subsists from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not be truly unbegotten. And if that which is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself. For every thing of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible. Hence it is neither truly unbegotten nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its corporeal nature, it is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an infinite power. But the celestial body is finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from the reasoning of Aristotle it is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

¹ Instead of *οὐκ ἀπα ὄντως γένητος ἐστίν* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *οὐκ ἀπα ὄντως ἀγένητος ἐστίν*.

shortly after. Now, however, this alone is evident from what has been said, that every thing corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes "that to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains to the most divine of all things. But the nature of body is not of this order. That, however, which we denominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives from its generator; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be entirely free from mutation." We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions.

If however, the daemoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects always exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he also distinguishes eternity from time; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, therefore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Timæus defines it to be. The most divine, however, of visible objects, are after another manner perpetual, and not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is *in becoming to be*. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligibles, possessing and comprehending in itself infinite time; and therefore the eternal is truly intelligible.* If, however, that which *always is*, signifies *the eternal*, why is it necessary to refer the nature of heaven to this *perpetual being*, and why should we not say that it is always generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his arguments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things be assumed. For different persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion is in all things fram'd;

* It is necessary here, to supply the word *æet.*

† Instead of το αἰώνιον νοητὸν οὐτως ἐστίν in this place, it appears to me that we should read καὶ το αἰώνιον ἀπὸ νοητῶν οὕτως ἐστίν.

others that it is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, *dianoia* to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastic objects, and sense to sensibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account divulsed according to him from each other. For the soul is both one and a multitude. If, therefore, the soul which judges is both one¹ and a multitude, the judicial power will also be both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence; not that intelligence indeed is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that *intelligence is the light of reason, perfecting and elevating it, and illuminating its gnostic power.*

But when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses *dianoia* and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the co-adjutor of its speculation. For in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for instance, to the manner in which the earth is posited, which has in its summit a habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its observations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers; but at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on account of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may suffice for the present; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our Commentaries on the Theætetus. From what has been said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another method. I say, therefore, that the nature which is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, is that which receives all² its essence, power and energy in time. For it is necessary that the

¹ It is requisite here to supply the word *ev*.

² For *πασων* here, read *πασαν*.

former should be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and consisting in an extension¹ of existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are, things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of *being*, and in a certain respect communicate with *generation*. But again, there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being superior, but the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And this also is true of *the one*, as Parmenides demonstrates of both these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth hypothesis. Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated by divine souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is participated by angels, and demons; and by partial souls, through angels and demons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect energizes eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world; likewise every thing which is properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures. Timæus also defines that which is simply generated, and that which is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence Timæus proposes both of them affirmatively and negatively, as for instance, *perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that which is generated, and is never real being*, in order that through the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distinguished from things which in a certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timæus calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

¹ For παραστᾶσι here, read παρασσει.

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media; such for instance as, that which is at one and the same time *being* and a *generated nature*, or that which is both *generated* and *being*; of which *being* and *generated* are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that which is *generated* and *being*, are allied to the summit of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as it is divisible about bodies, is generated, but so far as it is entirely incorporeal, is unbegotten. But it is absurd to say that matter is both *generated* and *being*. For thus it would be superior to generated sensible natures, since these are generated alone, but matter would also participate of being. And if you are willing separately to assume that which is alone perpetual being, and that which is alone generated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and from the other sense; you will produce the definition of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion. For reason knows both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself and reason; the former indeed both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. For in this reason and opinion differ from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion. And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and making it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will have the manner in which *the one* is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and spurious opinion. Hence it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge, because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and *the one* is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which is simple; but a *spurious* intellect knows *the one*, because it is superior to *intellectual* perception. The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference to intellect, as *the one*¹ also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as that which is intelligible to truly existing intellect, and to which intellect is allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, *the one*, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is *the one* in it, according to which also it is a God.

¹ For *αὐτὸν* here, it is necessary to read *ἐκείνῳ*. For Proclus is speaking of the *τὸ ἄν*.

“ Every thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is perfectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”

Timæus, in a manner truly conformable to the geometric method, after the definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what *being* and *what that which is generated* are, he adds these other common conceptions; that the thing which is generated, is entirely generated by a cause; but that the thing which is not generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is evident that το διαίρετον, does not signify the dividing method, but that the hypotheses are to be defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered beautiful, all these being axioms, are to be considered as belonging to the term διαρίστέον, and not to be parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, but the other is less known and clear, hence Timæus places the one as the middle term, but the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom, it is entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the middle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may be in the first figure, as follows: It is impossible for that which is generated to be generated without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is better to collect what is said after this manner, as the divine Iamblichus also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syllogism to be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion? For it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be, and that it is impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or in a certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for instance, the physician says [to his patient] it is necessary you should be nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it is impossible to live without being nourished, this will now compel the patient [to take nutriment]. And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i. e. to avoid death]. And, it is necessary to give money

that is owing to a tyrant: for it is impossible not to give it. And in a great variety of other instances, you may in a similar manner see, that one of these is more obscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the same thing.

How, therefore, in the words before us, is the one clearer than the other? For what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say, that here also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not being able to preserve itself, neither is it connected by itself. But as it derives from its cause alone its preservation and connexion, if it is separated from its cause, it is evident that it becomes of itself powerless, and being dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also demonstrates that what is generated, cannot be generated without a cause. For if it is generated, it is generated by a certain maker. Hence it is rightly said in the Philebus, that what is generated is made, but that which makes is the cause to that which is made¹ [of its being made]. If, however, this be the case, it is either generated by itself, or by another. But if by itself, it passes into the same with perpetual being; and thus that which is generated, and that which always is, will be the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal subsistence. But if it is not generated by itself, it is entirely generated by another. For it is necessary that what is generated, should be generated by something, if it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. For not connecting itself, nor making itself in energy, it will suffer this from something else. And being itself by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another. Farther still, though the same thing should both act and suffer, so far indeed as it is that which suffers, it suffers from another, and so far as it is effective it operates on another. That also which is generated, so far as it is generated suffers. But if it suffers, it suffers from something else: for it is not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it would be before it is generated, and would be in energy prior to subsisting in capacity. For it is necessary that what operates should operate in energy on that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to cause, which he does in the conclusion, very properly uses the term *from necessity*. For firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is generated, from its cause: just as he says in the Politicus, that a renovated immortality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

¹ For τῷ γειγνησεν here, it is requisite to read τῷ ποιησεν.

generated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term *impossible*. For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefficacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of the demiurgic principle; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which gives subsistence to another thing; for Socrates says that *the good* is the cause of intelligibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed to generation as Plato says in the *Philebus*, "*that the demiurgic refers to that which is generated.*" Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. If, therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to it from its cause, and therefore it is much more necessary that its cause should be uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of causes according to Aristotle; nor is this done immethodically. For it is requisite to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, [and this proximately or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex. All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence; as they are either in capacity, or in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes. But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately or remotely, there are four modes. And again, on account of all these subsisting in a two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are eight modes. Through these also being two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity, there are sixteen modes. But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a three-fold,¹ and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect,—hence according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes; [but according to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of con-causes. For thus the assumption will become perfectly methodical; though that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

¹ These causes are, the *producing*, the *paradigmatic*, and the *final*; and the con-causes are, *matter*, *material causes*, and *form*.

according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every thing which is generated, is generated by a certain cause. We, however, omitting all this superfluous discussion, say that Timæus is here speaking about the effective cause. Hence he uses the words, *by a certain cause*. For the term *by which*, is adapted to that which is effective. But he adds *a certain cause*. For the intellect of the universe, soul and nature, are said to be producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have this dignity, yet as many things are generated, and there are many causes, though not of each particular, the word *certain* is very properly added. For each particular is generated by a *certain* cause, and not by all cause. These things therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures to be the work of chance. But by the Aristotelians, for the name alone it is thought worthy of reverence. For they say indeed, that what is generated, is entirely generated by a certain cause, but they undesignedly make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate chance with causes. For chance is this very thing, *the causeless*. But Plato alone, following the Pythagoreans, rightly says that every thing which is generated, is generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and God. For though generated natures are many, and separated from each other, and which also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in a different manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. For it is not proper that beings should be governed badly. Let there, however, be one ruler, one cause of all things, one providence, and one chain of beings; let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many kings, various causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude has a co-arrangement about the monad, things various about that which is simple, things multiform about that which is uniform, and things different about that which is common, in order that a truly golden chain may have dominion over all things, and that all things may be constituted in a becoming manner. For if, as Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, it is necessary that there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in vain to a part, should be advantageous to the whole. These observations, however, have been made elsewhere.

* These are the words of Aristotle, in the 12th book of his *Metaphysics*.

But what is said in the *Philebus* appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists from a certain cause of the mixture. For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. - This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intellect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature. Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence. All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the *Philebus*, viz. the Demiurgus to *the one*, form to bound, matter to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. *the one*, bound, the infinite, and that which is mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former [viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated] are seen in mundane natures only. For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible. Hence, a *certain* cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a *certain* mixture, and not *every* mixture; by which also it is evident that the Demiurgus is subordinate to *the one*, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,* the formal, and the material, Timæus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demonstration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material cause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, it is a form participated by matter, and by the organic, formal, and material causes is proximately moved. But Timæus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypotheses afford him this utility.

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inviolable sameness of subsistence, and always employing^a a certain paradigm

^a There is an omission here, in the original, of το οργανικον.

^b For προσχημενοι in this place, it is necessary to read προσχωρημενοι.

of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his work will not be beautiful."

This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, but the present axioms do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigmatic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is, whether eternal or generated. For from there being an effective cause, it follows that there is also a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him. For universally, that which makes, being extended to a certain form, makes that which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is necessary however to find that which is next in order, viz. whether the mundane paradigm is eternal, or generated. But to this the proposed axioms contribute: and the whole of what is said, will be truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is generated, there is a Demiurgus of it; if there is a Demiurgus of the universe, there is also a paradigm. And if indeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was generated on account of an eternal paradigm. But if it was not, that which is generated is not beautiful. So that a continued syllogism such as the following is produced. The world was generated. Every thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every thing having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has both a demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms there were two hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which is generated has a cause, that which has not a cause, is not generated; thus also in these, there are two common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an intelligible paradigm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is not beautiful.

Each also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intelligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he makes the imitation beautiful: for there, that which is primarily beautiful, subsists. But if dissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible: for on the contrary, he falls off from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account

of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently does not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who made the [celebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception of the Jupiter in Homer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God. And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident that he would have rendered his work still more beautiful. For from the paradigm indeed, beauty or the want of beauty accedes to the image; but from the maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetype is derived. With reference to both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work an effect of the maker. On this account also Timæus, when he speaks of the paradigm, conjoins with it its image: for he says, "*Thus therefore we must speak concerning the paradigm and its image.*" But when he speaks of the Demiurgus, he conjoins with him his work: for he then says, "*Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.*"

Since however paradigms are triple; for there is either an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, or an eternal paradigm of a generated thing, or a generated paradigm of a generated thing;—hence when there is an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated nature, this falls off from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially generated, should be productive of eternal natures. The former, therefore, participate from their paradigms of beauty and order, as being imitations of a stable nature; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in motion, are not beautiful, and yet are not entirely deformed, but are alone manifested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which accedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms. And perhaps on this account also, Timæus does not say that what derives its subsistence according to a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not subsist conform-

¹ For *ομοίαι* here, it seems necessary to read, *παράδειγμα*.

ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of things artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that productive principle which is in the mind, of the artist.] That these axioms therefore are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a Demiurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is perfectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripatetics grant indeed, that there is something which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that it is a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multitude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a producing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendency, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which is infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perpetual, and deriving its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad infinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the proposition which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Either therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is in it. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite. This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself. Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always *becoming to be*, and never *is*.

But if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very being? If indeed by consulting, an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults; just as every one does who consults before he energizes. But if it makes by its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself. And if it does this, it will contain the paradigms of the things that are generated. And again, we must investigate, whether these paradigms subsist primarily in it, or not, and whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what manner do we see artificers that are here produce? Is it not by possessing the reasons or productive principles of their effects? This, therefore, the daemoniacal Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is necessary that nature, much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates. And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is perfected? For she is irrational; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes of all things are in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has been said by many; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, therefore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to generated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not from the producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold demiurgic causes, viz. the generated and the intelligible, the latter being effective of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But Plato does not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautiful effects, but generated paradigms, of such as are not beau-

tiful. It may however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to erudition, exhorting us not to reject beautiful actions. For if he had said that what is generated, is not effective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, if we say that it is possible for the same effective cause to look to two-fold paradigms, and to make a certain thing beautiful, and a certain thing not beautiful. For soul looking to intellect, generates truth and science, but looking to generation, she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites. But it is impossible for the same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and not beautiful effects. Very properly therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to generated natures. As the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, it is evident that it is intelligible, and always subsists invariably the same; to which also the Demiurgus looking, adorns the universe. If, therefore, it is the supplier of beauty, it has the highest order among eternal beings, and belongs to the first intelligibles. Hence the cause effective of beauty is there, through which all things are beautiful, intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Again, therefore, the Demiurgus, indeed, is the cause of form, but the paradigm of beauty, and *the good* of union. And the last of these, supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the supplier of beauty and form, and the demiurgic cause, so far as it is intellectual, of form and essence.

Moreover, the demiurgic cause looking to the intelligible is multiform. For the *whole* Demiurgus fabricates in one way¹ looking to it. He, therefore, is united to it according to supreme transcendency. But the demiurgic triad fabricates in another way. And of this triad indeed, the first [i. e. Jupiter] fabricates uniformly; the second [i. e. Neptune] generatively, and the last [i. e. Pluto] convertively. And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after a different manner to the many demiurgic Gods, who from these receive and are allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceeds in one way to demiurgic angels, but in another to demiurgic daemons, the attendants of this order. Farther still, we must likewise survey the undefiled forms of life, which contribute to the demiurgic series, and the genera of partial souls, which follow the demiurgic choir. For the peculiarity and the mode of production, and of looking to the intelligible, extend differently to different natures, as far as to these. It is also necessary to admire this in Plato, that he does not say that what is generated on

¹ For αὐτῶν here, it is necessary to read ἀλλῶν.

account of¹ an eternal paradigm is beautiful, but that what is generated by the Demiurgus who looks to it, is most beautiful; since that which is confused and disordered is generated, for it is visible and sensible. But every thing of this kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though it is in a certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter. Hence that which is generated on account of an eternal paradigm, such for instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautiful, but that which was generated by the Demiurgus looking to it. For from that confused nature the Demiurgus was absent; but the intelligible prior to the Demiurgus, illuminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the Demiurgus, it was also generated by the eternal paradigm, energizing on it through the Demiurgus as a medium. And so far indeed as it was generated by the paradigm, it was invested with form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was arranged. *For the Demiurgus is the cause of order; but the paradigm is simply the cause of form to its participants.*

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers may be assumed. For some of these powers, indeed, looking to the whole of intelligibles, produce according to the whole of them; but others produce partially. And some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligibles through union; but others through intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelligible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes; others proceed into a greater number; and others make the last forms the paradigms of their productions. Hence through these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of horses, as Plato says in the Politicus, and in a similar manner in other forms. As the demiurgic series therefore is various, and there are different paradigms of different things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timæus very properly does not say, that he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that which is generated to be beautiful, but he who uses a paradigm of *this kind*. In the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on account of the union of intelligibles; and the multitude is most similar to the monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the whole Demiurgus looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible; which paradigm also

¹ For *πρωτοιωτον* in this place, we must read *προς αιωνιον*.

is such as the intelligible through similitude to it, but is of a more partial nature; hence Timæus adds the words *a certain to a thing of this kind*. For these intelligibles participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect animal. Hence, too, he calls idea, $\tau\iota$, *a certain thing*, assimilating that which is generated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say "*employing a paradigm of this kind*," but of that which is generated, he no longer adds the expression "*of this kind*," but instead of this, adduces the term *generated*? Is it not because the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and to this the dissimilar is appropriate; but to the intelligible, the similar, the same, and every thing of this kind, is allied. And thus much concerning these particulars. But the term *always* must be conjoined to a subsistence according to sameness, in order that there may be that which looks to a nature always possessing a sameness of subsistence. For thus the philosopher Porphyry properly decides. For Timæus does not say that the Demiurgus in fabricating all things, *always beholds*, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible *always subsists after the same manner*. Unless it should be said, that on this account he assumes the beholding always, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should latently introduce into his production, that which is not beautiful. The Demiurgus, therefore, looks to that which is eternal, in order that he may produce that which is similar to it, and beautiful.

"Let therefore this universe be denominated by us, *all heaven*, or *the world*, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted to receive."

This is the last of the axioms, giving a name to the subject [of discussion] conformably to geometricians, when they speak about the gnomon in parallelograms. For they say any one thing consisting of two complements is to be called a gnomon. For since Plato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing at different times different names, he previously determines something about the

* For $\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ $\gamma\alpha\rho$ here, read $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\alpha\rho$.

names. For it must be observed that these names had great ambiguity with the ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the region above it, heaven; but others denominating heaven a part of the world. And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon; but others called the summits of generation heaven:

The wide-spread heav'n in æther and the clouds
Fell to the lot of Jove.*

Hence Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying *all heaven*, that you may not fancy he says, *a divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called*. And it seems, indeed, that he calls the universe *heaven*, conformably to the opinion of all men, but *the world*, according to his own opinion. For he says, let it be called by *us* heaven and the world. For the name of *world* is adapted to it as a certain fabrication; though it is also possible to call it both heaven and the world: *heaven*, indeed, as beholding the things above,¹ as surveying the intelligible, and as participating of an intellectual essence; but *the world*, as being always filled and adorned by truly existing beings. It may also be called *heaven*, as being converted [to its principle], but *the world* as proceeding from it. For it is generated by, and is converted to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things pertaining to them are manifest,² but others are inwardly concealed, being symbolical³ of the presence of the Gods, and which are only known to the mystic artists themselves; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligible, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indications of its divinity; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the participation of being⁴ received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order that⁵ through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indeed,

¹ Iliad. xv. vs. 192.

² This is asserted in the Cratylus.

³ For *αφανη* here, it is necessary to read *εμφαιη*.

⁴ Instead of *συμβολικης των θεων παρουσιας* in this place, it is necessary to read, *συμβολικα της των θεων παρουσιας*.

⁵ Instead of *της του οντως μετοχης* in this place, it is necessary to read *της του οντος μετοχης*.

⁶ In the words *ενι μη δε αυτων ερριζωμενος η δαιωνιος εν τη οντι*, it is obvious that *μη* ought to be expunged.

and *the world*, are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so far as it proceeds from the intelligible, but the former so far as it is converted to it.

It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and which is a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names adapted to every order of things; those indeed that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia, being dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion, doxastic. This also Plato says in the *Cratylus*, where he embraces what is asserted by Homer on this subject, who admits that names of the same things with the Gods, are different from those that subsist in the opinions of men,

Xanthus by Gods, by men Scamander call'd.¹

And,

Which the Gods Chaleis, men Cymindis call.²

And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names of the one are different from those of the other; since divine names unfold the whole essence of the things named, but those of men only partially come into contact with them. Plato therefore knowing that this pre-exists in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name itself, which is different from the apparent name, and with the greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, "*or whatever other appellation,*" and "*it may receive,*" are a latent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and allotted a divine essence; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists; some of which are called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some being significant of the invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and the apparent and unapparent name of the world, are delivered. And the former name indeed is duadic, but the latter monadic. For the words "*whatever other*" are significant of oneness. You may also consider *the ineffable* name of the universe, [as significant³] of its abiding in

¹ *Iliad* xx. vs. 74

² *Iliad* xiv. vs. 291.

³ In the original in this place, *σημασιον* is omitted.

the father ; but the name *world*, as indicative of its progression ; and *heaven*, of its conversion. But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which it is full of good ; abiding ineffably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to *the good* as the antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows by the principles.

“ In the first place, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered respecting it, which ought in the beginning to be surveyed about every thing.”

After the prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, and the delivery of the hypotheses, nothing else remains than to dispose the whole discussion conformably to the hypotheses themselves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, having no beginning of generation. For in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Timæus said, “ *It is necessary that we who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it was generated or is unbegotten, should invoke the Gods and Goddesses,*” as from hence commencing the theory. And in the hypotheses, “ *What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated, but is never [real] being,*” were the things which were first assumed. This therefore must first be considered, as it was the first thing supposed in the principles. It is necessary, however, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, respecting every thing, to consider in the first place *what* it is. But this is the form of the object of investigation. And the generated and the unbegotten give distinction to the mundane form. So that this is very properly thought to be the first thing that deserves an appropriate consideration, to which also Timæus immediately after this directs his attention. But since most of the Platonists understand by the words *περὶ πάντος*, that Plato means *about every thing*, conformably to what is said in the Phædrus, but Porphyry understands the words as signifying *about the universe*, it being fit to speak first concerning the universe, and to show whether it is naturally unbegotten or generated,—it is requisite to know that the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spontaneous. For to assume *τὸ πάντος* for *τὸ περὶ τὸν πάντος*, is a forced assumption.

That, however, these things are simply to be investigated concerning every thing, we may previously assume from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The addition also of “ *whether the universe always was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,*” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of the universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has a

beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to discover in the first place the mundane form, whether it is to be arranged among eternal, or among generated natures, let us see what arguments the philosopher employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or was generated from a certain principle; for we shall find that he uses all the dialectic¹ methods in the hypotheses. Thus he *divides* being from that which is generated, and *definitively* and *analytically* assigns what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures to the demiurgic and paradigmatic causes of them. Moreover, having indicated to us the truth concerning ineffable and effable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of Pythagoras, who said that number was the wisest of things, but that he was the next in wisdom who gave names to things,—he afterwards converts himself to the demonstrations of the problems concerning the world. And in the first place, he endeavours to find the form of it, and whether it must be admitted to be a portion of perpetual being, or of a generated nature. And on this account he inquires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking whether it belongs to eternal beings, or to generated natures; for he might have said that it was a medium between both these, in the same manner as soul. But he asks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend the medium between both these to be that which has a certain principle of generation, and yet always is. Afterwards having shown that the world is alone generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to be unbegotten, according to which also it is a God, as will be evident as we proceed.

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticus, and many other of the Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or generated according to time. For they assert that prior to the fabrication of the world, there was a disorderly motion. But time entirely subsists together with motion; so that there was time prior to the universe. Time, however, was also generated together with the

¹ As the dialectic of Plato is perfectly scientific, as we have shown in the notes on the Parmenides, and employs the dividing, defining, analysing, and demonstrative methods, it is evident that instead of *διαλογικαὶ μέθοδοι* in this place, we should read *διδασκτικαὶ μέθοδοι*. This is also evident from what follows.

universe, being the number of the motion of the universe; so that the former time was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion. But the interpreters of Plato that follow Crantor, say that the world is said to be generated, as being produced by another cause, and not being self-begotten, nor self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers after Plotinus, viz. Porphyry and Iamblichus, say that the composite nature is here called that which is generated, and that with this, generation from another cause is con-subsistent.

We however say, that all these assertions are most true; and that *the world is generated, both as a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence.* For every thing which has interval is a thing of this kind, and that which is sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul, survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say, that [real] being indeed is that, which eternally possesses a stable essence, power and energy. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect generated, possesses its energy in motion and extension. For it has been before observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which is simply perpetual being, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said, he comprehends the media. Hence, *that which does not possess at once, the whole of its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated generated.* A thing of this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated, or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world has generation, and the perpetuity of it subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllogize as follows: First, that it is necessary between things that are eternally perpetual, and things which are generated in a part of time, the medium should be an hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the parts co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial

! For *τοῦτο* here, it is necessary to read *τοῦτο*.

bodies. For there is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole of time; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eternity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by eternity, and exists in eternity, is necessarily impartible. For how can that which is partible be fixed, and have its essence established in the impartible? In the third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that body subsists entirely in time. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body. What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies is thus perpetual according to time? It is this, that it cannot be separated from the cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated perpetuity, and is always generated from a source external to itself. For if it received the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, separate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence. The intention indeed of Plato is to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence, power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time. But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things which are perfected by time. For the expression *always was*, signifies with Plato the intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that the term *was* is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term *is*, we must not be disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demiurgus he says, "*he was good*," though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, "*The nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal*;" together with *αιωνιος οουσα* being eternal, assuming *το εγγχαι* was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eternity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always *be*, but should always *be generated*, or *becoming to be*, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

Being, therefore, as I have said, and perpetual *being*, manifest the eternal. But "*that which was generated*," signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, measured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intelligible is self-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former *is* in number,

but the latter *is generated* in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, though it is said to be perpetual, has an hypostasis co-extended with all time, and which is always generated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause; for such is that which is always generated; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of a certain generation;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same as an investigation, whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause.

Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated. For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature [or which is naturally capable of being generated] though it should not have been generated; such as is that which has a visible nature, though it should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. It does not, however, entirely follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the generations,] or not all,¹ we should say that he investigated whether it is generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smallest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain principle of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

¹ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: *ει τοιουν εζηρει ο πλατων ποτερον το παν πασας εχει ραι γενεσεις.*

Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologians, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is fit that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, is composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypo-stasis; with which also time is conjoined. It likewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in number, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsistent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though you may divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself. Hence also it is eternal, never at any time deserting itself. But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause is different from the effect.

Thus, therefore, the physical axiom¹ may be adapted according to analogy to this generated nature: and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time. But this is evident; for if you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect; which is likewise the case with every thing that is still generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always generated. Hence also its perpetuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven [or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, therefore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a certain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause commences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

¹ i. e. That the cause is different from the effect.

world subsists with reference to the final principle, and as the world is always becoming to be, it is beginning to be generated, and possesses the end of it, through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, *it was generated*, is not one thing, and *it is generated* another; as neither is the beginning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another; *but that which is generated in the whole of time is always beginning, and is always perfect*. And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by something different from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the beginning of a certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the principle also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the whole of time¹ is *a certain* generation, and this principle is the principle of *a certain*, and not of *all* generation. What therefore is this generation? That which has both the beginning² and the end contracted together [so as to be simultaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a principle or beginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is always becoming to be, and is generated. For these do not³ subsist at one and the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as Aristotle says, in the end; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

“ It was generated. For it is visible and tangible, and has a body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated.”

As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively, and with eternally invariable sameness; for he does not make at one time, and at another not, lest he should depart from eternity; after the same manner also

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¹ *χρονος* is omitted in the original.

² *αρχη* also is omitted in this place in the original.

³ It is necessary to supply *ορχ* here.

Timæus, being converted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to intellect from *dianoia*, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect; doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-motive nature of soul; but in answering he imitates the projecting energy of intellect. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word *γενόμεν*, *it was generated*, and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those who energize enthusiastically. For these see the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, perceiving all things at once. But syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence, in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible and tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sensible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the world therefore is generated. Hence he shows this demonstratively from the definition, according to a conversion¹ of the definition; since geometers also use demonstrations of this kind.² And thus much concerning the form of the words.

[Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or has a certain principle of generation, he answers, *it was generated*.³ From this, therefore, it is evident that he gives a *certain* generation to the world: for this was the other part of the before-mentioned opposition. If, however, this be the case, he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation; for if the world has a *certain*, and not *every* principle of generation, but that which is generated in time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in time. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner is unbegotten, but that the world was generated in time, and let us speak concerning this assertion, "*it was generated*."] Since, therefore, Atticus admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible. Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner will be generated in time: for he says that this also

¹ For *επιτροπήν* here, it is necessary to read *επιστροφήν*.

² See this explained farther on.

³ *Γεγόνε* is omitted here in the original.

was visible. But if not every thing, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllogistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless he should say, indeed, that the world is visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, "*every such thing as was visible, and was moved in a confused and disorderly manner.*" But in the words before us he says, "*for it is visible and tangible, and has a body.*" He shows therefore that every thing which is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which *was* visible and tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted by Atticus; for the man is skilful in defending what he advances; it must be said in answer to him, that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. So that if there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such thing will be generated. But every thing visible is sensible; and therefore that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition to which we may also say that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself generated. For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms. Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It is not proper therefore to say that it was unbegotten according to time, and that the universe was generated; but either both were generated according to Plato, or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said by him to be visible and generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being generated such as it now is was changed into the confused: for to a contrary, the generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good, how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned? For it is the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same manner as the eternal, or is it not

* For φως here, it is necessary to read φωμεν.

eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or produced' by another? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it is produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. A thing of this kind however, is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has a generation according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not eternal, it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. For it is fabricated on account of another, and is generated as a flowing image of being. Hence, as that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence. If, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal, the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation. For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from a certain principle. For that which is generated in a portion of time began from a temporal, from a producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. For since principle is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a beginning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated from a *certain*, and not from *every* principle. What therefore is this principle? You must not say it is a temporal principle. For that which originates from this is also allotted the principle of generation from all the rest. But it originated from that principle, in which he afterwards instructs us, I mean the most proper, or the final principle. For it was generated on account of *the good*; and this is the principle from which its generation originated. He says therefore that this is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the generation of the world. Hence in the first place he shows that the world is generated from its composition; for it is visible and tangible. These, therefore, are the extremes of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible. And visibility is in earth so far as it participates of light; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terrestrial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause. But the world is simply [visible and tangible],¹ and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains. And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: *It is an imitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has something of body.* So far, therefore, as the universe

¹ For *παρομενον* here, read *παραγομενον*.

² For *μεν* here, it is requisite to read *μη*.

³ The words *οπαρον και απρον* appear to me to be omitted in this place.

has something corporeal, it is generated; for according to this it is visible and tangible. But every thing visible and tangible, is sensible; for *sense is touching and seeing*. That however which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled from sensibles, and not able to preserve the purity of intelligible forms. But every thing of this kind is generated, as having a composite essence.

Plato, therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who follow the Aristotelian hypotheses fancy he does. And that this is true we may easily learn from hence. [He says that time was generated together with the heaven of universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual. But if the universe had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal beginning, which is of all things the most impossible.¹ They say, however, that time is twofold, the one disorderly, but the other proceeding according to number. For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other orderly and elegant. But there is a time² co-ordinate to each of these motions. That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible; but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the essence of time will be a composite. And why do I say this? For when the motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions; and some are swifter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another; but there is one continued time of all these, and which proceeds according to number. Hence it is not right, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time is one and continued; if indeed it is unbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten, which is consubsistent with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will follow; since time, in order that it may be generated, will be in want of time, and this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was generated, time was not yet.

Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its being generated, with body, and does not give to it life prior to the corporeal-formed nature, but as soon as it is constituted incloses it in body. Moreover, he says that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. For that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is un-

¹ Instead of *εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικην, καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴν ἔξει χρόνικην*, in this place it seems to be necessary to read, *εἰ δὲ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικην, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀρχὴν ἔξει χρόνικην*.

² For *χρόνος* here, it is requisite to read *χρονος*.

gotten. Again, Timæus here says, that the soul was generated; but Socrates in the Phædrus says, it is unbegotten. Hence, he after another manner calls that generated, which is clearly unbegotten according to time. Farther still, he says that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him. But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses, that every thing generated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to time. From these things, therefore, you may understand what I say: for the world is thus demonstrated to be unbegotten. For if the world is incorruptible, but nothing which is generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is not generated according to time. What occasion is there, however, for these syllogisms? For Plato in the Laws clearly says, that time is infinite according to the past, and that in this infinity there have been myriads on myriads of barren and fertile periods of men. For investigating the beginning of a polity, from which cities change into virtue and vice, he adds: "*But you will say, from whence? I indeed think from the length and infinity of time, and the mutations which take place in a thing of this kind.*" Or rather that we may argue from what is in our hands, a little prior to this, we may hear him saying, that "*where there is neither extreme heat or cold, there the race of men always exists more or less numerous.*" But if the race of men always exists, the universe also is necessarily perpetual.

Again, therefore, if the Demiurgus ranks among eternal beings, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not. For if he did, he would not have an invariable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. But if he always fabricates, that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willingly at rest for an infinite time, did he at length convert himself to fabrication? Was it because he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to this, ignorant that it was better or not? For it is absurd, being intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both ignorance and knowledge. But if he knew this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world? And if it was better, why did he not persevere in this energy, if it be lawful so to speak? For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and a God, he would pursue that which is less instead of that which is more beautiful. It is necessary, however, to admit these things, if the world is generated according to time, and is not consubistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against

1 Instead of *ἀλλὰ τῆ ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ κόσμου συνέχεται*, in this place, it is necessary to read *ἀλλὰ μὴ τῆ ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ χρόνου συνέχεται*.

the Demiurgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was a time in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in capacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. If, however, there is prior and posterior about him, it is evident that he does not belong to natures which energize eternally; but that he passes from not making according to time, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of time, does he produce it through this energy? For he once produced time, of which he is indigent, in order that by his effective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world simply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was generated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean guest has shown; one of which is that which the universe now circumsolves, but the other the contrary to it. The world therefore is generated, and originated from a certain principle, which is the cause of this circulation. But simply considered it is not generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that it is not proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to physiology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? How also is the universe perfect, and sufficient to itself, if it desires mutation? How can there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that which is moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper habit? And how does Timæus say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgic will, but that which is characterized by difference, to the left hand? For if it is necessary that the works of the Demiurgus should remain invariably the same, and be perpetual, it is likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, but that which is characterized by difference, to the left.* For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Farther still, is it not necessary, that inequality must thus be introduced to the

* The words *την δε βαρειον εν' αριστερα*, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted in this place.

motion of the universe! For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, i. e. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued fixed in the same energy, what is the cause of the second circulation? By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which ascribe generation to the world, in conception only. For thus we may also infer according to conception, and not according to truth, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe. For from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic cause of it. Or it may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may learn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. For this is indeed in a certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. For the perspicuous, says Iamblichus, is venerable, when it is adapted to science. For admitting also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much in opposition to these interpretations.

Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. For it is neither so according to time, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds from a cause; since it is not sufficient to say this. For intellect also is from the first cause, and all things after *the one* are from a cause, yet all things are not generated. For where does the eternal subsist, if all things are generated? For *the one* is prior to eternity. After what manner therefore, it may be said, is the universe generated? As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same time always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For it is not that which is partial. Body therefore, [i. e. partial body] is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in *becoming to be*, and is not at the same time that which *was* generated. It is also according to Aristotle always in the end, *the always* being temporal, according to temporal infinity. For as the solar-form light proceeds from its proper fountain, thus also the world is always generated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

¹ Γαρ is omitted in this place; and the sentence ought to be interrogative. Hence instead of *ετι της αυτης εσως εεργειας, το αυτα της δευτερας αιωνοδιουρειας*, we must read *ετι γαρ της αυτης εσως εεργειας* &c. with a note of interrogation at the end.

² After *υπεθετο το παρ* here, the word *γινεσθαι* must be supplied.

same time always was so. As a composite likewise it is generated. For all composition is generation. But if it is always composed, it was always becoming to be, with which to be generated concurs. And it appears to me that Plato knowing this, says *it was generated* instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, he says it was, instead of it is; for his words are "*whether it always was.*" For as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same; for all things are there according to sameness, since all things are in *the now*, which is more impartible than the now which is according to time; thus also *it is generated* and *it was generated* proceed to the same thing in every sensible nature. For it was generated, as that which always was becoming to be, and as generated, it is. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed according to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident from its opposite. For to this Plato opposes perpetual being. If, therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. But if eternal being signified that which is always according to time, that which is originating from a certain thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is generated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as it is generated, but so far as it participates of time; on which account also it is generated. That perpetual being, however, [or that which always is,] manifests the eternal, is evident; since the Demiurgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the paradigm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it signifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Some one, however, who acknowledges this may nevertheless doubt, why we have before said that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in it a body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? It is said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with soul, you will speak rightly. But when you see it animated and endued with intellect, you may call it a God. For thus Plato in the Republic calls it *a divine generated thing*. But in this dialogue, he thinks fit to denominate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he in a greater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is

Handwritten notes in the right margin, partially obscured by a large bracket. The text is difficult to decipher but appears to be a commentary on the philosophical terms used in the main text.

Handwritten notes in the right margin, partially obscured by a large bracket. The text is difficult to decipher but appears to be a commentary on the philosophical terms used in the main text.

unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juxtaposition with the eternal. He likewise conjoins *the becoming to be* of it, with *it was generated*; in order that as *all* or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. He likewise assigns to it the principle of a certain and not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and is called a God.

Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Hence also, he inverts the order. For in the hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the object of opinion; but to the demonstration of that which is generated, he assumes the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstrations is perfectly requisite. For this will cause what is said to be truly a demonstration. For opinion through ' possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of causes with reference to them. Hence it appears to me that Plato is not satisfied with the term sensible in order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion; since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also their essences. For it antecedently comprehends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the essence of sensibles to be generated, he forms his demonstration from that which is the object of opinion. Farther still, his not adding *that which is destructible to that which is generated*, shows his reverential conceptions of the world; though it is in a certain respect true that the world is destructible, as we have before said. At the same time, this exhibits to us the caution and reverence of Plato: for having that which is consequent [to the being generated], yet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. For this generated nature which he calls the object of opinion, is at the same time destructible; but the world is not destructible at the same time that it is generated. Hence the world is both destructible and incorruptible, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbegotten, according to time. For if that which is generated according to time,

* Instead of η γαρ δεξα τα τοις λογους εχει των γενητων in this place, it is necessary to read η γαρ δεξα τη τοις λογους κ. λ.

is corruptible, as it is said to be in the Republic, that which is incorruptible is unbecotten. But *the world is destructible, as not being able to connect itself.* For as that which is corporeal so far as pertains to itself is alter motive, or moved by another, thus also so far as pertains to itself it is destructible, in consequence of being connected by something else. For no body is either generative or connective of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which makes is incorporeal. *For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers.* Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal; and every thing which connects, is effective of a certain thing, viz. it is effective of union, and the undissipated. But every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing therefore connective is impartible. Hence it is impossible for that which connects itself to be a body. For it is not the province of body to connect; since so far as it is body, it is partible, as it is said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies. But that which connects is impartible. If, however, that which is connected is body, but that which connects is incorporeal, body is not itself connective of itself. Hence that which is connected by itself is necessarily impartible. As therefore body has in its own nature a finite power, so likewise it is in its own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in capacity, that you may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of imparting incorruptibility to itself.

Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whence does it receive infinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated. For every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the demoniacal Aristotle says; so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable [i. e. from the intellectual] fabrication. Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is generated, it is always generated from the father. But since the world being all and a whole, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or becoming to be, it always was generated, since, likewise, the motion of it is always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential generation of it always in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. *So that it is always generated, and always was generated; not receiving¹ at once the whole infinity of the generative*

¹ It is necessary here to supply *μη δεχομενος*.

power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at once. After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the generation of it takes place; and in this respect the before mentioned men [i. e. Plato and Aristotle] are not at variance. At the same time, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body. Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never has the whole of it, because it is finite. It is therefore alone true to say, that from infinite power it is *generated*, but *is not*, infinitely. But if it is generated, it receives infinity on account of infinite time. For *to be* infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a *generated* infinite belongs to that which is temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated.

Both likewise assert that it is the same in number, but Plato conformably to principles, says that it is generated. For he established prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Treatises. For such things as Plato asserts of *the one*, Aristotle ascribes to intellect, viz. the non-possession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to him, fabrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motion; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

* Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is truly ineffable.

productive powers.* Since, however, the dæmoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phædrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption! The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent meaning].

“ But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause.”

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. For as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in continuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypothesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For if the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world. For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing generated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

* This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, just as Plato discussed physics metaphysically.

which is in energy. But that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another is always when it perfects in energy' according to that form to which it gives perfection). That however, which is generated, so far as it is generated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing. But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself. The latter, therefore, is a greater undertaking than the former. For that which perfects itself, is also perfective of another thing.¹ But if it is not perfected by itself, it is evident that it is perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated. But every thing which is generated being imperfect, is either perfected by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or by itself. But it is not perfected by itself. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world is a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if it is a composite, it is either composed by itself, or by another. For it is necessary that composition should be from a cause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and from chance. If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsistence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. For how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them. And how is it holy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what is it which made them? For this is what we investigate. But if they are the efficient causes, how is it possible that things unadorned can be effective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? If however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition from another. Hence if the world is a composite,² but that which is a composite is

¹ Instead of *αὐτὸς ὁ ἐστὶν* in this place, we should doubtless read *αὐτὸς ἐργεῖν ἑστὶν*.

² Instead of *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸς τελευτῶντος ἐστὶν*, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸς τελευτῶν, καὶ ἄλλοι τελευτῶντες ἐστὶν*.

³ *Συμβῆτον* is omitted in the original.

composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, from these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, *a certain cause*. For the cause of all things, is *simply* cause, and not *a certain* cause; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For it is simply God. But every divinity posterior to it is *a certain* God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a certain cause, as differing from the cause of all. Hence, he says, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one cause precedes the whole of generation. For multitude is co-arranged about one principle, and the many unities about *the one*. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to nature; and others to soul. Plato, however, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-operates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will. Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad precedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is imparticipable,¹ he adds the word *certain*. So that the words "*by a certain cause,*" have the same signification as, *by one cause indeed, yet not the first cause*. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from *the one*; in order that from *the one*, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed; but from an eternal nature, that which is generated and temporal. And that self-subsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others. For the series and order of things which proceed from *the one*, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.

"It is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men."

¹ For *αὐτὸς* here, it is requisite to read *αὐτῷ*.

² The demiurgic monad, (i. e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immediately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation of Proclus on the theology of Plato.

It has been rightly observed by some prior to us, that Plato having shown that the world was generated by a cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is the Demiurgus of it, in a manner worthy of his intellectual conceptions. For it seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypostatic power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. It is requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and afterwards thus recur to the whole theory.

Father and maker therefore, differ from each other, so far as the former is the cause of matter,¹ but the latter of the world and order, and in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed as the former is the supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself, but the other is the cause of progression and generation; and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the *father* of Plato, but the builder of a house is the *maker* or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no occasion to call the Demiurgus father, because, according to Timæus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the maker as producing form? For we call all those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence. But so far as the Demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But "*this universe*" signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane causes² and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine,

¹ For $\alpha\lambda\eta\varsigma$ here, it is necessary to read $\epsilon\lambda\theta\eta\varsigma$, because matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phæus, or animal itself, and not from the Demiurgus.

² For $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota$, it is necessary to read $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\alpha\iota$.

intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the *universe*; since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the pronoun *this*, is significant of the universe being in a certain respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not *this*, because it is comprehensive of *all intellectual forms*. But the term *this* is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are first,¹ but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of the Demiurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,² and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and daemoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it is necessary,³ that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in-

¹ viz. From axioms and definitions.

² *Μετισταυρας* is omitted in the original.

³ For *ἐν* here, it is requisite to read *ἐκ*.

roduce herself to the maker of the universe ; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For being present with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but words,¹ banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic ; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific ; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life ; or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of *the one* than this. For this is the paternal port,² and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

¹ This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus being so much superior to scientific perception.

² Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the *Odyssey*. For Homer by these occultly indicates the life of a man who passes in a regular manner from a sensible to an intellectual life, and who being thoroughly purified by the exercise of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming re-united to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the opinion of the Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise *De Antro Nympharum*. "For he thought that the person of Ulysses in the *Odyssey* represented to us a man who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation ; and thus at length arrives at that region (i. e. the intellectual region) where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

'Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.'

See more on this subject in my *Restoration of the Platonic Theology*, p. 294.

But to say "that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all men," perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted,¹ to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato says in his Epistles, in what other way can it be possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of *the one itself*? To this we reply, we speak indeed *about* them, but we do not speak *of each of them itself*. And we are able indeed to speak *scientifically* of them, but not *intellectually*. For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light.

After these things, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions on this subject. For Numenius, indeed, celebrating three Gods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and the third that which is made. For the world according to him is the third God. So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second God, and that which is fabricated is the third God. For it is better to say this, than² to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, offspring, nephew. He how-

¹ For μηδε ευροῦντα δεικνῶντα εἶναι λεγεῖν it is necessary to read, μηδε ευροῦντα εἰς ἀκαταρτῆς δεικνῶντα, κ. λ.

² For ἀπιστραμμένης, it is requisite to read ἐπιστραμμένης.

³ It is necessary here to supply ἦ.

ever, who asserts these things, in the first place does not rightly con-numerate *the good* with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor has it an order secondary to another. But *father* with Plato [in the text] is arranged as the second to *maker*. Farther still, Numenius co-arranges that which is exempt,¹ from all habitude, with the natures that are under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the first, but to take away from it all habitude. Neither therefore, is the paternal nature of the maker² adapted to the first. For these things³ are apparent in the orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same God by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause [of the world,] is just as if some one, because Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world, should say there are two fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world: just as here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic God, the one father, but the other maker.

With respect to Harpocraton, it would be wonderful, if he were consistent with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus. For this man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God, Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the World. But again changing the order he calls the first God Dia, and the king of the intelligible; but he denominates the second God, the ruler, and the same divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, is all these; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all language, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God even father; but he denominates him father, and offspring, and the offspring of an offspring.

But Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocraton, immediately makes the Demiurgus to be the same with *the good*, though the Demiurgus is called *good* by Plato, but not *the good*. He is also denominates by him *intellect*, but he says that *the good*

¹ For εζηρημενον in this place, it is requisite to read εζηρημενον.

² Instead of πατριος here, the sense evidently requires that we should read ποιητου.

³ Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards in the other orders of Gods.

is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic. What then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the Demiurgus, and in this case, there will be something more ancient and honorable than *the good*; or it is in the Demiurgus, and the first God will be many things; or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus *the good*, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and will intellectually perceive them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold Demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, but the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain respect the Demiurgus of the universe. And Aristotle shows that this is the first God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling every thing between *the one* and the world, the intelligible. For there, according to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things.

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is *truly* that which it is. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect. But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how much greater the interval is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, therefore, that there are these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn. And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds. Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad. For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad;

but the monad is prior to the triad. Where, therefore, is the demiurgic monad, in order that the triad may proceed from it? How likewise is the world one, unless it was fabricated by one cause? For it is by a much greater priority necessary that the cause itself should be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may become only begotten. Let there then be three Demiurgi; but who is the one Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten? Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the Demiurgus, but the intellect of it to which it is converted, animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm of the Demiurgus; whom it is worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the Demiurgus. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually denominates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul? How also does he call the world a God? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things partake of the demiurgic providence. And divine production, indeed, is able to generate intellect and Gods, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the psychical order. I omit to say that this very thing itself requires much confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable¹ soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine Iamblichus has written much against the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian; but delivering his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that from what has been said, it is evident that he asserts the same thing as Plotinus. He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, "Thus we call that which is truly cause, and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic God, whom we now investigate, comprehending in one, possesses in himself." If, therefore, in what is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-

¹ i. e. A soul which is not consubstent with body.

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says :

For in Jove's ample dwelling all things lie,
And in Jove's belly they together flow.

And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods should be the universe, but after a different manner, one demiurgically, another connectively, another immutably, another convertively,¹ and another in some other way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent between the world and *the one*, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the subject of doubt; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are the fathers of Jupiter? Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to *the one*? How likewise can we say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is not an eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with other eternal beings. That Iamblichus himself, however, though he here celebrates the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately elsewhere, may be from thence assumed. For writing concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the *Timæus*, after the intelligible triads, and the three triads of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual² Gods, he attributes the third order in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. For he says that these three Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the perfection of things of this kind, and that the most beautiful indications of it are divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds

¹ Instead of τῶν δε τρεπτῶν, it is necessary to read τὸν δε ἐπιστρεπτικῶν.

² It is here necessary to supply καὶ νοερῶν. For the three triads of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order.

every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions, the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined by forms, all proceeding fabrications, and other things similar to these. It is worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the Iamblichean theology from these things, and to determine what the nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of wholes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole¹ of perpetual being, if indeed perpetual being has been already defined by Plato; but he now says that it is difficult to find the Demiurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men? And how can these things be verified of that which is definitively delivered, and unfolded into light to all those that were present?

After Iamblicus, therefore, Theodorus, following Amelius, says that there are three Demiurgi. He arranges them, however, not immediately after *the one*, but at the extremity² of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and the third, the fountain of souls. He likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars. Again, therefore, the same things must be said to him as were said to the illustrious Amelius; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Gods, or Gods analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Demiurgi, but that the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power, and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to consider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated partially, and not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls, is one of the fountains contained in this middle [or generative power of the Demiurgus.] For life is not in souls only, nor in animated natures alone, but there is also a divine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychological life, which is said to proceed diversely from thence, from divided rivers. And such, in short, are the dogmas³ of the ancient interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

Let us, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor [Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.

¹ For όλων here, it is necessary to read όλον.

² Instead of επί τα δε των νοητων τε και νοιρων θεων, I read επί εσχατον των νοητων κ. λ.

³ For δογματων here, it is necessary to read δογματα.

The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him,¹ subsists at the extremity of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes. Being, however, himself immoveable, he is eternally established on the summit of Olympus,² and rules over the twofold worlds, the supercelestial and the celestial, comprehending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the³ whole demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholes totally, another of wholes partially, another of parts totally,⁴ and another of parts partially. Fabrication, therefore, being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts totally, and over the divided power of the monad.⁵ Just again, as in the other, or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad dances [as it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its productions, and is filled from it. Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is one Demiurgus [who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may be consequent to each other, viz. *the one*, the paradigm in intelligibles, the one intelligible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established indeed in the intelligible, but being full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Timæus calls him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible paradigm; in order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he denominates the causes demiurgic, as also he had before said, "*Every thing generated is generated by a cause,*" and adds, "*When therefore an artificer, &c.*" Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

¹ For *αυτην* in this place, it is obviously requisite to read *αυτον*.

² i. e. He dwells eternally in the highest intellectual splendor.

³ Instead of *πως γαρ δημιουργικης κ. λ.*, here, it is requisite to read *την γαρ κ. λ.*

⁴ After *το δε των ολων μερικως*, it is necessary to supply the words, *το δε των μερων ολικως*, in order to render the division complete.

⁵ For *τριαδος* here, we must read *μοναδος*.

however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, he would alone abide in his own accustomed manner : for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was the second, he would be particularly the cause of life. But now, when he generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i. e. with Juno], but when he generates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principal work is to produce intellect, and not to fabricate body. For he produces body not alone, but together with necessity ; but he produces intellect through himself. Nor does his principal work consist in producing soul : for he generates soul together with the Crater. But he alone by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to preside over the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellectual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the extremes indeed, are father and maker ; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and being prior to the royal series [i. e. to Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus] ; but the latter possessing the end of the [intellectual] order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity ; but the latter being allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however, are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same ; but in one order the paternal, and in another the effective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the effective. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former¹ is more father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth,² and the fountain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. For it is the monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called *Metis*, but the latter *Metietes*. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees. The former also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Concerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a dark cavern these the father made.

¹ Viz. father and at the same time maker. This God also is Phanes or animal itself, and subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order.

² For βροτων in this place, we must read βυθων.

But concerning the latter Plato says, “*Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.*” In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e. with Phanes] the paternal is more predominant, but with the latter [i. e. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each of the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is comprehensive of all things. And he indeed who is alone maker, ¹ is the cause of mundane natures. He who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. He who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to be ineffable and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of *the good*.² For in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to *the one*. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Orpheus gives a name to the Demiurgus, in consequence of being moved [i. e. inspired] from thence; whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of all things shone forth in him, as the theologist says :

Hence with the universe great Jove contains,
 Extended æther, heav'n's exalted plains;
 The barren restless deep, and earth renown'd,
 Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;
 Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,
 With all that nature's ample realms contain;
 And Gods and Goddesses of each degree;
 All that is past, and all that e'er shall be,
 Occultly, and in fair connection lies,
 In Jove's wide belly,³ ruler of the skies.⁴

¹ i. e. Vulcan.

² viz. The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to *the good*. For as *the good* is the exempt monad of the intelligible order, so the Demiurgus is the exempt monad of the supermundane order.

³ Celestial and sublunary causes and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to subsist in the belly of Jupiter, because these have a middle subsistence between supermundane and Tartarean natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body.

⁴ These verses are very defective in the original; but the learned reader will find them in a correct state in the Orpheus of Herman.

Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds:

Jove is the first, and last, high-thundering king,
 Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring.
 Jove the foundation of the earth contains,
 And the deep splendor of the starry plains.
 Jove is a king by no restraint confin'd,
 And all things flow from Jove's prolific mind.
 One mighty principle which never fails,
 One power, one daemon, over all prevails.
 For in Jove's royal body all things lie,
 Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky.

Jupiter therefore, comprehending in himself wholes, produces in conjunction with Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and likewise all mundane natures, Gods,¹ and the parts of the universe. Night therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each be separate and apart from the rest:

All things receive inclosed on ev'ry side,
 In æther's wide ineffable embrace:
 Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n;
 In which let earth of infinite extent,
 The sea, and stars, the crown of heav'n, be fixt.

But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds:

And when your power around the whole has spread
 A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
 Suspend from æther.

This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders

¹ For θεων here, it is necessary to read θεων.

which are above the world,¹ a golden chain; which Plato emulating says, “*That the Demiurgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, fabricated the universe;*” and that he gave subsistence to the junior Gods, through whom also he adorns the parts of the universe. If therefore, it is Jupiter who possesses the one power, who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intelligible causes of wholes first subsist, who produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn,—he is the one and whole Demiurgus of all the world, and has the fifth order among the kings, [i. e. among the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise, is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes, and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is manifested by him in the Cratylus from names: for he there shows that he is the cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says, “*That we denominate him Dia and Zena, through whom life is present to all things.*” But in the Gorgias he co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them. He also makes Law to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also Law is placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still, Plato in the Laws represents total Justice to be the attendant of Jupiter, in the same manner as the theologist. But in the Philebus he shows, that a royal soul and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane Gods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial Gods as media. To which we may also add, that in the Politicus he calls Jupiter the Demiurgus and father of the universe, just as in the present dialogue he says concerning him, “*Of whom I am the Demiurgus, and father of works.*” He likewise says in the Politicus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, and that the world is moved according to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus delivering a speech,² this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on this

¹ Instead of τῶν θεῶν πραξίων ὑπο τῶν ἐκσμίω in this place, it is necessary to read τῶν θεῶν ταῦτων ὑπερ τῶν ἐγκσμίω.

² For δημιουργοῦντα here, it is necessary to read δημηγοῦντα.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all-
various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer] manifests, who repre-
sents him thus speaking' from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all ye Gods and Goddesses, my words.

And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things to Jupiter, what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone, nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but the decad is the demiurgic¹ order of divine natures, "to which divine number arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable universal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied, and is called the sacred decad." Hence, after the paternal monad, and the paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds. And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity subsists together with it. But it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewise illuminates souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul, and generates things which are truly generated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of comprehending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in the Protagoras, we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls. This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things by his own immutable powers. For as the theologist establishes about him the Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards. And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adorns all things through the middle orders. Who the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect, the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said; and likewise that Jupiter himself is celebrated as the Demiurgus both by Orpheus and Plato.

¹ Here also it is requisite to make the same emendation as above.

² Δημιουργικη is omitted in the original.

Whether, however, we must say that he is a fountal or a ruling God, or belongs to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over in silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as the theurgist [Julian] ascribes to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgus; such as to fabricate the heavens, inclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the numerous multitude of inerratic stars; to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary animals; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the bosoms of the earth, and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion; and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole world according to union. But the God who is said by Timæus to be the Demiurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses [*τας ολοκλητας πασας*]. For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness. On all these accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the triad of ruling fathers; that he is one fountal cause, and that the Oracles represent him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fountal soul, and constituting the world from intellect, soul and body, and producing our souls, and sending them into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timæus. For they say, "The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul in sluggish body."¹ But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, concerning him who is according to them² the Demiurgus. If however these things are asserted conformably³ both to Timæus and the Oracles, those who are incited by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus is fountal; that he fabricates the whole world conformably to ideas, considered as

¹ It appears to be necessary here to read *τη δημιουργω* instead of *τη κοσμη*.

² The Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is *κατεθετο γαρ τον μεν εν ψυχη ενιματι δε ημεας εγκατεθηκε πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε*. Instead of which it ought to be,

————— *κατεθετο γαρ*
Νουν μεν ενι ψυχη, ψυχην δ' ενι σωματι οργη
Ημεων εγκατεθηκε πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε.

³ For *παρ' αυτης* here, it is necessary to read *παρ' αυτοις*.

⁴ For *ομοφυλως* in this place read *ομοφυως*.

one, and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is celebrated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men by Plato, Orpheus, and the Oracles; generating indeed, the multitude of Gods, but sending souls to the generations of men, as Timæus himself also says. For if he is the best of causes, as he says, by what contrivance can he be arranged in the second orders of Demiurgi? For the most excellent among the Demiurgi is significant of the highest transcendency in the demiurgic series. But the highest summit of every series is fontal, so that this Demiurgus is necessarily fontal, and not ruling; the rulers being every where secondary to their proper fountain. Hence also he renders the mundane Gods Demiurgi, or fabricators, as being a certain demiurgic fountain. Since, however, there are many fontal Demiurgi, in what place this Demiurgus is to be arranged, requires greater consideration. But from what has been said, it is evident in what order of Gods it is necessary to investigate him; from which likewise, it is manifest after what manner it is difficult to find him, and when found to speak of him to all men. It is also evident how he is father and maker, and what his effective power is; and that he is not as some say, the *maker* of inanimate natures, but the *father* of such as are animated. For he is both the maker¹ and father of all things. For he is called the father of works, as he himself says in his speech (to the junior Gods). But he is maker and father, as the cause of union, essence, and hypostasis, and the supplier of providential inspection in all things.

“Again, however, this must be considered respecting him, viz. according to which of the paradigms the artificer fabricated the world, whether according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or that which was generated.”

Timæus having shown what the form is of the mundane system, that it is generated, and the manner in which it is generated, viz. as sensible; for he makes no mention whatever of time, because he has not yet constituted time; and having also shown what the demiurgic cause is, viz. that it is effective and at the same time paternal, but this is intellectual, imparticipable and total;—he now passes to the third object of inquiry, what the nature is of the paradigm of the universe, whether generated, or eternal? For he perceived that every artificer

¹ Πουργη is omitted here in the original.

either assumes the paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers, some are able to imitate other things accurately; but others possess themselves a power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of it. Farther still, this also must be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope and measure of that which is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, and will not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has. For whence will it know that this is the end, since something may be deficient or redundant, and it may be necessary to take something away, or to add something? For on this account bodies make irrationally and stupidly, because they have no measure, nor cause of the thing that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should be heated to a certain degree; but if art and the medical intellect are not present, defining the measure of energy to the fire, it will operate too abundantly and destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute to the production of the remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore, which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends to make in an orderly manner. Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time that he admits the effective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe; just as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker. Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through these things what the nature of it is, and employing the before-mentioned definitions, discovers the object of his inquiry, through the three former hypotheses. But in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demonstration, we shall shortly after survey.

In the first place, however, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world was generated according to a certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must investigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. If indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, there is not a paradigmatic cause of the universe; but if it is not lawful to conceive this to be the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus produces the fabrication of the world, the causes of the things generated are contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these causes, or that they should be imparted to him by more ancient principles. But whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world. Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,

he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates. This therefore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the world, and especially when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Demiurgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated, or that he should know it. But if he is ignorant of this, how can he providentially attend to it? And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore, he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must be considered what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it ranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine Iamblichus, that which is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that *the one* is beyond the paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concurs with it, and denominates each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry supposes, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the Demiurgus, but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this interpreter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving that in each monad of it there is a first, middle and last, calls the last¹ in each animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to him, intellect is proximately suspended from *essential* animal. Hence, either the *essential* Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic causes are not many, or not every Demiurgus effects his proper production according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial soul.

¹ For εἰσαγορεύ here, it is necessary to read εἰσάγειν.

Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients, some have made the Demiurgus himself to possess the paradigms of wholes, as Plotinus; others, not the Demiurgus, but have asserted that the paradigm is prior to him, as Porphyry; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to *the one*, or there are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and *the one*. For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after *the one*, it is absurd that all the multitude of intelligibles should be immediately posterior to that which is without multitude. For through numbers proximate to *the one*, the progression is to the whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there are other orders between *the one* and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him. For if it is primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible multitude. For the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be, intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has those which are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus, whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him? To say, therefore, that it is not seen by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible, whether being converted to himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the image of being, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to himself, the object of his intellectual perception will be in himself. So that the paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus; intelligibly indeed prior to him, but intellectually in him.

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, "*Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,*" he asserts that

the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself. And again, when he says, "*Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fashioned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part; but we must admit that it is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts;*"—in these words also he separates him who constituted the universe from the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, "*He was good; but in that which is good, evil can never be inherent about any thing whatever: being therefore void of this, he was willing that all things should be as much as possible similar to himself;*" here, the sameness of the Demiurgus with the paradigm, appears to be manifest. So that in some places Plato says that the Demiurgus is the same, and in others, that he is different from the paradigm, and very properly makes each of these assertions. For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist intelligibly; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus; and the whole number of ideas is one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating these things says, that the intelligible God [Phanes] was absorbed by the Demiurgus of wholes. And Plato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradigm, indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theologist, however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our preceptor, the God who is called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established at the end of intelligibles, is animal itself,¹ with Plato. Hence it is eternal, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.² And the former indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but the latter is the most monadic of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through Night as the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty strength
Was seen; for in his belly he contain'd

¹ For τῆ ἀνορέωῃ here, read το ἀνορέωον.

² i. e. Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order.

The whole ' of things, and mingled where 'twas fit,
 The force and powerful vigour of the God.
 Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c.

Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Demiurgus looked to the paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly. Hence also the theologist says:

For in his sacred heart he these conceal'd,
 And into joyful light again reveal'd.

That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this paradigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intellect, is manifest through what has been said.

Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible; for there is not any other generated nature in order that the universe might be fabricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning Socrates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have been reasonable. But as the inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated? For what other generated nature is there besides the universe? We may dissolve this doubt however, by recollecting what has been frequently said, that Plato calls soul generated, so far as it participates of time. But the inquiry here is, what is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature. After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may be solved. May it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

¹ In the original τῶν παρῶν δι' ἑμας, the word *ἑμας* or *body* obviously signifying *whole*. In this sense also, the word *σῶμα*, which is likewise *body*, is used by Aristotle in Lib. 2. Cap. 2. of his *Metaphysics*. For he there says, *that the sea is the principle and body of all water, ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ σῶμα τοῦ παντός ὕδατος ἧδ' ἐστὶ*. This principle too, he afterwards calls *ἠθροισμενὸς ὄγκος*, a *collected bulk* or *mass*. So that *ἑμας* with Orpheus, and *σῶμα* with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as *ολοκλή* or *wholeness* with the Platonists.

world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbegotten? For if nothing was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to inquire whether the world was generated with relation to perpetual being, or to that which is generated. This however, is now investigated. Prior to the world therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither perpetual being, nor place; for three things [as Plato says] were prior to the generation of the universe, viz. being, place, and generation; it is evident that the so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind. Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, was generated, as we have said, and had a prior subsistence. The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible pre-existing as more excellent, whether was the universe assimilated to the material nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more divine? For being a medium between the two, it is necessarily assimilated to one of the extremes. For it is supposed that the Demiurgus assumed that disorderly nature, and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very properly inquires to which of these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, whether to that which he assumes, or to that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows is conformable; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms, with relation to which of these the universe was generated. And this assertion is after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these paradigms, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that which is less excellent; but we perceiving the natures which are prior, and also those which are posterior to him, interrogate ourselves, in which of them it is fit to place the paradigm. But others say that Plato adduces that which is generated, for the sake of a perfect division, in order that he may not appear to prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm is eternal. For supposing the paradigm to be generated, he shows that a certain absurdity will follow. Others again say, that since of sensibles, some are preternatural, but others according to nature; and of these, some have the images of certain generated natures, but others are the similitudes of them;—hence Plato wishing

to demonstrate that the world was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm, makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful. For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a generated paradigmatic essence; since that which is derived from this is not most beautiful. But because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural. Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt.

It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For the words "*again,*" and "*must be considered,*" indicate the order of the problem; viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this immediately follows those speculations. But the words, "*respecting him,*" collect all the investigations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the theory of the universe. The words, "*according to which of the paradigms,*" separate as extremes, and as different from each other, the intelligible, and that which is generated; the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of beings. But the word *artificer* exhibits the production of form by its cause, and demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane production. And,

Who thunder, and the lightning formed for Jove.
Vulcan and Pallas the first artists, taught
Jove all the daedal arts, the world contains.

Plato therefore following what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the words *τεκτονικὴ δύναμις* and *επιτεκτονικόν*, which signify fabricative energy, when speaking of the demiurgic production. But the words, "*according to that which subsists with invariable sameness,*" indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, which is the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first intelligibles. And again, "*that which was generated*" signifies, that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and alter-motive, or moved by another; all which are the elements of a generated nature. He does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that the world is generated and corruptible; but that the former of these was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato clearly says, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three

things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation therefore is this; and the world is unbegotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted opinions about the universe.

“Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Demiurgus of it is good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm; but if he is not good, which it is not lawful for any one to assert, he looked to that which was generated.”

In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from the hypotheses he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful; but that what is generated according to a generated paradigm is not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful was not generated according to an eternal paradigm. For if to the opposite of that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent follows, then these reciprocate with each other, and that which was proposed from the beginning is demonstrated, through a deduction to an impossibility. For if that which is beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigm, but that which is so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that what is not beautiful is beautiful. Why therefore, did not Plato immediately in the hypotheses assume these axioms, viz. that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated; but those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former, and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer to this, it must be said, that the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but the former which are derived from things caused, are more allied to things posterior to hypotheses. For when he says, “*That which was generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful,*” he begins from causes, but ends in that which is caused. But when vice versa, he says, “*That is beautiful which was generated according to an eternal paradigm,*” he makes the beautiful to be precedaneous, but the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that

he may assume things adapted to principles and causes in the hypotheses, but he employs the latter, which is the converse of the former, in the demonstrations, selecting that which is appropriate to the things demonstrated. Hence laying down these four axioms, he very properly enquires concerning the universe, whether it is beautiful, or is not beautiful. But if indeed the world is beautiful, it was generated according to an eternal paradigm; but if it is not beautiful, according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is beautiful, is evident from sense. It was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.

Since however beauty is imparted to the world from the paradigm, through the demiurgic cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurgus is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art. And this is accomplished in a much greater degree by the whole Demiurgus, who also gives subsistence to nature, the [universal] subject of things, as other assertions evince; and who produced it, that it might co-operate¹ with him, in receiving the world and fabrication from him. Since however, he had added this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. For the defamation of the world is atrocious, since it is most beautiful, and a blessed God, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence Plato employs Themis² as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the Demiurgus, and does not suffer them to be divulsed from the goodness of the father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascribe any thing disorderly or defamatory to the Demiurgus. The propositions therefore, being such, and receiving their beginning from the dividing art, let us see what Plato afterwards adds.

“ It is however, manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm; for the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus generated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by reason and intelligence, and which subsists invariably the same.”

¹ Instead of *αεργος* here, it is requisite to read *συνεργος*.

² For Plato uses the word *θεμυς*, or *lawful*, in this place.

Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the conclusion, as he is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations from intellect. In the next place, he introduces the recollection of the assumption, and afterwards adds the rest.¹ For the words, "*It is however manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm,*" are the conclusion. But the words, "*For the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes,*" are a narration of the assumption, as the causal conjunction *μεν* indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, be-taking ourselves to the theory of the things, let us in the first place see through what cause he transfers the word *beautiful* to the word *most beautiful*, and *good* to the *best*. In the next place, let us survey how these things are true, and what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal paradigm is evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm, but if it be requisite to say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal natures. For every image which more clearly participates of form, is the image of a purer paradigm. And *as of the statues produced by the teletic art, some partaking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjoy the second and third powers of the divinity, but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the first and highest powers of the God*;—after the same manner likewise, the God who gives perfection to the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautiful is derived to the world from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty. Again therefore, if the demiurgic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal, and not to that which is generated; lest by looking to what is less excellent, which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. If, however, this be the case, not only a good cause, but the best among causes, looked to the most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the perceiver is more divine, by so much the more elevated is the object of perception. For the same thing will not be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature. Plato therefore, indicating these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

¹ Instead of *το λεγον* here, it is necessary to read *το λειπον*.

digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but is the most eternal of all of them, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most excellent. For that which is most beautiful was generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is most excellent necessarily looks to that which is supreme. For if that which is most beautiful was not derived from the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures. And unless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that which is most beautiful] or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless that which is best intellectually perceives it? And how can that which is intelligible to a less excellent nature, be incomprehensible through transcendency by that which is more excellent? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful should have been generated according to that which is most divine, and that what is most excellent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it is necessary that what is most beautiful should be fabricated by that which is best. For of what is that which is best the cause, unless of that which is the most beautiful of generated natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted. It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated by geometrical necessities; and through these we are reminded after what manner names are assumed by Plato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgus is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or¹ that he will not fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,² it is necessary that he who fabricates what is [truly] beautiful, should look to that which is eternal, or³ he will not make what is beautiful as the best of fabricators, but he will make it casually. Hence also, Plato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are demons. And if indeed, they are simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificers and framers of mortal natures from being likewise most excellent, and on this

¹ The words η ου ποιεῖ το καλλιστον, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

² Instead of η in this place, it is requisite to read $\epsilon\iota$ μη.

³ Instead of $\epsilon\iota$ here, read η . * For $\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon$ read $\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$.

⁴ The same emendation is also requisite here as above.

account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations of Porphyry.

We may easily however learn, that it is rightly said the world is most beautiful, and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony of the elements, and the analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate to those who are not entirely blind, that the universe is most beautiful. In the next place, does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according to which the parts of the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participation of intellect, the supply of a divine life, the progression⁴ of ineffable deity, and the number of henads or unities, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the [partial] soul which is assimilated to the universe, becoming elegantly adorned, exhibits in herself an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should not possess beauty in a still greater degree? hence theologians conjoining Venus with Vulcan, say that he thus fabricated the universe. And again, from Vulcan and Aglaia, they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and Philoprosune, who render the corporeal-formed nature decorated with beauty. Neither therefore, do those who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the world is not most beautiful, but on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and ensnared.

But how are we to admit that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures? For some think that we must understand by this word *best*, the best of the causes of generated natures, in order that he may not be absolutely the best of causes. For this would be false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that are generated; since the natures that are above him are not the causes of these. I however, should be ashamed of myself, if I were in want of such an artifice as this, forgetting what was a little before said, in which the Demiurgus now delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain and monad of every demiurgic order. On account of this therefore, he is the best of causes, because he is allotted the first order among the demiurgi of the universe; Plato here, directly emulating Homer, who calls the Demiurgus the father of wholes, and the supreme of rulers; and he thus denominates him though he mentions the Gods

⁴ It appears to me that the word *προεδοι* must be supplied in this place.

prior to him, as far as to the Goddess Night. Because therefore Jupiter is the most ancient and venerable of demiurgi, he is celebrated by Homer as the supreme of rulers, but by Plato as the best¹ of causes. Others however by no means dare to accuse the Demiurgus, but blame this universe, and pervert the assertions of the ancients, who call it a cavern and a den. And others, as Heraclitus, say, that the Demiurgus sported in fabricating the world.

To these objections however it is easy to reply. For though the world is, as Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a den. And it is especially so to partial souls who verge to bodies and matter. But with respect to the Demiurgus, though he is the best of causes, yet the whole of his providential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called *sport*, when compared with the energies which are exempt from sensibles. For these reasons therefore, the Demiurgus is thus celebrated in the present words by Plato. It is requisite also to understand how the co-ordination of the most beautiful with the most excellent, is suspended from the first principles. For as in them beauty is suspended from *the good*, and the beautifying cause, from the fountain of all good, thus also here, the world is said to be most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most excellent, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which is best. In the next place it is requisite to understand how what is said about the fabrication itself [of things] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself was led from confusion to order, and a similitude to the intelligible, by fabrication, thus also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent appellations, calling it generated and destructible, but now the most venerable names, denominating it the best of generated natures, the offspring of the most excellent father, and the image of the most divine paradigm. And shortly after, he reminds us of it by the most sacred of names.

“ But again, these things [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that the world should be the image of a certain thing.”

To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same with what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey things accurately may ask what difference there is between saying, that the world was fabricat-

¹ For *αιρισ* here, it is necessary to read *αριστος*.

ed according to a paradigm, and that it is the image of a certain thing. In reality however, each of these is separated from the other. For since it is possible for an artificer to make conformably to a paradigm, but the thing fabricated may not become the image of the paradigm in consequence of not being vanquished by the fabricating cause; in order that you may not fancy that this is also the case with the world, Plato has shown that the Demiurgus indeed looked to a paradigm, and that being most excellent he looked to the most divine paradigm, from what he said respecting the universe being fabricated conformably to the intelligible. But that the universe also is vanquished by form, and truly ¹ imitates its paradigm, he manifests from what is now said. For if the world is an image, the universe is assimilated to the intelligible. For that which is not dissimilar but similar and consentaneous, is an image. You have therefore, the sensible universe, the most beautiful of images, the intellectual universe, the best of causes, and the intelligible universe, the most divine of paradigms. Each of these also is every where. For the sensible universe participates of intellect and being; the intellectual universe possesses sensibles uniformly, but intelligibles ² secondarily; and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordially and unitedly, intellectuals and sensibles. The universe however, subsists appropriately in each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placed before us as a fabrication; but the eternal is two-fold, the one being as demiurgic, but the other as paradigmatic; though the paradigmatic is also in the demiurgic. For the Demiurgus makes looking to himself; since every intellect sees itself, and is the same with the intelligible it contains. And again the demiurgic is in the paradigmatic; since it makes that which is generated. For it is not a paradigm like a form impressed in wax, nor as the image of Socrates is the image of another image; but the paradigmatic cause by its very being makes secondary natures similar to itself. At the same time however, to fabricate paradigmatically, and to be a paradigm demiurgically [i. e. fabricatively] differ. *For the former is to energize essentially; but the latter is to impart essence energetically.* And the former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly; but the latter is to be intelligible intellectually. *For the peculiarity of the paradigm is to make by its very being; but of the Demiurgus, to make by energizing.* For it is not the same thing to make by existing, and to know and energize through knowledge; *since soul also produces life by existing, but makes artificially through knowledge.* And it

¹ For *ομοιος* here, read *ομοιωσις*.

² For *τα ακαθαρτα* here, it is necessary to read *τα καθαρα*.

possesses indeed, the former essentially, but the latter according to energy. And why is it requisite to lengthen these observations philosophically? For the theologian long before, celebrates the demiurgic cause in Phanes. *For there, as he says, the great Breminus, or all-seeing Jupiter, was, and antecedently existed*; in order that he might have as it were the fountains of the twofold fabrication of things. He also celebrates the paradigmatic cause in Jupiter. For again, he likewise is, as he says, Metis the first generator, and much-pleasing Love. He is also continually denominated by him, Dionysius, and Phanes, and Ericapaus. All the causes therefore participate of each other, and are in each other; so that he who says as the divine Iamblichus, that the Demiurgus comprehends in himself the paradigm, and he who evinces, as the illustrious Amelius, that the paradigm is the Demiurgus, in a certain respect speak rightly. For the latter saw the demiurgic peculiarity pre-existing in the paradigm; for there the first Jupiter exists, and on this account he makes Phanes to be the Demiurgus; but the former saw the paradigm in the Demiurgus. For Metis also was in the Demiurgus, being absorbed by him. And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to be the same with the demiurgic cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

We ought not however, to wonder if Plato calls the world an image. For though it is most beautiful, yet it is the image of intelligible beauty. Through this similitude also, it exhibits such things as adorn and beautify generation, and receives as a whole the form of the paradigm. Thus the philosopher calls the world the image of the intelligible, as being assimilated to its paradigm. The addition likewise of *necessity*, shows that the similitude of the former to the latter is admirable and ineffable. Afterwards also, he testifies this by a demonstration indubitable and firm. For it proceeds from the hypotheses themselves.

“ But in every thing, to begin from a principle according to nature, is the greatest of undertakings.”

Some read what is here said by stopping at the word *παντος*, every thing, according to whom the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make that beginning of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stopping at the word *μεγιστον*, greatest, conjoin the word *παντος* with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

* For *επιπροβουτα* here, I read *επιπροβουτα*.

the discussion of the universe, from a principle which is according to nature. Others again say that these words are introduced for the sake of the things previously assumed, these being rightly concluded through the hypotheses which were necessary. But according to others, they are introduced for the sake of what is directly after asserted, it being requisite, if we intend to make a proper beginning, to define previously what kind of discourses ought to be adopted concerning sensibles. And others say, they are introduced for the sake of what will afterwards be delivered concerning the final cause. For this is the greatest principle, and according to nature, which it is requisite especially to survey, and from which commencing it is fit to discuss what follows. But that previous to the disquisition of this, he informs us what the mode will be of physical discussions.

To me however, this axiom appears to be rightly asserted of all things. For it is universal, and is adapted to what has been before said, to what immediately follows, and to what will be again said. Or rather, it is not adapted to these alone, but to all fabrication. For beginning from a principle according to nature as from a root, Plato delivers afterwards explanations of cause homologous to this principle. And science itself, from proper hypotheses, collects appropriate conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of things; but doctrinal disquisition follows science. And this is the greatest undertaking. In the first place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next place, because if the smallest particular is overlooked in the principle, it becomes multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, is said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the greatest power. If, too, as some say, the principle is something more than the whole, it is in an admirable manner said to be the greatest thing. The truth of this is also testified by poets who say, "that every thing which receives a good beginning usually ends well." And moreover, on this account the Athenian guest calls the principle a God, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says, "*Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly if it obtains a congruous portion [or the part which is adapted to it].*"

But what is the meaning of the words "*according to nature*?" Is it the receiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds from things which subsist essentially? For that which is last is a principle as with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore

according to nature, of the universe indeed, is the final cause, but of demonstrations the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the doctrine, whether it is to be received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimilated to truth.

“After this manner therefore, we must decide about the image, and the paradigm of it.”

These three particulars are consensually consequent to each other, the things, the conceptions, and the words. According to the things and the conceptions therefore, Plato assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he makes this definition. For when he separates that which is generated from being, he adheres to the theory of the things. But when he defines our knowledge according to the objects of it, he adheres to the theory of the conceptions.¹ And now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them, he demonstrates to us their definite nature. Hence, these are consentaneous to each other; viz. twofold things, being and that which is generated; twofold knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable and the probable. For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of knowledge? And whence is the difference of words derived, except from knowledges? Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what the mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to be; and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

I however should say that the discussion imitates the fabrication itself of things. For as that unfolds into light the invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence to that which is apparent, and imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world, thus also Timæus adheres indeed to the theory of the things; but also makes the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes, and previously defines the mode of the whole theory of the discussion, in order that he may dispose the whole of the doctrine conformably to this definition. Why therefore does he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-

¹ In the original, *οτε δε τας ημετερας γνωσεις διηριζει, επι τοις πραγμασι τοις των νοηματων*, which is evidently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, *οτε δε τας ημετερας γνωσεις διηριζει επι τοις πραγμασι, της απειχου θεωριας των νοηματων*.

tion, that it is requisite the world should be generated, he necessarily defines what the nature of the discussion about sensible things ought to be, but not prior to this, the nature of the universe being unknown. But when he calls the world an image, an image of such a kind is not ¹ to be assumed, as we conceive that of inanimate ² natures to be, as neither is the paradigm unprolific and inefficacious, but an assimilation must be given to this world to the intelligible. In the first place indeed, according to the prolific power of the paradigm; for by its very being it produces the image from itself. In the second place, according to the demiurgic cause, which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible, by the energies extended to it. And in the third place, according to the conversion of the world itself to the forming power and participation of intelligibles. For "it assimilates itself, as the Oracle says, hastening to be invested with the impression of the images which the intelligible Gods extend to it."

"As words therefore are allied to the things themselves of which they are the interpreters."

As the progression of beings is from *the one* which is prior⁴ to the many, and mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thus also the discourse of Timæus, being assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences from one axiom, and the universal, and thus afterwards introduces division to his words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before us? That it is necessary language should be allied to the things, of which it is the interpreter. And it seems that the Platonists Albinus and Gaius, and their followers, took occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmatizes; and that he does this in a twofold respect, either scientifically, or from probability, and not according to one mode, nor as if all discussions had one accuracy, whether they are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation; but such as is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided in conjunction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that

¹ *Ον* is omitted in the original.

² For *ἀνεχόμενον* here, it is necessary to read *ἀνεχόμενον*.

³ *Προ* is omitted in the original.

language should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their nature, than by being allied to them. For it is requisite that what the thing is contractedly, that language should be evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the thing into light, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Hence, the divine causes of language unfold after this manner the essences of the natures prior to them, and are consascent with them. *In the Gods therefore, the angel or messenger of Jupiter [i. e. Hermes], who has the relation of logos to the intellect of his father, announces the will of Jupiter to secondary natures. But in essences, soul which is the logos of intelligibles, unfolds the united cause of wholes which is in them, she receiving from them her hypostasis.¹ And in the genera superior to us, the angelic order has the relation of logos to the Gods.* Very properly therefore, is it here said, that language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore, must be said to be the one² common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And Timeus in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction with the quality of the things.

“ Hence, respecting that which is permanent and stable, and intellectually apparent, it is requisite that the words should be as much as possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. But in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient.”

Prior to this, Timeus called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably the same, and apprehended by intelligence ; but now he calls it permanent and stable ; the former indeed, instead of perpetual being, and which is apparent in conjunction with intellect, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by intelligence. He also denominates the words respecting it *permanent*, indeed, in order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of them to things ; but *without lapse*, in order that they might adumbrate the firmness of the thing. And *irreprehensible*, in order that they may imitate that which is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it is necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligibles, should have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

¹ For τὴν ὑποθέσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

² Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he denominates the thing itself in the singular number permanent and stable, and intellectually apparent; but the discourse about it in the plural number, calling it *stable words, which are without a lapse, and are irreprehensible*. And since in language there is a certain similitude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant, he assumes one word in common *the permanent*, but the others different. Since also a scientific discourse is irreprehensible, as with reference to our knowledge; for there is not any thing in us better than science; but is confuted by the thing itself, as not being able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and as falling off¹ from its impartibility,—on this account he adds, “*as much as possible*.” For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehensible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is impartible, and apprehending that which is simple in a composite manner. For the phantasy also reprehends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from which opinion is free. Science reprehends opinion, because its knowledge is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

“It is necessary however, that words respecting that which is assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being should possess probability [alone].”

That the discussion of generated natures, is a discussion about an image, and that on this account it is to be called *probable*, is evident. Perhaps however, some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same time exist in the universe, such

¹ For ἀπορροια here, I read ἀποσημαμενος.

² For προ των γενητων in this place, it is obviously necessary to read περι των γενητων.

as we assert conjectural and artificial things to be. May we not say, that words of a conjectural nature are adapted to these, which words are different from those that are assimilative? For to conjecture is one thing; since this is more obscure than sense; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural things, are unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words are adapted to things which are truly conjectural; but with respect to artificial things, assimilative or probable words, are adapted to those that are the first from forms, but to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For conjectural things are the images of sensibles, in the same manner as sensibles are the images of intelligibles. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must be considered, that Plato is now speaking about physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words. For things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally; but this is not the case with things artificial. For the artist does not make that which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,¹ but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clearly shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,² and much less of things artificial,

¹ See the 10th book of the Republic, where he speaks of the ideas of a bed and a table. Plato, however, did not intend to signify in what he there says, that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the Demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive and forming principle which subsists in the dianoetic power of the artificer. This reason also he says, is the offspring of deity, because he conceived, that this very artificial principle itself, is imparted to souls from divinity. Proclus, in the Parmenides, well observes, that an argument of the truth of this may be derived from hence, that Plato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the dianoetic part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is painted as the third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

² i. e. The soul does not essentially contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to the purposes of the moral life.

and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and those which are concerning the image of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he says, *that words respecting that which is assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone].* But the works of nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so that neither have particulars this assimilation definitely, but the universals which are in them. We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

“The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that truth is to faith.”

Prior to this, Timæus made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith: so that as truth is to the intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. But now alternately he says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which is generated. And this perfectly well. For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but at the same time begins from that which is generated and faith, that he may mingle that which has a reference to us with the order which is according to nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue from what is known to us. Plato, therefore, clearly divides language and knowledge conformably to the objects of knowledge; and Parmenides though obscure on account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these things, he says, “that truth is full of splendor and immutable, but that the opinions of mortals have no real credibility.” And again, “that there are two paths, one of which has a real existence, so that it is not possible for it not to exist. But this is the path of Persuasion, and is attended by Truth. The other, necessarily has no true existence. The former of these paths, however, though replete with the most perfect persuasion, is unpleasant.” And again, “Neither can you have any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it the subject of discourse.” The philosopher therefore says, that there are two-

* Owing to the obscurity of the original, I have only given the substance of the verses of Parmenides

fold knowledges, of twofold things; *truth* which he calls [full of splendor, as shining with intellectual light; and *faith*, from which he takes away stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to be different from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line. For there the faith is an irrational knowledge; whence also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged according to sense. The faith however of which he now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture. Hence it is filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the *στι*, or *that a thing is*, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Socrates in the Phædo reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately.

How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the accurate and the irreprehensible? For the powers which use science alone, comprehend the whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that energize with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment. But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote from us, is not easily known, nor to be apprehended by science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty]. For every thing which is in place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this kind; since it is not apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible so far as it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary can be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be surveyed. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be difficult to discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men, since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language about the paradigm? Or is not that which is said about the Demiurgus, in a much

greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself! For it is much more difficult to discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men. Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in exhibiting the science pertaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that it is difficult to find it, we ought not to wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists transfer the effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in the same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be found, and difficult to be known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to theologians. For uniform truth [or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind, and is the light proceeding from *the good*, which, as he says in the *Philebus*, imparts purity, and as he says in the *Republic*, union to intelligibles. The truth proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual orders, which the essence that is without figure, without colour, and without contact primarily receives, where, also, as it is written in the *Phaedrus*, the plain of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that which is connate with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and is conjoined through science with the objects of science. For the psychical light, may be said to be as in the extension of breadth the third from the intelligible; the intellectual breadth being filled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now be assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational, and separated from all rational animadversion. The one also must be conjoined to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles.

“ You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many things about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect accurate and consistent with itself.”

Timæus first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the

third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to hear perfectly accurate arguments in physical discussions, nor such as are truly scientific, but such as are assimilated to them. It is besides this requisite he should know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers and an intellectual and divine essence; for "physical works, as the Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father;" thus also the discussion of it, makes a commixture of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from sense partake largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intelligibles possess that which is irreprehensible, and cannot be confuted. For when we say of the Demiurgus himself, that he consults, that he energizes dianoetically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relinquish the truth of things. So that if when speaking of eternal beings, and showing how they provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible, and to make that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions respecting sensibles themselves be deficient in accuracy [and truth]. What then, some one may say, do we not speak accurately concerning the heavens when we say, that the circles in them bisect each other? But do we not fall off from accuracy, when we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in consequence of our imbecility, and not on account of the nature of the thing? Or, also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from universal reasons? The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligibles, exhibit the irreprehensible; but as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended through immaterial forms. Consider then this very thing which is now asserted, that the greatest circles in the heavens bisect each other. Is it not necessary that the section should be according to points? But a point is impartible. What, therefore, is there of this kind in a partible nature? What is there without interval in a nature distended with interval? For every thing which subsists in a physical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a physical point? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

it is soul which adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contacts, bisections, and equalities, we speak accurately, as not speaking about sensibles. Since therefore things of this kind may be asserted of all material natures, the objection is trifling.

If, however, some one should ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartible, and that which is truly a circle, without interval? For each is a universal; but universal is an impartible reason and form. But the natures in the heavens are partible, and not indivisible, and are in a subject. Here again, we do not say that either circles, or equalities, or any thing else of this kind are in sensibles; and thus we are consistent with ourselves. We summarily, say, therefore, that *Plato at one time defines science, by an explanation of causes alone; at another time, by the subjects of it, possessing an essence perfectly stable, together with an explanation of cause; and at another, by the principles not being hypotheses.* And according to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science [i. e. dialectic] which ascends as far as to the principle of being. For this science pre-establishes the principle which is truly principle, to be unhypothetical. It also has for its subject truly existing being, and produces its reasonings from cause. But according to the second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to physiology. Now therefore looking to the first¹ form he thinks fit to call it conjunctural knowledge. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which may thus be corrected with a small addition. “*If, O Socrates, asserting many things about many,*” afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds, “*concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe.*” And these are the many he alludes to. “*If therefore, he says, many things being asserted about many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Gods it contains, each of these being many, we should not be able to employ accurate language, you must not wonder.*” He says this, however, because it is not wonderful, to be occupied in things of a necessary nature. But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in a twofold respect, viz. on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear, and on account of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

¹ It is evidently necessary instead of δευτερον ειδος in this place, to read πρωτον ειδος. For dianoetic knowledge is by no means conjunctural.

which Plato employs in what he says. This however is not the case with others. But Heraclitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other men to be destitute of science. And Empedocles announces that he imparts truth herself, and that, in what he writes.

To Wisdom's summit rapidly he leaps.

For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics say that there is the same virtue of Gods and men, being very far from emulating the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.

“ If therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others, it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. So that if you receive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to seek for nothing farther than this.”

Timæus reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accuracy in physical discussions; first, from the essence of the things. For from immaterial natures becoming material, from impartible partible, from separate natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming individual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms. But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and darkened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know' that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

* The word *γινώσκουσιν* is wanting in the original.

intellectually perceive them after the above-mentioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that what is not stable is also not stable with the Gods, as the philosopher Porphyry says; for this is asserted by him which it would have been better not to have said; but we must admit that the mode of knowledge varies with the diversities of gnostic natures. For the same thing is known by divinity indeed unitedly, by intellect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically,¹ and by sense passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the Gods, and their intelligence is not adventitious, such as they are, such also is their knowledge. But they are immaterial, eternal, united, and undefiled; and, therefore, they know immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with uncontaminated purity. Hence they antecedently comprehend that which is material, immaterially; dispersed multitude, uniformly; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally; and every thing preternatural, dark and impure, in a manner [transcendently luminous and] pure. Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further confirmation of this truth?

Again however this may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility. For to the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and divine intellection. For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter. But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectural, through employing sense, and material instruments. On this account, we must be satisfied with proximity in the apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom, as it is said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from different hypotheses; some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phenomena. What then, some one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato in physiologizing, and in affording us arguments no less probable than others? May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

¹ The word *morphe*, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Hence, the phantasy perceives *morphotically*, because its sight is a *figured* perception.

² For *τοια* here, it seems necessary to read *τοιο*.

medium between dissimulation and arrogance; for the latter is to say more, but the former less, than all others, and the medium is to say what is in no respect less. In the next place, the words *no less*, may not only be said of men in former times, and speculators of nature, but also of the conjectural things themselves. As if he had said, "*If therefore, we shall afford arguments no less probable than the things themselves, and shall not desert the nature of the objects of knowledge, we must be satisfied.*" The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner, but we must be satisfied with an approximating knowledge of them. For we are men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much of a conjectural nature. Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word *μῦθος* a *fable* [used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature.

"You speak most excellently, O Timæus, and we shall receive what you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we wonderfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the subsequent melody."

In the Republic, where Socrates disposes the discourse, Timæus was silently present, not exhibiting his own judgment about what was said. But here Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Timæus says. For in the things also, of which the persons are images, while secondary natures energize, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not depart from themselves, nor verge to inferior natures. But when more divine beings energize, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participation of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in what is here said, very properly surrounds Timæus with all possible praise. For through wonder itself, he is in a greater degree united to him. Moreover, the word "*most excellent*" indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific nature of the doctrine of Timæus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demiurgus. For as he is the best of causes in works, thus also Timæus is the best in discourses. The words likewise, "*we shall receive what you say in every respect*

¹ For *πῆλον* here, it is necessary to read *καλον*.

² In the text of Proclus, *λογον* is erroneously printed for *ερον*.

as you advise," indicate what kind of person he ought to be, who rightly receives discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered by him; and to persuade himself, that it is right to be persuaded by what the teacher says.

Farther still the word "*preface*" indicates the comprehension of total conceptions in the hypotheses. All things therefore, are in the preface itself.¹ For in this preface, it is shown what the form² is of the object of inquiry, on what hypotheses,³ and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of the auditor. But the word *νομος melody*, is assumed from modulations adapted to the harp. These therefore, are certain melodies, some of which are Minerval, but others Martial. And some indeed, are entheastic, but others are defamatory of manners. Prior, however, to these melodies, it is usual to arrange the preludes, which also on this account are called *precontractations*. From thence therefore, they are assumed. But the word *melody* contributes to the thing proposed to be considered, because all the visible partible⁴ order of things, being harmonious, eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And because likewise, it proceeds from, and subsists according to intellect, and possesses total powers separated from each other, and arranged in a manner adapted to each. For melodies are called *νομους laws*, because they remain immutable, and because such things as are fit are distributed from each.

"Let us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing artificer constituted generation, and this universe."

All that has been before said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physiology. And of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstration through images or symbols; one part of which unfolds the union, but another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-

¹ For *κατα τι τε* here, it seems requisite to read *κατα τουτο*.

² Instead of *τι του ειδους* in this place, it is necessary to read *τι το ειδος*.

³ For *και ποιων υποθεσεων* read *και εκ ποιων υποθεσεων*.

⁴ The word *μεριστη* is omitted in the original.

theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of discussion, may be placed among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikology [or speaking from probability], is consequent. But again, these things having received an appropriate end. Timæus commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from *the good*, conceiving that the discovery of the final cause will be to him the most beautiful incitation. For as *the good* is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first principle. For all things are from *the good*. And of such things indeed, as the demiurgic intellect is not the cause, as for instance of matter, of these *the good* is the cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive their subsistence from *the good*. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timæus refers the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and effective cause, he now wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes, the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all things for the sake of the final cause? For though the worthy man frequently appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate nature; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes that to be his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demiurgus of the universe fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For he does not energize without design, nor indefinitely. Hence also, as it appears to me, Plato does not investigate in the beginning, if there is a final cause of the composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, he inquires what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a God, and not chance, as some say. But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly *that for the sake of which* in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsistence to all things conformably to divinity. But this is the same as conformably to *the good*.

* For *οὐδὲν μὲν ἐστὶν αἰτίας* here, it is necessary to read *οὐδὲν μὴ ἐστὶν αἰτίας*.

Whether therefore, it be requisite to follow the Aristotelian problems, after *what* the universe is, and *what kind of a thing* it is, it is necessary to investigate *on what account* it is. For it has been said that it is generated indeed, but is the image of being. And it is also requisite besides this to consider, for the sake of what it was generated. Or if it be necessary to adopt the Platonic causes, it is fit after the demiurgic cause and the paradigm, to discover the final cause of the fabrication of the world. For again, all other causes are suspended from this, and likewise the divinity of the paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and the perfection of that which is generated. And as far as to this is the ascent to those who love to contemplate truth. It is usual however, to call the final cause $\delta\iota\omega$, *on account of which*; the paradigmatic cause $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omega$, *with relation to which*, the demiurgic cause $\nu\phi\omega$, *by which*; the instrumental cause $\delta\iota\omega$, *through which*; form $\κατ\omega$, *according to which*; and matter $\ἐξ\omega$, or $\ἐν\omega$, *from which, or in which*. These causes also received the same appellations from Plato himself. For now investigating the final cause he says, *on account of what cause*. Inquiring concerning the paradigmatic cause, he says, *with relation to which* of the paradigms. But concerning the demiurgic cause, he says, that which is generated, is from necessity generated *by* a certain cause. And as we proceed, we shall point out the rest from the words themselves of Plato; except that at present also it must be said, that these appellations are adapted to the discriminating science of the philosopher.

What however is generation, and what is the universe? Some indeed by generation understanding the sublunary place, call the universe the whole world. But these entirely wander from the meaning of Plato. For the Demiurgus is not represented as separately fashioning material natures, and separately the whole world. And in the next place, generation itself is a part of the universe. If however, it should be said that Plato calls the heaven the universe, because it is the greatest part of the world, for the rest is small; or because it is the most divine and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe; for the head also is called the whole, as,

Teucer, dear head;

and Plato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining bulk of body for the sake of this;—yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, but that

† Iliad, viii. 281.

which is adorned from matter [as the subject], they denominate the universe, by whom many things written by Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For he says, that every thing generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tangible, and visible. Farther still, he gives a division to generation opposite to that of matter, as when he says, there were these things subsisting separately, being, place, and generation, from which the universe was constituted.

Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be understood in a twofold respect. For one part of it consists in the formation of bodies, but the other, in adapting bodies to the completion of one world. For it is one thing to fashion bodies themselves, through figures, but another to harmonize them when fashioned, to the universe. *Generation therefore, must be said to be the formation of bodies, being a motion [or tendency] to the wholeness and perfection of the universe. For that which is composed from parts has a pre-conceived production of the parts. Hence the formation,¹ which takes place between matter, the whole orderly distribution of things, and the one completion of the universe, must be called generation, in order that it may be a path to the whole in which the parts are comprehended.* For this is the universe, being constituted perfect from perfect parts, according to the one harmony of wholes. Since however, this whole is sensible, and not the intelligible all, or universe; for this was the paradigm; nor the intellectual all; for this was demiurgic; on this account Plato adds the particle *this*, manifesting by it that which is sensible and partial. For every thing corporeal, though it should be a whole, is partial. But the most principal whole is that which is immaterial and without interval, and that is truly all whether it be intellectual or intelligible. And thus much concerning this particular.

But what shall we say is meant by composition? Perhaps it indicates that the world is composed from many things, and that the generation of it is from dissimilars. Perhaps also, it signifies that union and stability accede to it from the total fabrication. For the collocation of *συν*, *with*, [in the word *συνιστας*] is significant of union, and of the conspiracy of all things to one. But *στασις*, *permanency*, manifests the firmness and stability of the fabrication of the world. Farther still, with respect to the words *συνιστας* and *συνιστητατο* [i. e. *he who composed and he constituted*] employed here by Plato, the former copulates the present and past times, and the latter indicates the perfection and the perpetuity of the fabrication. For the former of these words manifests continual pro-

¹ For *πασις* here, it is necessary to read *κλασις*.

duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness; but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signifying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, indicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude. For such as is the nature of that which is effective, such also is the energy which it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates; because it produces by its very being, and from¹ its own proper essence.

“He was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing.”

Those who call the Demiurgus *the good*, are entirely ridiculous. For *the good* and one who is good are not the same. For the former is imparticipable itself by itself, and is exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participation of the former. And the one rules over all intelligibles; but the other, if indeed it is the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not the sovereign ruler of intelligibles; and if it is subordinate to the paradigm is in a much greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligibles. And in short, every certain God is a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a vivific, and another a perfective good. But *the good* is not a certain good, but is simply good. And if you say that it is demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as simply good.

These distinctions therefore being made, let us next consider the beginning of what is here said. In the first place, therefore, as Plato when investigating the mundane form, and inquiring whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, adds prior to the whole demonstration, “*it was generated*;” and as when exploring the paradigmatic cause, he previously adds, “*it is manifest to every one, that it was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm*,” adducing the conclusion prior to the whole of the reasoning;—thus also proposing to discover the final cause after all the others, he adds, “*he was good*,” imitating intellect through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of the assertion. For in this colon, the whole of what is investigated is comprehended, because goodness is the final cause, whether it is simply so and one, or whether² it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

¹ For *avro* here, read *a-ro*.

² *Ere* is omitted in the original.

being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the demiurgic number of forms;—thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is simply so, but another is in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, is the fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good; but the latter being a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted an order subordinate to others. For if we wish to explore what it is which makes a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, supermundane or mundane, we shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. For what is it that makes each of the bodies that are animated to be so, except the resemblance of soul? What is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them, and which is an illumination of total intellect? What therefore can deify intellect, and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first God, and the forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If indeed, he were intelligible 'beauty we should say that intellect was a God through beauty. But since the first God is *the good*, intellect also through participating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the *hyparxis* of the Gods; and the very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to this likewise, every God exists as a God. And on account of this he has a providential, or a demiurgic, or a vivific, or a connective characteristic. For intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual perception and knowledge of beings; but to energize providentially is divine. So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The being also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with *relation to it*; and by goodness, because it produces *on account of it*. But the paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is *the one*,

* For *ἦρον* in this place, it is necessary to read *σοφρον*.

which is beyond even intelligibles themselves: for it is imparticipable¹ goodness. But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the number of forms. And the maker is the intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to wholes. So that if Amelius said that there are three demiurgi after this manner, perceiving this triad in the one Demiurgus, he said rightly. For one of them, says he, makes [as it were] by contraction, another by mandate, and another by his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual artificer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; but the third is established prior to both, analogously to a king. *So far therefore, as the Demiurgus is intellect, he produces all things by the intellectual perceptions of himself; but so far as he is intelligible, he makes by his very being; and so far as he is a God, by his will alone.* If however Amelius divulses the three Demiurgi from the one Demiurgus, we must not admit it, while we follow Plato. For the same Demiurgus is good, so far as he is a God, and on account of goodness he produces all things by his will, and is intelligible² intellectually; for such is the demiurgic being. He is also intellect, the artificer of the world. The words therefore, "*he was good,*" have an explanation of this kind; *in the term WAS, the super-plenary, the consummately perfect, and the super-eternal nature of his divine hyparxis, being indicated. For the term IS, is significant of eternal things; the term WAS, of the super-eternal unities; and the term WILL BE, of things which subsist in time. For if the term IS pertains to eternal natures, the term WAS will be adapted to the natures prior to these, and the term WILL BE, to the natures posterior to these.* But such are the beings which are indigent of time.

Since however the Demiurgus is good, envy is never ingenerated in him about any thing. But some one may say, what is there [remarkable] in intellect not being envious? For this³ does not happen even to men that are moderately good. The term therefore *never*, is significant of eternal perfection; since souls are at one time passively affected, but at another, recur to impassivity. But the term *about any thing*, is significant of self-sufficiency; since we indeed, for the sake of other things, are frequently purified from envy, but in those things in which we have less [than we think we ought to have in these] we are filled with envy. What however, is

¹ For ἀμεταθεκτος here, read ἀμεθεκτος.

² For κοητως εστι νοητως, it is necessary to read in this place κοητως εστι νοητως.

³ For του γαρ here, it is requisite to read τουτο γαρ.

the meaning of the term *οὐδεις*, none.¹ Is it because there are many kinds of envy that he adds *none*? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a perfect negation of envy? But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find in assertions concerning the Gods? For all the appellations and words which are employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion in us being mingled from pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the *Philebus*? Envy likewise, is for a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benefiting, but keeping the good confined to himself. And *envy is also the want itself of good*; which the philosopher appears to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence. For it is naturally adapted to be perfectly exempt from this alone, since it is essentialized in goodness itself. *For to be pained from the goods pertaining to others, is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not primarily good. For adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary, in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the second is wholly boniform, yet is such by participation. And the third, which is primarily good, is good itself.* For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What therefore is this? It is *the deity* of each thing, according to which every truly-existing being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any one of secondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, it is among the number of things deified, and rendered good, and is a God through participation, and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself.

This participation therefore, Plato is accustomed to call *indigence*;² just as in the *Banquet*, he calls *Love the want* of things beautiful and good. Hence, a divine nature, so far as it is divine, is primarily good, and not according to participation; so that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all envy. For as to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for darkness to approach, but it is excluded from it at a great distance, about the cavities of the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach to a divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity? What participation in the

¹ i. e. *Οὐδεις φθονος, no envy.*

² *Ἐνδεϊα* is omitted in the original.

fountain of good? The Demiurgus therefore, being good by his very being, transcends all indigence, and all participation which accedes from another thing. For he is united to *the one itself*, and does not proceed out of it. For intellectual union is of one kind, but the union prior to intellect of another, according to which the generative deity of the Demiurgus, and the goodness which connects all things, are united to *the one itself*. For this goodness is not a certain power, as some say, but the measure of all power. Nor is it will, but will proceeds from it. Nor is it a habit; for habit pertains to another¹ thing different from habit; but goodness is itself of itself [i. e. pertains to itself alone]. Nor, in short, is it an essential hypostasis; but it is that which unites essence, and is ineffable, connects powers, and is prolific of demiurgic energies. As therefore, every intellect is essentialized in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is participated by it; and as every soul is essentialized in existing as soul, but intellect is participated by it; thus also every God is essentialized in being a God, or rather is superessentialized, but there is not any thing which is participated by him; because the Gods are the most ancient and venerable of all things. The demiurgic intellect therefore, so far as it is a God, in existing as a God is primarily so, and not according to participation. This however is the same with good. As therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for it is indigent of intellect, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intellect;—thus also in goodness, envy² is the indigence of good; but every thing indigent is not primarily good. Soul indeed and intellect are indigent of good, because they are not primarily good. But a God, so far as a God, being good, is exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be, whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. For indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

“Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself.”

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

¹ For αλλο here, it is necessary to read αλλοι.

² i. e. Every God, so far as he is a God, is a participant of nothing superior to himself. For the procession of the Gods from the principle of all things, is not a participation, but an ἀσφραγιστος ἀποκάλυψις, an ineffable unfolding into light.

³ For αἰθροί here, read φθοίαι.

part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of the Demiurgus, that he is a God. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but another participable,¹ he manifests that the Demiurgus is participable. For he does not say that he was goodness, but that he was good. But he who is good participates of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Demiurgus does not rank among deified natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable, such, for instance, as *the good*; but another is good by² the participation of some other nature, as every thing which is deified.³ But that which is primarily good, is good itself. And that which is participated, and is the medium of both the before-mentioned natures is of such a kind as all the intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods are said to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgic peculiarity. For not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and effective cause, desiring to fill all things with itself, and to benefit all things; in order that all things may become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine nature, and of arcane and ineffable impressions, which accede to them from the whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For *being* signifies the eternal; and because he especially benefits all things, he imparts to all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither is there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are naturally adapted to receive them. Hence he made all things similar to himself, so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures; but he caused them to become other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For as Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but differ-

¹ The Demiurgus is a participable deity, because his intellect participates of his goodness, which constitutes his hyparxis.

² Instead of *το μετὰ* in this place, it is necessary to read *τῷ μετὰ*.

³ Thus soul is deified by the participation of intellect as a medium; because deity accedes to soul through the intervention of intellect; and body is deified by the participation of soul as a medium.

ent things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one thing to be a ladder, but another a bed; thus also the Demiurgus, so far as he is good, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good; but according to forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradigmatic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these things, thinks fit to ask what it is by the reception of which genera are good. And he says it is by the reception of harmony, symmetry, and order. For these are beautiful. But every thing [truly] beautiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is in these, when he says, "*That God led that which was disorderly into order, through his wish to communicate good.*"

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus produces eternally; that the world is perpetual, according to a perpetuity which is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with arrangement; and that it is not always incorruptible, but is always *generated or becoming to be so*, in consequence of always receiving good. But it is not immediately good like its generating father. For in him all things are contained unitedly, [but in the world distributedly],¹ and not with perfect reality, as in eternal natures. For if the universe was generated in time, was it from the Demiurgus that it did not exist before, or from its subject nature being without order? For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist eternally? Or is it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain? For concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether shall we make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unbegotten, and the Demiurgus still more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in consequence of the Demiurgus not energizing. Whether then, did he not fabricate, because he was not willing, or because he was not able? If indeed we say it was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him of goodness. But if he was not able, it is absurd that he should at one time have power, and at another imbecility. For we shall take away the eternal. But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did not exist before, whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to be now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not

¹ The words *εν δε τῷ κοσμῷ διατηρημενως*, are omitted in the original.

self-motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus? And why was it not moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that all things should become similar to himself? The extension therefore of providence is suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production of the Demiurgus; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who made it. For if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates¹ all things, and fire heats as long as it is fire; for the one is essentially illuminative, but the other calefactive; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the passion of the vilest natures. For neither does the worthy man wish to effect other things than such as he is able to effect. But if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good, he always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If however, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good. But if he always makes it, the world is always generated. Hence the world is perpetual; for the Demiurgus is always good. The world therefore is perpetual, not *being* but *becoming to be* perpetually. Hence, as we have said, the perpetuity of the universe is suspended from the goodness of its maker. For the orderly distribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. For matter, on account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to be without God, and the confused and disorderly nature, to be remote from divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production. The visible order of things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consubistent with the goodness of the father.

“He therefore, who especially receives this most principal or proper and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the greatest rectitude.”

Timæus assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him,

¹ For *καταλαμβάνει*, it is necessary to read *καταλαμβάνει*.

he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces all things, and this *Timæus* denominates the most proper and powerful principle, because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves indeed that which is generated, but is moved from thence [i. e. from the first principle]. And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but is moved by goodness; because *the good* indeed, is prior to intelligibles, but the paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectual. About *the good* also, all intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of intellectuals subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the paradigmatic is more principal, and the final is most principal. For it is that for the sake of which all things subsist, from which other things are suspended, and which is truly the end of fabrication. Hence the world is perfected indeed, on becoming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as it participates of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. For as *the good* is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first dignity in each. On these accounts therefore, he calls the final cause the most principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of *most principal*, he indicates that which is truly^a cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of generated natures; but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the effects themselves. It must be said however, that *generation and the world, as we have before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement of things, and the perfection itself of the universe.* Since also in dogmas concerning the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in discussions concerning *the good*. For intellect subsists on account of *the good*, and the intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in us. Hence Plato thinks it is necessary, that those who assert something concerning the most proper and powerful principle, should be prudent men, and that their auditors should receive what they say with the greatest rectitude. What then, may not any casual person say something concerning God and the final cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude asserting that God is good? *But God spoken of without true virtue is but a name, as Plotinus says; and*

^a Instead of *περι δε το νοερον, η των νοητων διακοσμησις* in this place, it is necessary to read *περι δε το νοητον, η των νοητων διακοσμησις*. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.

^b *Γορ την οστω αιτιαν* here, it is requisite to read *την οστω αιτιαν*.

he is spoken of by the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance. Do not daemons also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were] round him; and demiurgic angels, who precede as in a solemn procession the paternal production of things; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the one fabricative cause? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, angels intellectually, daemons with undefiled purity, eternally, and in a way allied to the natures prior to them, but we must be satisfied with having this knowledge prudently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media between more divine natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived of intellect. For such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and intelligence, but ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak concerning the most proper principle, what we assert must be received as uttered by prudent men. *For prudence is a medium between intellect and opinion*; so that a right judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, "*he who especially.*" For the assertion concerning this principle must be *especially* received from prudent men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must be sought; and from the multitude, a casual assertion.

"For the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil."

The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartibles to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from things without interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the final cause apophthegmatically; in the next place, discursively; and in the third place, it delivers in an evolved manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the assertion, "*he was good,*" uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of causes. But the words, "*In him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing; and being entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself,*" comprehend this cause discursively; because, after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now says represents to us intelligence proceeding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third

* The word *ἐπιεικής* is omitted in the original.

assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first division was, "*he was good*," on this account the second begins from *good*, but proceeds as far as to the *will* of the father. And the third beginning from his *will*, delivers the whole of his *providential energy*. For if he was good, he wished to make all things good. But if he wished, he made them to be so, and the universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much concerning the order and connexion of the assertions.

Let us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itself, therefore, which is of itself exempt from beings, is one, ineffable, and uncircumscribed, from *the one itself* possessing its undefined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requisite to survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of *the one*,—goodness indeed precedes, but the second is will, and the third is providence; *goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable*; but *will exhibiting the super-plenary, the extended, and the generative*; and *providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective of works, and the undefiled*. According however, to this ineffable and united hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, being firmly established in this triad, and existing self-perfect; but power possessing a never-failing and infinite progression; and energy being allotted perfection and essential production. And again, intellect analogously receives a triple division, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first of these is the supplier of existence, the second of vitality, and the third of knowledge. After these, soul likewise is divided into the object of science, into science, and the scientific. For the first of these indeed, is that which is known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These triads therefore, being four in number, as goodness is to will, so is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform, and the perfective, pertain to goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will. And energy, intellect, and that which is scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, and that which proceeds

through and antecedently comprehends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence. Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so far as he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, he is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If, however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods, therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression¹ as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be when things characterized by *itself*² have the first subsistence; those that rank as the second proceed from these; those of the third order proceed from these and

¹ Προσδον is omitted in the original.

² viz. Self-subsistent super-essential natures; for to these the *αυτο*, or *itself*, primarily belongs. The next to these are intellects. Those in the third rank, are souls. Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies. And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term *another*; and those in the fifth rank being *others* only; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar! Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from *the one*.

Let, therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely; but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. For if, indeed, divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. But it is not lawful for *the good* to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt.

We must say, however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil but good. For so far as it is a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of all good, you will

¹ viz. *The one*, and matter.

² $M\eta$ is wanting in the original.

make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as *the good itself* is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entirety. For that which is most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.¹ If, therefore, that which in no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you make it good to other things. And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, participates of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure, and order, and bound? It is evident that it is the Demiurgus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen;² but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence therefore of the Demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last.

That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the *Politicus*, he clearly says, "that the world obtained from its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens." For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

¹ *The good itself* is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good: for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from the good is evil itself. Hence evil itself is posterior to non-entirety.

² For *πολυαγαρον*, it is necessary to read *πολυορινον*.

³ For *περι* here, it is requisite to read *παρα*.

And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. At the same time, however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But in the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that are good, viz. that *the one* and what is primarily good, precede multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The words *others*, therefore, and *certain*, evince that the causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Theætetus he says, "that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode." If, therefore, evil revolves necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice and divinity.

For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial demons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes, therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and corrupted. For if it is necessary that there should be generation, it is also necessary that there should be corruption. For generation subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if there is

corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be secretly introduced. As, therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe has an orderly arrangement. For if though it should be destroyed and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good, but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from a certain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually depraved; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they undergo the punishment of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they suffer the punishment of their will.

Let us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise

they punish the contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives? If therefore that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing soul alone is transferred to another and another order. For all choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved¹ soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chooses to its proper order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of providence.

If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, is it necessary that there should not be every self-motive life? But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should be self-motive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts? And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are self-motive indeed, but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary² to each other. Evil, however, is not on this account natural to the soul; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially corruptible; and yet disease

¹ *Μοχθηρίας* is omitted in the original.

² For the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also self-motive.

³ For *ἀπ' αἰτίας* here, it is necessary to read *ἀπὸ αἰτίων*.

is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As, therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For every thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced *essentially* indeed from a partial soul, but *accidentally* from divinity, so far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable¹ of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that perform them with repentance. And when, indeed, they are the subjects of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

¹ For το μεν δυναμενον in this place, it is necessary to read, το μη δυναμενον.

most disgraceful parturition. And some, indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life ; but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination.

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil ; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies ; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature. It remains, therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it in the essences of these ; for all their essences are derived from divinity ; nor in their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, it is neither in such as are rational ; for all these aspire after good ; nor in such as are irrational ; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry¹ of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form ; for it wishes to rule over matter ; nor in matter, for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a *parypostasis*, or *resemblance of subsistence*, and that at the same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, "*as much as possible*," written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.

207
 "Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former."

¹ For *συμμετρία* here, it is necessary to read, *ασυμμετρία*.

Plutarch of Chersona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world from a certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was from a disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the *Laws*, that a beneficent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the composition of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Iamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his beneficent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the numerous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously surveys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribution of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal-formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,¹ but the other decorative, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that

¹ For Σωματικῆ here, it is necessary to read οὐρανοτικῆ.

every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet participating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if it is moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whole of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed; the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorer, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct subsistence; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe. And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, it is evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject [unproduced by the Demiurgus], and that he alone produced its orderly distribution. For he first constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is true. But with respect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms.

Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbegotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. For Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it is unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether it is unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

conception of Plato is on this subject. For that the Demiurgus is not the first who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, viz. that these three things preceded the generation of the world, *being, place, and generation*; and that generation is an offspring, but place a mother. He appears therefore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus, according to the maternal and paternal peculiarity, but to produce generation from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to matter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus? In the Philebus therefore, he clearly writes, "*We say that God' exhibited the bound, and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies and all beings derive their composition.*" Hence, if bodies are from bound and infinity, what is the bound in them, and what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we say matter is infinity, but form bound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, is the first and ineffable cause of matter. But since every where sensibles are analogous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter; as for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from similitude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants,—it is evident, that he likewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity, just as he produces the bound which is here from the bound which is there. It has however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the first infinity which is prior to things that are mingled in the summit of intelligibles, and from thence extends its illumination as far as to the last of things; so that according to him, matter proceeds from *the one* and being, or if you are willing, from the *one* being also, [or being characterized by *the one*] so far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. On this account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into light.

Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces two-fold causes from *the one*, viz. bound and infinity, thus too the theologist gives subsistence to ether and chaos from time; ether being the cause of bound every where, but chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both the divine and the visible orders of things; from the more excellent principle indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of measure and connexion; but from the less excellent, every thing motive, effective

¹ viz. The highest God, or *the one*.

of difference, never failing progression, the nature which is defined, and connected by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended. Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the first infinity.¹ *And it is indeed a separation (χωρισμα), as being the receptacle (χωρα) and place of forms; but there is neither bound, nor a bottom, nor a seat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and indefinite. But again, the last infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, as being allotted a formless nature.* Hence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles. *For there perpetual darkness² and the infinite subsist.* And these indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than the successive orders of being. In matter however, the unilluminated, and the infinite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same things concerning it. For the divine Iamblichus relates that according to Hermes materiality (υλοτητα) is produced from essentiality³ (εξ της ουσιοτητας). It is probable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles, viz. intelligible and intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why do I say this of the Gods themselves? For the nature of the universe likewise, produces matter so far as she is [a Goddess]⁴ and according to the hyperaxis of herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus therefore, according to the unity which he contains, according to which likewise he is a God, is⁵ also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demiurgic being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,

¹ For *προς εαυτην* here, it is necessary to read *προς αυτην*, [i. e. *προς αυτην απειριαν*.]

² The first hypostasis of intelligibles is being itself, which is mingled from bound and infinity. Perpetual darkness therefore, may be said to reside here, because this hypostasis through proximity to the ineffable cause of all becomes darkened. "For being very near, as Damascius admirably observes, to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it dwells as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence." This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous. For as there is one kind of ignorance which is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another which is above knowledge, being that in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates; thus also, there are two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light.

³ See Iamblic. De Mysteriis, p. 159.

⁴ The word *θεος* is omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified.

⁵ For *ετι* here, it is requisite to read *εστι*.

and of corporeal qualities. Hence generation is the offspring of being. According to the life which he contains, he is the cause of the animation which pervades through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cause of the intellectual supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces according to his secondary powers, he produces in conjunction with those that are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of life, of being, and of union. That also which lives is, and is one; and being is connected through its own proper unity. The converse, however, is not true. For such things as he produces according to *the one*,¹ so many he does not produce according to *being*. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to the fountain of life, as he does according to being. Nor as many things according to a royal intellect, as he does according to life; but he gives the greatest extent to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we have elsewhere more fully discussed.²

Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each. The word *thus* then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, "*every thing that was visible*," in the first place, leave nothing solitary; and in the next place, they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if it was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the second subject [i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolie and indistinct presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timæus says farther on. These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabrication. For superior energize prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demiurgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence does not extend. If therefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the things which proceed from them,³ you will find that *the good* which is the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of

It seems to proceed motion

¹ Instead of *εἰς τὸ ἓν* here, it is necessary to read *κατὰ τὸ εἶναι*.

² For *εἰρησάται* here, it is necessary to read *εἰρασται*.

³ Instead of *ἀφίστησιν* in this place, it is requisite to read *ἀφίησιν*.

⁴ For *τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν* here, read *τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν*.

its being invested with forms; for every form is a measure; and of its participation of order. For order is the reason of things that are arranged. The paradigm, however, is not the cause of matter, but of the production of form, and of the order in forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order. Hence also Plato says, that the Demiurgus received matter now advancing to the participation of forms. Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, but of their effects, some proceeding as far as to things that are last [i. e. to bodies], but others as far as to things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes;—this being the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from *the good*, and invests it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm; but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers, and inserts in them order. After this manner therefore, you must conceive, if you disjoin causes. If also you say, that the Demiurgus is the one cause of all things, he produces indeed in one way according to his goodness [or *the good* which he derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic, and as we may say, artificial peculiarity. As he produces likewise collectively, at once, and eternally, different things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him. For according to *the good*, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible. From this order likewise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, “From thence entirely leaps forth the generation of abundantly-various matter.” *For the first matter does not possess a great variety; nor is there a generation of this, but of that matter which has vestiges the forerunners of forms*; from which it is evident that the paradigm and the Demiurgus differ from each other, since matter indeed participates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is present with it. The word therefore *receiving*, may be said to indicate the paradigmatic cause which is exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now variegated with certain vestiges of forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a different power, though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

But the words, "*which was not in a state of rest but moved,*" show that the hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the *Politics*, where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, "*he led it from disorder into order,*" signify the participation of intellect, and an intellectual life. But the word *conceiving* indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the expression "*being willing,*" and power in the expression "*as much as possible,*" in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, "*conceiving.*" For in the *Laws*, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, viz. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, "*that was in every respect better than this,*" signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. "*that he led it from disorder into order.*" The word *this* also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received; but the word *that* represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. He places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is first in the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being all things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

¹ For ἄλλο here, it is requisite to read ἕτερον.

alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, absurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither is nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through *this* indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primarily. But external natures are the images of his allness, (*παντοτιτος*) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. For the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and preserve its own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologians, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order. They however speak *theologically*. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato *philosophically* transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent soul, and is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order.

① 101
 (Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without generation from a cause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something else, and not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

for the conclusion

that confuses

a quality with a substance

* Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ου καθ ολεν.

not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be preservative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbegotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But if something else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it should be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten,¹ that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause.

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as *the good*. For that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. For why is the one more sufficient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these principles being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity: [but that it is the prin-

¹ It is necessary here to supply *αγενητον των*; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, *ειτε αγενητων ουτων*, we must read, *ειτε αγενητον των αγενητων ουτων*.

² For *ααζιαν* here, it is necessary to read *αζιαν*.

ciple of all principles]. But if this be the case, there will not be more [independent] principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing, than things posterior to it when the principle is subverted.¹ But this will be the case, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating. If however this be true, it is not possible for the principle to exist, the world not existing. But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, that God exists without fabricating. They assert this however, not² knowing that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nutritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrument [the body]. For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation; but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, is adscititious. If therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power; but if he does not, his power will be adscititious. How therefore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. This is likewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things; since whatever you may assume will be derived from thence. This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he clearly says, that all things are from bound and

¹ Instead of *καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνηρημένη τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκ ποδῶν τὰ μετ' αὐτῆς, ἐκ τούτων μὴ εἶπω, ἀναρρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή*, I read, *καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνηρημένη τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκ ποδῶν τὰ μετ' αὐτῆς ἢ ἐκ τούτων, κ. λ.*

² Οὐκ is omitted here in the original.

intinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles; but these are perfected by the one principle. From what is said also in the Philebus this is evident, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he demonstrates, that it is neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself.

In the third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume pertain any thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting by themselves apart from it; but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms. Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things inefficacious, resembling in themselves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intellect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is superior to every intellectual essence. Nor does a certain irrational soul move that which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. For every soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring all things into order, how was he willing? Was he always willing, or at a certain time? For if he was willing at a certain time, this was either from himself, or from matter. But if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every thing good, however, which always exists, is always effective.* And if this arose from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned? Because, say they, it became adapted to receive the demiurgic productive power. For God observed this, viz. the aptitude of it. It is necessary therefore, that it should have been brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For if it had been disorderly, it would not have been adapted; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude. Hence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover, neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore the world is always adorned; and the Demiurgus always arranges the confused and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically introduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when generated, another; bodies indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

* Instead of το δε αγαθον παν, αι ου ποιητικον, it seems necessary to read το δε αγαθον παν αι αι, αι ποιητικον.

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12/20

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pable of arranging themselves. Hence Plato, wishing to indicate the order which accedes to bodies from something different from themselves, shows that disorder is consubistent with their motions, without a divine cause. Aristotle, however, blames him who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothesis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that it is not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to be admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which is formless prior to forms, though it is never separate from them. Thus too, that which is invested with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it never was prior to it, but is consubistent with order.

The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is that in which Plato demonstrates the mode of fabrication; a divine intellect effecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For artists are in want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion over every kind of matter. But this is evident from the instruments which they use, in order to render matter pliant, boring, or polishing, or elaborating it with a wheel; all which operations do not insert form, but take away the inaptitude of the recipient of form. *The reason itself however, or form, becomes present with the subject from art instantaneously, all the impediments being removed.* Hence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede to matter, and would not in short be in want of any instruments. Moreover, the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone. For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red; and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. But the cause of these is a phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contrivances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists assert that there are certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by their motions, to such as are able to behold the visions which they externally present to the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations of partial souls, and the energies of dæmons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should give subsistence to the sensible nature; generating, indeed, that which is material immaterially, that

which is tangible, without contact ; and extending impartibly that which possesses interval ? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circumstance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the seed, and in each part of it contains all the differences of the solids ; as for instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow ; of the soft parts, such as the lungs and the liver ; of the dry parts, such as the nails and the hair ; of the moist parts, such as the blood and phlegm ; of the adipous parts, as the marrow and fat ; of the bitter parts, as the bile ; of the parts without quality, as the saliva ; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves ; and of the expanded parts, as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts, and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence from a small bulk ; or rather from that which is without bulk. For reasons [or productive powers] generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For whatever part you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce all things, being not at all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of all things is eternally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

“ But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.”

Themis' is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night. But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom

Olympus and great Heav'n are giv'n in charge,
And a dense cloud to open, or to close.

She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order ; on which account also Socrates in the Republic calls her Necessity, as is demonstrated in that dialogue. He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine cause of order, the Demiurgus also, leading that which is disordered into order, imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar to, and connects it

¹ This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful.

with himself. For being himself most excellent, he very properly causes the world to be most beautiful; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is suspended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beautiful, is suspended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes]. And because *the good* is the cause of beauty, on this account also the best of fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful off-spring. Farther still, as Themis is the guardian of the divine laws, but they make the generations of secondary from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first;—on this account also, the Demiurgus, energizing with Themis, renders the universe most beautiful, being himself most excellent. For if Socrates, being a man, says that it is not lawful for him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth, how is it possible we should say that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else than what is beautiful, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united to Themis, who is likewise always present with him? And thus much concerning this particular.

But the words, "*it neither was nor is,*" are very appropriately assumed with *that which is best*: for before this, he had called the Demiurgus *good*, and then also the term *was*, was added. For Timæus says; he *was good*. For the simplicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of deity, are more adapted to the term *was*, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception. Now¹ however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also *was* and *is*, are adapted to the Demiurgus; as to a God indeed, the term *was*; but as to an intellect, the term *is*, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

308 "By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect would ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect."

Amelins in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Plato knew the different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

¹ Now is erroneously printed here for *is*.

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are one, and one is all. Since now also he who *wills* is one Demiurgus, he who *reasons* is another, and he who *assumes* or *receives* is another. And the first, indeed, makes by his will alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception, but the third by [as it were] manual operation. For they placed intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus together fabricated ' the universe. The divine Iamblichus however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised. But he defines λογισμος, or a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes beings, which is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy invariably the same; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Timæus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. For if there is a multitude in the demiurgi, [i. e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange a monad prior to the multitude. Moreover, we think it fit that the divine Iamblichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiurgus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate different things, in addition to his being the father of all things? For let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in a distributed manner, giving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively; according to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he produces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because he is the Demiurgus of total natures, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμος is a distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, no reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For *συνεστραφει* in this place, it is necessary to read *συνεστραφειται*.

doubt. Hence this λογισμος is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμος is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of "by a reasoning process."

With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timæus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the Demiurgus should be converted to them. For how can he verge to that which is less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? It is better therefore, as the divine Iamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which Timæus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, "*As many therefore, and such ideas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which is animal, &c.*" That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and inmanifest; but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had called that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? For invention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process; since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and such as are deprived of intelligence; since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not partícipate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

For νοητων here, it is necessary to read αισητων.

of a superior¹ but the rest, of an inferior order. For though all things there are objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause possesses the intellectual nature of the things caused, but in others, the privation of intellect and the irrational; the causes themselves being intellectual, but the things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiurgus looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venerable than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genus of the other, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For man is better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the other. Nor if you assume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the art of the statuary, is the former in every respect more venerable according to figure than the latter. For art is in many respects more accurate [in this instance than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what other thing can body be able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intellect]? Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there [i. e. in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are there, he likewise perceived the separation which is here between the beings which possess, and those that are deprived of intellect. Hence he thus says, that nothing destitute of intellect, will be better than that which possesses it, the difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.

Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary energize on account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former, but the former being suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Demiurgus is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness is the cause of beauty. But because he made the universe to be most beautiful, he rendered it endued with intellect. And beauty fills the first intellect with its own power. Because also he made the universe to be endued with intellect, he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in

¹ For υπερτερον read υπερτερων.

a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to participate of soul, soul of intellect, and intellect of beauty. The whole world however, becomes most beautiful from *the good*, and after this manner may be said to be a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said, to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which are not separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal itself, when he causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal, it is the image of animal itself, and so far also as it consists of four parts [i. e. of the four elements]. So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual, and non-intellectual beings, so far it entirely derives its subsistence from other paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in animal itself. So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm,¹ but every ² paradigm is not ³ animal itself. Having discussed these particulars however, let us proceed to what follows.

305 "It is impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul."

The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal representation. These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other, and are in want of a medium which may be able to collect them together; a medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite and simple, eternal and generated. But according to Plato, the psychological order is a thing of this kind, intelligible, and at the same time the first of generated natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be endued with intellect, it is also necessary that it should have a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it intellect exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in want of soul: for thus it would be less honorable ³ than soul; but that bodies

¹ Instead of το δε παραδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read παν δε παραδειγμα.

² For ο το αυτοζωον here, it is necessary to read ου το αυτοζωον.

³ For ευσημοτερος here, it is necessary to read απρωτερος.

require soul, in order to their participation of intellect. For the last, and not the first of things, are in want of secondary ¹ natures. For the first of things are every where present without a medium.² Hence it is necessary to understand, that the soul which connects intellect with a sensible nature, ought to be intellectual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute of intellect be suspended from intellect? But to these another medium will be requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect, dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficient than effects, it is necessary that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal, are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the presence of intellect? For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may be said to afford clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intellect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies, and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world.

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection ³ what is written in the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is animated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analogously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be contained in the universe. For either it must be said that no animal possesses intellect, or if there is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should

¹ Instead of *σωμάτων* in this place, it is requisite to read *δεύτερων*.

² viz. They are not in want of a medium in order to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first of things.

³ For *ἀγαμισθόμεν* here, it is necessary to read *ἀγαμνησθόμεν*.

participate of intellect prior to the universe.¹ For the universe is always arranged, and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence. But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.² Hence Plato very divinely admits that there is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and demiurgic, but the other participable, and inseparable³ [from its subject]. For from things which are in themselves, those which are in others, and are co-arranged with inferior natures, are derived. He also gives to the universe a twofold life, the one connascent, but the other separate; in order that the world may be an animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and endued with intellect through much-honored intellect itself. But Aristotle only admits the half [of this doctrine of Plato], since he takes away⁴ imparticipable intellect from his philosophy.⁵ For the first intellect with him, is the intellect of the inerratic sphere; but he cuts off the intellectual soul, which is the medium between intellect and the animated body of the universe; and immediately conjoins intellect with the living body. In addition to these things also he appears to me to err in another particular. For having placed intellect over the spheres, he does not establish the whole world in any intellect; but this is the most absurd of all things; for how is the world one, unless one intellect has dominion in it? What co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual multitude, unless it is suspended from a proper monad? And how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent condition of being, unless there is a certain common intellect of all mundane natures? For the intellect of the inerratic sphere is the intellect of that sphere [alone]; and this is also the case with the intellect of the solar, and of the lunar sphere, and in a similar manner of the other spheres. Against Aristotle however, we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars.

With respect to Plato however, is not his method admirable? For receiving the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which is moved in

¹ In the original *ἡ εἰς ἑστέ τι ζῶον ταύτης, ἀποκάν. ἀλλ' ὅτι πῶς τοῦ πάντος σου μετέχει.* But it is necessary to expunge *ἀλλ'*, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: *ἡ εἰς ἑστέ τι ζῶον ταύτης, ἀποκάν ὅτι πῶς τοῦ πάντος, κ. λ.*

² The words *ἐν τῇ παύσει εἶται*, are omitted in the original.

³ For *ἀχωρήτου* here, it is necessary to read *ἀχωρήτου.*

⁴ For *ἐκείνη* here, read *ἀφείλη.*

⁵ For an explanation of the intellect to which Aristotle ascended, also why he says nothing about that which is beyond intellect, and why he appears to dissent in many things from Plato, but does not in reality, see my Dissertation On the Philosophy of Aristotle.

a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion. Just as in the *Laws*, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, he stops the whole heaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe, in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world. He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, being converted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these particulars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that this should be intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once, and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparticipable prior to participable intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence, intellects, souls and bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible world. That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true; viz. that an intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through a certain thing in itself derived from it? But if indeed, that which is corporeal immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the whole soul [of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of the universe, and the universe participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipable intellect through participable intellects. For as the body of the universe is to its soul, so is the soul of it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intellectual, it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

* Instead of *και ει μιν καθο νοερα, ψυχη γινεται*, in this place, it is necessary to read, *και ει μιν καθο ψυχη, νοερα γινεται*.

intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is *essentially* intellect, and not *becoming to be so*, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being¹ a certain intellect, it is co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by *existing*, and not by *becoming to be*, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. If also you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themselves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things.² And if it participates of a certain other intellect, this is the intellect of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. *But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe.* If therefore intellect presides over wholes, the universe is animated; but if the universe is animated, it is also endued with intellect.

306 "Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe."

In the first place, it is requisite to see what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body. But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as to be a habit of it; and therefore neither is intellect a habit of soul. This like-

¹ For το δε τῆς εἶσας, read τῆ δε τῆς εἶσας.

² viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubstantial with soul.

wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.¹ But the converse is not true. If however, soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where² does essence subsist on account of habit. And in the third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, through the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For [as he adds] through this motion, intellect and science are necessarily produced. How therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence? To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing. For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused³ exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of the mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so far as it is a part of the universe, is animated. For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because it is present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in

¹ For *δια σοφ* here, it is necessary to read *δια σοφω*.

² After *ουδαπου* in this place, it requisite to supply *γαν*.

³ For *τα αιτια* here, it is necessary to read *τα αιτιατα*.

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it.

Nor does Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but if it be requisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on account of the most rapid rotation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel¹ on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a dragon, receives Dionysius [or Bacchus]. For with the most divine part of herself, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mundane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it elevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida,² from which all the series of souls is derived. Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter. For as Plato before observed, it is impossible for intellect to accede to any thing without soul. But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, is the mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect that abides in Jupiter. Thus too, the divinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its completion from these three things [viz. from intellect, soul and body]. Soul therefore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe: "I soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things."³ For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body." Plato likewise, bears testimony to the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him generating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, as we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears to me to use very appropriately the words to *constitute* and *co-fabricate*, through the common preposition *συν* in both,

¹ For *λιγύον* in this place, I read *λιγύον*.

² i. e. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature.

³ For *θεοπέχησθα* here, read *θεομη ψυχονσα*.

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprehensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other demiurgic art.

“In order that it might become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.”

In what is here said, Timæus recurs to the principle from which all the before-mentioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on account of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect proceeds into the universe on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of *the one*; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beautiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For *the good* is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timæus most excellent. He however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as *the good* is simply most excellent, existing beyond all the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent work; for it is a fabrication. For here also the world participates of deity; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity; and on this account the world is denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not speak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineffable, and intellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsistence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.¹ Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the meaning here of *according to nature*? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty; and therefore will be the same with *according to order*. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

¹ Instead of *απο της ελης* here, I read *απο της θεουργίας*.

the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrication, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which is better than nature; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

308
C "Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative reasoning, that this world was generated an animal, possessing in truth [or reality] soul and intellect through the providence of God."

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it *assimilative*, and again *truth*. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is in it, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak concerning the world adds the word *assimilative*, or probable, but the word *truth*, when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity. Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and truth in the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fabrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and compositions, though all things subsist at once in divine production. And frequently, he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, as in the axioms, "*he was good*," and "*it neither was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful*." For in the former of these his apprehension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth]. For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, does he define the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect; for it seems indeed, that *animal* is a certain part, but *animated* a genus! In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to see how, according to this doctrine, every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the rational soul an animal¹ but also arranges life after the rational soul, he very pro-

¹ Ζωον is omitted here in the original.

perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intelligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that it is animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that *animal* indeed, accedes from the first intelligible,¹ and thus also from the intelligible father,² who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the *animated* accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.³ And the possession of intellect accedes from the intellectual father [Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, "*through the providence of God.*" For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, and a blessed God,⁴ becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also see how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is suspended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is generated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies. *For these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it; but will is the measure of power; and providence is an energy prior to intellect.* For this I think, the very name itself manifests.⁵ We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

Iamblichus however, arranges *animal*, with every thing that has life, but *animated*, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

¹ i. e. From το εν ου, or from being characterized by the one, and which is the summit of the intelligible order.

² i. e. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order.

³ i. e. The *animated* accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause in both these orders.

⁴ For και δαμων in this place, read ενδαμων.

⁵ i. e. Ηποροια providence, is an energy προ τον prior to intellect.

possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the animated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an animal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion; and that it is endued with intellect, from its excellent order. For if according to this, mortal¹ are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an effluxion to the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For if this life were not common there would not be a sympathy of the parts in it. *For sympathy is effected through a participation of the same nature.* And if the world is perpetually moved, it is governed by soul. For every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself, is animated; but the body which is moved externally, is inanimate. If therefore, the universe is always moved, what is it which moves it? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. But it is not lawful for the immoveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are moved by something different from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self-motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The world therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if² the universe is always arranged, and if all things are co-ordinated to well-being, and there is nothing adventitious in the polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order, and the sacred laws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest symbols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this, when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right, but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the right hand and the left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued with intellect. For that which moves it is intellect. According to both philosophers therefore, the world is an animal animated and endued with intellect; except indeed, that according to Aristotle, it is animated, as having an inseparable life; for he does not admit that it has an intellectual soul, but that it has an intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelligible animal. For what Plato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as in his *Metaphysics*, when he says, “*We say that God is an eternal animal.*” And in short, since there are in the world things that are moved, and things that are immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are immoveable, it is necessary that the

¹ It is necessary here, to supply *τα θνητα*.

² *Ca* is omitted here in the original.

causes of both these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cause of motion; on which account also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake of argument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction of soul. And in the Phædrus taking away soul, he makes all things to stand still. But it is evident that intellect belongs to immoveable natures. And beings that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on account of the permanency of the latter, the former are perpetually moved. Hence it entirely follows, that there is a mundane intellect above soul. By no means therefore, must that which Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the world. For he confounded imparticipable with participable¹ causes, by supposing them to be the same with each other, and also the divine, and the intellectual, the immaterial and the material. For the same God, and who according to him is the first God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both soul and nature inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato however, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of undefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe. In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and goodness, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing it to be one. And in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, subsisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt from all the subjects of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the progressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato. For he delivers the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body; but their conversions, when beginning from the world, he calls it an animal animated, and endued with intellect, and connects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion. And in the last place, he refers the composition of the world to the demiurgic providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurgus to the one. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to the good. For, as we have said, goodness is

¹ It is necessary here to supply καὶ μετέστας.

analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy; because the first indeed, establishes all things; the second moves them to progression; and the third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of goodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to be animated, and doing these things, effects them on account of providence, (for these were generated through the providence of God)—if this be the case, it is necessary that it should be the same thing to produce on account of goodness as on account of providence. And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to good. For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the cause of good to the object of our providential care. Not only, therefore, must providence be defined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things according to one union. And this is in reality providence, the communication of good to all things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the giver [of every good], who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite likewise to remember what the Cheronian [Plutarch] says about the name of providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine. If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intellect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived of the end [which is their proper good]. And because he is providence indeed, he is suspended from *the good* itself; but because he is intellect he is suspended from the first intellect. For the first intellect [i. e. Saturn] is not that which intellectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives; and on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the Cratylus. Hence also, according to Plato, the latter may be said to be *once*,¹ as having one energy directed to himself; but the former *twice*, together with this energy receiving also a power fabricative of the universe, and not only legislatively regulating things, posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato says shortly after.

¹ Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called *once beyond*, and Jupiter *twice beyond*.

“ This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world.”

Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, “ *this being determined,*” and “ *let us consider what is consequent to these things,*” indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligible animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? For it was one of the things pre-demonstrated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal. For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of it be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was generated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible]¹. These however, [i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if it is similar, it is from thence allotted the *morphe* of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life is imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, it is endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. *For every thing endued with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated is also an animal; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that*

¹ Instead of *πως τον το εκεινο γενοτος εικων* in this place, it is necessary to read *πως το εκεινον γενοτος εικων*.

² The words *αλλ' ως ορατον και απρον* are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted.

which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor is every thing which is animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect, is small; so that animal is more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is not necessary that the rest should be inherent in those things with which this is present. That however, which is more comprehensive, is nearer to the first principle. But that which is nearer to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first principle is the cause of all beings. That Plato also, not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, is manifest from what he says in the Sophista. For placing life and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, "But that which has intellect and soul, if it is not animated, must remain entirely immoveable." Hence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated; the cause of intellect, and that which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, that may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the universe was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. It is necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, it is so from form. If however from form, that which is primarily animal is the cause to it of form.

It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it is assimilated, must next be considered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indicating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. For beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle orders; in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly

* For ἀθροῦν γὰρ γένος, βραχὺ ἐστὶν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, ἀθροῦν γὰρ γένος, βραχὺ ἐστὶν τοῦ τοῦ μετέχον. For Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.

* For ἄλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ἐγγυτέρως.

indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals; and in another intellectually alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intelligibly alone, but as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane, or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible only. For the nature of animal¹ proceeds according to all the orders of intellect. But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate numbers. For as the first animal is tetradic, thus a different animal is defined according to a different number. And in those things in which there is the same number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals. For it is necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic prior to the multiplied; because this² is more allied to *the one*. And universally, every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the monad of all effective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods, thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which likewise the most total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre-exist.

Why, however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because it is the supplier of life, as I have before observed; and because it generates the causes of the whole vivific series, and the fountains themselves of life. Because likewise, it is replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by *the one*, is beyond life. But the middle order of intelligibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself, however, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is an animal, on account of its reception of life. For it is intelligible, as being arranged [immediately] after intelligible life. It is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal. “For because it has life, says *Timæus*, it may be justly called an animal.” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

¹ For η του ζων φημις here, it is necessary to read η του ζωον φημις.

² For τουρη here, read τουρα.

animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives; and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third triad of intelligibles. For it is not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second; for this is life. Hence it is in the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this¹ account alone calls the paradigm intelligible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intelligible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigm of the world considered as living. *For perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation; since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe.* But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is the paradigm of the vestiges of the elements. So far, however, as it is animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity likewise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal; since not every paradigm is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, which is not an animal. For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term *itself*, is there a certain form prior to it. As therefore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so likewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being. Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the [Chaldean] Oracles say, "It is the operator, and the giver of life-bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,² and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength of a fire endued with mighty power." For all these assertions in no respect differ from saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual

¹ For *εἶα τε* here, it is necessary to read *εἶα ταυτε*.

² For *εκαστης* here, read *εκατης*.

life, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis. And thus much concerning this particular.

With respect to the words of the text, "*to constitute in the similitude,*" manifests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. For then similitude is not the end. But the words, "*the constituting artificer constituted,*" clearly demonstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and possesses energy essentially. For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. For the word *constituting*, manifests an ever-present making; but the word *constituted*, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, it is very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at a certain time.

"We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of a part. For that which is similar to an imperfect thing, can never at any time become beautiful." 300

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,¹ some of which are united, but others divided, and some are defined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with reference to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal. And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

¹ It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, τῶν δὲ μερικωτέρων.

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradigm of the world will not be a partial animal. For whether does the Demiurgus intellectually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investigating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal.

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in conjunction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not exhibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, each when essentially divulsed from the whole, suffers a diminution of its own proper beauty. The perfect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry is, that in intelligible forms the part is a whole.* For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the assertion is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For it is one thing to be after a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of each

* Instead of *το όλον μέρος είναι*, it is necessary to read *το μέρος όλον είναι*.

intellect possessing all things in a way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and another thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far as intellect, and not so far as a particular kind of intellect. What then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the sun and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautiful? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. But the world is that which is truly most beautiful. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautiful, but not like the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, "*that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes.*" Hence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and of the part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial participation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, "*in the form of a part,*" may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, *in the order of a part.* And this is the same with, *becoming a part.* But the divine Iamblichus thinks fit to add the conjunction *as* to the words *in the form,* and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles; since each is there according to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philosopher adds, *as in the form,* in order that surveying the appellation of part in a manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impartible and united. But with respect to the word "*naturally,*" we must not now understand by it *according to nature,* but the being *essentialized.* For all essences are frequently called *natures,* as by Socrates in the *Philebus,* when he says, "*hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.*" But the words, "*he thought it would be adequate to its dignity,*" are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the *dignity* of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the exempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrangement in conjunction with him. And the words, "*for that which is similar to an imperfect thing can never be beautiful,*" is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

For if in that which is a whole one thing is more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect; but when they are not conglomerated with each other, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature. If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what is employed by the objector as the middle term, is not so. For in one place, the words "*in order that it might be beautiful,*" manifest that which is beautiful, whether in a certain respect, or simply; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes; this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a *certain* [and not a *universal*] thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, i. e. the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence it is not so beautiful as to be most beautiful.

From what has been said, those assertions likewise may be confuted, which make *the good* to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, it is also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that *the good* likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is similar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, or more beautiful. If therefore *the good* being a part, will suffer things of this kind, it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither is it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to *the good* the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that *the good* should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with *the good*; since each of these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

* For *τ' αγαθόν* here, read *τ' αγαθή*.

“ But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts.”

Some, as Atticus, assert that this “ *according to one, and according to genera,*” gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms. Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, “ *according to genera, and according to one.*” But others, as Xenarchus, assert, that *according to genera* manifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timæus. And that by “ *according to one,*” the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of lions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the “ *according to one,*” subordinate to, and more partial than, “ *according to genera ;*” but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. *For intelligible animal is comprehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For it is a whole prior to,* and does not derive its subsistence from parts.* Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, is a whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself *causally*.

a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts impartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfect manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another after a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfectly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals; since it is likewise similar to the Demiurgus; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primarily intelligible animal. Hence, that which is most similar is so in a twofold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is especially similar to animal itself.

301

“ For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects of sight.”

Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist in a twofold respect. For at one time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled *Different Considerations*, but at another, as inferior to it, as in his treatise *Concerning Numbers*, when he says that being is first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgi has a triple hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfolding itself into light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as far as to the last of things. It is likewise comprehensive of all things, being exempt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing in itself the causes of them. For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

* For *την* here, it is necessary to read *την* $\lambda\eta\tau\eta$.

concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many animals, viz. of a ram, a bull, a serpent, and a fierce lion.¹ He also proceeds from the primogénial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically; and Plato knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. For what difference is there between calling an occult cause an egg, or that which is unfolded into light from it, an animal? For what can be generated from the egg of all things, but an animal? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that which is primarily being, *the being* of Plato will be the same with the *Orphic egg*. And if Phanes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it is necessary to investigate it as situated next to eternity according to Orpheus, which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.² And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the Phanes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evident that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and, as Plato would say, *animal itself*. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes, therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective, connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the most total ideas of all things. Hence also, he is said [by Orpheus] to be the first of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the intelligible and united³ causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too, the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible

¹ This is an Orphic line, which is not noticed either by Gesner or Hermann in their collection of Orphic fragments. It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, *καὶ τὰς ταυρίους ὀφίας, χαροκὸν τε λέοντος*. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from a manuscript, it may be amended as follows: *κρίον καὶ ταύρον, ὀφίοι, χαροκὸν τε λέοντος*.

² It is here necessary to supply the words *τοῦ πρώτου οὐτος*.

³ For *ἠνωμένων* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *ἠνωμένα*, in order to agree with *αἴτια*.

world, and causes it to contain all sensible animals, both such as are more divine, and such as are mortal, which are properly *θρεμματα*¹ *thremmata*, or *things which are nourished*, as entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise, may properly be called *θρεμματα*, as being the progeny of nature, and as always living from, and being connected by it, even though they should be perpetual bodies; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment. Unless indeed, it be requisite to call all things in the world *θρεμματα*, as being nourished by the king of visible natures through the communication of light. For Socrates in the Republic says, that the sun is the cause of nutriment and generation to all such things as he illuminates. For every visible thing is nourished being perfected by light. For as we learn in the Politicus, it is possible to be nourished externally, and not only internally. The Demiurgus therefore, comprehends all that the world contains, in order that this sensible world may be *all* and perfect from the parts that are in it, conformably to a similitude to him. Hence, this world is a various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a different voice, and from all its parts one voice. For it is also one, [as well as many]. By a much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude [of animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also, exhibits the one in multitude. And the latter indeed, is a whole from parts; but the former is a whole prior to parts, exemptly, uniformly, and according to cause, comprehending intelligible animals. For from it the fountains of divine natures, and all the most total genera proceed. Hence also, the theologist represents it as *a most total animal; surrounds it with the heads of a ram, a bull, a lion, and a dragon; and ascribes to it primarily the female and the male, as to the first animal.*

Female and father, strong and mighty God,
Ericapæus,²

says the theologist. He is likewise the first God that is represented with wings. And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if he has his progression from the primogenial egg, this fable manifests that he is the first animal, if it is fit to preserve the analogy. For as the egg³ antecedently comprehends the spermatic

¹ The word used by Plato here for animals.

² In the original erroneously *ηρως προς*.

³ For *το αυον* here, it is necessary to read *το αυον*.

cause of the animal, thus also the occult order,* uniformly comprehends the whole of the intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in a distributed manner, such things as were in the egg spermatically, thus likewise this God produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible in first causes. Concerning these things however, what has now been said may suffice for the present.

If however, as this world comprehends in itself all visible natures, so its paradigm comprehends all intelligibles, and the mode of comprehension, as we have said, is different in each, yet at the same time the visible in the former is analogous to that of the latter. For Phæus supernally illuminating intelligibles with intelligible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intelligible] generated from invisible causes; and the world imparts visibility to bodies through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may be considered as admirable in the doctrine of Plato, that at the same time that he preserves the union of intelligibles unshaken, he imparts to them an unmingled purity. For if all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to permit the peculiarity of each to remain undefiled, there would have been no occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradigm the universe was generated. For in things confused there is no distinction of quality. And if these were so divided from each other as to be without any communion, some intelligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend and be comprehended pertain to order and communion of powers, and to the rapid conspiracy of all secondary natures to become one. Moreover, for the union of them to subsist from essence, but their separation to be rendered apparent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal and immaterial effects. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all will be found to be in each other, on account of their being, as it were, of the same colour, and especially if the unities of them are seen with the eye of intellect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their unconfused union. For whence is the separation of these derived, except from the unmingled purity of their efficient causes? For things which are confused with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i. e. to natures which are similarly confused.]

* i. e. The first triad of the intelligible order, which is called by Plato in the *Parmenides* 27 c. 1, *the one being, or being* characterised by, and absorbed as it were in *the one*.

30D "For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exquisite degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect perfect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, containing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature."

Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus inferior to the intelligible. For establishing a supercelestial soul to be the maker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of generated natures. The divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurgus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible. But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is defined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus.¹ We however say, that animal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial. The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself; for it is not lawful for him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, these superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so far as it is the universe, or *the all*, to be the image of the whole intelligible world. The Demiurgus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, according to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist; not as being a part, or one species of it; but as a second order in the order which is prior to it. For a divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. For each of the latter indeed, is all things in a self-perfect manner; but each of the former is united to other forms,² but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelligible intellect, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these

¹ For τῶν μεν τῶν δημιουργῶν in this place, it is necessary to read τῶν μεν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.

² For τῶν ἄλλων εἰδήσιν here, read τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδήσιν.

being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things therefore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to *allness* (παντοτητα) however, one is intelligible, but another intellectual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distributedly. The decad likewise, though it contains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, it is more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the magnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing all such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as *comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes*, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species of animals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. e. in animal itself; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so comprehended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timæus in a certain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals comprehended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time in a way known to us, passes from images to paradigms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, *that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals*, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, *that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things*, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial,

subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them? For they do not participate of beauty; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into light in this order. And as beauty had a prior existence in the first intelligibles, unitedly and without intermission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, "the very beautiful son of ether," and "delicate Love." Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with occult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manner as the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifully asserted [by Orpheus and Plato].

That however, which is most synoptical¹ in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itself is the most beautiful, not of all intelligibles simply, but of intelligible animals. For comparing all-perfect animal with more partial animals, he says, it is the most beautiful of all intelligible animals; so that if there is something more excellent than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. It is necessary however, that there should be a thing of this kind, because being itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals. Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word *assimilation* is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious concerning the mode of participation, whether it is from forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communicating with them in some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is similitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the similitudes of intelligible forms.² So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude. Farther still, the world is an animal, as the image

¹ For *συνεπιλαμβανόμενος* here, I read *συννοητικώτατος*.

² Concerning the mode in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that the visible is here.

'The Gods admit'd, in ether when they saw
A light unlook'd for, bursting on the view,
From the immortal Phanes' glittering skin ;'

[says Orpheus]. And the world comprehends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, "*as are allied to its nature,*" because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preternatural. For in short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to nature, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, but by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual. For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing which proceeds from ideas is essence. For since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident.¹ These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. But whatever the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition of the world, viz. "*one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.*" For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there is only one,] is one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the definition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato.

¹ For το ου απεσπληζε in this place, it is necessary to read τῷ μὲν απεσπληζε.

² For συμμειβηκος ενος νποστατικον, read συμμειβηκος ειναι νποστατικον.

31 A "Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds?"

This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now¹ been said. For because he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that it is also one. For thus he will demonstrate that it is a God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals. Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a dæmon and an angel are animated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suffered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds *the one*, and *the alone*. For every thing which is monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be lawful so to speak of *the one*. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the angelic, as the demoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it is suspended from its proper deity, and each of these is monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem is suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and is intelligible, is the supplier of life, and is also intellect; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to *the one* and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to *the one*, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be

¹ For *ra nov* here, read *ra nov*.

animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other things. And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect.

From what however is now shown, and from what has been before demonstrated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of it without multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubistent with *the one*, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from *the good* it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is all-perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be all-perfect. These things, however, we shall more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, *the one*, and *all multitude*. And the word *whether* being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion. But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, *the one*, *finite multitude*, and *the infinite*. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Iamblichus, who speak conformably both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is effected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word *whether* seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that either *whether* signifies the same as *shall we therefore*; (τιν' αρ' ουν το ποτερον σημαίνειν ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, *or not* (ἢ ου) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, *whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there are many, or infinite worlds?* Plato omitting to say this through conciseness. Perhaps too: you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words *much* and *finite*.

¹ For ποτερον here, read πορον.

For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as if the paradigm is not monadic, so as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are infinite; after this manner it is probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacuum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds.

31 A "One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm."

Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to belief, dissolving the doubt. For the word *one* is uttered analogously to, *it was generated*, and to *he was good*,¹ and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demonstrates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intellect; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to comprehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is an image of intellectual projection. And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia. For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of his demonstration from intellect. But it is intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms; for through this we apprehend [true] beings by simple projections. Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.

Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, syllogistically survey the truth of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind. If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one.² But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent also is true. That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and us. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds. The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the paradigm, it ought to imitate it in all things, and ought to resemble the essence of it. For if it imitates the paradigm in some things, and not in others,

¹ Instead of *το αγαθόν ην* in this place, it is requisite to read *τω αγαθόν ην*.

² The words *ο κομπος απα εκ εστιν*, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

it will not be the image of a certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things in it, so far as it is naturally adapted to such an imitation; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly.

Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses. For man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of many horses, and this is the case with every other form or idea of the like kind. But if some one should say, that these because they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the objector will not cease adducing to us the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Hence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the difficulty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into multitude and division, and pass into bulk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Hence an intelligible essence, proceeding into the world, terminates in a divided, gross, and material multitude, though on high it is united, impartible, and monadic. To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many impressions of that form. The world, therefore, is one from one [paradigm], and a whole from a whole. But man is numerous from one form, the world supplying the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corruptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason [or form] but only one corruptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [material] forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry.

The divine Iamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts. For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yet

why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is in want of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and difference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that after *the one* two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts in the *Philebus*. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the dual, thus likewise, though all forms subsist according to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts? According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and demiurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivific and effective series, according to infinity. But according to parts, because of the paternal and of the vivific series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite to assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifariously. He says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelligibles. For such things as are more immaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated in a greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their paradigms, viz. according to the monadic, the essential, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain respect assimilated to their causes, and in a certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-

arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.¹ For it has been demonstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures therefore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according to the eternal? This however is impossible. For each of them will perish; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsists from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore it is possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate them in all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secondarily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. If it is impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And if in certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,² either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have relinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. *Hence it is necessary that they should not express the monadic peculiarity of forms, but only the essential and the eternal. On this account all mundane forms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic.* For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to all the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradigmatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of all forms. But the principle perish-

¹ Instead of το δε ουσιωδες ου, ουδαμως; in this place, it is necessary to read το δε ουσιωδες ου, ειδαμως;

² Viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal.

ing, that which is derived from it can by no possible contrivance be preserved. And if an intelligible form is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a paradigm. For it is impossible for any thing to be two things primarily, as Socrates says in the Republic. For whence is allness derived to these mundane forms, except from one certain common form? These three things therefore are present with all first paradigms. And it seems that the monadic is present with them from bound, the perpetual from infinity, and the essential from the first essence.

Farther still, it is also possible for us after another manner to solve the doubt. For of the things contained in the world, some indeed subsist from the first fabrication [i. e. the fabrication of the Demiurgus] alone; but others from the first and also from the second [or the fabrication of the junior Gods]. Those, therefore, that subsist from the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are monadic, imitating the onliness of their producing¹ cause. For the supermundane fabrication is immoveable, one, and eternal. But things which proceed from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone in multitude, and subsist differently at different times. For the second fabrication is multiform, makes that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity commensent with itself. Hence the things which proceed from it are very mutable, and multiplied, and entirely moved. For things which proceed from causes that are moved, are naturally of this kind. Whence also I think the Demiurgus, having constituted all the monadic and perpetual natures in the world, excites the junior Gods to the fabrication of mortal natures; in order that these, so far as they have something perpetual, may derive their subsistence from him, but so far as they are mortal, from the junior Gods. And that so far as one thing participates of one form they might be constituted by him, but so far as this one is multiplied, they might derive their subsistence from them. For the mutation and multiplication of mortal natures are from many causes, and such as are moved.

Again, therefore, this also may be said, that the only-begotten is threefold. For it either signifies the monad of its proper series; according to which signification, the form of man is monadic, and the form of horse, and every form of things of this kind. Or it signifies one thing participated by one thing, according to which signification man and horse are not monadic, but the form of the sun and the form of the moon. Or it signifies that which has no other thing co-ordinate with itself, according to which meaning the above-mentioned natures are no longer only-begotten, since they are co-ordinate with each other but whole animal [or

¹ For *πρωτογενής* here, it is necessary to read *παραγωγός*.

animal itself] is only-begotten, in consequence of not being co-ordinate with any other animal. As the only-begotten, therefore, has a threefold subsistence, if you assume that which is truly only-begotten, it is the third, as the cause of all animals, having the relation of a monad to all of them, being participated by one thing, and not being co-ordinate with any animal, but being truly monadic. This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined with it now necessarily follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is generated according to it is only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the paradigm, and nothing else besides the world is a thing of this kind. For no other thing besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten.

Farther still, it is requisite to solve the doubt after another manner, by considering as follows: *Every form is generative of one thing, and of a multitude. Of one thing, indeed, because it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior to the multitude which it produces. But it produces a multitude, because every monad has a number co-ordinate with itself.* Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world. But according to each order, it generates a number¹ analogous to the whole, and which is able to preserve the similitude to the universe conformably to that series. Hence the solar paradigm, generates indeed the visible sun itself, but it likewise generates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to a similitude to their proper form. And of animals of this kind, some are celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not *immediately* produce this infinite multitude of men; for progression is no where without a medium; but through numbers proximate to the monad and appropriate. Hence, since an intelligible form is one, it is necessary that it should not immediately produce the infinite, but in the first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, and so on in succession. *For between the intelligible form which is one, and the sensible which is multiplied, the medium is the form which is sensible indeed, but monadic; through proceeding becoming sensible; but through preserving the similitude of its paradigm, having a monadic subsistence.* For it may be said to be truly absurd, that divine, intelligible, and immoveable causes, should not be primarily the causes of things essentially immutable, but of things material and mutable.² For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, can be conjoined with those super-

¹ *Ἀριθμὸν* is omitted in the original.

² In the original *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνυλῶν, καὶ μεταβάλλητων*; but *ἐπὶ* ought evidently to be expunged.

mundane natures; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectuals; perfectly mutable, with eternal natures; very composite things, with such as are simple; and things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences? It is necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude; from which the progression of each to its appropriate number is derived. It is likewise necessary that these monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably the same, as being alone produced by an immoveable cause. You must not wonder, therefore, if some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But progression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm, exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual in capacity. For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its fountain, is most similar to the fountal water, and preserves its proper purity undefiled; thus also the natures which are first unfolded into light from intelligible forms, genuinely preserve the similitudes of their paradigms; but as they proceed, dissolve the perfect similitude, and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.

In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible; the second is partial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts; and the third is not only partible like that which precedes it, but comes into contact with generated natures, and with the forms they contain. *You have also these three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, the Dionysiacal, and the Adonaical [or pertaining to Adonis], conformably to which he divides his three politics, as we have elsewhere shown. The third fabrication, therefore, is the cause of wholes¹ and parts, and of things which are not monadic. The second is the cause of things which are monadic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first is the cause of the whole and the monadic.* For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato had now spoken concerning every fabrication, it would have been requisite to annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in consequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are effected by an

¹ For εἶδω here, it is necessary to read ὅλω.

immoveable and total cause! For the whole Demiurgus is a fabricator *totally* and *monadically*; since also producing many Gods, he produces them monadically. For each of the Gods belonging to the inerratic sphere, is constituted according to one form; since the form of earth is different from that of water, and the form of water from that of fire; the parts of which have a temporal generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and also partial souls, differ in form from each other. For every individual and at the same time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they possess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number too of forms must be placed in the *fountain*¹ of souls unically [or having a subsistence characterized by unity], but distributedly in the *principle*² of souls. For how is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived? Since even nature comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers. If, however, the Gods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are likewise monadic; so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely monadic. This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things which he produces, that each receives the *whole* form of the paradigmatic cause. Hence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this kind.

If, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on account of the demiurgic monad, and the onliness of the paradigm; which Plato, as it appears to me, knowing, says, "*if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.*" For by not saying if it was *generated*, but if it was *fabricated*, according to the paradigm, he indicates the *onlyness* both of the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the paradigm also is a monad; and therefore this universe being generated by a monad, with reference to a monad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm? We reply, because the

¹ i. e. In Rhea, or the vivific Goddess, considered according to her first subsistence in the intellectual order of Gods.

² i. e. In Proserpine, who subsists in the vivific triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which order consists of the Gods who are called *αρχαί* or *Principles*. See the 5th and 6th Books of my Translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called *fountains* and *principles*.

paradigm is more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it; and both the Demiurgus and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad.¹ Hence, since the monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we to think concerning the universe? Is it not, that it primarily possesses its onliness from the paradigm? The paradigm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for the purpose of demonstrating the onliness of the world. And again, you may see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual monad, and the third, a sensible monad.

“For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, can never be the second, [or co-arranged] with any other thing.”

The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect animal is one and monadic,² similar to those methods through which in the Sophista, he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of them is primarily being, or only one of them. But if only one of them, the other will proceed from this. And if each, it is necessary there should be another being, from which both of these are beings. For each of these is a certain being, and not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all-perfect animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to exist primarily, will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, just as animal itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten. For how is it possible this should not be only-begotten? For if there is another animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things, but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all things, each of them is imperfect. We however are speaking of that which is all-perfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be

¹ i. e. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself.

² In the text of Proclus μεθ' ἑτερον erroneously instead of μεθ' ἑτερον.

³ In the original εν εν και μενον. But for μενον I read μοναδικον.

said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things according to its own order, and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to which it applies itself, and from assigning to every thing its appropriate reason; but that there is not a certain intelligible, which is truly comprehensive of all intelligibles, just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universe sensibly. For whence is allness derived to these, except from intelligibles? If, therefore, the intelligible is all-perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is primarily all. But if one of them is all things, and the other not, these will neither be co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated; but that which has not all things will be inferior to the other, and that which is all-perfect will have a more comprehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and both will not be all-perfect animals, but one of them will be more perfect than the other. For that which has a diminished perfection is not all-perfect. But if each of them is all things, whence did they obtain all things? For it is necessary that they should receive this allness from something. For as participating of one form, they subsist from one cause. And thus the natures which similarly participate of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore be a cause prior to them; since it is necessary that where there are two things there should be an antecedent cause, which conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But if indivisibly, another cause will be requisite as a medium. *For the medium between that which is perfectly indivisible, and the duad which possesses all things divisibly, is the monad which has all things indivisibly;¹ this indeed being itself united by an indivisible cause, but uniting the allness which is in the duad. Hence that which primarily comprehends all things is the monad which is prior to the duad. But in that which subsists indivisibly, the seed and cause are contained of an allness which is characterized by unity.* Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear to say, because it is not conjoined with another, but because if it were arranged with another, it would be secondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. *That, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic.* But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will

¹ The original is, του γαρ ἀδιαίρετος πάντα οὗτος, καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πάντα ἔχουσης, μεσσην ἔστιν ἡ μονὰς ἢ πάντα ἔχουσα διηρημένως. But it appears to me to be necessary to read, agreeably to the above translation, του γαρ ἀδιαίρετος πάντῃ οὗτος, καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πάντα ἔχουσης διηρημένως, μεσσην ἔστιν ἡ μονὰς ἢ πάντα ἔχουσα ἀδιαίρετος.

not be an intelligible animal besides it. For if there were, this would no longer be all-perfect, but a part. And that will be the whole of which this will be alone a part. For it is necessary that multitude should stop at the monad.

Why, however, does Plato say, *the second with another thing?* For it would have been sufficient to have said, *with another* by itself, or *the second*, by itself. But he conjoins both, for the purpose of indicating that the nature which is co-arranged with another, and is not monadic, cannot as we have before observed, be the first. Perhaps likewise, it signifies the contrary, and that what is said pertains to things and not to words. For the form which is in corruptible natures entirely subsists with another. For the human form is in this individual, and in that, the participants being many, and on this account each is with another. That form, however, which is perpetual, yet not a whole, though it may be monadic, and on this account not with another, yet it is more imperfect than a certain whole. But that which is neither in many things, nor a part with another thing, is not secondary, as being one and a whole, and not a part. Very properly, therefore, does the theologist produce Phanes, the only divinity bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods,¹ from the God who is occultly all things; and from Phanes gives subsistence to all the second orders of the Gods. For Heaven indeed proceeds together with Earth. But she,

Again th' extended heav'n and earth¹ brought forth.

And Saturn proceeds together with Rhea. For according to a third progeny, Earth produced [as the theologist says,] "seven pure beautiful virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons that were kings, with fine long hair." But the Demiurgus, who is the great Jupiter, is conjoined with Juno. Hence also, she is said to be of equal rank with him, and proceeds from the same fathers. Phanes, however, proceeds by himself alone, and is celebrated as female and father. *He also produces the [three] Nights, and is present with the middle Night.* For he

Pluck'd the shorn flower of Night.²

According to this theologist therefore, all-perfect animal is not the second with another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the

¹ For θεον αλυσον here, it is necessary to read θεων αλυσων.

² i. e. The intellectual Earth brought forth the sensible Heaven and Earth.

³ In the original αυτος γαρ εστι παιδος αφειλετο κουριμον ανθος. But for εστι παιδος, it appears from Eschenbach to be necessary to read της Νυκτες.

allness of himself; in imitation of whom, Jupiter likewise, produces twofold orders, the super-celestial and the mundane. Phanes, however, gives subsistence to twofold triads, but Jupiter to twofold duodecads. For on this account his sceptre is said to consist of four-and-twenty measures. Hence, the demiurgic is always assimilated to the paradigmatic cause, but proceeds into multitude from intelligible union. These things, however, are also elsewhere discussed.

But that animal itself rejoices in onliness, is also manifested through the Orphic theologies. For as Phanes is the offspring of an egg, it is evident that he is an animal. At the same time also, he is called by Orpheus the happy and venerable Metis, bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods; to whom Jupiter being analogous, is likewise denominated by Orpheus Metis and a dæmon.

One power, one dæmon, the great lord of all.

Thus too, the Oracles call this mighty God [i. e. animal itself] the fountain of fountains, and say that he alone generated all things. "For from thence the generation of abundantly-various matter entirely' leaps forth. Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable rays downwards."

"For again, another animal would be required about these two, of which they would be parts: and it might be more rightly said, that the universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two." 31 A

This which is now asserted by Plato, may be easily demonstrated from the demiurgic goodness. For if the Demiurgus is good, he fabricated the universe with reference to all-perfect animal. But he is good and the best of causes, and therefore he assimilated the world to all-perfect animal. For it is necessary that the first Demiurgus should be intellective of the first paradigm; and that being intellective of it, he should be the maker of that which is in every respect most similar to it. For if there is nothing which is intellective of it, it will no longer have the order of a paradigm, with respect to that which is fabricated by the first Demiurgus. If, however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well

* For *εἶθεν ἀδη* here, read *εἶθεν ἀρῆν*. And for *ἀμύροιο*, *ἀμύροι*.

indeed, but at the same time you should preserve the universe one. For the fabrications of these partial paradigms are parts of the universe, in the same manner as the paradigms, and vice versa. As therefore paradigms are parts of paradigms, demiurgic¹ are parts of demiurgic causes, and fabrications of fabrications, it is necessary that the wholeness of the universe should be the image of all-perfect animal; and that all-perfect animal should be the paradigm of the universe. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that animal itself is one, and alone, as being monadic. The world therefore is one and monadic, in order that it may perfectly imitate its paradigm. For as it primarily receives a similar idea of it, how is it possible it should not adumbrate all the nature of it, in consequence of having been generated intellectual, perpetual, and monadic?

31 B "In order, therefore, that the world from its oneliness or being alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal, on this account the artificer neither made infinite, nor two worlds."

Again, Plato reminds us of the Demiurgic cause, in order that we may understand also from this, that every thing which is generated by the whole fabrication, is monadic, perpetual, and intellectual; and that the Demiurgus is the cause of all things, in consequence of producing the moulds of them; but that he delivered the multitudinous and partial fabrication to the junior Gods. Farther still, he also latently teaches us who this all-perfect intellect is, the name of which is so celebrated by the more modern philosophers; viz. that it is intelligible intellect, in which the universe primarily subsists. Before, therefore, he called it distributedly "according to all things perfect," because he then celebrated its allness; but now speaking of it collectively, he calls it "all-perfect," since his discourse is about the only-begotten.

The infinite, however, in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not. But a thing is said to be infinite in a three-fold manner; either according to power, or according to multitude, or according to magnitude. The infinite therefore according to power is in divine natures, and in the world. For the never-failing, and the perpetual, are the peculiarities of the infinite according to power. But the infinite according to multitude partly is, and partly is not. For it has not an at-once collected subsistence, but exists according to a part. And the infinite according to

¹ Instead of *δημιουργήματα* here, it is necessary to read *δημιουργία*.

magnitude, neither exists according to a part,¹ nor has any existence whatever Hence the infinite according to multitude, if it exists in the worlds, in the first place, will be without arrangement with reference to itself. For what order can there be in the infinite of things first and second, where there is no first? *In the next place, it will not have one producing cause. For if it had, that cause would produce the one prior to multitude, and the whole prior to parts. For being itself one it would first assimilate to itself the things posterior to itself.* For every cause which is effective of things according to nature, produces things similar to itself. But there is no first in those worlds, since they are infinite. And if they suppose other worlds consisting of others, either the causes of them will be unco-ordinate or co-ordinate. And if co-ordinate, it is necessary that the worlds should have one co-arrangement. But in the infinite there is no order. To which we may add, that the intervention of a vacuum in the middle, will separate the worlds. But if the causes are unco-ordinate, we must admit that there is a divided and unsympathetic multitude in the principles. This, however, will entirely abolish both all the causes themselves, and the things posterior to them. For the causes will be corruptive of each other, not being able to subsist in conjunction with, in consequence of being perfectly foreign from each other. But the things which proceed from them, collapsing, will stop, and will not have any thing from whence again they can be generated, the principles being destroyed.²

Perhaps, however, some one may say that there is neither one world, nor infinite worlds, but many and finite. For we have heard of a certain Barbaric opinion, which the Cheronean Plutarch relates,³ placing in one equilateral triangle the intelligible world according to the middle of it, in each of the sides sixty worlds, about the intelligible, and in each angle one world; all of them (except the intelligible) being such worlds as that in which we are comprehended.

So that there are three leaders, and thrice sixty others, under them. For the angular are of a more ruling nature than the lateral worlds. This opinion, therefore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligible world in the middle, as the

¹ The words, οὐκ ἀκα μέρος are omitted in the original; but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted.

² These arguments, which possess an invincible strength, fully show the futility of that very popular theory of the moderns, that there are infinite worlds. For like most other modern dogmas, it is unscientific and rambling.

³ See Plutarch's Treatise on the Silence of the Oracles.

root of all things, but the three angular worlds as connective of all things, and causing all things to be one, according to one mundane intellect, one soul, and one nature. Or according to the empyrean, ethereal, and material world. For an angle is connective of the sides. But the three sixty worlds may be said to be the multitude according to each sphere of these. For the spheres are twelve in number; and the multitude in each is spherical, of which the pentad is a symbol, being the first spherical number. Hence there are thrice sixty worlds, because there is an intellectual, a psychical, and a physical series, according to each sphere of which the pentad is a symbol; or because there is an empyrean, ethereal, and material multitude of Gods. If, however, some one should not admit that these things are obscurely signified [in this narration of Plutarch], but should assert that the worlds are truly divided according to number, we ask him, whether it is better to make one world comprehensive of all things, or many worlds separated from each other? For the former makes multitude to be connectedly contained by the monad, and parts by the whole; but the latter dissipates production into an unco-ordinate multitude; though nature, and every cause of this kind, makes a monad prior to multitude, and a whole connective of parts. If likewise the worlds being spherical, touch each other, they will touch according to a point, but in the whole they will be separated from each other, and will be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. It is necessary however that things which proceed from one cause, should be co-passive with each other, and give completion to one life. But if they do not at all touch each other, they will be [entirely] separated. How also, Aristotle would say, will things which are upward be downward, and things which are downward be upward, interval being external to the worlds? And how will this thing pertaining to the worlds be arranged here, but another there? For that which is upward to us, will be to others downward. Will not the earth therefore of the other worlds, and every thing there which is heavy, be impelled to this world, if the motion of that which is heavy tends downward? But at one and the same time, a body which in one of those worlds tends upward, will, as proceeding to this world, tend downward. And there will not be an order of motions, or powers, or of things which are co-ordinate in the universe. Unless some one should say in answer to this, that there is a different middle in each of the worlds: for the middle is not the middle of a vacuum, but of a world. Each part therefore of a world tends either to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that which is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are

foreign to each other. If therefore, some one should think that these assertions are worthy of belief, let them remain as such.

Plato however, has chosen the most principal and proper cause of their being but one world, viz. that which is derived from the paradigm of the universe; but has omitted as concauses the above, and such-like causes. A demonstration also of this kind is definite. For it does not separately confute those who say there is a multitude of worlds, and separately those who introduce an infinite number, dispersed in different places, and intercepted by a vacuum, but at one and the same time he shows that the assertions both of the former and the latter are false, directly proving that the world is one from the onliness of the paradigm. And farther still, he avoids the modes of argument which are derived from matter. For he neither demonstrates, as Aristotle does, from matter being one, nor from places being definite according to nature, nor from essence, i. e. matter which is a body, being united, according to the doctrine of the Stoics. *For Plato alone or especially employed, says Theophrastus, the cause which is derived from providential inspection; beautifully testifying this of Plato.* As we have said therefore, he ascribes the onliness of the world to the paradigm. For if the paradigm is one, and the Demiurgus is one, it is necessary that the world should be one. Or rather, if the paradigm is one, and the world adumbrates the onliness of the paradigm, the world is one. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent. For the paradigm is one, as he before demonstrated, and constituted the world conformably to the onliness of itself. For as the intelligible paradigm was generated one from *the one* which is *the good*, so likewise with reference to itself being one, it constituted the world only-begotten. Hence the world is one. And neither are there many worlds; for there are not many first paradigms; nor infinite worlds; for the infinite according to multitude, does not even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpetual beings.

But it is possible, says Porphyry, to use the demonstration of Plato in all other principles. For through this, not only intelligible animal is demonstrated to be one, but also the first Demiurgus. And in short, it may be demonstrated, that there are not many principles of intelligibles, but one principle. For again another principle of their being many would be requisite, through which the principles themselves are unbegotten. *For every thing which is naturally inherent in many things, is necessarily derived from one cause.* He therefore who says, that God and matter are principles, must be compelled to admit that there is a certain

other cause prior to them. For neither is matter sufficient to itself, nor will God be comprehensive of all things [if there is another principle independent of him]. It is necessary therefore, that there should be a cause prior to these which comprehends all things, and which is truly sufficient to itself, and is not in want of any other thing.

31 B “ But this heaven [or universe] was generated, is, and will be one and only-begotten.”

The only-begotten indeed, adumbrates the monadic cause, and indicates an essence which is comprehensive of all secondary natures, and has dominion over wholes. For the theologian is accustomed to call Proserpine only-begotten; as presiding in a leading and ruling manner over all mundane natures, and as the cause of only-begotten animals. For the Goddess who is posterior to her gives subsistence to the animals which are not only-begotten, as being irrational. The theologian therefore, on this account calls Proserpine only-begotten, though he produces another divinity from the same causes as he produced Proserpine. Unity however, is imparted to the universe from the one unity of unities. For as the being which is every where, is derived from being itself, so the one¹ which is in all things is from the one itself. But the words “was generated, is, and will be,” manifest the temporal perpetuity of the universe, which is extended with the infinity of time. For the term *was*, is indicative of the past, the term *is*, of the present, and the term *will be*, of the future time. Again therefore you have the term *one* conformably to the image of the one being [the summit of intelligibles]; but the terms *was*, *is*, and *will be*, conformably to the image of eternity. For the infinity of time imitates the eternal infinity. But all these are according to the image of animal itself. For this was primarily monadic, and truly an eternal one. But the world is *monadic* and perpetual through the imitation of it. Farther still, the term “was generated,” is significant of perfection; the term “is,” of the participation of being; and the term “will be,” of perpetual generation, through which the world has a never-failing subsistence. So that of these, the first is from the one; for from thence perfection is imparted to all things. But the second is from the one being. And the third is from eternity; for from thence the never-failing is inherent in wholes.

¹ For το εἷς παντός οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον, it is obviously necessary to read το εἷς παντός εἷς.

BOOK III.

THE present treatise in one way surveys the world according to the wholeness which it contains, conformably to which also it is similar to all-perfect animal, and was generated an only-begotten animal, animated and endued with intellect; but in another way, according to the division which is in it; as when it divides the soul from body, and likewise things which have a more formal order. But how does the psychical breadth proceed from fabrication, and according to what kind of reasons? For since the world is an animated animal and endued with intellect, three things are exhibited in it, viz. a certain body, soul, and intellect. Intellect however, is entirely unbegotten: for it is allotted an eternal essence and energy. But body is entirely generated: for it consists according to the whole of itself, in the whole of time. And soul is of a middle essence. As therefore, it is arranged in the middle of impartible and partible natures, after the same manner also, it is the boundary' of unbegotten and generated essences. Hence it is generated indeed, as with reference to intellect, but is unbegotten, when considered with relation to a corporeal-formed nature. It exists also as the end of eternal beings, but ranks as first among things that are generated. On this account therefore, Plato delivers to us an all-various generation of body, producing it wholly from causes different from itself; but he produces soul both from itself, and from the total fabrication and vivification. He does not however, in words devise any generation of intellect. For neither is intellect produced according to idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotten, and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes, but abiding in them

¹ For *epous* here, it is necessary to read *epous*.

inherently, it proceeds unitedly, together with its more total causes. Hence it abides impartible and undivided, being preserved by undefiled and inflexible powers, while another life is distributed and divided about the parts of the universe. Plato therefore, delivers the first hypostasis of the universe from fabrication, viz. an hypostasis according to wholeness; according to which it becomes animated, divine, and endued with intellect, conformably to a similitude to all-perfect animal. But he adds a second hypostasis, which divides the world according to wholes, and the production of total parts; soul and the corporeal-formed nature existing according to this hypostasis. For intellect is entirely unbegotten, as we have said, because it is without generation and indivisible; except that it proceeds in an unbegotten manner, from the providence of the Demiurgus. But he calls the nature which receives intellect, the evolution¹ itself into light of soul. For the Demiurgus himself places the circles of soul in intellect, unfolding it without division, as being impartible, and without figure, as being perfectly unfigured. And he delivers after this, the third hypostasis of the universe, dividing it according to parts, and giving perfection to each of the parts. For he delivers to us, how fire and air, water and earth are generated. But in the last place, he surveys the energy of fabrication which is effective of body; and neither in this does he descend to particulars,² but abides in the whole elements. For the total fabrication is the fabrication of wholes, and of total parts. But he delivers the formation of individuals, and of things which are truly partial, to the junior Gods; in order that imitating the providence of their father about wholes, they also may receive a similar fabrication about particulars, and may have that analogy to him which he has to the intelligible paradigm. For being intellectual as with reference to this paradigm, and having the order of intellect, as with relation to intelligible intellect, he becomes himself intelligible to the mundane Gods.

As we have said therefore, fabrication being triple, the first, according to wholeness, the second, according to a division into wholes, and the third, according to a division into parts,³ Plato now intends to deliver to us the middle or second fabrication; having indeed a transition of this kind consentaneous from things themselves; and having also an opportune progression to this from what had been

¹ For *εξαστα* here, read *εξαστασι*.

² For *τα καθόρα*, read *τα καθέκουρα*.

³ In other words fabrication is either Jovian, or Dionysiacal, or Adoniacal, as was before observed by Proclus.

before said. For since he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within it all such things as are naturally allied to it; that the world indeed is one, he demonstrated from the onliness of the paradigm; but that it is visible, and that it is comprehensive of all kindred natures, is rendered manifest to us by the division of the universe into wholes. For if we can discover from what cause the world is visible, and how all the elements are co-arranged in it, and through what analogies, we shall easily perceive that it comprehends all kindred natures, and that there is nothing sensible which is not contained in the one ambit of the world. Perceiving this however, we shall sufficiently obtain the object of investigation. For this was, how the world is visible, and how it is comprehensive of all things which are naturally allied to it. For from what has been before said, we assume that the world is alone; but from these things, that it is all-perfect.

“ Since, however, it is necessary that what is generated of a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible; but without fire nothing can become visible, neither can any thing be tangible without a certain solid, nor solid without earth;—hence divinity beginning to fabricate, constituted the body of the universe from fire and earth.”

Plato having a little before given the definition of that which is generated, calling it that which is becoming to be, and which is perishable, he defined it to be that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense. But demonstrating that the world is generated, he converts the definition. For he says that sensibles are seen to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated. But now transferring that which is itself generated, to the order of a subject, he predicates of it the visible and tangible. For these are the extremes of sensibles, just as the sight and the touch are the extremes of the senses. Hence there, as I have observed in what he says respecting the world being generated, he converts the definition. But here he gives it according to nature. For that which is becoming to be was in the order of the indefinite. But as he said in the hypotheses, that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is to be assumed in the definition. He says therefore, it is necessary that what is generated should be sensible, not indeed every generated nature, but that which we before called generated, viz. the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.

If however, some one should say that according to Plato material forms and qualities themselves are apprehended by sense, and yet are incorporeal, and at the same time have generation, let him know, says the divine Iamblichus, that these likewise contribute to the hypostasis of bodies, and are surveyed in conjunction with them. Since therefore the world has a certain corporeal and likewise an incorporeal portion in it, and this latter is two-fold, one being inseparable, but the other separate from body; since also the portion of the incorporeal, which is separate from body is two-fold, viz. psychical and intellectual; and further still, since the world also has the unbegotten and the generated, but the whole of every thing which consists of the unbegotten and the generated, is generated, Plato very properly calls the whole world something generated and corporeal-formed. For if a whole consists of the mortal and the immortal, the whole is mortal; if from the unbegotten and the generated, the whole is generated; and if from the incorporeal and the corporeal, the whole has the form of a corporeal nature. For if indeed, the incorporeal itself is co-passive with body, it becomes itself corporeal-formed, and not the whole only. If, however, that which is principally and properly incorporeal, is itself exempt and impassive, being raised above body, this more excellent nature is not indeed body, since it remains in its own purity, but the whole may more justly be denominated corporeal-formed. Hence, since the world participates of many and blessed prerogatives from its generator, but partakes also of body, it is deservedly called corporeal-formed, visible and tangible, according to the whole of itself. For it is generated. But that which is generated is visible and tangible and has a body, as was rightly asserted before.

Plato beginning therefore from body, in the first place gives it to be sensible according to the extreme senses. In the next place, he imparts to it that which is more perfect than this, viz. the bond through analogy, which is connective of the bodies it contains. In the third place, he makes it to be a whole consisting of the wholes of the elements. Afterwards, in the fourth place, he gives it a spherical figure, in order that it may be most similar to itself according to form. In the fifth place, he shows that the world suffers all things in itself. In the sixth place, he distributes to it an appropriate motion. Afterwards, in the seventh place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to it a temporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the series¹

¹ For *εφα* here, it is necessary to read *αεφα*.

of Gods in it, who conjointly produce the perfect year. And in the tenth place, he makes it to be perfect from all animals which are assimilated to the four ideas [in animal itself]. And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole fabrication of things. These particulars however will be unfolded as we proceed.

Now therefore, we shall observe, that since the world possesses interval, and is apprehended by sense, it is known through the sight and the touch; being visible indeed, in consequence of being wholly filled through the whole of itself with light; but existing tangible in consequence of being a solid. For it is sufficient for it to receive through these senses, all sensible natures. The visible also, and the tangible conceived as always existing in the world in the four elements, are contraries. For these as being most distant from each other and under the same genus, are contraries. For both are sensibles, and this is their common genus, and they are most distant from each other, since the one is immediately sensible, but the other is not sensible without a medium. If however, we investigated the contraries in the elements so far as they are mutable, we should not say that they are fire and earth, but fire and water. For water especially extinguishes fire. Each also of the assertions is true. For it is common to both to have their contrariety consist in being extremes. *And in this the assertions accord, as in sensibles indeed, earth being contrary to fire, but as in things of a mutable nature, water to fire.* Hence also Plato opposes the visible to the tangible. Or, [it may be said] that he assumes the sensible elements, as not yet considering the mutation of them, according to which water is more contrary to fire than earth. What Plato therefore here says, is not as Theophrastus thought, imperfect: for he doubts as follows: Why does Plato say that the peculiarity of fire is visibility, and of earth tangibility, but does not at all mention the peculiarities of the other elements? We reply, it is because we see the world, and also touch it, but we do not taste, or hear, or smell it. The world itself also is visible and tangible to itself. And as being luciform indeed, it is visible, perceiving itself through divine light, which is extended through all heaven, and is similar, as Socrates says in the Republic, to the rainbow. For this divine light is that which is primarily visible, and pervades through the whole world. For as the sphere of the sun is the sight of the soul which is in it, thus also the sight of the sphere¹ is that divine light, which pervades through all visible² natures, and operates on, and imparts life to things that are visible. You may likewise say, that this is

¹ For ψυχῆς here, it is necessary to read σφαιρας.

² Instead of ορατων in this place, I read ορατικων.

the first and most principal sight, but not that which subsists in conjunction with passion, and which is separated from visible natures. But again, the world as being solid and full of life, has what is called a co-sensation of itself. For we also have a co-sensation of the motions or passions which inwardly subsist in us. And through this consciousness, the world becomes tangible to itself. The most proper solution however of the doubt, is that which says, that Plato assumes the extreme elements prior to the others, because the latter subsist for the sake of the former. And he intends to show that the rest are constituted as the bond of the extremes. Or it may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends the media. For as the universe is defined through fire and earth, and the media which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible he comprehends all the variety of sensible natures.

This however, he employs as an axiom. For it is usual with him prior to each of the subjects of discussion, to assume an axiom from which he demonstrates the thing investigated. Thus for instance he assumes axiomatically the sentence, "*In him who is good envy is never ingenerated about any thing,*" in order that he may demonstrate that the Demiurgus imparts good to all things. And again, in this way he assumes the words, "*It neither was, nor will be lawful for the most excellent nature to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful;*" in order to show that the universe is an animal endued with intellect and animated. This too, is the case with the words, "*That which is assimilated to an imperfect thing can never become beautiful;*" in order that he may survey what the nature of the paradigm is, according to which the Demiurgus constituted the world. After the same manner therefore here, previously assuming as an axiom, *that what is generated is visible and tangible*, he demonstrates from this, how the elements contribute to the composition of the world, and how they are arranged in the universe. For if it is necessary that the world should be visible and tangible, fire and earth are necessary to it: for that which is primarily visible is fire. In the first place, indeed, because visible natures themselves are luminous substances: for *all colours are the progeny of light*. In the next place, because *the sight itself is light proceeding from an ethereal-formed essence*. And in the third place, because sight, and that which is visible, require the congregating power of light, in order to their existence in energy. For what else is it than light that collects both these together? So that the world will be in want of fire, in order to be visible. To which also may be added, that *Pythagoras in what he says to Abaris, demonstrates that the eye is analogous to fire*. For it is the most elevated of the instruments of sense, just as fire is of the elements, and employs as well as fire acute energies. The conical emission also of its rays, has no

small similitude to the pyramidal form of fire. Plato however, does not say that fire alone is visible: for this is false in a twofold respect. For fire itself by itself, unmingled with the other elements, is by no means [externally] visible, but is only visible in mental conception. And farther still, none of the other elements will be visible if fire alone is visible. It is one thing therefore, to be visible through fire, and together with fire, and another for fire itself to be the only thing visible. Hence, he does not assert the latter, which may be confuted in a twofold respect, but the former, because nothing is visible separated from fire; from which also you may assume, that all bodies part'cipate of fire. But in different bodies there is a different fire. *For light, flame, and a burning coal, are not the same thing. But from on high there is a diminution as far as to the earth of fire which proceeds from a more immaterial, pure and incorporeal nature as far as to the most material and gross bodies.* For there are streams of fire under the earth, as Empedocles somewhere says;

Beneath the earth burn num'rous fiery streams.

Nor ought we to wonder how fire, though in water, is not extinguished. For all things proceed through each other, and that which predominates is different in different things. Light also is fire pervading through all things. Numenius therefore, being of opinion that all things are mingled, thought that nothing is simple. But Plato knew the mixture of things, and separately delivered the nature of each, fashioning the elements from figures.

Perhaps however, the wonderful Aristotle will object to what is said, not admitting that every thing visible is such through the participation of fire; because the choir of the stars, and the great sun itself, though they do not consist of fire, yet at the same time are visible. But if some one should say to him, that with respect to fire, one kind is material, but another immaterial, as with reference to sublunary fire which is material; that one kind is corruptible, but another incorruptible; that one is mingled with air, but another is pure; and in short, that there are many species of fire, perhaps he will assent to the assertion, and also to *the theologists' who call the sun a fire which is the channel of fire, and the dispensator of fire, and all such-like appellations.* For to what else can he ascribe visibility, than to that which is generative of light? But what except fire is a thing of this

¹ viz. The Chaldean Theurgists. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles.

kind? For earth¹ is effective of that which is entirely contrary to light: for it is the cause of darkness. And that which is more terrestrial participates in a less degree of light; but air and water are diaphanous, and are not of themselves visible. Hence each of these is a medium between that which is primarily visible, and that which obumbrates visible natures; each being the cause of visibility to other things, but not to itself, so far as each of these is diaphanous, but other things are transparent through these. It remains therefore, that fire alone illuminates the things with which it is present, and makes them to be visible.

If however, some one should say, that the celestial element which is visible and illuminative, is not fire, we ask him, whence does the fire which is here, become such as it is? For if each of these is generative of sensible light, why may not each of them be fire, though the one is immaterial, but the other material? When, however, I say that the one is immaterial, I mean as was before observed, that it is so when compared with the grossest² matter, which is not able to sustain forms, so as to prevent them from gliding away, and which is distinguished from the matter that invariably remains in its own proper form. For we learn that matter pervades through the whole world, as the Gods also say. Hence Plato, as he proceeds, calls matter the receptacle of the universe. Such therefore, as are the kinds of light, such also are the kinds of fire; and analogy shows that the light which is from the celestial element is from fire. Hence, it must be said, that Plato does not characterize fire by heat, nor by being, moved upward; for these things are the peculiarities of the fire which is here, and which is not in its proper place; but that he characterizes it by visibility. For through this he comprehends all fire, the divine, the mortal, the caustic, and the vehement.

Farther still, the same things must likewise be said concerning earth, that earth is that which is primarily solid. For it must not be said that earth derives its solidity from some other place; but in sensibles, that which is especially solid, has this peculiarity, prior to such things as are less solid; since also that which is especially hot, is hot prior to things which have less heat, and from this things which have less heat, participate of this quality. If therefore, earth is more solid than the other elements, but that which is most solid is the cause of things which are less solid being solid, and things which are less such are not the causes of solidity to those which especially and particularly have this power;—if this be

¹ Instead of $\pi\eta$ in this place, it is necessary to read $\gamma\eta$.

² For $\tau\alpha\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\eta$ here, it is necessary to read $\pi\alpha\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\eta$.

the case, it is necessary that earth should be the cause of solidity to the other elements, having itself a subsistence contrary to fire. And if indeed, we assume things which are apparent to our senses, viz. heaven as fiery, and the earth on which we walk, as especially earth, the contrariety of these will be manifest, the former being always in motion, but the latter being immoveable; the former being transcendently visible, but the latter tangible: and the one being most attenuated through light, but the other most gross through darkness. But if we wish to survey the first elements of these, viz. fire itself so far as fire, and earth itself, so far as earth, we shall shortly after unfold all the oppositions of these, when we discuss the analogy of the four elements. That visibility therefore, is the peculiarity of fire, and tangibility of earth, we may from these things assume to be most true. Hence Porphyry says, that of dæmons some, being visible, have in their composition more of a fiery, in consequence of not having any thing of a resisting nature. But others, participating also of earth, are capable of being touched. He adds, that such as these appearing near Italy about the Tuscans, not only emit seed from which worms are generated, but also strike against other things, and leave behind them ashes; from which likewise he shows that all things partipate of earth. There is not, however, the same nature of earth every where, and in all parts of the world, but in some places it is more pure and immaterial, and without gravity. *For not gravity, but tangibility, is the peculiarity of earth.* But in other places, it is more material, and heavy, and is moved with difficulty. In some places likewise, it exhibits solidity alone; but in others, it receives other genesiurgic and material powers, after the same manner as fire.

If however, these things being asserted by us, Aristotle should doubt, how if fire is in the heavens it is moved circularly, and not in a right line, we must adduce in answer to him, what *Plotinus says, that every simple body, when in its proper place, either remains immoveable, or is moved in a circle, in order that it may by no means relinquish its proper place. For if it is moved in a different manner, it will either no longer be in its own place, or will not yet be in it.* A celestial body therefore, being fiery, is necessarily moved in a circle. For earth also, if it were moved without leaving the place about the middle, would be moved in a circle. For when fire is moved to the upper region it is so moved in consequence of being in a foreign place. For the same reason likewise, a clod of earth is moved downward; and in short, *the local motions of the elements in a right line, are occu-*

* Instead of *ενα μη δε ως* in this place, I read *ενα μηδαμως*.

sioned by their being preternaturally disposed; so that it is false to say that fire is naturally moved in a right line. For it then especially subsists according to nature when it possesses its proper place. But when it tends to its proper place, it is not yet in a condition conformable to nature. This however being demonstrated, it is evident that the celestial fire when it is moved, is moved in a circle; and nothing that has been said disturbs the Platonic assertion. For if fire is moved in a right line,¹ it is not yet in its natural place. But if it is in its natural place, it will either be immoveable, or moved in a circle. It is impossible however, that it should be immoveable: for all fire is naturally moveable. In its natural place therefore, it is alone moved in a circle. But let us return to the thing proposed to be discussed.

If therefore the universe is generated, it is necessary that it should be sensible. But if sensible, it is visible and tangible. And if so, it consists of fire and earth. But if this be admitted, it also consists of the middle elements. For fire and earth are as much disjoined from each other as the sight and the touch, and require the other elements as connecting media. If however, the world is visible, it is necessary there should be fire; and if tangible, it is necessary there should be earth. For that which is solid is tangible, and is also able to resist the touch; since that which is friable, and cannot sustain the touch, is by no means tangible. Hence Pythagoras calls the earth *the sustainer*, as being solid, and resisting the touch, and as moved with difficulty, and participating of stable power. If therefore, as we have said, fire is requisite in order that the world may be visible, but earth, that it may be tangible, divinity beginning from fire and earth, made the universe. Not that he first made these; for we have already rejected the generation which is according to time; but since every physiology commences from contraries, on this account Plato says that the composition of the universe originated from fire and earth, in order that it might become visible through fire, and tangible through the solidity of earth, which with great accuracy he calls *a certain solid*. For a physical solid is one thing, but a mathematical solid another. And the latter is intangible, but the other, which the discussion now requires, is tangible. For that solid is tangible, which is physical. Hence those are absurd who doubt why earth alone is solid: for, say they, water and air are also solids. For it may be said, in answer to them, that resistance especially pertains to earth; since it is the support and foundation of the other elements. For earth supports water, and

¹ The words *ex' efferias*, are omitted in the original

both earth and water support air. *Earth therefore, is the first tangible, and the first resisting substance, and on this account is the first solid.* We shall omit however to notice those who say that Plato here calls the three elements after fire, earth. For if this were admitted, it would not be possible to assign what is the medium of earth and fire.

“ It is impossible however, for two things alone to cohere in a beautiful manner, without the intervention of a certain third ; for a certain collective bond is necessary in the middle of the two. But that is the most beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound, to be one.”

In what is here said, a bond is assumed as affording an image of divine union, and the communion of powers, according to which the intellectual causes of wholes effect their generations. But beauty appears to be assumed, as having an uniting and binding essence and power. For the words, “ *to cohere in a beautiful manner, and the most beautiful of bonds,*” appear to me to be significant of this. Beginning therefore from the duad, as allied to generation, progression and difference, Plato introduces union to the participants of it, and an harmonious communion through a bond, imparting to the world this as the second gift from the Demiurgus. We shall however here avoid the introduction of such doubts as are adduced by those who do not rightly understand what is said by Plato. For neither do those who say that semicircles require no bond in order to the generation of a circle, speak rightly ; for a circle does not consist of semicircles, but on the contrary, the circle now existing, and not subsisting from these, the diameter being drawn makes the semicircles. And this is evident from the name affording a generation to these from the circle, but not vice versa. Nor do those speak rightly who assume the monad and the duad, which in a certain respect are opposites, and have no medium. For Plato does not absolutely say, that there is something between all things, in whatever manner they may exist, which gives perfection to the hypostasis of one composite. For he says, that two things alone cannot beautifully cohere without a third. But the monad and the duad are not contraries, since the duad consists of monads. Nor again, is there any rectitude in the assertions of those who introduce things that are corrupted together, as for instance, wine mingled with honey. For these no longer exist

when the mixture takes place. We however, do not investigate how things are corrupted; for this is not wonderful; but how remaining what they are, they are co-harmonized with each other. For this bond¹ is the cause of safety to the things that are bound, but not of their common corruption and abolition. Nor do those speak rightly who adduce as a witness the communion of man and woman, which requires no third thing to its subsistence. For through ignorance they do not perceive the greatest bond, that of love, which excites to communion, in one way indeed, to a communion of the psychical life, and in another to that of the physical life. For the bond through animation is the medium in these. Nor are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver. *For of these there is the same essence; since both are water.* All these therefore, wander from the conception of Plato.

We however, again say, conformably to what has been before observed, that it is necessary these two things should be assumed, in the first place, in order to the composition of one thing, and in the next place, in order that their coalition may not be corrupted. For they would no longer be bound, but would cease to exist. In the third place, also, it is necessary that they should truly be the elements of that which consists of them. For having these conditions, they will entirely be in want of a certain third thing to their colligation. For what, since they are separate, divided, and most distant from each other, will collect them into one? For if nothing accedes to them, they will remain divided, and will subsist after the same manner as before. But if something accedes to them besides what they already are, this thing which accedes will become their bond. For it was this which collected them into the composition of one thing. A bond, however, is said to be so in a threefold respect. For one bond is that which pre-exists in the cause of the things that coalesce. But another is that which is inherent in the things themselves that are bound, and which is co-ordinate to, and consascent with them. And a third is that which exists in the middle of these, proceeding indeed from the cause, but presenting itself to the view² in the things that are mutually bound. If you are willing also, one bond of an animal, and of the parts in it, is the one reason which is pre-established in the cause itself of the animal. But the nerves and the fibres are another bond, connecting the parts of the animal. And another bond is the physical reason or productive and forming power, which

¹ For *ου γαρ δεσμος ουτος*, it is necessary to read *ο γαρ δεσμος ουτος*.

² For *ειρηαισθητες* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *ειρηαισθησις*.

proceeds from the cause of the animal, and employs the nerves, and all the material organic bonds for the colligation of the animal. For this bond is neither exempt from the things that are bound, nor yet ranking among things which are without effective power, is it destitute of the true cause. You must not therefore, understand the bond which is now mentioned by Plato, according to the first mode; for this is not attended with cause; but cause is entirely exempt from the things which proceed from it, so far as it is cause. But Plato says, that the bond is in the middle of the things that are bound. That, however, which is in the middle of certain things, is not separated from them. Nor does this bond subsist according to the organic and last kind of bond. For the bond which is conformable to this, is not the lord of itself nor of its own proper union. Plato however adds, that the bond of which he is speaking, makes both itself and the things which are bound to be one. For it is possible for this to be arranged in the middle. But it possesses such a power as this through analogy, which is the most beautiful bond, and which imparts to it a power that causes all things to have sameness and union. This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound, but has a subsistence in them. The demiurgic will likewise, is a bond, but is exempt from the things that it binds; "*My will, says the Demiurgus, being a greater and more principal bond than those with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation.*" It remains therefore, that we must understand the bond here mentioned, according to the middle mode, and as having a middle form, so as to be neither effective nor organic.

Whence then is the conception of such a bond derived, and of what is it the symbol? It proceeds indeed from the one cause of wholes. For the power of imparting union is present to all things, from that fountain of all union, through which also intellect is conjoined to the intelligible, and which produces the light of truth, or the first of bonds, through which all things are connected with each other, and become perfectly one thing through similitude. It is through this likewise, that things which have proceeded from their proper principles are converted to them. But this bond also proceeds from the one being, which is the first of beings, and which unitedly comprehends the causes of all things, according to the bond and divine union contained in it. It likewise proceeds from all-perfect animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to itself, than a sensible⁴ animal; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade

⁴ For ἡ το νοητων here, it is evidently necessary to read ἡ το αισθητων.

through each other prior¹ to analogy; which analogy imitating, makes all things to be in all, and imparts the same powers to different things. It also proceeds from the connectedly-containing cause.² For analogy inserts connexion, causing the natures which are bound by it, as Plato says, to be indissoluble by every thing except by him who binds them. Hence this bond proceeding from these causes, is connective, is the cause of the communion, and one union of separated natures, and is the supplier of harmony, and of the conspiracy hastening to unity of different things; in order that it may be similar to the causes from which it was derived.

These things, however, being thus divided and defined, let us return to the thing proposed to be considered. For since it is necessary that the world being generated should be visible and tangible, it will be in want of fire and earth. Of fire, indeed, because it is visible. For vision³ is of an ethereal nature, on which account also it emits rays; and that which collects both sight, and that which is visible, is light. But all light is from fire; for it is not from earth, which produces darkness. As we have before observed, however, there are many kinds of fire. Because likewise, the world is tangible, it is in want of earth. For earth is that which is especially solid: for it is more stable, and more of a resisting nature than the other elements. But that which is especially solid is especially tangible. For it in a greater degree sustains resistance, than that which is not solid. Hence earth is especially tangible. Let it therefore be admitted, that there are primarily these two elements in the universe, and that they are contrary to each other; fire indeed, being analogous to form, to the masculine nature, and to things of this kind; but earth, being co-ordinate to the female nature, and to matter. Hence, of these, which are thus oppositely divided, in their essences, powers, and energies, in the senses by which they are perceived, and in the places of their abode, there will not be one order, nor one world, unless a bond accedes to them, and communion with each other. For it is impossible for two things to cohere in a beautiful manner without the intervention of a certain third. And Plato indeed adduces an universal assertion by saying, "*a certain or some third thing.*" *But if you add the words, "which are entirely contrary," (immediately after the words, "for two things alone") you will render what is said incontrovertible, and more acknowledged.*

¹ For *προς αναλογίας* in this place, read *προ αναλογίας*.

² i. e. From the middle triad of the order of Gods called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

³ For *το ὄραον* here, it is necessary to read *το ὄραον*.

For it is impossible for two things which are most contrary to concur into one composition with each other, without the intervention of a third. For either they collect themselves, or they are congregated by another thing. Being, however, contrary, and most distant from each other, and secretly flying from each other, through the fear of losing their own essence, they cannot bring themselves together. Hence they are congregated by something else. But this is a bond; so that they are in want of a certain third thing. The universe, therefore, proceeds from the duad to the triad. For it began indeed from the duad, because all generation subsists in a way adapted to this principle. For difference, the infinite, and the Empedoclean strife [as being allied to the duad] are adapted to generated things. But the universe proceeds as far as to the triad, through the bond which is now mentioned. Again, therefore, a certain medium must be assumed between earth and fire, which is collective of both. *And let this for the sake of an example be moisture, which is common to air and water. For this¹ is connective indeed of earth, conglutinates it, and holds it together, so that it may not be dispersed; but being as a subject to fire, it imparts to it nourishment and permanency.* From this triad, however, the tetrad will shortly after be unfolded, because the natures which are bound together are solids. Hence it is rightly said, that a bond imparts beauty, and an harmonious communion and union. But what this bond is, and how it is inherent in the things that are bound, Plato shows through the following words.

“This, however, analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner.”

It must be said, therefore, that this analogy is the bond which is now investigated; but that the middle or media, are after a certain manner bonds. For analogy is in those things which have the same ratio, and is naturally adapted to bind itself in conjunction with them; them indeed, through ratios; but itself, through preserving the same form in things numerically different, and continuing to be one in multitude. For it has this from itself, and according to its own reason, and this consentaneously. For analogy proceeds from equality. But equality is of the co-ordination of unity. For as the monad is the fountain and root of quantity considered by itself; so is equality of all relative quantity, having the order of a monad, to all habitudes. For that we may omit other middles or media, which more recent philosophers have added, I mean Nicoma-

¹ For του γαρ, read τουτο γαρ.

clus, Moderatus, &c.,¹ we shall confine ourselves to the three media from which Plato constitutes the soul, arithmetically, geometrically, and harmonically.

It may be seen, however, how all these middles are generated from equality, by the following method. The arithmetic middle, indeed, after this manner: Make the first number equal to the first; the second to the first and the second; and the third to the first, second, and third. Three monads therefore being proposed, there will be produced according to this method three terms, viz. 1. 2. 3. preserving an arithmetic middle. For this middle consists in equally surpassing according to number, and being equally surpassed.² But the geometrical middle is produced as follows: Make the first equal to the first; the second, to the first and second; and the third to the first, to twice the second and the third. For again, there being three monads, there will thus be generated the three terms 1. 2. 4. forming the geometric middle. For the peculiarity of analogy consists in preserving the same ratio in greater and lesser terms. And the harmonic middle, which has the third order, is generated in the following manner: Three monads being proposed make the first equal to the first, and to twice the second; the second to twice the first, and twice the second; and the third to the first, to twice the second, and thrice the third. For by this method the three terms 3. 4. and 6. will be produced, forming the harmonic middle. For the harmonic middle, according to the Platonic definition itself, consists in surpassing and being surpassed by the same part of the extremes.³ All the middles, therefore, have their generation from equality. But if this be the case, they have the uniform, and a power which collects things, and causes them to be one. For equality is analogous to sameness, to the monad, to bound and to similitude, through which communion is produced in beings. Hence Plato appropriately adds the words, "*naturally adapted*," because the analogies and all the middles have the spontaneous. For they neither introduce an artificial, nor an adscititious bond, but present themselves to the view in the essences and powers themselves of things.

“For when either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the

¹ For an account of these media, see my Theoretic Arithmetic.

² In the original, by some negligence of the transcribers, after *ισω δε υπερεχομενη*, being equally surpassed, the words *κατα φωνην αυτος ο φιλανομος*, immediately follow, which are obviously totally foreign to this place.

³ Thus 3 is surpassed by 4, by 1 which is a third part of 3, and 6 surpasses 4 by 2 which is a third part of 6.

middle to the first so is the last to the middle; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then the middle becoming both first and last, and the last and the first becoming both of them middles, it will thus happen that all of them will necessarily be the same. But becoming the same with each other, they will be one."

In the first place, it is requisite to explain what is here said mathematically; and in the next place, physically, as being that which is especially proposed to be effected. For it is not proper to separate the discussion from its appropriate theory. There are therefore some who think that Plato in these words defines the geometric middle, and among other things which they assert, they say that the geometric middle is properly exclusive of all the others analogy; but that the others may be justly called middles. Nicomachus also is of this opinion, and he speaks rightly. *For geometric proportion is properly analogy; but it is requisite to call the others middle, as Plato also says further on in the generation of the soul. But the others are improperly called analogies.* To others, however, these appear not to have apprehended the meaning of Plato properly. For they say that it is not definitely asserted in these words, that there ought to be the same ratio; but thus much only is said, that it is necessary there should be such a habitude of the last to the middle as there is of the middle to the first. But this is common to all the before-mentioned middles. For as the monad is to the duad, according to the arithmetical middle, and the equal in quantity, so is the duad to the triad. For by as much as the duad is surpassed by the triad, by so much is the triad less than the tetrad. And as the monad is to the duad, according to the geometric middle, so is the duad to the tetrad. For the ratio is the same. And as the triad is to the tetrad, according to the harmonic middle, and the part of the triad by which the tetrad surpasses it, so is the tetrad to the hexad. For by that part of the triad by which the triad is exceeded by the tetrad, by the same part of the hexad is the tetrad surpassed by the hexad. Such, therefore, is their opinion, though Plato clearly assumes the geometric middle. For it is the peculiarity of this proportion, that the first has the same ratio to the middle that the middle has to the third term. As, however, there are three middles, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic, and these being such as we have shown them to be, Plato very properly assumes these

* For *καταχρωμενοι* here, I read *καταχρηστικως*.

three subjects, *numbers*, *masses*, and *powers*. For the arithmetical middle is in numbers; the geometrical is in a greater degree conversant with continued [than with discrete] quantity; and the harmonical middle is in powers. For it is conversant with sharp and flat sounds. And after this manner you may speak, distinguishing the middles according to their predominance.

All of them, however, may be assumed in numbers, in masses, and in powers. And how, indeed, they may be assumed in numbers is evident; for it has been shown by us. But they may also be assumed in masses. For three equal magnitudes being proposed, you may be able, by using the before-mentioned three methods, to devise other magnitudes, at one time producing an arithmetic, at another a geometric, and at another an harmonic middle. In powers likewise after the same manner. For let there be three equal powers, as for instance, three highest *hypatæ* (*ὑπάται*) sounds, all of them homotonous, or of the same tone. You will produce therefore from these, the arithmetical middle, if you place the first sound, that is *hypatæ*, equal to the first; but the second, to the first and second, as for instance, another sound emitting a sound the double of the first. And let it be *nete* or the last sound, which has a double ratio to *hypatæ*. But the third sound must be placed equal to the first, second, and third. For it will be a sound which will have a triple ratio to *hypatæ*, surpassing *nete* by as much as *nete* surpasses *hypatæ*. And these three sounds, *hypatæ*, *nete*, *trite-hyperbolaon*, will arithmetically differ from each other. But you will make the geometrical middle, if the *hypatæ* being posited, you make the first equal to the first, but the second equal to the first and second *hypatæ*. And let this sound be *mese*: for this is capable of emitting a sound the double of *hypatæ*. But if you make the third sound equal to the first *hypatæ*, and to twice the second, and the third, you will have a certain chord which will sound *nete-hyperbolaon*. For this will be capable of producing a sound the double of *mese*, and the triple of *hypatæ*. These three sounds likewise will form the geometric middle. All the middles, therefore, are seen to exist in numbers, in masses, and in powers. Number, however, is more adapted to the arithmetical, bulk to the geometrical, and power to the harmonic middle. And hence Plato uses these three, viz. numbers, masses, and powers.

It is well, likewise, that assigning certain common ratios, he commences from the middle. For it is this through which all analogy consists, collecting the

extremes according to ratio, from one power to the other. For analogy is that which is principally and properly a bond. But it is a bond as that *through which*, and the middle. For through the middle analogy binds the extremes. From this, therefore, he commences as most allied to the nature of analogy, and because habitude receives its completion through it. Hence, also, they are called middles, and because sameness is the end of all this analogy. For since they proceed from equality, but equality is sameness, it converts all things to sameness. Sameness, however, may be properly and principally asserted of the geometric middle, for there is the same ratio; but equality of the arithmetic; and similitude of the harmonic middle. And in the third place, the ascent is through sameness to union. For analogy indeed is suspended from equality,¹ being a habitude ingenerated in the boundaries of equality. But equality is suspended from sameness, and sameness from union.

It is necessary, however, after the mathematical resumption of these words, to direct our attention to the physical theory. For it is not fit that those who apply themselves to this discussion, should dwell on mathematical speculations; for the dialogue is physical; nor that they should neglect such speculations, investigating only what relates to sense; but it is requisite to conjoin both, and always connect physics with mathematics; just as the things themselves are connected, are homogeneous, and of a kindred nature, according to the progression from intellect. For, in short, if the Pythagoreans arranged the mathematical essence as a medium between intelligibles and sensibles, as being more evolved than intelligibles, but more universal than sensibles,² why is it requisite, omitting mathematics, to pay attention to physiology alone? For how is the sensible nature adorned, according to what reasons is it arranged, or from what reasons does it proceed, except from those that are mathematical? These reasons therefore [or productive powers], are primarily in souls, descending into them from intellect; and afterwards they are in bodies, proceeding into them from souls. Hence it is necessary not to remain in mathematical speculations as some do; for this produces false opinions in the auditors, and induces them to think that physical figures and numbers are mathematical. It is also in another respect absurd. For the reasons of nature do not receive the accuracy and firm-

¹ Instead of *εληρηται γαρ η μεν εκ της αναλογιας*, it is requisite to read in this place, *εληρηται γαρ η μεν αναλογια εκ της ισοτητας*.

² For *των νοητων* here, it is obviously necessary to read *των αισθητων*.

ness of the mathematical reasons. To which may be added, that in so doing we shall not follow the demonstrative canons, in which it is said that things pertaining to one genus must not be transferred to another. Neither therefore is it possible to survey physical objects arithmetically.

Let us, therefore, if you think fit, discuss the theory of the proposed words physically. The first analogy then, according to which nature inserts harmony in her works, and according to which the Demiurgus adorns and arranges the universe, is one certain life, and one reason, proceeding through all things; which first, indeed, connects itself, but afterwards the natures in which it exists; and according to which sympathy is ingenerated in all mundane essences, as existing in one animal, and governed by one nature. This life, therefore, which is the bond of wholes, total nature [or nature which ranks as a whole] and the one soul of the world constitute. The one intellect likewise generates it; and always more excellent beings, insert in mundane natures, a greater and more perfect union. Let it be said, therefore, that the habit which predominates in material subjects, that material form, and the powers of the middle elements, are bonds. All these however, have the relation of *things without which* the primary bond is not participated, and are analogous to the middle in mathematical entities, through which habitude subsists in the extremes. But the life of which we are speaking, which collects and unites all things, and is suspended indeed from its proper causes, but binds the things in which it is inherent, is *truly* analogy, and preserves both its own union and the union of its participants. Again, therefore, a bond is threefold. For the common powers of the elements are one bond; the one cause of bodies is another; and a third is that which is the middle of both the others, which proceeds indeed from the cause of bodies, but employs the powers that are divided about body. And this is the strong bond, as the theologian says, which is extended through all things, and is connected by the golden chain. For Jupiter after this, constitutes the golden chain,¹ according to the admonitions of Night.

But when your pow'r around the whole has spread
A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
Suspend from aether.

¹ This golden chain may be said to be the series of unities proceeding from *the one*, or the ineffable principle of things, and extending as far as to matter itself. And of this chain, the light immediately proceeding from the sun is an image.

Physical analogy then being a thing of this kind, let us survey in what things, and through what, it is naturally adapted to be established. As Plato therefore says, it subsists in numbers, masses, and powers. Physical *numbers*, however, are material forms divided about the subject [i. e. about body]. But *masses* are the extensions of these forms, and the separations or intervals of them about matter. And *powers* are the things which connect, and give form [or specific distinction] to bodies. For form is one thing, and the power proceeding from it is another. For form indeed is impartible and essential, but becoming extended, and dilated into bulk, it emits, as if it were a blast from itself, material powers, which are certain qualities. Thus, for instance, in fire, the form and essence of it is impartible,¹ and is truly the image of the cause of fire. For in partible natures there is that which is impartible. But from the form in fire which is impartible, a separation and extension of it take place about matter, from which the powers of fire are exerted, such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something else of the like kind. And these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of fire. For essences are not from qualities, nor are essence and power the same; but every where the essential precedes power; and from that being one, a multitude of powers proceeds, and that which is divided, from that which is indivisible; just as from one power many energies proceed. For by how much more each thing proceeds, by so much more is it multiplied and divided, conformably to [the characteristic of] its principle and cause, which is impartible and indivisible. As in every body, therefore, there is this triad,² I mean number, bulk, and power, analogy and the physical bond, occupy from on high the numbers, masses, and powers of bodies, and likewise congregate their partible¹ essences, and unite them for the purpose of producing the one completion of the world. They also insert communion in forms, symmetry in masses, and harmony in powers. And thus all things are rendered effable and consentaneous to each other. But this analogy proceeds from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle; from the first also to the middle, and from this to the last; and again, from the last to the middle, and from this to the first. Because, likewise, a bond of this kind imparts progression and conversion to bodies, it begins indeed from the

¹ Instead of το μὲν εἶδος αὐτοῦ και οὐσία, ἀμερῆς ἐστὶ και οὗτος ἀγαλμὶ της αἰτίας του πυρός, it is requisite to read, το μὲν εἶδος αὐτοῦ και οὐσία μερῆς ἐστὶ, και οὗτως πᾶσα της αἰτίας του πυρός.

² For του τρίτου τούτου in this place, it is requisite to read του τριάδου τούτου.

³ Instead of ἀμερῆς here, it is necessary to read μεριστάς.

middle, in consequence of being connective, and the cause of union, and is defined according to this peculiarity. But it proceeds from the first through the middle, to the last, as extending and unfolding itself, as far as to the last of things. And it recurs from the last to the first, as converting all things through harmony to the intelligible cause, from which the division of nature, and the separation and interval of bodies were produced. For by converting them to this cause, according to one circle, one order, and one series, secondary being suspended from primary natures, it causes the world to be one, and most similar to the intelligible [paradigm]. For as there all things are truly united to each other, so here all things are adapted to each other. And as intelligibles proceeding from *the good*, are again converted to it, through the goodness which is in them,¹ and through the intelligible monads; thus also sensibles proceeding from the Demiurgus, are again converted to him, through this bond, which is distributed and pervades through all of them, and binds all things together. For in this respect it imitates the intelligible. But it subsists intellectually in intellect, totally in wholes, and partially in partial natures.

After the same manner, therefore, as the intelligible, the sensible world has all things, according to all its parts. For fire, so far as it is tangible, participates of earth, and earth, so far as it is visible, participates of fire, and each participates of moisture. For earth indeed is conglutinated and connected through moisture, and its dissipated nature is united through it; but fire is nourished and increased by it. So that the extremes are the middle, in order that what is said may become physically manifest in things that are known by us. The extremes, therefore, are in a certain respect the middle, as preserving through it their proper idea, and remaining such as they are. And moisture itself, so far as it is coloured, participates of fire, and so far as it is re-invigorated through heat. But again, so far as it is tangible, it participates of earth. So that each of the extremes gives perfection to moisture. These things, however, will shortly after become more known to us.

But through this harmony and analogy, in the first place, sameness presents itself to the view, and in the next place union. For bodies themselves according to their own nature are partible, and are subdued by difference and strife. These, however, at the same time through harmony, are leagued in friendship with sameness, and through sameness with union. For through analogy the universe is

¹ For *ex autq* read *ex utroq*.

completely rendered one, this having the power of making things that are divided to be one, of congregating things that are multiplied, and connecting things that are dissipated. Hence, theologians surveying the causes of these things in the Gods, enclose Venus with Mars, and surround them with Vulcanian bonds; the difference which is in the world being connected through harmony and friendship. All this complication and connexion likewise has Vulcan for its cause, who through demiurgic bonds connects sameness with difference, harmony with discord, and communion with contrariety. And this being effected, Apollo, Hermes, and each of the Gods laugh. But their laughter gives subsistence to mundane natures, and inserts efficacious power in the bonds. Let these things, however, as it is said, be preserved in sacred silence. But now, from what has been discussed, let thus much be manifest to us, that the physical bond being Vulcanian and demiurgic, (for the one and all-perfect Demiurgus comprehends also the production which is through necessity, as being Vulcanian and Dionysiacal, and causing each of the parts of the universe to be a whole,) is collective of contraries, and connective of material things; uniting their essences, measuring their masses, and harmonizing their powers. It likewise makes all things to be in all, and exhibits the same things in each other, according to all possible modes, empirically, aerially, aquatically, and terrestrially.

“ If then it were necessary that the body of the universe should have been generated a superficies, and not have depth, one medium might have been sufficient for the purpose of binding both the natures that subsist with it, and itself. But now it is requisite that it should be a solid, and solids are never adapted to each other by one, but always by two media.”

The scope proposed to us [in the Timæus], is, as we have before observed, to learn how the universe is constituted, and of what it consists. But this being the design, we may see in what a well-ordered manner the discourse devises the composition of the four elements. For it is impossible that there should be one simple element alone; since there would not be generation. For all generation is a certain mutation. But all mutation is naturally adapted to be effected in two things. All generation likewise is from contraries. But a simple element itself, is by no means contrary to itself: for it would be itself corruptive of itself. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be generation, it is

necessary there should not be one element only. For as Hippocrates says, if there was one element only, it would be impossible for things to be changed. For mutation and motion are not to the similar, but to the contrary. Hence there is not one simple element only. If, however, there is not one, but two at least, it is necessary that these should be contraries: for generation is from contraries. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be two elements having in a becoming manner a nature contrary to each other. Hence, if they are contraries, they will be in want of a certain bond and medium. For it is impossible that two contraries can in a becoming manner coalesce, without a third thing; since it is necessary that a bond should intervene, which is collective of both. For being themselves contraries, they will avoid communion with each other. Hence it is necessary, there should be another third thing which conjoins them and leads them to the completion of one thing. But it is likewise necessary that this medium should be of a bifurmed¹ nature. For if the elements which were to be bound were superficies, one medium would be sufficient. But since they are solids, they are connected through two media. For the duad being the primary leader of solids, is also allotted the primordial cause of the bonds that are in them. Hence, likewise, Timæus calls a binding of this kind harmony, as inserting in the extremes a symmetry of communion with each other. The analogy also which is in solids is introduced through two media. For two media analogously come between two similar solids. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, all the elements are four; and there is neither one alone, lest we should destroy mutation; nor two contraries without a third thing, lest there should not² be a bond of things which are hostile to each other. For there will not be order and ornament from two things most foreign to each other. But if you conceive a certain thing of this kind, the solution of the doubt will be easy. Moreover, neither will there be alone two things which are not³ contraries. For they will not be able to operate on each other. For whiteness suffers nothing from a line, but from blackness. Nor does heat suffer any thing from whiteness, but from cold.

Again, therefore, it must be said still more universally, reasoning from things known, that either there is one element alone, or not one. If, however, there is only one element of the world, the variety of the phenomena, the opposition of the cir-

¹ For *ἑκαίδες* here, read *δυοκίδες*.

² *ὄν* is omitted in this place in the original.

³ *ὄν* is also here omitted in the original.

culations, and the war of generation, will be subverted, and either all things will be perpetual, or all things will be corruptible. But if there is not one element only, there will either be two elements, or more than two. And if two, they will either be contraries, or not contraries. If, however, they are not contraries, there will neither be action, nor passion, nor opposition in bodies, nor will there be generation in things which have generation. But if they are contraries, these will require a medium. And if this be the case, there will either be one medium, or two media. It is impossible, however, that there should be only one medium: for the elements are not superficies. Hence there are two media. But if there are two media of two things, all are four. That so many elements therefore in number are sufficient to the world, is through these things manifest.

Let us, however, if you please, concisely survey the mathematical meaning of the words before us, and afterwards adduce the physical theory pertaining to them. For how of two similar superficies or planes there is one medium, and of two similar solids two media, we will survey in number by themselves. For the primordial and spontaneous nature of numbers, is to be embraced prior to geometrical necessity. In the first place, therefore, let there be two square numbers 9 and 16, the less of which has for its side 3, and the greater 4. By multiplying these and making 12, we shall have an analogy in the three terms 9, 12, and 16.¹ Let two numbers likewise be assumed, which are not squares indeed, but at the same time are similar planes, and let them be 18 and 32,² the former being generated from the triad and hexad, but the latter from the tetrad and ogdoad. If therefore, we multiply either the triad by the ogdoad, or the hexad by the tetrad, we shall have for the product 24, binding in analogy 18 to 32, according to a sesquitercian ratio. This, however, is caused by their sides having the same ratio. If, therefore, the sides of the assumed numbers are found to receive no analogous mean or medium, all the planes generated from them will have but one medium, according to the before-mentioned mode.³ But if the sides themselves should be

¹ For as 9 is to 12, so is 12 to 16.

² The two similar plane numbers 18 and 32 here adduced by Proclus, prove that Gaston Pardies was greatly mistaken in asserting in his Elements of Geometry, "that if two numbers are similar planes, the greater may be divided into as many squares as there are units in the less." See the Translation of this work by Harris, p. 133. For 32 cannot be divided into as many squares as there are units in 18. And 32 and 18 are evidently similar plane numbers, because their sides are analogous. For as 3 is to 6 so is 4 to 8.

³ The sides of these numbers are 3, 6, 4, and 8, and they have no analogous mean. For there is no geometrical mean between 3 and 6, nor between 4 and 8. Hence the planes generated from them, viz. 18 and 32, will have but one medium, which is 24.

found to receive a certain analogous mean, the planes also produced from them, will necessarily receive more than one mean. For let there be two squares 16 and 81, and let the side of the former be 4, but of the latter 9. Since, therefore, the analogous medium between 4 and 9 is 6, according to a sesquialter ratio, it is necessary that more than one mean should fall between them. For the tetrad multiplied by the hexad will produce 24; but the hexad multiplied by itself will produce the square of itself 36; and multiplied by 9, will produce 54. And there will be a continued analogy, in the terms 16, 24, 36, 54, 81.¹ Hence, when the sides have an analogous mean, the planes produced from them, will have more than one mean. Hence, too, Plato appears to me to say very cautiously, not that there is entirely one medium in similar planes, but that it is possible for one to be sufficient. For more than one plane being produced, one medium would be sufficient to conjoin them, viz. 36 alone, according to the duple sesquiquartan ratio.² And thus much concerning similar planes.

Let us, however, now pass on to similar solids, and survey the media in these. In the first place, therefore, let there be two cubes 8 and 27, the former having for its side 2, and the latter 3. Of these cubes, there will be two media, the one being produced from twice two multiplied by three, i. e. 12, and which on this account is (*δοκίς*) a beam, but the other from thrice three multiplied by two, i. e. 18, and which is therefore (*πλινθός*) a tile. These will make a continued analogy with the before-mentioned cubes, according to a sesquialter ratio.³ And here you may see how each of the media has two sides from the cube placed next to it, but the remaining side from the other cube.⁴ This however will be useful to us for the purposes of physiology. Again, if the numbers were not cubes, but similar solids, they will likewise have two analogous middles or means. For let there be two similar solids 24 and 192, the sides of the former being 2, 3, 4, but of the latter 4, 6, 8. And from the duad, the triad, and the ogdoad, 48 will be produced, but from the tetrad, the hexad, and again the tetrad, the product will be 96. Here too, each of the media will have two sides from that similar solid of the extremes which is next to it, but one side from the other cube, in the same manner

¹ For as 16 is to 24, so is 24 to 36, so is 36 to 54, so is 54 to 81, the ratio being sesquialter.

² For 36 is a geometrical mean between 16 and 81, according to a duple sesquiquartan ratio. For 36 contains 16 twice, and a fourth part of it, i. e. 4 also; and 81 contains 36 twice, or 72, and 9 besides, which is a fourth part of 36.

³ For *πλινθός* here, read *πλινθοί*.

⁴ For 12 contains 8 once, and the half of 8. And in a similar manner $\frac{1}{2}^8 = 1\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{2}{1}^7 = 1\frac{1}{2}$.

⁵ For $12 = 2 \times 2 \times 3$, 2 being the cube root of 8, and 3 being the cube root of 27; and $18 = 3 \times 3 \times 2$.

as in the media of the before-mentioned cubes. Hence between similar solids, two media are sufficient; just as Plato says, that two media adapt solids to each other, but never one medium. What then, some one may say, is there not one medium alone of the two solid numbers 64 and 729, which medium is 216? For 64 is a cube produced from 4, but 729 from 9. And 729 is the triple and superparticular ogdoan part of 216; and after the same manner 216 of 64. For each contains the other thrice, and three eighths of it besides.¹ And this will not only be the case in these, but also in other numbers: for these are the smallest numbers which admit of this. In answer to this however it must be said, that the above-mentioned numbers are cubes and at the same time squares; the one, i. e. 64, being the square of 8, but the other, i. e. 729, being the square of 27. Hence they have one mean, not so far as they are cubes, but so far as they have the tetragonic peculiarity. For the tetragonic side of 64, i. e. 8, being multiplied by 27, which is the tetragonic side of 729, produces the analogous mean 216, according to the method delivered [by mathematicians] of finding the mean between two squares. He who makes the objection, therefore, using solids not as solids, binds them together by one medium. But if he had surveyed them so far as they are solid numbers and cubes, he would have found that there are also two media between these, the one being 144, from four times 4 multiplied by 9, but the other 324, from nine times 9 multiplied by 4.

But Democritus² doubts, how it is said that one analogous medium falls between two planes. For by assuming four lines in continued proportion, it may be shown that the squares from them are analogous;³ so that two analogous media will fall between two extreme planes. He adds, that different persons have been involved in different difficulties through this doubt, and have been led by it to the duplication of the cube, and such-like investigations. Plato, however, does not say that one medium only falls between any casual planes, nor again two media between casual solids, but between those that are similar, and in an effable ratio, and which have their sides arranged according to numbers. For

¹ Thus 729 contains three times 216, i. e. 648, and three eighths of it besides. For the eighth part of 216 is 27, and thrice 27 is 81, the difference between 729 and 648. And thus also 216 contains 64 thrice, i. e. 192, and 24 besides, which is three eighths of 64.

² This is most probably the junior Democritus mentioned by Porphyry in his life of Plotinus.

³ For let the lines be as the numbers 2. 4. 8. 16, which are in continued proportion; then the squares of them 4. 16. 64. 256 will also be analogous. For as 4 is to 16, so is 16 to 64, and so is 64 to 256.

the things generated by the demiurgic God, are effable with reference to each other, and are variegated by demiurgic numbers, as Plato says in another part of this dialogue. And it is requisite to assume similar planes, and solid numbers, and to survey in these the truth of the Platonic assertion. We shall show therefore at the end of these Commentaries, how it is possible, two right lines being given, to find two analogous media, selecting for this purpose the demonstration of Archytas, rather than that of Menæchmus, because he uses conical lines, and in like manner rather than that of Eratosthenes, because he employs the apposition of a rule.*

With respect however to the things investigated, it must now be said that Plato appears to have perfect confidence in arithmetical demonstrations, since it is also possible to find in geometrical figures of two solids an analogous medium. For if there are three analogous right lines, $\bar{\alpha}$, $\bar{\beta}$, $\bar{\gamma}$, in a duple ratio, the squares from them will be in a quadruple ratio, as $\bar{\xi}\bar{\delta}$, $\iota\sigma\tau$, and $\bar{\delta}$. But the solids from them will be in an octuple ratio, as $\zeta\iota\beta$, $\bar{\xi}\bar{\delta}$, and $\bar{\gamma}$. Hence there will be three cubes, the extremes of which will have one analogous mean. And it is manifest that all cubes are similar to each other. For the angles are the same in each cube and are equal; and they are also comprehended by similar planes; and the multitude of them is equal. Moreover, we may thus demonstrate in the same manner as Democritus, that two analogous media fall between two similar solids. For that all squares are similar to each other is evident; since the angles are the same in each, and are equal, and the sides are analogous. Hence it seems that Plato employing numbers, shows that solids are never co-adapted by one mean, but always by two media. For in these, as you see, the extremes are cubes, and at the same time similar planes. For $\zeta\iota\beta$, is from $\iota\sigma\tau$, and $\lambda\bar{\beta}$. But the other of the extremes $\bar{\gamma}$, is from $\bar{\beta}$, and $\bar{\delta}$, and there is the same ratio of the sides. There is therefore one medium of these, so far as they are similar planes, but not so far as they are solids. So that you will have the solution of what is said, by assuming numbers. For it is possible to find the same numbers which are at the same time similar solids and planes; but it is impossible to assume geometrical figures which are at one and the same time similar planes and solids; since this also may be said, that all of them being cubes, the form of them is one. But Plato

* From the most unfortunate loss of the latter part of these commentaries of Proclus, this method likewise of his finding two analogous media between two given lines, is lost.

assuming that the means are similar to the extremes, is thus confident in the theorem. For how would the extremes be in want of other bonds, if they had entirely the *same* form? And how would the media communicate with the extremes, and differ from them according to the sides, if they were all of them cubes? Hence it is evident that he assumes the media, as being truly media, and thus says, that solids are never conjoined by one, but always by two media; every medium containing the communion and difference of the things of which it is the medium. For to say universally, that all solids are connected through two media, makes the media to be infinite. It is manifest, therefore, that he assumes things which are most distant, and in every respect contrary to each other, and which have all the sides opposite to all; these in natural bodies being corporeal powers. But he does this, in order that of the media, one of them may have a greater communion with one of the extremes, but a less with the other; and that this may be vice versa with the other medium. Unless that also is true which is asserted by our preceptor. For he says that it is necessary to assume the same ratio in the media or means, as there is in the sides of the extremes. Thus, for instance, if one of the cubes is 8, but the other 27, we shall find the media of them, if we take their sides 2 and 3, and multiply the square of 2, i. e. 4 by 3, and the square of 3, i. e. 9 by 2. For then the media will be 12, and 18, which will conjoin the extremes through the sesquialter ratio, which is the ratio of the sides of the cubes. Hence, as there is the same ratio in the sides of the cubes, and in the media, Plato says that there is necessarily two media, and this in a manner more consonant to the proposed physiology. For in the powers of the elements, and in simple forms, the Demiurgus inserted communion prior to things of a composite nature. We however conjoin the extremes through the octuple ratio, the sides of them not having an octuple ratio. For the mean being assumed in a duple ratio, the extremes will have a quadruple ratio. Thus, for instance, in the three proposed terms, if we assume a fourth analogous term, we shall find that as the side 2 is octuple of the side 16, so the first cube is conjoined to the fourth through the octuple ratio. For if you add 16, as a fourth term to 2. 4. 8, the cube from 16, is conjoined to 8, through the octuple ratio which 64 has to 8, and 512 to 64, and 4096 which is the cube of 16; to 512.* So that the sides of the media receiving an octuple ratio, two media will fall between

* If each of the terms 2. 4. 8. 16, is cubed, the four terms 8. 64. 512. 4096, will be produced, and 64 is octuple of 8, 512 of 64, and 4096 of 512; and the first cube 8 is conjoined to the fourth 4096, through the octuple ratio.

the extremes. But if a fifth analogous term is added, the sides will no longer be conjoined in an octuple ratio but in the ratio of 10 to 1; and on this account there will be three analogous media between the two cubes. What Plato says, therefore, is true according to the before-mentioned method. Are not the sides also adapted to his purpose? And it is requisite to say, that there may be one medium between two cubes, yet not according to harmonic ratios. Hence, when there is truly a colligation of the extremes through these ratios, then it is perfectly requisite that there should be two media. Through these things, therefore, it is manifest mathematically, that similar planes require one medium, and similar solids two media, and that they can never be bound by one medium alone.

Being impelled, however, by these observations, let us see how physical conceptions accord with them, and let us adapt probable to scientific assertions. And in the first place, let us survey what a physical plane is, and how in planes of this kind, there is one medium, but two in physical solids. The divine Iamblichus indeed (for this man in a remarkable degree comprehended a theory of this kind, others being as it were asleep, and conversant only with the mathematical meaning of the words) appears to me to distinguish things simple from such as are composite, parts from wholes, and in short, material powers, and material forms, from the essences to which they give completion. And some of these, he calls superficies, but others solids. For as a superficies is the ultimate boundary of a mathematical body, so likewise material form, and material power, are the *morphe* and boundary of their subjects. These things, therefore, being thus divided, in things of a simple nature, one medium is sufficient, because there is [one] difference of the reasons and forms, and according to the common bonds of the reasons and the life. For in these there is one medium. Hence quality is uniformly connected with quality, and power with power, according to the difference and sameness of forms. But in things of a composite nature, there are very properly two media. For the duad is the supplier of all composition and separation. Every composite nature however consists of many essences and powers. Hence, there are many media. And these at least are two-fold. For there is one medium according to form, and another according to subject.

We however, conformably to physical principles, speak as follows, receiving auxiliaries from what Plato says as he proceeds. Or rather, let us speak from the beginning. There are some physiologists then, who ascribe one power to each of the elements; to fire indeed heat, to air frigidty, to water moisture, and to earth dryness; in so doing entirely wandering from the truth. In the first

place, because they subvert the world and order. For it is impossible for things to be co-adapted to each other, when they possess the most contrary powers, unless they have something in common. In the next place, they make the most contrary natures allied to each other, viz. the hot to the cold, and the moist to the dry.¹ It is necessary however, to make things which are hostile more remote than things which are less foreign. For such is the nature of contraries. In the third place, therefore, the first two powers will have no sympathy whatever with the rest; but will be divulsed² from each other. For it is impossible to say what is common to humidity and frigidity. And in addition to all these things, as the elements are solids, they will not be conjoined to each other by any medium. It has however been shown that it is not possible for solids to be conjoined through one medium. Nor can they be conjoined without a medium. For this is alone the province of things that are perfectly without interval.

But some others, as Ocellus, who was the precursor of Timæus, attribute two powers to each of the elements, to fire indeed heat and dryness, to air, heat and moisture, to water, moisture and coldness, and to earth, coldness and dryness. And these things are written by this man in his treatise *On Nature*. In what therefore, do these err who thus speak? In the first place, indeed, wishing to discover the common powers in the elements, in order that they may preserve the co-arrangement of them with each other, they no more assign communion than separation to them, but equally honour their hostility and their harmony. What kind of world therefore, will subsist from these, what order will there be of things which are without arrangement and most foreign, and of things which are most allied and co-arranged? For things which in an equal degree are hostile and peaceful, will in an equal mode dissolve and constitute communion. But this communion being similarly dissolved, and similarly implanted, the universe will no more exist than not exist. In the second place, they do not assign the greatest contrariety to the extremes, but to things most remote from the extremes; though we every where see, that of homogeneous natures those which are most distant have the nature of contraries, and not those which are less distant. How likewise did nature arrange them, since they are most remote in their situation from each other? Was it not by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third was more allied than the last to the first? How also did she arrange the motions

¹ For το εναντιωτατα here, read τα εναντιωτατα, and for τῶ θερμῶν τῶ ψυχρῶ, το θερμῶν, κ. λ.

² For ἀπρητημενα in this place, I read διρημενα.

of them, since fire is most light and tends upward, but earth is most heavy and tends downward? But whence were the motions of them which are most contrary derived, if not from nature? If therefore, nature distributed to them most contrary motions, it is evident that they are themselves most contrary. For as the motions of simple beings are simple, and those things are simple of which the motions are simple, thus also those things are most contrary of which the motions are most contrary. And this may occasion some one to wonder at Aristotle, who in what he says about motion, places earth as most contrary to fire; but in what he says about powers, he makes the most remote of similar natures to be more friendly than those that are proximate, when they are moved with most contrary motions. For as the elements have contrary places in their positions, as they have contrary motions in motions, as they have contrary powers, gravity and levity, through which motions subsist in their forms, thus also they have contrary passive qualities. Aristotle himself likewise manifests that earth is contrary to fire. For wishing to show that it is necessary there should be more bodies than one, he says: "Moreover, if earth exists, it is also necessary that fire should exist. For in things, one of the contraries of which naturally is, the other likewise has a natural subsistence." So that neither was he able after any other manner to show that there are more elements than one, than by asserting that fire is contrary to earth.

Farther still, as the elements are solids, how can they be bound together through one medium? For this is impossible in solids, as we have before observed. Hence those who assert these things, neither speak mathematically nor physically, but unavoidably err in both these respects. For physical are derived from mathematical entities. *Timæus therefore alone, or any other who rightly follows him, neither attributes one nor two powers alone, to the elements, but triple powers; to fire indeed, tenuity of parts, acuteness and facility of motion; to air, tenuity of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; to water, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; and to earth, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion.* But this is in order that each of the elements may have two powers, each of which is common to the element placed next to it, and one power which is different, in the same manner as it was demonstrated in mathematical numbers and figures; this different power being assumed from one of the extremes; and also in order that earth according to all the powers, may subsist oppositely to fire; and that

* For *μια* here, it is obviously necessary to read *εκατομια*.

the extremes may have two media, and the continued quantities two; the latter having solids for the media, but the former, common powers. For let fire indeed be attenuated in its parts, acute, and easily moved. For it has an attenuated essence, and is acute, as having a figure of this kind [i. e. a pyramidal figure], and on this account is incisive and fugitive,¹ and permeates through all the other elements. It is also moved with facility,² as being most near to the celestial bodies, and existing in them. For the celestial fire itself is moved with celerity, as is likewise sublunary fire, which is perpetually moved in conjunction with it, and according to one circle, and one impulse. Since therefore, earth is contrary to fire, it has contrary powers, viz. grossness, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion, all which we see are present with it. But these being thus hostile, and being solids, are also similar solids. For their sides and their powers are analogous. For as the gross is to the attenuated, so is the obtuse to the acute, and that which is moved with difficulty, to that which is moved with facility. But those are similar solids of which the sides that constitute the bodies are analogous. *For the sides are the powers of which bodies consist.* Hence, as fire and earth are similar bodies, and similar solids, two analogous media fall between them; and each of the media will have two sides of the extreme situated next to it, and the remaining side from the other extreme. Hence, since fire has for its three physical sides the triple powers, tenuity, acuteness, and facility of motion, by taking away the middle power, acuteness, and introducing instead of it obtuseness, we shall produce air, which has two sides of fire, but one of earth, or two powers of fire, but one of earth; as it is fit that what is near should rather communicate with it, than what is separated in the third rank from it.

Again, since earth has three physical powers, contrary to the powers of fire, viz. grossness of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion; by taking away difficulty of motion, and introducing facility of motion, we shall produce water, which consists of gross parts, is obtuse, and is easily moved; and which has indeed, two sides or powers common with earth, but receives one from fire. And thus these media will be spontaneously conjoined with each other; communicating indeed in twofold powers, but differing in similitude by one power; and the extremes will be bound together by two media. Each element also will thus be in a greater degree conjoined to, than separated from the element which is

¹ For *πυρρὸν* in this place, read *πυρρῶδες*.

² Instead of *αἰσχροῦ* here, it is necessary to read *εὐαίσχρον*.

near to it; and one world will be perfectly effected through all of them, and one harmonious order, through the predominance of analogy. Thus also, of the two cubes 8 and 27, the medium 12 being placed next to 8, will have two sides of this, but one side of 27. For 12 is produced by $2 \times 2 \times 3$. But it is vice versa with 18. For this is produced by $3 \times 3 \times 2$. And the side of 27 is 3, in the same manner as 2 is the side of 8. The physical dogmas therefore of Plato about the elements of the universe, accord with mathematical speculations.

Hence these things being thus determined, let us physically adapt them to the words of Plato. We call a [physical] plane or superficies therefore, that which has two powers only, but a [physical] solid that which has three powers. And we say, that if we fashion bodies from two powers, one medium would conjoin the elements to each other. But since, as we assert, bodies possess triple powers, they are bound together by two media. For there are two common powers of the adjacent media, and one power which is different. And the extremes themselves, if they consisted of two powers, would be conjoined through one medium. For let fire, if you will, be alone attenuated and easily moved; but earth on the contrary, have alone grossness of parts and immobility. One medium therefore, will be sufficient for these. For grossness of parts and facility of motion, and tenuity of parts, and difficulty of motion, are all that is requisite to the colligation of both. Since however, each of the elements is triple, the extremes require two media, and the things themselves that are adjacent, are bound together through two powers. For solids, and these are things that have triple contrary powers, are never co-adapted by one medium.

“Thus therefore, the divinity placing water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and rendering them as much as possible analogous to each other, so that what fire is to air, that air might be to water, and what air is to water, that water might be to earth, be bound together and constituted the heaven, visible and tangible.”

Some of the Platonists, being impelled by the assertions of Aristotle, extend through the whole world one passive matter, not at all different from that of the *heavens*, and in consequence of embracing certain barbaric opinions, give to the world a fifth body, and refer the doctrine concerning it to Plato. For Aristotle, following these opinions, introduced a fifth element. And this in a certain respect he obscurely signifies, adducing the observations of the Barbarians as a

testimony of the perpetuity and sameness of the motion of aether. But others assert, that the heavens are of a different essence, as having a different form of life, a more simple motion, and a more perpetual nature; but that Plato is now speaking about the sublunary elements, and adorns these by analogies. These men indeed, speak rightly, both with respect to things, and the opinion of Plato, in asserting that the nature of the heavens is different from mutable, and in short, material things; but at the same time ¹ they neglect the Platonic words, in which the philosopher says, that "*the Demiurgus bound together and constituted the heaven [or the universe] through the analogy of the four elements;*" and again, in another place, "*that he elaborated the idea of the stars, for the most part from fire.*"

Let us therefore, if you are willing, preserving the opinions of both these men, perspicuously show, that the whole world consists of the four elements, and that the heavens are of a different essence [from the sublunary region]. And in the first place let us discuss the latter. For it is necessary, either that the heavens, should be entirely different from the four elements, being, as some say, a fifth element; or that the heavens should consist of the four elements; or from some one of the four; or from more than one. And if ² the heavens consist of the four, they either consist of elements specifically the same with the sublunary, or of others. If however, that element is different from the four, how does Plato say that the whole world consists of the four elements? But if it is constituted from one of the four, how does he say shortly after, that the stars consist for the most part of fire? And if the world is constituted from more elements than one, [but not from all the four] how will it happen that a divine body will not be imperfect, and how will it possess all things, though the earth, and in short the sublunary region, have all things? But, if the world consists of all the elements, how does it happen, that in the heavens the composition of them is indissoluble, but in these [sublunary] realms is dissoluble. For they will not be indissoluble on account of equal dominion. For whence, if there is equal dominion, is the variety in the heavens produced? And how does Plato say that fire for the most part predominates there, if there is an equal domination? But if the heavens consist of four elements specifically different from the four sublunary elements, how, since they are composites, are the heavens moved with a simple motion? Where also are the wholenesses of the things which are there mingled?

¹ For ημων in this place, it is necessary to read ομων.

² Et is omitted here in the original.

Such therefore being the doubts, it is better to say *that all heaven consists of fire, which there predominates ; but that it also comprehends according to cause, the powers of the other elements, such as the solidity and stability of earth, the conglutinating and uniting power of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air.* For as earth comprehends all things terrestrially, so the heavens comprehend all things according to a fiery characteristic. So that one thing [i. e. fire] has dominion, and the other elements are comprehended in it causally. It is necessary however to think, that the fire which is there, is not the same with sublunary fire, but that it is divine fire, consubsistent with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire. And that the fire which is here is wholly material, generated, and corruptible. Genuine fire therefore, is in the heavens, and total fire [for the wholeness of fire] is there. But earth is there according to cause, being another species of earth, and as it is fit it should, commaseent with divine fire, possessing solidity alone, in the same manner as fire possesses an illuminative power. And as this celestial fire is not caustic, neither is the earth which is there gross, but the summit of each is there. And as genuine and truly existing fire are in the heavens, so real earth is here, and the wholeness of earth ; but fire is here according to participation, and materially, in the same manner as earth is primarily. For that which remains is in each appropriately ; there the summit of earth [for earth according to cause ;] but here the dregs of fire. But this is evident from the moon which possesses something solid and dark, and obstructing the light. For to obstruct is alone the province of earth. The stars also obstruct the sight, as producing a shadow above themselves. And it is evident this being the case, that since fire is in the heavens, and also earth, the diaphanous media between these, are likewise necessarily there primarily ; air indeed, such as the most pure and agile air which is here ; but water, such as the most exhaleable with us, and even still purer than these ; in order that all things may be in all, but appropriately in each. For on this account we characterize fire by visibility, which is deservedly the peculiarity of all fire. For as earth is primarily tangible, so fire is primarily visible ; because it is not in want of any one of the other elements, in order that it may be visible, as the others are in want of the illuminative power of fire to their visibility. But fire becomes itself visible through itself. And this is common to all fire. The question therefore is solved.

That all the progression of the elements however, may become manifest to us, and the gradations of them, it is requisite that we should begin the theory of them from on high. These four elements therefore, fire and air, water and earth,

subsist primarily, and uniformly according to cause, in the Demiurgus of wholes. For all causes are antecedently contained in him, according to one comprehension. Hence he comprehends the intellectual, divine, undefiled, and vigorous power of fire; the connective and vivific cause of air; the prolific and regenerating hyperxis of water; and the firm, stable, immutable, and unvacillating idea of earth. The theologist therefore, knowing these things, says of the Demiurgus,

His body 's boundless, firm, and fiery-bright;

And,

The wide-extended all-pervading air,
Forms his broad shoulders, back, and bosom fair,
His middle zone 's the spreading sea profound,
His feet, the roots deep-fix'd within the solid ground.

But from these demiurgic causes, a progression takes place of these four elements into the universe, though not immediately into the sublunary world. For how can the most immaterial natures give subsistence without a medium, to the most material; and immoveable natures, to those that are in every respect moved? For the progression of things is nowhere without a medium, but exists according to a well-ordered gradation. The generations also into these material, dissipated, and dark realms, are effected through things of a proximate nature. For these are capable of being fashioned by the junior Gods, and especially so far as they have a tangible composition. But the Demiurgus is the father of greater and more beautiful effects.

Since therefore, the elements in the Demiurgus himself are intellects, and imparticipable intellectual powers, what will be the first progression of them? Is it not evident, that they will still continue to be intellectual powers, but participated by mundane natures? For the progression from imparticipable intellect is proximately to that intellect which is participated. And in short, the progression from imparticipable causes, is to those that are participated, and from supermundane to mundane forms. These powers however, still remaining intellectual, but participable, what kind of diminution will they have? Is it not this, that they will no longer be

* For *γενεσις* in this place, it is necessary to read *ποιησις*.

intellectual? But I call intellectual natures, the forms of intellect, and of an essence truly intellectual. Being however, participable, but no longer intellectual, it is evident that they will not be immoveable. And not being immoveable, they will be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immoveable natures; and the progression is from things essentially intellectual, to those that are so by participation, and from immoveable beings, to those that move themselves. These elements therefore, will subsist in life, and will be intellectual according to participation, and self-motive. But it is evident what that is which will proceed from this. For the descent from life is to animal; for this is proximate to life. And from that which is self-motive according to essence, to that which is self-motive according to the participation of life. And so far indeed, as the elements proceed from life to animal, they are changed; but so far as they proceed from that which is immaterial to immaterial natures (I mean immaterial as with reference to mutable matter,) and from a divine life, to a divine essence, they are assimilated to truly immaterial essences. Here therefore, taking away the immaterial, and the immutable, you will make the material and the mutable. And through this they will be inferior to the natures prior to them; but through the order and symmetry of their motions, and the immutability in things mutable, they will be assimilated to them. If therefore, you also take away this order, and survey the great confusion and instability of the elements, you will have the last of all things, and those which are allotted an ultimate separation, being the dregs of all the elements prior to these. Hence, of the elements, some are immoveable, intellectual, demiurgic; others are intellectual indeed essentially, and immoveable, but are participated by mundane natures; others are self-motive, and have their existence in lives; others are self-motive, but live [i. e. are animals], and are not lives only; others are alter-motive, but are moved in an orderly manner; and others, are disorderly, tumultuous and confused.

The difference of the elements therefore, being so great, what occasion is there to disturb what is here said by Pl: to, as if the elements existed only in one way? For it is necessary to survey the elements in as many ways as there are media between the Demiurgus and sublunary natures; because their progression is through media. The elements therefore, are in the heavens, but not¹ after the

¹ *Ου* is omitted here in the original.

same manner as in genesurgic bodies ; for neither do they subsist in the heavens, after the same manner as in the Demiurgus. But prior to the sublunary elements, there are, the celestial fire (and this light manifests which is a species of fire) and celestial earth. Or why does the moon being illuminated produce a shadow, and why does not the solar light pervade through the whole of it ? It is also necessary that the middle elements should be in the heavenly bodies, but that different elements should abound in different parts of the celestial regions. *And in some places indeed, it is necessary that the fiery nature should widely scatter its splendour, on account of solidity, as in the starry bodies ; but in others, that it should be concealed from us, as in the spheres that carry the stars. Hence, the peculiarity of all fire is visibility, but neither heat, nor floating. And solidity and tangibility, are the characteristics of all earth, but not gravity, sinking, and a downward tendency. If therefore, we assume these peculiarities, we shall find that fire and earth subsist also analogously in the heavens ; fire indeed, defining the essence of them, but each of the other elements being consubsistent with it.*

For again, this also may be said, that causes and the efficients of certain things, every where antecedently comprehend the powers of the natures which are adorned and produced by them ; and especially when they produce according to nature. For thus nature possesses the form of the teeth, the eyes and the hands, through which also she gives *morphe* to matter. And not every eye possesses interval, but there is something in which it has an impartible form. Again, soul is one, and contains in itself that which is divine, and that which is irrational. And in the divine part of itself, it comprehends rationally the irrational powers, by which it governs, and arranges in a becoming manner irrationality. And neither is the unity of the soul, nor its multitude destroyed through different essences. For these things subsist in one way in the superior, and in another in the inferior part. In a similar manner, the world also is one and many ; for the heavens are one thing, and generation another. And generation is adorned from the heavens ; and these elements are in the heavens, but celestially. For they are in soul, psychically, in intellect, intellectually, and in the Demiurgus, demiurgically. For how could the sublunary elements be governed by the effluxions from these natures, unless they also subsisted in them after another manner ? Thus also in the arts, we may see that the physician does not preside over the carpenter ; for the physician does not antecedently comprehend in himself the works of the carpenter. Nor does the mechanic preside over the cook ; for the former does not antecedently comprehend things pertaining to banquets. But it

is the province of that which antecedently comprehends the whole power of a thing, to govern it. Hence it is evident that the mechanist entirely presides over the carpenter, and the physician over the cook. If therefore, the heavens govern all generation, the elements will be contained in them primarily.

The Pythagoreans however say, that the elements may be surveyed in the heavens in a twofold respect, in one way indeed prior to the sun, and in another after it: for the moon is ethereal earth. This therefore, the theologist clearly asserts. For he says:

Another boundless earth besides he made,
Which Gods *selene*, mortals *menē* call,
With num'rous houses, cities, mounts adorn'd.

But they say that the planet Mercury is ethereal water, Venus air, and the sun fire. And again, that Mars is celestial fire, Jupiter celestial air, Saturn celestial water, and the inerratic sphere celestial earth. And thus speaking in a divided manner they make the extremes to be every where fire and earth, but conjoin the ethereal natures through media, viz. through Venus and Mercury: for both these have a collective and unifying power. But they conjoin the celestial natures, through Saturn and Jupiter: for through these that which is connective of wholes, and the commensurate, accede to all things. What we now say, however, is conformable to the history delivered by many [of the Pythagoric doctrines]. For that this mode of distribution is not Platonic, we may learn from this that Plato arranges the sun immediately above the moon, afterwards Venus, and then Mercury.

It is necessary therefore to understand, that all the elements are in each of the celestial spheres, since in the sublunary elements also, each participates of the rest. For fire participates of earth; since being moved with facility, it would most rapidly perish, if it was entirely without stability. And earth participates of fire; for being moved with difficulty, it requires heat to resuscitate and restore it. As this therefore is the case in these sublunary elements, much more must all the elements be in each of the celestial spheres, though some of the heavenly bodies participate more¹ of fire, others of air, others of water, and others of earth.

Again therefore, from the beginning we must say, that the elements being con-

¹ Μᾶλλον is omitted in this place in the original.

ceived in one way as unmingled, but in another as mingled, the first mixture of them produces the heavens, which contain all things according to a fiery characteristic. [But the second mixture of them produces the sublunary region],¹ in which all things subsist according to a middle characteristic. And the last mixture of them produces the subterranean realms, in which the dregs of all things are contained, Pyriphlegethon, as they say, and Acheron, Ocean and Coeetus. Hence it may be said, that the four unmingled elements are every where, and that there are five, all heaven being assumed as one element; but that the last elements are comprehended in the earth. The five elements however, are said to be the elements of the *world*; and on this account the world derives its completion from them. But it must be said that the four elements are the elements both of the *heavens* and of *generation*. Hence the heavens are of a fifth essence, besides the four elements; but are mingled from the simple elements. For these sublunary four are not in the heavens, but the summits of them are there, and all the four elements unmingled, and separated from each other by their proper forms. And these assertions are most concordant with Plato, who at one time says that the heavens consist of the four elements, bound together by analogy, and that the whole world is constituted from these; but shortly after fashions the five figures, and calls them five worlds. For these things give a fifth essence to the heavens, introduce a tetractys of the elements, and accord with truth. For all things are in the heaven according to a fiery mode; and on this account it is a simple body, different from that which is sublunary, and truly comprehends all things pertaining to these material masses. We must not therefore admit that all earth is heavy, nor that all fire is light; but sublunary earth and fire are perhaps things of this kind, while those in the heavens subsist after another manner. For the solidity and stability which are there are derived from earth. And hence each of the spheres is not moved according to the whole of itself [but revolves round an immoveable centre]. But the celestial light, and facility of motion, are derived from fire. The connective and transparent nature of the heavens are from air; and their equability and smoothness, from water.

That Plato however, affords us these auxiliaries, he clearly shows shortly after, when he says, "*that he who constituted the world composed it from all fire water, air and earth, leaving no part nor power of any one of them externally.*" For he does not say from

¹ It appears that the words της δε δευτερας του υποσκληρην τοπον, are wanting in this place, in the original.

fire or water simply, but from *all* fire and *all* water, through which he indicates that there is much fire in the universe, and of a different nature, and also much water, and which is essentially different. Moreover, *the theology of the Assyrians which was unfolded into light from divinity, delivers the same things.* For in that theology, the Demiurgus is said to have made the whole world from fire, water, earth, and all-nourishing ether or air; and the artificer is said to have fashioned the world as it were with his own hands. For it says, "there was a certain other mass of fire." But he fashioned, as it were manually, all things, in order that he might conglomerate the mundane body, "that the world might become manifest, and might not appear membranous;" which is the same thing as to say, that it might not alone bear the obscure and imbecile vestiges of forms. For the word *membranous* signifies the indistinct subsistence of reasons [or forms]. As we have said therefore, the *Oracles* also bear witness to what is asserted by Plato, since they too generate the world from the four elements. And thus much concerning the concord of philosophers about this particular: for we shall see in what follows, if there is any difference respecting it in the doctrine of Plato.

It is manifest however, that the elements are every where bound to each other by analogy.¹ For analogy, as we have said, imitates divine union, and is a demiurgic bond. And the analogy indeed in mathematics, possesses the accurate and the scientific: for the ratios there are immaterial. But in physics this is no longer similarly the case. For the analogy which is in the heavenly bodies participates of a certain accuracy; but in sublunary natures the analogy is less accurate, because it is conversant with matter. Again therefore, the order of the elements becomes apparent, and we see that Plato very properly procures from the mathematics belief in physical reasons. For they are causes, and the demiurgic progression is effected through soul. The generation also of physical essences appropriately proceeds through media; and celestial natures are in a certain respect more allied to accurate reasons, but sublunary natures have an obscure truth. Plato therefore knowing these things, adds, "*as much as possible,*" in order that you may not entirely require in physical reasons a mathematical accuracy. *For if you are willing to examine each of the elements, you will perceive an abundant mixture in it. Thus, for instance, air is not simply a thing of attenuated parts. For it has also something gross, nebulous, and aqueous. Nor is water simply easily moved. And the part of fire itself which is mingled with air, resembles the*

¹ Instead of *οτι δε αναλογια δεδωκεται* in this place, it is necessary to read, *οτι δε αναλογια δεδωκεται*.

obtuseness of air ; and this necessarily. For it is requisite to conjoin the summits of secondary with the dregs of primary natures.

Farther still, we ought also to understand the manner in which Plato constitutes the analogy. For he begins from the media, and preserves the order of the terms, just as the Demiurgus made all things to be in each other,¹ together with preserving the distinction of them ; and he denominates all this contexture a bond and composition. For it is a *bond* indeed, as imparting union and analogy from the demiurgic cause ; but it is a *composition*, as being thence produced according to essence itself. For some one may bind things which he did not compose. This however, is not the case with the Demiurgus, but he is the father, he is the unifying cause, and he is the guardian of all his own works. In addition to these things also, it must be observed that Plato assumes here, as we have said, the geometric mean, and indicates that this is analogy. For it is the peculiarity of this middle to have the same ratio. Hence some persons properly call it analogy. The other media therefore, appear to be the suppliers of more partial goods to the world, and not to be the sources of the order which proceeds through all things, and of uninterrupted connexion. For in the generation of the soul the other² media are assumed for the sake of binding together the geometric ratios, and are comprehended in the whole geometric middle, as in that which is alone analogy.

“ Hence from these and things of this kind, which are four in number, the body of the world was generated, being concordant through analogy, and possessing friendship through these, so as to conspire into union with itself, and to be indissoluble by any other nature than by him through whom it was bound.” 320

That the tetrad itself of the elements, primarily proceeded from all-perfect animal, (for it was the intelligible tetrad) and that on this account all things exist tetradically, becomes I think evident through the words before us ; and also that generation proceeds to the tetrad from the monad through the duad. For the world is only-begotten and one. Afterwards we find it is necessary that there should be the visible and tangible in it ; in the next place, we find that these being much separated from each other, are in want of a certain third thing ; and in the

¹ For *εν αλλοις* here, it is necessary to read *εν αλληλοις*.

² There is an omission in this place of *αι αλλατ*.

third place, that the medium is biformed, and thus we arrive at the tetrad. This therefore, is what the Pythagoric hymn says about number: *That it proceeds from the secret recesses of the monad, until it arrives at the divine tetrad. And this generates the decad, which is the mother of all things.* Thus also the father of the Golden Verses, celebrates the tetractys itself, as the fountain of perennial nature. For the world being adorned by the tetrad, which proceeds from the monad and triad, is terminated by the decad, as being comprehensive of all things. That the world likewise is one through analogy, subsisting from these elements, and from such like things according to powers, and from so many according to quantity, Plato clearly manifests by saying, that not the sublunary region, but the body of the universe, was generated from the four elements. But the friendship of the world is the end of the analogy, through which also the world is saved by itself. For every thing which is friendly, wishes to be preservative of that to which it is friendly: but every thing foreign turns from, and does not even wish that to exist to which it is abhorrent; so that the nature which is friendly to, is preservative of itself. The world however, is friendly to itself through analogy and sympathy, and therefore it preserves itself. But it is also preserved by the fabrication of things, receiving from it an ineffable guard. Hence also, the theologist denominates the bond derived from the Demiurgus strong, as Night is represented saying to the Demiurgus,

But when your power around the whole has spread
A strong coercive bond.

Analogy however, imparts this friendship to the world, by connecting and comprehending the powers of the elements that are in it. Total nature likewise imparts it, producing the sympathy and harmony of contraries. But prior to nature, soul imparts it, weaving the one life of the world, and co-adapting all the parts of it to the whole. And still much prior to these, it is imparted by intellect, which produces in all things, order, perfection, and one connexion. And even prior to an intellectual essence, the one divinity of the universe, and all the Gods that are allotted the world, are the primordial causes of the union that is in it. But much prior to this, the one Demiurgus imparts this friendship to the world. This greatest however, and most perfect of bonds, which the father on all sides throws round the world, as being effective of the friendship and harmonious communion in it, is denominated by the [Chaldean] Oracles, *the bond of love heavily-laden with fire.* For they say, "The paternal self-begotten intellect understanding his works,

disseminated in all things, the bond of love heavy with fire." And they add the cause why he did this, "That all things might remain' loving for an infinite time, woven together intellectually in all the light of the father." For on account of this love, all things are adapted to each other, "That the elements of the world might remain running in love." Hence, the mundane elements are bound together, possess friendship, and this indissoluble for an infinite time, through the will of the father. If also together with these,¹ you are willing to survey the supermundane cause of friendship, you will find this likewise celebrated by theologists. For the Demiurgus produced Venus, in order that she might beautifully illuminate all mundane natures, with order, harmony, and communion. And he also produced Love as her attendant, who is the unifying cause of wholes. The Demiurgus however, likewise possesses in himself the cause of Love. For he is "Metis the first generator, and much-pleasing Love." Hence he is very properly the cause of friendship and concord to his fabrications. *And perhaps looking to this Pherecydes said, that Jupiter when he was about to fabricate, was changed into Love.* Because however, he constituted the world from contraries, he led it to concord and friendship, and disseminated in all things sameness and union which pervade through wholes.

Through these things therefore, the world is indissoluble, and it is likewise so from its maker. For how can that which generates all things by its very existence, be the cause of corruption to all things? Besides, every thing which is corrupted is corrupted either from matter, or from form, or from its maker; and from each of these in a two-fold respect. For it is corrupted from the maker, either being imbecile, as a partial nature; or changing its intention, as a partial soul. It is also corrupted from form, either not being well constituted at first, or being dissolved in the course of time. And it is corrupted from matter, either being inwardly deprived of symmetry, or sustaining violence externally. As corruption therefore, is produced in a sixfold manner, Plato subverts all the modes of it. For the world is not in either way corrupted from its maker. Not from his want of power, because the Demiurgus is the best of causes, and imbecility has no place with him, since he governs the universe by inflexible powers.

¹ For Μη δε here, read Μηνη δε.

² In the original προ τουτων, but as Venus is posterior to the Demiurgus, who has previously been said to be the cause of friendship to the world, it appears to me that we should read προς τουτων, or rather προς τουτοις, as προς seldom signifies *with*, when it governs the genitive.

Nor from his will, because he does not at different times will different things; and because, to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and well constituted, is the province of an evil nature. But he is good, and the universe is beautifully harmonized. It is a similar thing therefore, for the Demiurgus to be willing that the universe should not exist, and for him not to be good. Nor is the world corrupted from form; for it is harmonized according to analogy, and is perfect and one. And through harmony indeed, form vanquishes; but through wholeness and onliness, the world will never be deprived of congruity. Nor is it corrupted from matter. For its inherent analogy subverts the privation of symmetry. But its onliness removes it from the reach of external violence. By no means therefore, is it possible for the universe to be corrupted. Why then does Plato add, that it cannot be corrupted, except by him by whom it was bound? It is evident indeed, that it every where belongs to him who binds, to dissolve. And you may assume from this, that the world is generated in such a way,¹ as alone subsisting from another cause. For as it is not dissoluble by any thing else than its generator; so it is not generated by any other than by him who bound it, which is, as we have said, through his possessing the cause of the dissolution of that which is bound. What is here said also has another indication. For the universe is indissoluble by every thing, except by him who bound it. For it is not indissoluble by him; since this is a small thing to assert. But on the contrary, it is eternally bound by him. As if therefore it should be said, that he who possesses scientific knowledge, is incapable of being deceived by all things except by intellect; for he is not incapable of being deceived by intellect; since it is not sufficient to intellect that the soul is not deceived, but that it possesses wisdom; thus also the world is not indissoluble by him who bound it, but is rather bound by him. For by other things it is indissoluble; but to him it rather belongs to bind, and not to dissolve. Just as it belongs to the sun to illuminate, and not to darken. For this is the province of certain other things.

“ But the composition of the world received one whole of each of the four elements. For it was constituted by him who composed it, from *all* fire, water, air and earth; and he did not leave externally any part or power of any one of the elements.”

¹ Instead of *αυτος* here, it is requisite to read *αυτων*.

Plato knew, as we have before observed, that there are many differences of fire, of water, and of each of the other elements; from *all* which, he says, the world derives its completion; and he confers this as the third demiurgic gift on the world. So that we must not wonder if he leaves the summits of the four elements in the heavens, but the middle progressions of them in the sublunary regions, and the last dregs of them in the subterranean realms, distributing the elements analogous to the three demiurgi Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. For each whole of them is assumed, and the universe consists of all of each; whether you speak of that which is primarily fire, and is celestial, or of that which has a middle rank, or of that which is the last, which is disorderly and confused, and is coloured over with certain fiery qualities. For such as we suppose the confused and inordinate to be, such especially appears to be each of the subterranean elements; because fabrication in proceeding, ends gradually in that which is unadorned, and which participates in the smallest degree of order. These things, therefore, are manifest.

We say, however, that part and power differ; so far as a part of each of the elements, is of a similar essence with the whole of which it is a part, but power gives completion to each of the elements. For a part of fire is fire; but power is one of the many peculiarities in fire, such as motion, acuteness, and tenuity. It is evident, therefore, that all fire, and all the powers of fire, and of the other elements, are comprehended in the world. What then, some one may say who is impelled by the divine wisdom which is beyond the confines of common philosophy; who divides all things, into the empyrean, the ethereal, and the material; and who calls the visible alone the material world, what shall we assert of the firmaments that are above the world, whether it be requisite to call them Olympus, or empyrean, or ethers? May we not say, that though those firmaments should not consist of the four elements, again it is true, that no part of the four, is external to the universe, or rather, as Plato says, is *externally*. For the term *externally*, is more emphatical, because it manifests, that the violence which these elements bring with them, is not within the universe, but *externally* invades it. For those firmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

¹ Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

² According to the Chaldeans there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this, three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region.

is true, that there is no fire out of the universe, but the universe comprehends the whole of it, such as the universe is, and such as is the amplitude of its bulk. So that the assertion of Timæus is perfectly true. But why then, some one may say, does he give subsistence to the universe, beginning from the inerratic sphere? Is it not because it belongs to a natural philosopher to discourse about visible, and in short, sensible natures? Perhaps, too, he very properly alone makes mention of these, as pertaining to the fabrication of Jupiter. For of those [i. e. the empyrean, ethereal, and material worlds] the ethereal is most vivific, but the empyrean is paternal, and the material is demiurgic. *For the fire which is the first beyond, did not enclose its' power in works, but in intellect: for the artificer of the fiery [i. e. the empyrean] world is an intellect of intellect, says the Oracle.* Unless it be requisite to say this, that Plato produces soul analogous to the ethereal worlds, but intellect, to the empyrean world. Hence also he says, that soul was mingled from three parts, but that intellect is impartible. For the ethereal is triple, and the *Psycho-crator*, or mingler of soul, who ascends into the ethereal worlds, is a Teletarch.¹ We learn, also, that the empyrean world is one, and is essentially intellectual. These things therefore must hereafter be considered: for it is very dubious how they accord with the dogmas of Plato. Now, however, let us pass on to the words that follow.

“ For by a dianoetic or reasoning process he concluded, that it would thus be a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts. And besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced. And further still, that it would neither be obnoxious to old age, nor disease. For he intellectually perceived, that the heat and cold which meet in body, and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally, and fall on them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish through decay.”

¹ For εκ δυναμιν here, read εν δυναμιν.

² Instead of σου γαρ με, it is necessary to read σου γαρ σου.

³ The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called *intelligible and at the same time intellectual.* See the 4th Book of my translation of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato.*

Plato assigns three causes, that I may speak summarily, through which no element is left externally to the universe, viz. perfection, unity, and perpetuity. But all these reciprocate in the subject of them. For if the universe is perfect, there is nothing external to it. For another world might be generated from that which is external; since why should one thing be generated from these elements [which are within the world], but nothing from those [which are external to it]? And if there is nothing external to the world, the world is one. Again, if the world is perpetual, there is no body external to the universe, homogeneous to the elements which are in it. For if any thing should invade it, it would injure, and dissolve the universe. For being external, it would be foreign to the world, and being foreign it would molest the universe. And if nothing is external to the world, the world is perpetual. For it will not have that which is corruptive of it. If also the admonition respecting the onliness, perpetuity, and perfection of the universe, is true, it was before assumed from the paradigm. For that was all-perfect, uniform [or having the form of one], and eternal; the second of these, on account of the one being, from which the only-begotten is derived; but the third, through eternity, from which perpetuity is derived; and the first, through comprehending all the forms of intelligible animals. For this is the peculiarity of all-perfect animal. But the all-perfect, indeed, is the cause of perfect natures; the uniform, of monadic; and the eternal, of perpetual natures; since every producing cause, produces that which is second similar to itself, and especially when it produces according to essence, and has an essence in energy. At the same time, also, each of these is demonstrated from these as material causes. For if there is nothing external to the universe, and if it comprehends all appropriate parts, it is one, perfect, and perpetual. Some one however may doubt, how Plato arguing from perpetuity, says that nothing is left external to the universe. For there are other perpetual natures, such as the celestial bodies, and yet something is external to them. But may you not say of these, that other things are external to them, and yet not external? For as naturally separated from other things, there is something external to them; but as being co-passive with them, and comprehended together with them as most principal parts of the universe by one nature, there is not any thing external to them. But if any thing was external to the universe, it would be external alone, having no sympathy with the world. It would also be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world, and would be cut off from it, by the intervening vacuum.

If, likewise, some one should doubt concerning the psychical vehicles, how they

are not passively affected by these elements, since they do not vanquish them in the same manner as divine bodies, it must be said that they would suffer from them, if they consisted of things similar to the elements. But now being composed of other things, they remain according to hypostasis¹ indissoluble. At the same time, however, they are not entirely impassive; but material bodies being agglutinated to them, they are hindered from their natural motion, and are moved in an inordinate manner; neither being able to be moved circularly, on account of the connexion with them of the material bodies, nor to proceed in a right line, on account of their own nature. Hence also Plato calls the periods of our souls, disorderly and confused; not only on account of the psychical motions, but likewise on account of the motions of our vehicles, in consequence of such a conglutination taking place from these sublunary bodies. If therefore the universe is perpetual, and always subsists according to nature, it will be requisite that there should be nothing external to it. For this being perfectly foreign from it, and falling on it externally, would become the cause of its corruption. You may also say conversely, that the words, "*in order that the universe may be perpetual,*" are the conclusion; but that the middle term and the cause of the conclusion is this, *that there is nothing external to the universe.* For because there is nothing external to the universe, nothing can introduce corruption to it, as something foreign; so that it is perpetual. To the universe therefore this is the cause of perpetuity; but to the parts in it, not this, but other things are the cause of incorruptibility; such for instance as, the being constituted by the one Demiurgus. For he is simply the cause of immortality to all things; so that the universe is in a greater degree incorruptible. For it is incorruptible on account of the Demiurgus, and because there is nothing external to it. Thus, likewise, it is possible to convert the other parts of the text, as, that because there is nothing external to the universe, the universe is *only-begotten*; that the *only-begotten* may be three-fold, viz. on account of the paradigm, on account of all matter being comprehended in it, and on account of the Demiurgus being one. And, also, that the universe is *all-perfect*, because it is comprehensive of all things. Each of these assertions therefore is evident. But with respect to the things which are the converse of these, such as that, if the universe is *only-begotten* it has nothing external to it, this is immediately true of the universe alone; and the demonstrations will be as follow: The universe is *only-begotten*; but if it is *only-begotten*, it will have nothing external

¹ For *υποβολαι* here, it seems necessary to read *υποστασις*.

to itself, from which another thing of the like kind may be generated. The universe is indissoluble; but if indissoluble nothing foreign to the natures of which it consists, will be external to it. The universe¹ is all-perfect. For the all-perfect is that which is not defective in any thing. Hence Aristotle also says, that the universe alone is perfect; but all things in it are imperfect, as being parts of the universe. These therefore, that I may speak summarily, are the particulars which are discussed by Plato.

If, however, you are willing, we will recur to the words themselves. Through the words therefore, "*by a dianoetic or reasoning process,*" he evolves the intellectual perception in the Demiurgus, calling it dianoia; since he apprehends it dianoetically and not through simple projection. *For a various evolution of cause, is the work of dianoia; but a uniform apprehension, and the comprehension of all things in one intellectual perception, are the employment of intellect.* Plato therefore, making himself the promulgator of the causes antecedently comprehended in the Demiurgus, refers his own discursive energy to the uniform intellectual perception of the fabricator of the world. Thus also the oracles call the partible intellection of the Demiurgus, dianoia. For they say, "I soul being hot and animating all things dwell after the paternal dianoias." But the words, "*a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts,*" assimilate the world to the intellectual wholeness, and the intelligible allness. For parts subsist with a reference to whole, and are not perfect from themselves; but they have indeed the perfection of parts, yet are simply destitute of perfection. The universe, however, is properly a whole. *For a whole totally is one thing; a part totally is another; a whole partially is another; and a part partially ranks in the third place. And the universe, indeed, is a whole totally, as being a whole of wholes. But each of the spheres is a part totally, according to the second form of wholeness. And partial animals, are wholes partially. For the third wholeness is in these, but with a partial peculiarity. And the parts of these are parts partially: for they are parts alone.*

Moreover the words "*as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced,*" is an explanation of the cause through which the world is one; but it is an explanation of the material cause. For if there was anything of this kind external to the world, another world greater or less might be generated from it. For the Demiurgus would not leave it unadorned; because he wishes

¹ In the original το παν ἀρα παντελες, but ἀρα is evidently superfluous. For that the universe is all-perfect, is now about to be proved.

all things to be good, and nothing to be bad. But if the world is one, nothing of such a nature as the things from which it is generated, is left external to it. Perhaps, too, Plato adds this, on account of the celestial bodies, and in short, on account of monadic natures. *For the celestial bodies are monadic, no other things being left external to them from which such like bodies could be generated.* For each of them consists of those things, which in magnitude, power, and multitude, are constitutive of them alone, but of no other thing.¹ Hence also they are called monadic, because they alone consist of these things alone. Nor is any one of the simple bodies [i. e. of the four elements], such in all respects as the element² of each of these [celestial bodies]. From the elevated conceptions therefore of Plato, it follows, that then alone a thing is corrupted by the natures that surround it, when it consists of the same things as those by which it is surrounded; so that there are as many differences of fire, and of each of the elements, as there are monadic natures from which the universe consists; and the Demiurgus constituted as many ideas of simple bodies, as of the composite natures, which he intended to produce. Hence, all of them give completion to one certain thing, and nothing else is generated from them.

But the words, *neither obnoxious to old age, nor disease*, have a manifest cause. *For disease arises from the want of symmetry in the things that enter into the body, some of the parts in us being augmented by others, and dissolving the analogy with the remaining parts of which we consist, through which a superabundance and deficiency of the humours are secretly introduced, and old age accedes, nature becoming imbecile, as Plato says further on, through contending against many things that externally attack it, and enduring a numerous succession of labours.* For the concoction and management of the food, purgation, and all such things as are the works of nature, are not without labour. And from this you may assume, that the Demiurgus who renders the world free from old age and disease, possesses the fountain of the Paeonian series. For it is necessary that the truly existing cause, and which is alone the cause of health, should subsist prior to the generated cause, or the cause of health which the world contains. For, in short, if the cause of symmetry is the health of the elements, it is necessary that this should exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is in the most

¹ Instead of ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὐδεὶς here, it is requisite to read ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδεὶς.

² For οὐκ τὸ ἐκάστου τούτων στοιχείου, I read οἷον τὸ ἐκάστου τούτων στοιχείου. The celestial bodies consist of, what Aristotle calls, a fifth element, and which is essentially different from each of the four elements.

eminent degree a symmetry of all the elements; so that the fountain of this is primarily with the Demiurgus. And it seems that there is one concurrence with each constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic health; but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being, which is still preserved, or is in a perishing condition; which is preserved, indeed, in the natures that are connected by indissoluble bonds, but is in a perishing condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble natures, as being finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And here indeed [i. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of divinity about the universe, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was vitiated in a former period, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which is of a renovating nature. Hence also theologians refer one kind of health to Esculapius, this being all the medicine of things preternatural, whether it perpetually or sometimes only represses a preternatural subsistence. But they generate another prior to Esculapius, which is consubsistent with the fabrication of things, and which they produce from Persuasion and Love. Hence, as Plato says, the universe is from intellect and necessity, intellect^a persuading necessity; but necessity being converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which is best. For it is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the conversion of necessity to intellect. Hence, it is manifest that the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that which is Esculapian, and that which is Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular.

But the constituted body, is a composite, and alter-motive. That which is self-motive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things. The universe, however, so far as it is a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as things of an efficacious nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers; the former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent congelation. But the word *unseasonably* manifests the privation of symmetry, and the inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions

^a For *rov rov* here, read *rov rov*.

from chance. For it appeared to those who leave something external to the universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding and falling on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that the world is in short both hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of this kind, though the natures which surround it should be hot and cold, it would suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would suffer by the things which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are hot and others cold, it would suffer by these; but if of others, which have strong and vigorous powers, it would suffer from them. For whether these surrounding natures should happen to be contrary to the things of which the world consists, because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay; or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures that are in it. As he speaks, therefore, of every composite, he very properly makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there is a certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Hence, because it is known, he mentions these. Since, however, every composite does not consist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally, "*and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers,*" though they should not be heats and colds. For it is necessary that every physical body should have a physical power, through which it may be able to act according to nature. If, therefore, any body should surround the world, whether similar or dissimilar to certain things contained in it; if dissimilar, indeed, it would disturb the world; but it is necessary that what is impassive should not be disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something which is situated in a certain place; and if similar, in consequence of being mingled with what is similar to it, it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful bond. Such therefore is the explanation of the particulars of the text.

Let us, however, survey itself by itself, how there is nothing external to the universe. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many kinds of matter, and many worlds? May we not say, that he constituted matter, and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on this account, he very properly produces but one matter; and that the multitude of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other, but that matter is without difference and without quality? For though we should

grant that there are many kinds of matter in this universe, yet we must say that there is one matter which proceeds from on high through diminution, as far as to the last dregs of things, which last sediment also is truly formless, the summit of matter having a great alliance to forms. For all things according to their summit are most allied to the natures prior to them. So that there is one, and yet not one matter, which proceeds through all things, itself subsiding into itself. On account of this matter, therefore, the Demiurgus produced one world having itself a diminution with reference to itself.¹ Every thing likewise which makes by its very existence, being one in itself, makes one image of itself, and one whole form; and especially when it remains immoveable. For being moved, it is possible for it to make other and other images of itself. Farther still it may be said, *that to divide production into multitude, is no longer the effect of power, but of imbecility. But to comprehend multitude in unity, and to connect the whole number of things through the monad, is the province of admirable abundance.* If, therefore, total power is in the Demiurgus, if he is an immoveable cause, if he fabricates by his very being, and if he generates that which is similar to himself, he generates the world one, whole, and perfect. *What then, it may be said, is not the Demiurgus able to govern many and infinite worlds? We reply, that multitude and the infinite [in quantity] are not the prerogatives of power, but that it pertains to power to congregate things that are divided, and to give bound to infinities. For this assimilates things to the good, to which also the Demiurgus extends all his productions.* This, therefore, is demonstrated through many other arguments.

That Plato however, in an admirable manner informs us, that nothing is left external to the universe, from which any thing else of the like kind could be generated, and that each of the things that are monadic alone consists of the simple natures of which it is composed, and there are not other² things external to it of a similar kind, from which any other such nature could be produced, we may learn by observing that he says, an all-various inequality exists in the seeds of bodies. And also, that on account of this inequality, the differences of fire, and of each of the elements, are incomprehensible. Hence, all fire is not³ similar to all fire, though visibility is common to all. On this account likewise, there is a certain fire which burns, and this is all-various from the smallness and magni-

¹ For *αὐτὰ εἰς εἰαυτὴν* here, it seems necessary to read *αὐτὸν εἰς εἰαυτὸν*.

² Instead of *καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἔκτος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτους ὁμοία*, it is necessary to read *καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἔκτος αὐτοῦ ἄλλα κ. λ.*

³ *Ὅχι* is omitted here in the original.

tude of the elements of which it consists. And the same thing is true of all the elements. Each of the monadic natures therefore, consists of all such things, as are contained in it alone, but in no other thing whatever. Hence it is not externally mingled with them nor is consascent with them. But you may also assume this from these sublunary bodies. For not every one is nourished by every one, but different bodies by different things, because all of them are not similar to the elements of which they consist. But each body becomes greater through those things by which it is able to be nourished, the things that enter into it receiving the places of those that depart from it. On this account, therefore, corruptible natures perish, because there are external to them things of a kind similar to those of which they consist, and which are contraries some to one thing, and others to another. Each of these also, being added to their appropriate natures, introduce corruption to composites, by dissolving the symmetry which is in them. In things that are corruptible therefore, the reason or productive principle, especially effects a difference, since it is very different from that of simple natures. But in things that are indissoluble, the difference, and the reasons of the composition of them, pertain to the same things. Hence, they are indissoluble, and in short monadic, alone existing from elements alone, according to one reason, and one symmetry. These things, therefore, should be examined more fully. For we shall find that they subsist in a beautiful manner,¹ if we look to things, and do not rest in words alone, as is the case with many who meddle with the theory of these particulars. Let us, however, proceed to what is next said by Plato.

“Through this cause, therefore, and this reasoning, he fabricated the world one whole, perfect from containing in itself all wholes, and free from old age and disease.”

Cause indeed, uniformly comprehends every thing which proceeds from it, but *reasoning* comprehends its productions in a divided manner, as we have before observed. So that the universe as one whole is comprehended by its cause, and is generated according to cause; but as consisting of all wholes, it is generated by a reasoning process.² And it is generated *one* indeed, by the demiurgic deity,

¹ Instead of *εἰρησόμεν γὰρ οὐ κἀλῶς ἐχούσθαι*, it is obviously necessary to read *εἰρησόμεν γὰρ κἀλῶς ἐχούσθαι*.

² A reasoning process in the Demiurgus signifies, as has been before observed, a distributed or divided cause of things.

and according to divine union; but a whole according to the wholeness which is connective of intellectuals.¹ For this producing totally renders the universe a whole. And it is a whole containing in itself all wholes, according to the divided causes of forms. For the monad possesses with itself the whole number [of which it is the cause.] The universe also is perfect, as being always converted to its principles, and imitating the demiurgic conversion. But it is free from old age and disease, as having a flourishing, vigorous, and ever vigilant life, and as participating of admirable powers. For from the causes which renovate the world a pure and unwearied life is imparted to it, and from the inflexible ² Gods, undefiled power. And through the former indeed the world is free from old age, always becoming new; but through the latter, it is free from disease, being purified from every thing preternatural. The Demiurgus, however, comprehends the cause of both these.

“ But he gave to it a figure adapted and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure will be adapted, which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence he fashioned it as with a wheel of a spheriform shape, every where [or from all the parts] equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities; this being the most perfect of all figures, and the most similar to itself. For he conceived that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.”

After the total causes of the world, the whole composition of it, and its essence consisting of total plenitudes, Timæus speaks concerning the figure of the universe; the most similar of all figures, being essentially imparted to it by the Demiurgus. And this is the fourth demiurgic gift conferred on the universe. There are therefore, other demonstrations both physical and mathematical, that the world is spherical, which we shall afterwards discuss. Now, however, let us first direct our attention to the Platonic demonstration, which is truly a demonstration, and together with *that* it is, showing *why* it is. The demonstration therefore, is

¹ The wholeness which is connective of intellectuals, constitutes the middle triad of the order of Gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See Book iv. of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

² These are the Anilietor Curetes of the Greeks, and form the unpolluted triad of the intellectual order of Gods.

triple, the first being derived from *the one*, the second from intelligible beauty, and the third from intellectual production. Or rather each of these is manifold, and at least triple. We may say then, immediately with respect to the demonstration from *the one*, that the Demiurgus is one, and you may also say that the paradigm is one, and that *the good* is one. From these things likewise, you may assume, that in figures that which is especially one is more divine and more perfect than that which is not one. For that which *the one* is in the Gods, that which the one intelligible animal itself, is in intelligible animals, and that which the one maker and father is among the Demiurgi, that the sphere is among solid figures. For *the one* is comprehensive of many unities, animal itself, of intelligible animals, the one Demiurgus, of many causes, and the one spherical figure, of all figures. The second demonstration therefore, is from the beautiful and the becoming. For the spherical figure¹ is becoming to the receiver, to the giver, and to the paradigm. To the receiver indeed, because he being perfect, is friendly to the most perfect of figures, and he who is comprehensive of all things, is friendly to that which comprehends all things in itself. But it is becoming to the giver, because he being intellect, and converted to himself, generated a becoming figure, and most similar to himself. For as Plato says in the Laws, intellect possesses intelligence similar to the motion of a sphere fashioned by a wheel; being extended according to the same things, after the same manner, in the same, and about the same. And it is becoming to the paradigm, because the intelligible universe is a thing of this kind, converging on all sides to itself,

On all sides like a sphere's revolving bulk,
Well from the middle pois'd with equal force,
And round its stable centre glad to run :

says Parmenides. The same things also are asserted by Empedocles. For he makes a two-fold sphere, the one being sensible, in which strife predominates, but the other intelligible, which is connected by Venus. He likewise calls the one the image of the other; but it is evident which of the two he denominates the image.

The third demonstration therefore, is from the allied. For a spherical figure is allied to the universe; since it is allied to *the one*, to the Demiurgus, and to all-perfect animal. To *the one* indeed, because of the oneness of a spherical figure.

¹ For το πρεπον here, it is necessary to read το σφαιρικον.

For as the world is one, so likewise the figure of it is uniform. But a spherical figure is allied to the Demiurgus, because he contains all things intellectually in himself. And it is allied to the paradigm, because it first proceeds from it. Hence this figure, is primogenial to the world. It also presents itself to the view, in the occult order itself.¹ For [what is said in the Orphic verse]

Unwearied in a boundless orb it moves,

is asserted of that order. But it is more clearly seen in all-perfect animal. For it is said of this divinity by the theologist, *that he is excited in an ineffable circle*. And it is still more clearly visible in the [intelligible and at the same time] intellectual Gods. For there, intellectual figure, the rectilinear, and the circular subsist, as it is asserted in the Parmenides. Farther still, after these Gods, this figure is seen in the Demiurgus. For as he is intellectual intellect, the universe subsists appropriately in him, and he receives demiurgic powers from the Gods that are prior to him. Hence also he is the Demiurgus of all mundane figures. But what shall we say after the Demiurgus of much-honoured Vulcan? Does he not fashion all mundane natures, elaborating all heaven and generation, and making

Bracelets and chains, and necklaces and rings.*

For how is it possible, since he produces the essence of the mundane body, that he should not impart a figure adapted to each of the bodies contained in the world? He however gives figure to the universe as it were with his own hands; but the Demiurgus by his will alone. For manual operation with him is will, and production is intellection. And thus much we have inferred from these particulars.

Because, however, the spherical figure is allied and adapted to the universe, it is necessary that the universe should have a figure of this kind. Perhaps, indeed, because² a sphere, as those who are skilled in mathematics say, is the most capacious of all solids that have equal perimeters, and as we shall shortly after show by collecting what they have asserted. Perhaps also because every polygonous figure of equal sides may be inscribed in a sphere;³ but it is not possible to

¹ i. e. At the extremity of the first triad of the intelligible order.

² Iliad XVIII. v. 402.

³ *Oris* is omitted here in the original.

⁴ Instead of *εις αλλο σχημα δυνατον εγγραφεσθαι*, it is necessary to read, *εις σφαιραν δυνατον εγγραφεσθαι*.

inscribe every polygonous figure of equal sides in another figure. Hence a sphere is most adapted to that which is to contain all things in itself: for the five regular figures may be inscribed in it. If therefore, you look to corporeal masses, all masses of equal perimeters will be comprehended in the sphere. Not that they will be so contained in as to have their surfaces equal to the spherical superficies: for they will be less than it. But if all figures may be inscribed in the spherical superficies, which is not true in other figures, this also is more appropriate to the things proposed. For Plato likewise says that this figure is adapted to that which is to comprehend in itself all figures. For intending to fabricate the body of the universe, through the five regular figures, he very properly looks to all the figures which are about to be comprehended by the universe. So that he evidently directs his attention, not to corporeal masses, but to the inscription of figures.

Farther still, you may also say in a more perfect manner, that the nature which is to comprehend all things in itself, ought to have dominion over all that it contains: for it will not otherwise be comprehensive of them. But that which has dominion over all things, assimilates all things to itself. For nothing has dominion over things foreign and dissimilar. That, however, which assimilates all things to itself, will be by a much greater priority most similar to itself; in order that it may impart similitude to other things. But that which being a body is most similar to itself, is spherical. Hence the body which comprehends all things in itself, is spherical. This figure, therefore, is adapted to the world: for it is most perfect, and most similar. It is most perfect, indeed, as being comprehensive of all things, and as having an unceasing motion. *For a right line is imperfect, as always capable of being extended; but a circle and a sphere are most perfect, as not receiving increase, and as making the end of their motion the beginning.* Such therefore is the meaning of what is here said by Plato.

Let us, however, consider the dogma by itself, conformably to the intellectual conceptions of Iamblichus. Since, therefore, it is necessary that the world should be assimilated to the whole soul which rides as it were in it, it is also necessary that it should become similar to the vivific body of that soul. Hence, as the Demiurgus constituted the mundane soul, according to two circles, thus also he fashioned the universe of a spherical figure, assimilating it to the self-motion of soul. *Hence too, our vehicle is rendered spherical, and is moved circularly, when the soul is in a remarkable degree assimilated to intellect.* For the intellection of soul, and the circulation of bodies, imitate intellectual energy, just as rectilinear motion imitates the ascent and descent of souls. For these motions pertain to bodies, which

are not in their proper places. Farther still, the unceasing motion of the universe, is similar to infinite power; its uniform circulation, to simplicity of essence; and the circulation of wholes, after the same manner, and about the same centre, to eternal permanency. Again, as the one motion of the world comprehends all motions, one wholeness, all wholes, and corporeal parts; and as one nature, comprehends all second and third natures, thus also it is necessary that the one mundane figure, should be comprehensive of all figures. This figure, however, is spherical, at the same time being one, and capable of containing multitude; which is a circumstance truly divine, to have dominion over every thing multitudinous, without departing from unity.

In addition also to these things, as intelligible animal itself comprehends all intelligible animals, according to one union, thus also the world being assimilated to its paradigm, comprehends all mundane figures, according to the spherical figure. For a sphere alone is able to comprehend all the elements. As therefore the world by its onliness adumbrates the intelligible universe, thus also by its spherical figure, it imitates the comprehension of wholes in that universe. Farther still, the world through this figure is assimilated to intelligible beauty. For how is it possible that a thing which is perfectly equable, commensurate, and similar, should not be in a remarkable degree beautiful? If, therefore, it is necessary that the world should be the most beautiful of sensibles, it is requisite that it should have a figure of this kind, on all sides equal, definite, and accurate. Again, the spherical figure is most adapted to bound itself. For other figures through the multitude of superficies, and their angles, or fractures, are elongated from bound, and the end. But a sphere being monadic, and simple, and on all sides the same, pertains to the cause of bound. Farther still, that which is collective of many things into one, and likewise the generative, and the spermatic, rejoice in a figure of this kind. But this is manifest in seeds, and in the more principal parts of animals: for nature renders these as much as possible, spherical. Again, the immutable, the unbroken, and the perpetual, are most adapted¹ and allied to a spherical figure; since in consequence of every where verging to itself, it is most powerful. For the centre is unific and connective of the whole sphere. Very properly, therefore, did the Demiurgus constitute the universe, which is connective of itself, of a spherical figure. These things, therefore, may be philosophically said concerning this particular.

¹ For *οικειοτα* here, read *οικειοτατα*.

After another manner, however, the same thing may be syllogistically inferred, physically in the way in which Aristotle endeavoured to prove it. For since the universe is moved in a circle, and it has been demonstrated by him that there is nothing external to the extreme circumference of the world, neither vacuum, nor place, it is necessary that the figure of the universe should be spherical, and not rectilinear. For if it was rectilinear, there would be a vacuum. For as the universe revolves in a circle, it would never have the same place through the alternate mutation of the angles and superficies. For since of every other figure besides a sphere, the lines from the middle are unequal, there will be a vacuum according to the less interval, where the bulk of the body is not. Whether therefore it be according to length, or according to breadth, there will be, during the revolution, a less interval. For a vacuum is perfectly equidistant; but where there is no body nor figure, there will be a deficiency, in consequence of the magnitude being less than the vacuum.¹ Farther still, from secondary natures also, you may assume physically, that the universe is spherical. For the earth is spherical, as is evident from all things every way tending to the middle of it. But water is diffused round the earth, and it is spherical. For there is a conflux of it into the concavity, till it comes into contact with the central part of the earth. The air also surrounds the water and the earth, and the fire surrounds the air. If, however, this be the case, the heavens likewise will be spherical. For there will be a vacuum within them, unless they also spherically comprehend fire.

Again, nature distributes to the first of bodies, the first of figures, and a simple figure, to a simple body. For in each genus of things, *the one* is prior to *the many*, and *the simple*, to *the composite*. As, therefore, we distribute motions in a way adapted to their works, to simple works indeed, simple notions, but to composite works, composite motions; thus also there is an allotment of appropriate figures, one kind to simple, but another to composite bodies. *Figure, however, is, as it were, the visible resemblance of form, the morphe of morphe, and as it were an afflition of the peculiar hyparxis of each particular thing.* Hence, that which is essentially simple, proceeds into a simple figure, but that which is variously mingled, has also a co-mingled idea of figure. Farther still, the celestial motion is the measure of motions; but the measure in each thing is that which is least. The least motion, however, is the swiftest. But circulation is the swiftest of motions. If, however,

¹ Instead of *οὐδεν το σχημα ελλειπει, δια το μεγαθος, ελαττον ον του κενου* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ουδε το σχημα, ελλειπει, δια το μεγαθος ελαττον ον του κενου.*

this be the case, the heavens are spherical. For the spherical is the swiftest of motions, in consequence, as the Elean guest says, of proceeding on the smallest foot. Again, of bodies, some consist of similar, but others of dissimilar parts. To bodies, therefore, of dissimilar parts, dissimilar figures are necessarily distributed by nature. For polygonous and, in short, angular figures, are of this kind, and also those that consist of many superficies. But to bodies of similar parts, similar figures are adapted conformably to their excellence. For the sphere alone among solids is a similar figure; since all the rest have dissimilar figures. For some have two superficies, as the cone, others three, as the cylinder, others four, others five, and others more than five, as pyramids on polygonous bases arranged in succession. If, therefore, ether consists of similar parts, but the figure of that which consists of similar parts is similar, and the similar is spherical, ether is spherical. After this manner, therefore, we may physically prove that the world is spherical.

If, however, it be requisite to elucidate what is said, by mathematical demonstrations, let us summarily relate what appears to be the truth to those who are skilled in these particulars. In the first place, therefore, they endeavour to prove [that the universe is spherical] from the stars being moved in parallel circles, both the fixed stars, and the planets, the sections always becoming unequal, as we approach to the north; so that some of the circles touch the horizon; but others which are less than these, do not touch it. And, at last, there is a certain immoveable point, about which all the circulation is moved. In the next place, they infer this from the nights and days becoming unequal, conformably to the solar motions to the north or south. In the third place, from shadows. For whence is it that the sun when he begins to rise,¹ and also when he sets, is more northern to us, and appears to pass beyond the crab, but when he is in the meridian, he sends the shadow to the north; unless from the universe being moved in a circle, which inclines to our motion? Farther still, they prove that the universe is spherical, from the stars which are not moved according to depth, always appearing to have an equal magnitude. For if the heavens were not spherical but cylindrical, or some other such like figure, it would be requisite that the sun, when he becomes more southern to us, should appear to be less, on account of the inequality of the interval.² Nothing of this kind, however, is seen to take place. From these things, therefore, astronomers, in short, endeavour to prove that the universe is spherical.

¹ For εἴξει here, it is necessary to read ἀνοξει.

² For ὑποστάσεις in this place, it is necessary to read ἀποστάσεις.

But that a sphere is the most capacious of all bodies that have equal perimeters, is also demonstrated by them. Likewise that all bodies of equal sides may be inscribed in a sphere, but not all of them in any one of the polyedra. Nor is there any occasion that we should transcribe what is demonstrated by them. For we write to him who has been sufficiently instructed in these particulars. At the same time, however, thus much must be related, that they demonstrate the superficies of the sphere to be more capacious than that of all other solid bodies of equal ambits, and they particularly demonstrate that it is more capacious than the bodies which are called by Plato, equilateral and equiangular polyedra; partly employing the propositions of Euclid, and partly those of Archimedes. As I have said, therefore, the demonstrations of this may be obtained from their writings. It is our intention, also, after we have commented on the whole of the *Timæus*, to discuss more fully in a collection of the Mathematical Theorems in the *Timæus*, such mathematical particulars as are disseminated in the Commentaries; in order that the lovers of truth, by having a collection of these things, may be assisted in the all-various comprehension of the mathematical parts of the dialogue. But enough of mathematics.

Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey after what manner each of them is delivered. That in intellectuals¹ then, *figure* is after *whole*, and that Plato having demonstrated the universe to be a whole, very properly in what follows teaches us concerning the figure of it, we have before observed. Since, however, this proceeds into the universe from the demiurgic cause, on this account he says that figure was given to it from thence. But the giver evidently possesses by a much greater priority that which he gives. The spherical figure, therefore, is in the Demiurgus, but *intellectually*; so that it is in all-perfect animal *intelligibly*, and in that which is still prior to the latter of these,² occultly. For if it be requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, where intellect is, there also the spherical peculiarity exists. For intellectual energy has an essence of such a kind as that to which the Athenian stranger or guest assimilates it.³ But in one place, this peculiarity subsists unitedly and intelligibly, as those say who are divinely wise. In another place, it subsists intelligibly, indeed, but with a

¹ i. e. In first intellectuals, or in other words, in that divine order which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

² i. e. In *being itself*, or the summit of the intelligible triad.

³ In the 10th book of the *Laws*, he assimilates it to the revolution of a sphere fashioned by a wheel.

more abundant intelligible division. In another intellectually, but accompanied with an all-various diversity. And in another sensibly, accompanied with separation and interval. And this last, indeed, is not simply called by Plato *spherical* (σφαιρικόν), but *spheriform* (σφαιροειδές), as being an imitation of the intellectual or intelligible sphere. For the universe also is moved in a circle, because it imitates intellect. *But either the intellectual or the intelligible universe, will be most principally spherical; and that which is truly astronomy, will be conversant with these. For this is to astronomize above the heavens.*¹ Moreover, to be from all the parts equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities, pertains indeed, to the sensible sphere, because all the lines from the centre of the earth to the extremities of the sphere are equal. For *from all the parts* is significant of distance according to the three intervals [of length, breadth, and depth]. It also pertains to the mathematical sphere. For there there is a middle, and the intervals are from all the parts equal. After another manner likewise it pertains to intellect. *For to converge to itself, and to be as it were of the same colour according to every part of itself, and to have all the powers in it conjoined to the one of itself, is the spherical peculiarity in intellect.* Proceeding also still higher, it will no longer be possible to separate the centre from the sphere, on account of the ineffable and united nature of the intelligible² peculiarity. He says, therefore, that it is the property of the sphere to have all the right lines every way equal from the middle, in order to distinguish it from the circle. For the term every way, or from all parts, does not pertain to this, since it has only two intervals.

Plato likewise uses the expression *to fashion as with a wheel*, because bodies with us are rendered more accurately round through a wheel which cuts off the inequalities of the bodies. And that the *similar* and the *perfect* especially pertain to the spherical peculiarity, is evident. The similar, therefore, is analogous to *the one*, but the perfect to *the good*, so that through both he refers the spherical peculiarity to the first principle of things, by saying that it is most similar to itself, and most perfect; equalizing that which is most unical and most boniform. For neither the mixed perfect or similar, nor the right line, which always receives an addition and may become angular; but the spherical peculiarity alone, is most similar and most perfect. After this, he adds, which is evident, "*that the similar is better than the dissimilar.*" For similitude is of an uniting, but dissimilitude of a

¹ Which the Corypcean philosopher mentioned by Plato in the Theætetus, is said to do.

² Instead of τῆς σφαιρᾶς ιδιοτήτος in this place, it is necessary to read τῆς νοητῆς ιδιοτήτος.

dividing nature. And the former belongs to the co-ordination of sameness, but the latter to that of difference. And the former is the cause of simplicity, but the latter of variety to things. As the artificer therefore of the universe found, that among things naturally visible, the intellectual is more beautiful than that which is destitute of intellect, thus also he thought that the similar is better than the dissimilar. For in intelligibles, similitude is better than dissimilitude, in powers, in intellectual perceptions, and in productions. Whence also some one may wonder at those Platonists, who admit that difference is better than sameness, though Plato says that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar. At the same time, also, dissimilitude is in a certain respect secretly introduced into beings from matter, but similitude accedes from form alone, and intelligible causes. Similitude, therefore, is infinitely better than dissimilitude; so that sameness is also more excellent than difference. This is the judgment of Jupiter. Through this, also, in the universe the similar is better than the dissimilar, in essences, in motions, in figures, and in all other things. For the progression of things is very properly effected through the similitude of productions to the cause of the production; and again, conversion is the primary leader of another similitude. Very properly therefore is the world, on account of these things, under the dominion of *similitude*, being a God according to *form itself*. Hence Plato also endeavours to show what the figure of the world is, from similitude, and the Pythagoric Timæus himself, assigns this as the first cause of its figure, in conjunction with making a physical mention of it. "For a sphere alone, says he, both when it is quiescent, and when it is moved, is capable of being co-adapted in the same place; so as never to fail nor receive another place." Aristotle likewise after him, well knew, that with whatever other figure you may surround the universe, you will make a vacuum, through the alternate mutation of the angles, and the unequal distance of the extremes from the middle.

336 "He also accurately elaborated the external circumference of the universe, and rendered it smooth, for the sake of many things."

Some one may think that the same thing which was before asserted, is again here repeated. For in what does this smoothness differ from rotundity, or what mutation is there of similitude? In a certain respect, therefore, this universe comprehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there is a difference between surveying what the nature is of the whole figure which per-

vades as far as to the centre of the earth, and alone considering itself by itself, the most external superficies of the universe. And what is here said about smoothness, contends as it appears to one thing, viz. to show that the universe is neither in want of gnostic, nor of partible motive organs, for the purpose of acting upon, or suffering from other things; introducing this as the fifth demiurgic gift to the world. What is said, therefore, about the smoothness, is a medium between what is asserted respecting the bulk, and the soul of the universe. For the proximate boundary of body is smoothness; but the exempt boundary is soul, and prior to soul, intellect. For this is the boundary of soul itself. And prior to intellect, the one deity which connects the whole mundane multitude, is the boundary of the body of the world. You may therefore speak after this manner.

But you may also say, according to a more perfect mode, that the universe being a luminous whole, it is most luminous according to its external superficies, and is full of divine splendour. For on this account also poets place Olympus on the summit of the world, being wholly luminous, and light itself.

Nor clouds, nor rain, nor winter there are found,¹
But dazzling splendour spreads its radiance round.

Of this luminous subsistence, smoothness is a symbol. Why therefore are the summits of the universe smooth? Plato says, for the sake of many things. For they are so, in order that it may be spontaneously conjoined with soul and intellect, and may be adapted to supermundane lights, through a similitude to them. Smoothness, therefore, is significant² of the highest aptitude, through which the universe is able to receive the illuminations from intellect and soul; in the same manner as mirrors receive the representations of things by their smoothness. Formerly also by theologians, a mirror was assumed as a symbol of aptitude, to the intellectual completion of the universe. Hence they say, Vulcan made a mirror for Dionysius, or Bacchus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himself, proceeded into the whole partible fabrication of things. You may say therefore, that Plato reminds us of this catoptric apparatus, in what he now says of the smoothness of the external superficies of the world. Hence the corporeal

¹ Hom. Odys. vi. v. 45. But in Proclus for *ἀλλα μάλλον αἰθήρη*, read *ἀλλα μάλ' αἰθήρη*.

² For *συμμακτική* here, read *σηματική*.

universe is a thing of this kind, externally smooth, according to which also, it is commensurate with its own intellect, and with the Demiurgus. Hence too, poets establish the Demiurgus on the highest summit of the world; it being allotted so great an aptitude from him, to the participation of intelligible causes.

If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itself is a symbol of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we have a partible life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because different things are prepared by nature for a different life. But the universe has one and a simple life. For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial animals are in want, through a material and partible life. Hence it is the recipient of one life, but is exempt from a various life. It is also prepared for one, but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said to be accurately elaborated externally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted by the demiurgic cause, to the reception of one life, being constructed as the organ of such a life. What follows, however, is significant of this.

“Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary: for there was nothing externally audible. Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration.”

Through these things, Plato appears to do nothing else, than to take away a partible life from the universe, and the partible organs, which are suspended from us, when we descend into generation. For while we abide on high, we are not at all in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. But the luciform vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore, we are purified from every life of this kind, when we are liberated from generation, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Is it not, that it has one simple life, that it is wholly vigilantly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for the completion of one life? Or must we not in a much greater degree admit these things of the universe? For wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures. And thus much as to the common conception of the things proposed.

Since, however, in what is now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away

all sense from the world, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, let us in the first place consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For of the ancients, some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this subject. We indeed hear theologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting of the father [i. e. of the Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligibles through intellect, but introduces sense to the worlds.' And again, we hear from the Greeks,

Sun who see'st all things, and dost all things hear.¹

Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to one life, and one subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is principally one sense, and one principal sensorium. Nor were the wise men among the Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of the Demiurgus himself,

The undecaying royal ether forms
His intellect from falsehood free; by which
He all things indicates and knows; nor voice,¹
Nor sound, nor rumor can Jove's ears chide.

And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense? So that asserting likewise that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On hearing therefore, as I have said, these things, we are unwilling to admit that the universe is without sensation. For in the Theætetus, sense is said to be the frustration of truth; and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and conversant with the images of things. Hence, it is better, in order that we may be in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapted to the Gods.

What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed? That the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal, and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mundane body a participation of both these; which participation is an image of dia-

¹ This is asserted in the Chaldean Oracles.

² Cæssa. XI. v. 108.

³ For ἀντα here, read ἀνέτη; and for ἡλυθεῖ in the following line, ἡ ληθεῖ. These verses are Orphic.

noia and opinion; and this we say is the mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating intelligence, and possessing invisible sensations¹ of the sensibles which exist in every period. It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. But it requires an appropriate inspection, to know what sense it possesses. I say then, that of sense, the first and most principal kind, is that which imitates intellect. For every where things that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, this sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in itself the sensible object of its perception, and neither passing from some things to others; for this is the province of sense distributed into various parts; nor proceeding outwardly; for this is imperfect; but it possesses the whole of what is sensible in itself, and is, as it were, rather consciousness than sense. The second kind of sense after this, is that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable sameness, and is purified from all passion, and from all the imbecility which is adapted to partible and material organs. But the third kind of sense is that, which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; beginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind of sense is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present, which is full of passion, and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a knowledge of the forms of sensibles. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it is hot or cold, but alone perceives that what falls on it is pleasant or painful. For Timæus farther on informs us that the sense of plants is a thing of this kind, being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible objects.

Sense, therefore, thus proceeding supernally, the world, indeed, is sensitive according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself it is the thing seen, and the eye [by which it is seen]; since we also say that the sun, and each of the stars, is an eye. The whole world therefore is sight and that which is visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion. Hence the knowledge in it is all-perfect, its sense is indivisible, and it is itself all things, viz. that which is sensible, the sensorium, and sense; just as the Demiurgus of it, is intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its *whole* body *partial* bodies, so in its *total* sense it contains many senses. And it does not

¹ αἰσθησις is omitted in the original.

know the colours and the sounds of sensibles, but the essence of all of them, so far as it is material and undivided. Hence also it has a sensible essence, and essentially, but not according to accident, sensible. For as that which is always intelligible, is not in a certain respect intelligible, and in a certain respect not, but is wholly intelligible, though not to those beings whose intellectual perception is partible, but to a divine intellect; after the same manner the generated sensible nature, is not in a certain respect sensible, and in a certain respect deprived of sense, but is wholly sensible, not to us whose sensible perception is partible, but to *total* animal, in which also there is a total sense. For as the intellectual perception of the Gods is of one kind, but that of men of another, thus also the sense of Gods is different from that of partible animals; the former having a knowledge of partial essences, but the latter of things alone pertaining to essences. The world therefore, has the first sense, which is immutable, united to the object of knowledge, and all-perfect according to energy. But *total* animals, which are purified from generation, are allotted the second form of sense. For because indeed, they are parts of the universe, the sense of them proceeds to the whole; for there is also something of them which is external. But because they are exempt from generation, they comprehend that which is sensible impassively and energetically. And such partial animals as have communication with generation, and employ as organs, luciform vehicles, possess sense mingled from passion and knowledge. But there are also certain last animals, such as plants, which participate of a vestige only of life and sense; one kind of sense being total, another partible, another knowing the essences, and another the images of sensibles.

It is not proper, therefore, to be disturbed, because Plato takes away from the world, all partible organs. For hearing is not divided in it from sight; since neither, as we say, is the one divided from the other, in our spirit, but there are in it, as Aristotle says, one sense which is truly so called, and one principal sensorium. Hence the world is neither in want of eyes extended to things out of itself, nor of ears,¹ to receive information externally, but it is itself both eye, and that which is visible, ear, and that which is audible; and the one sense in it knows all sensible natures. For whence also is the one sense in us which is prior to the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knows all the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-

¹ Instead of *οὐρα* here, it is obviously necessary to read *ωρα*.

mony which pervades through wholes. Hence it neither requires eyes in order to see, nor ears in order to hear. It possesses also this eyeless peculiarity according to the image of the intelligible God,¹ to which it is assimilated. For Orpheus says that this God has *eyeless Love*,

In his breast feeding eyeless, rapid Love.

Thus therefore, the universe is conjoined through love to the natures prior to itself, and beholds the beauty which is in them through that which is in itself; and this not by perceiving with partible senses.

“Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration. Nor again, was it in want of any organ, through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted. For there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to, or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its composing artificer thought that it would be much more excellent, if sufficient to itself, than if in want of other things.”

Through what is here said, Plato takes away two other senses from the universe, the smell and the taste. The former indeed because it is without respiration. For not every thing which respire is in want of smell, though every thing which has smell respire.² But that which respire is more perfect. This therefore, he takes away from the universe. He also takes away the taste, because the universe is not nourished. For the animal which is nourished, is in want of the taste. Again therefore, how shall we say? Must it not be thus, that these partible senses are not in the universe, but that it contains one simple sense in itself, which has a knowledge of all colours, sounds, juices, spirits, and qualities, the sensible essences themselves existing in the universe as in a subject. For if the one

¹ i. e. Phanes, or animal itself, the exemplar of the universe.

² Instead of το γαρ αναπνεον δεχται της αναπνεως, ει και μη παν το εχον αναπνεον, αναπνευστικον εστι, in this place, it seems requisite to read, ου γαρ παν αναπνεον δεχται της αναπνεως, ει και παν το εχον κ. λ.

[common] sense which is in us, uses all the partible senses, and knows all things according to the same, how much more must the world know at once all the variety of sensibles, according to one reason, and one sense? As therefore, it is one in essence, and as it is allotted a uniform figure, thus also it has one sense, comprehending in itself all sensibles. For it likewise contains one nature, which connects and vivifies all bodies. And these are the dogmas respecting the universe.

Let us however, discuss the particulars of what is here said by Plato. In the first place therefore, he admirably refers the use of the smell to respiration, but not to the discrimination of fragrances; giving us the more comprehensive cause, as existing in respiring natures. For when we have a sensible perception of fragrant or fetid substances, we respire; but when we respire, we have not entirely a sensation of them. For respiration is more natural, and more comprehensive than the proper subjects of the smell; since such animals as have the sense of smelling, but do not respire, in consequence of not having lungs, are more imperfect than those that do respire. Very properly therefore, does he frame his argument from more perfect animals, that if the universe had the sense of smelling, it would be requisite that it should have it accompanied with respiration, in the same manner as the more perfect of smelling animals. But in the second place, he refers the use of the taste, to nutriment. For nature formed this as a criterion of juices, through which nutriment and increase subsist. For that which is without moisture has the power of manifesting this. The world however, is not in want of nutriment externally, but imparts it to itself, increases itself, and is the cause of its own consumption. And in the first place, if you are willing, it effects this, according to a division into two; the heavens augmenting and changing all things, but the sublunary regions being increased and consumed. For the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But of each of these,¹ the motion of the heavens is the cause. In the second place, the world effects this from the heavenly bodies themselves, receiving by their motions an analogous increase and consumption, according to their risings and settings, their visibilities and occultations, their elevations and depressions, their illuminations, and mutations of light; through which the celestial bodies receive and lose a certain thing, in the same manner as sublunary natures. For from these, generation also is changed.

¹ For *εκαρεpas* here, it is requisite to read *εκαρεpas*.

And again you see that the natures which are above the moon, have increase and consumption according to analogy only; but that sublunary natures are essentially the recipients of both these. But the moon is between these, and is truly an isthmus, exhibiting in herself the beginning of mutation according to an increase and diminution of light. For in the bodies prior to it the same form perfectly remains, in their increase and consumption; and in the bodies posterior to it, their very existence is naturally adapted to reciprocate. But in the moon the essence remains, but the light is changed externally according to diminution and increase, which is not the case with the luminaries that are above it. Hence it is not proper to say, that the heavenly bodies are nourished from exhalations, as some fancy they are. For things which are in want of an influx externally, and receive addition and ablation, have not indissoluble bonds. Hence the celestial bodies remain immutable; as of the ancients Proclus, Malotes, and Philonides assert, and of those that are more modern, all the Platonists from Plotinus. For as Plato has not yet delivered to us the generation of the heavens and stars, how could he speak about the nutriment of them? And it seems, that now generating the elements alone, and perceiving that these proceed through each other, and that all are in all, he calls this mutual transition, the nutriment of the universe, of itself by itself; since it both acts upon and suffers in itself, by imparting to all things, all the things of which it consists. Hence when he likewise constitutes the other natures (i. e. the celestial), then he introduces their illuminations, and the communion of all of them with each other, through these. Alone therefore, directing his attention to the composition of the four elements of the universe, and perceiving that in these, there are certain communications with each other, he says, that the consumption of some, is the nutriment of other parts of the universe. But it is not yet manifest what each of these may be. Now however, thus much is evident, that all the parts confer something on each other, in order that the universe may become one, and are in each other, so as to nourish each other, and this without any diminution of themselves. For all things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and all of them are likewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself, from its own parts, having all things in all.

Farther still, this also may be said, that if nothing proceeds to the universe, there is no body external to it, and that if nothing departs from it, there is no vacuum out of the world. For it would be in vain not being the recipient of any thing, as that is which receives the world; which things were particularly em-

braced by Aristotle, who subverts the existence of a vacuum in energy, and preserves the world only-begotten. But that nothing departs from, or accedes to the universe, Plato infers, the latter indeed, because there is nothing external to it, and the former, from the universe making the consumption of itself, its proper nutriment. As therefore, not having the organs of nutriment in itself, it has nutriment, and is that which itself nourishes itself, and is at the same time nourished; thus also, not having senses extended outwardly, it possesses sense in itself, and is itself sensible to itself. And that Plato intended the latter should be inferred as well as the former, I think he clearly manifests by saying, that "*the universe suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations.*" But if all that is generated, is the consequence of the universe acting on and suffering from itself, it must not be said, that either consumptions or corruptions are simply evils. For neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to himself. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what Plato says.

Again however, he recurs to the true cause of all mundane effects, viz. the demiurgic art, and the principle which is perfective of wholes. For from thence art also proceeds into the demiurgic order. Hence the Oracles call the Demiurgus of the universe *one who produces works by art*; which expression Plato divides, at one time calling the things contained in the world, the *works* of the Demiurgus, [as when he represents the maker of the world saying] "*of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works;*" just as the Oracles also when they say; *for understanding the works of the paternal self-begotten intellect*; but at another denominating the energy of the Demiurgus art, which in the end becomes the cause of the sufficiency of the universe to itself. For the Demiurgus being good, made all things similar to himself; i. e. he made all things perfect and self-sufficient. For self-sufficiency is an element of *the good*. *By no means however is the world, as possessing the power of being sufficient to itself, divulged through this self-sufficiency from its maker, but is in a greater degree united to him. For by how much the more self-sufficient it is, by so much the more is it constituted in a similitude to him. And by how much the more it is assimilated, by so much the more perfectly is it united, to the demiurgic goodness.* The universe therefore is self-sufficient, as being the object of sense to itself,¹ and as not being in want of other sensibles. For to these the appellation of indigence belongs. But it is in want of the Gods, as being

¹ *Ἐαυτῷ* is omitted in the original. .

always filled by them. Or rather neither is it in want of these, for divinity is every where present, and the universe is always prepared for the reception of divine goods. And as the similar is better than the dissimilar according to the judgement of Jupiter; so likewise, the self-sufficient is more divine than that which is indigent. For the self-sufficient has dominion in the Gods, and similitude¹ in beings. And this is another dogma of the mighty Jupiter.

“ But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive or resist; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest.”

The touch is the last of the senses, and of this an animal especially participates according to the whole body, but particularly according to the hands. For these have the greatest power of touching, as may be seen in the operations of them. Since however, the hands afford us a twofold use; for through them we receive things that delight us, and repel such as pain us; but the universe cannot receive anything, for it has every thing which it wishes; nor repel any thing, because there is nothing foreign to it;—this being the case, it is not at all in want of hands. For as Aristotle says, neither nature, nor God, does any thing in vain. So that the Demiurgus did not make hands to adhere to the world, because they would have been added in vain. Since however, that which is motive is suspended from that which is sensitive, but I mean that which is naturally motive, the discussion of Timæus, appropriately and at the same time reasonably proceeds, from the sensitive to the progressive organs. For the feet were formed as instruments for rectilinear motion, as likewise were the other parts subservient to progression, such as the leg, the knee, the thigh, and any other such-like part. It is impossible however, for the universe to be moved in a right line: for, as we have before shown, there is no vacuum external to the universe. Through these things therefore, he takes away the progressive and sensitive parts. And here again it may be said, that in taking away the motive organs, he alone takes away feet, but not wings; because feet are sufficient to more perfect animals for the purposes of motion; doing the same thing here as he did respecting smelling and respiration.

Again however, it must be said, that these organs are by no means in the universe, but that sense and motion after another manner are. For since every

¹ For η ομοιωσις in this place, it is obviously necessary to read η ομοιοτης.

thing sensible of whatever kind it may be is comprehended in it, and it is itself the first sensible, it has also one sense conjoined to a sensible of this kind, just as the intelligence of the Demiurgus is conjoined to the whole of the intelligible, and is said to absorb the universe in itself. After the same manner therefore, the universe absorbs itself by the sense of itself, and comprehends the object of knowledge, by a connascent knowledge. Besides, it has indeed powers which apprehend and are the guardians of all things, and these are its hands. It possesses likewise perfective orders, and these are analogous to nutritive parts. And it exhibits vivific causes, which correspond to the parts of respiration. Besides these also, it has other powers, some of which fill it with invisible causes, and others conjoin it to intelligible light; of which the latter are analogous to seeing, but the former to hearing. By those also who survey it physically and theologically, it will be found, that it has a motion analogous to this sense. For as it has a sense of itself with itself, so likewise it has a motion in itself, and circulating about itself, and both these, according to the similitude of its paradigm. For in this there was intelligence converging to itself, life converted to itself, and knowledge not subsisting according to transition, nor according to a distribution into parts, but self-perfect, and united to intelligibles themselves. *For such is the intellect which is there, energizing prior to energy, because [according to the Oracle] it has not proceeded, but abides in the paternal profundity, and in the adytum according to the God-nourished silence.*

“ For from among the seven species of local motion, he distributed to it that which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom, and which is adapted and allied to its body.”

Of the ancients, some converting the world to intellect, and imparting to it motion through love about the first appetible, say that nothing proceeds into it from intellect, thus depriving intellect of fecundity,¹ and giving it an arrangement equivalent to that of lovely sensible objects, which have nothing generative in their own nature. Others on the contrary, acknowledge that intellect, or soul, or whatever that may be which is above the world, operates on it, yet they do not give to the world a spontaneous and proper motion, but only say that it is externally convolved in a circle. These however, Aristotle blames, as subverting the

¹ For *μεινών* here, it is necessary to read *γούμων*.

perpetuity of the universe. *For that which is violent is not perpetual.*¹ But Plato guarding against the oversights of both these, assigns to the world a proper and spontaneous motion, and shows that the Demiurgus is the cause of this motion. And this is the sixth demiurgic gift imparted to the world; as imitating the motion of intellect, which the world possesses both from itself, and from the father. For the expression *he distributed*, refers us to the paternal cause. For from that from which essence, from that also motion according to nature, is imparted to the universe. But the words, "*adapted and allied to its body*," refer us to the peculiar nature of the world through which it is excited by itself to a motion of this kind. For it possesses something adapted and allied to the motion in a circle, both according to the self-motive nature, and to its figure, which is spherical. Perhaps also, if he had asserted one of these things only, the other might have been inferred. For if he had said, that the motion of the universe was adapted and allied to it, whence did it possess this except from the father, from whom also its essence is derived? But if this motion was imparted to it by the Demiurgus, he entirely gave to the recipient an appropriate motion, he being intellect, and assigning to all things that which is according to desert. The Philosopher however, combines both these in order that you may see the similitude of the world to the Demiurgus. For as he himself intellectually perceives himself, is converted to himself, and surveys intelligibles through energizing about them, which become the centres of the demiurgic intelligence; thus also the world is moved about itself, verges to itself, and harmoniously revolves about the middle, which becomes the centre of the mundane motion. And as the Demiurgus is said to absorb the intelligible, by² proceeding to it, thus also the world is said to comprehend in itself, the centre of itself. *For the absorptions which are celebrated by theologians, are certain comprehensions.* But the absorptions by grandfathers comprehend intellectuals intelligibly, and those by sons, intelligibles intellectually.

¹ If the principal parts of the universe therefore are perpetual, and that they are so is most fully demonstrated in these commentaries, it necessarily follows that the modern system of astronomy, which fills the heavens with violent motions, is false.

² Instead of εἰς αὐτὸν μίμνησκει κίνησις in this place, I read ἀπὸ τοῦ μίμνησκει κινήσει.

³ For εἰς αὐτὸν χωρεῖ here, read τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν χωρεῖν.

⁴ Instead of ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν προγοῖται τὰ νοητὰ περιλαμβανουσι νοητῶν, αἱ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν, τὰ νοητὰ νοητῶν in this place, it is necessary to read, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν προγοῖται τὰ νοητὰ περιλαμβανουσι νοητῶν, αἱ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν, τὰ νοητὰ νοητῶν.

For these things, the generators of them again convert them to themselves, and comprehend them in their own allness. The universe therefore imitates both these things indeed, as it revolves about the centre, and comprehends the centre in imitating the progonic¹ absorption; but so far as it comprehends its own allness in itself, affording nutriment to itself by its own consumption, and again comprehending in itself the natures distributed from itself,—so far it imitates the comprehension of children in their fathers. And these things indeed, are asserted for the sake of the analogy of the universe to the two fathers.

Again, however, you may see, how the Aristotelic axiom is here pre-assumed, that the motion is simple of a simple body. In the first place, therefore, the body in the world which is more simple than other bodies, is moved with a circular motion, as being adapted to it; and in the next place, the whole universe is thus moved. For the body which is posterior to it, is as much as possible convolved in a circle. For what else is the meaning of the word *adapted*, than that the motion in a circle is natural to the essence of the universe? For as it was allotted a spherical figure, so likewise a circular motion according to nature. And farther still [another Aristotelian axiom is also here pre-assumed] that a circular motion has nothing contrary to it. For as there are seven local motions, that which is in a circle, the upward, the downward, that which is to the right hand, and that which is to the left, that which is anterior, and that which is to the posterior parts, you will find that six of these have a contrary. For the motions are contrary, which are from contrary to contrary places. But the motion in a circle is exempt from all contrariety. For since the motions in a right line are generated and contained by the motion in a circle, as Mechanics demonstrate, how can it be said that any one of these is contrary to it? For the contrary is corruptive and not generative of the contrary. Nor does Plato stop here, but having mentioned the peculiarity of the circular motion, he shows its admirable transcendency above the other motions. For he denominates it to be that which subsists about intellect and wisdom, and this not simply, but he also adds *especially*. For of these seven motions, the circular imitates intellect, and the intellectual life, being established in the same, and about the same, according to one reason and one order, and possessing a motion which is vanquished by permanency. But all the

¹ i. e. The absorption of Phanes, the paradigm of the world by Jupiter.

² For *ταυτην* here read *ταυτα*.

remaining¹ motion pertains to soul. For in this, *from whence*, and *whither*, and transition first subsist. In her also the intelligible is the upward, but the sensible downward. And the circle of sameness, indeed, is the right hand, but the circle of difference, the left. Intellect likewise is before her, but nature behind. For thus she was constituted at first. And circulation, indeed, is adapted to intellect, according to both numbers, whether you wish to adduce the monad itself, or the heptad, enumerating it the first or the seventh motion. *For the monad and the heptad, are certain intellectual numbers; the monad indeed being directly intellect, but the heptad, the light according to intellect. And on this account also the mundane intellect is, as Orpheus says, both monadic, and hebdomadic. Farther still, the monad is Apolloniacal, but the heptad Minerval. Again therefore it is intellect and wisdom.* So that circulation through the alliance of numbers, shows that it is suspended from intellect and wisdom. *But rectilinear motion, demonstrates through the hexad its alliance to the psychical peculiarity.* For the number six is allied to the soul, and this will be manifest as we proceed. Let us however pass on to what is next said by Plato.

“Hence by a circumduction according to sameness, in the same, and in itself, he caused it to be moved convolving in a circle. But he separated from it all the six motions, and framed it void of their wandering progressions. And as feet were not requisite to this periodical motion, he generated the universe without legs and feet.”

We have before observed that intellect and wisdom are the paradigms of circulation. But what this is, and how it is assimilated to intellect, is delivered in the words before us. For circulation is a motion which is led round according to sameness, and in the same, and in itself, as Timæus here says, and the Athenian guest in the Laws. Of which definition indeed, the words “*according to sameness*,” signify according to one reason, and one order. For what if the universe should be moved circularly indeed, but should be differently changed at different times, by rising or setting, as the fable says in the Politicus. That we may not therefore apprehend this to be the case, the words “*according to sameness*” are placed respecting it, before the rest. The Platonic Severus therefore, (for we shall here speak freely against him,) is not right in admitting fabulous circulations, and thus making the world to be both generated and unbegotten.

¹ For η δε νοση, αυται ην ζιχη, I read, η δε νοση πασα, ην ζιχη.

The universe indeed, Plato says, is moved according to sameness, and after a similar manner; and according to one reason and one order. But such a circulation as Severus speaks of, subverts the one order of motion. The mode, however, in which such a motion is fabulously introduced, is shown by our preceptor in his Commentaries on that dialogue,¹ conformably to the meaning of Plato. But the words "*in the same*," manifest the immutable in transition, and that the motion is vanquished by permanency. For because there is not a vacuum external to the universe, but it is necessary that the universe should be moved, being a physical body; for nature is a principle of motion; it is moved convolved about itself, and in the same place. For the bulk of the universe occupies the whole of place, and possesses by its parts the parts of interval; and as a whole being immutable, it is locally moved in its parts. But the words "*in itself*," manifest that it is moved on account of this very transition of its parts. For it does not require the transition of another thing, in order to the motion of itself, but itself yields to itself, and itself is transferred into the place of itself; so that it is moved in itself, the parts of it being transferred by their motions into the places of each other. Hence, through the words "*according to sameness*," you have the perpetual; but through the words "*in the same*," the immutable; and through the words "*in itself*," the form of the transition. And from all these you have, that circulation is a motion unceasing, remaining in one place, and effected by the transition of the parts into the places of each other. But being such it is evident, that it is most similar to intellect. For intellect eternally energizes intellectually, is established in the same order, and all things in it are intellectual, most energetic, and possess an ever-vigilant life. And this indeed is evident.

It is however worthy of admiration in Plato, that when discoursing about the essence of the universe, he assimilates it to intelligible animal; but that now teaching us concerning the motion of it, he refers the similitude of it to intellect; delivering to us from these things, the analogy which is in them, viz. that the intelligible has the relation of essence, but intellect of energy. When, likewise, he says that the universe is spherical, he at the same times gives it to be moved in a circle, and to be convolved. For it appears to be moved in a circle according to the greatest circle which is in it. Because however a cylinder is moved in a

¹ viz. On the Politeicus, in which dialogue it is fabulously asserted that the sun and stars now set in the place from whence they formerly rose. See this fable explained in the notes to my translation of that dialogue.

circle when it is rolled along, he adds, for the sake of accuracy, the word *convolving*.¹ It is also admirable in him, that he takes away the six motions from the universe. For this is most peculiar to the world, there being in the stars an advancing motion. The world, therefore, is truly inerratic, not only because the summit of it is a thing of this kind, but because it is moved with one and the same simple motion.

It is necessary however to observe, how the form of motion which exists in the most principal part of the universe, is said to have been given, as appropriate to the whole world, by the father. For all the other parts, participate of the circulation of the world; and the inerratic is present with some of them more manifestly, but with others more obscurely. For the streams under the earth being moved in a disorderly manner, and differently at different times, are especially said to wander. But the sublunary elements being naturally moved from one place to another, participate of less wandering than the subterranean effluxions. For those things wander which are transferred from one place to another. And the divine bodies in the heavens, wander still less than these. For so far as they are moved according to length, and also according to breadth they are wanderers; but so far as they are moved according to the equable and orderly, and according to one reason of motion, they are inerratic. But the world itself may most properly and principally be called inerratic, as not receiving the representation of any other motion.

If also you are willing to make a division in incorporeal natures, the irrational life wanders in a remarkable degree, not having the measure of its energies from itself. The soul that opines rightly wanders, but less than the irrational life. For this soul also participates in a certain respect of wandering, through being ignorant of cause. But the soul that possesses scientific knowledge, wanders still less than this. For in such a soul, the transitive form of life alone produces the wandering; because it is not arranged to one intelligible, but becomes a different intelligible in different forms. And intellect alone is inerratic among beings, always intellectually perceiving the same thing, and energizing towards and about the same thing. The world, therefore, which imitates intellect in its motion, is deservedly truly inerratic, always making the same uniform period after the same manner. That however which is thus moved, has no need whatever of the addition of feet, or in short, of progressive organs. And hence the universe was generated without feet and legs. *Theologists also wishing in a certain*

¹ For *τροφομερον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *στροφομερον*.

respect to indicate this to us, are accustomed to call the God who is the Demiurgus of the corporeal nature, lame in both feet, as constituting the universe without legs and feet. They say too that the Gods laugh at him with inextinguishable laughter, and by their laughing incessantly attend with providential care to mundane natures.

“ All this reasoning, therefore, being employed by the eternally existing God, about the God that would at a certain time or once exist; in consequence of this reasoning, he made his body smooth and even, every where from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from perfect bodies.” 33B

What is here said, imitating the one intellect, and the united intellection of wholes, collects all things into the same, and refers them to one summit, the fabrication of the corporeal system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recollect what has been before said. It was said then, that the elements rendered all things in the world concordant through analogy; that the universe was generated a whole consisting of wholes; and that it is spherical and smooth, and has a knowledge of itself, and a motion in itself. But this being the case, it is evident that the whole world itself, is assimilated to all-perfect animal. The orderly distribution of it, however, according to wholes, proceeds analogous to second and third causes. And the number of the elements, indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, proceeds conformably to the essence which is uncoloured, unfigured, and without contact; for there number subsists. But the first wholeness which adorns all things, and which consists of the whole elements, is assimilated to the intellectual wholeness.¹ The sphericity of the universe is analogous to the intellectual figure.² Its self-sufficiency, intellectual motion, and convolution in sameness, are assimilated to the God who absorbs in himself all his progeny [i. e. to Saturn]. Its possession of soul, is analogous to the vivific cause [i. e. to Rhea]. And its participation of intellect, is analogous to the Demiurgic intellect; though all these proceed from this, and from the natures prior to it, to which these are respectively analogous. And the more excellent natures, indeed, are the

¹ This essence forms the summit of that order of Gods which is called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

² This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order.

³ And this forms the extremity of that order.

⁴ For *τροφή* here, it is necessary to read *στροφή*.

causes of all the things of which secondary natures are the causes; but the latter are the causes of fewer effects than the former. For the Demiurgus himself, so far, indeed, as he is intellectual, makes all things to be intellectual; but so far as he is being, he is the father of all bodies, and incorporeal natures; and so far as he is a God, he constitutes matter itself. In what is here said, therefore, Plato makes a summary repetition of all such particulars as the universe derives from the intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory.

It is requisite, however, that we should understand the truth pertaining to each of the words. Directly, therefore, the words "*all this*," imply that you should survey in one the whole cause of the corporeal-formed nature, and know the division of forms. For wholeness is assimilated to one thing, figure to another, and motion to another. And the word *this* indeed indicates *union*; but the word *all* the number of causes. Moreover, the words "*reasoning employed by the eternally existing God*," make the essence, and at the same time the intelligence of the Demiurgus to be eternal, through which the world is perpetual. It is necessary likewise to observe, that Plato by arranging the Demiurgus among eternal beings, gives to him an eternal order, so that he will not [according to Plato] be soul. For in the *Laws* he says, that soul is immortal, indeed, and indestructible, but is not eternal. Hence every one who fancies that soul is the Demiurgus, seems to be ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the indestructible. But the word "*reasoning*" is significant of a distributed fabrication. And the words "*that would at a certain time exist*" are not significant of a beginning according to time, as Atticus fancied they were, but that the world has an essence conjoined with time. For time was generated together with heaven [or the universe,] and the world is temporal, and time is mundane. For they were co-produced with each other, and are consubstantial from one fabrication. The words therefore *at a certain time* or *once* do not signify a part of time, but reason is time as compared with eternal being. For that is truly always being; but the temporal always is *once* as with reference to the eternal, just as that which is being, after a generated manner, is non-being with reference to that which is intelligibly being. Hence though the world exists through the whole of time, yet the existence of it consists in becoming to be, and is in a part of time. This however is *once*, and is not simultaneously in all time, but is always once. For the eternal is always in the whole of eternity; but the temporal, in a certain time, is always at a different time in another time. As with reference therefore, to the eternally existing God, the world is very properly called, "*the God that would once exist*." For as with re-

ference to that God who is intellectual, this is sensible. Hence, the sensible world is indeed *generated*, or *becoming to be*, always, but *is once*. For it has its existence partially, always advancing to being from eternal being. For since, as we have before observed, it has an eternal power of existing derived from a cause different from itself, and the power which it possesses it possesses terminated, but by always receiving, it always is, having the power in that which is terminated numbered to infinity;—this being the case, it is evident that it is *once*, from *the once* always acquiring existence, and always becoming to be, in consequence of that which gives it to exist, never ceasing.* According to its own nature, however, it is once, and has a renovated immortality, as Plato says in the Politicus, possessing its being in advancing into existence, and on this account participating not at once wholly of the whole [of time] but *once*; and this again and again, existing in generation, and not being without an extension [of existence]. Unless, therefore, the word once signifies with Plato the whole of time. *For the transitive subsistence of time, as compared with eternal energy, is once, and the whole of time has the same ratio to eternity, as the part of time the once to the whole of time.*

If you are willing also to consider what is said after another manner, since Plato has hitherto fashioned a corporeal nature, but has not in words constituted soul and intellect, he denominates the God that would exist, and who subsists in discourse according to a part, *once*. For divinity indeed constitutes collectively parts and the whole, but language divides things which are consubsistent, generates things which are unbegotten, and distributes according to time, eternal natures. The God therefore, that would once exist, is the God that would exist in the discourse, in which there is a distribution into parts, and composition. For the Pythagoric Timæus likewise, indicating this in his treatise to those who are able to understand him, says “that before heaven [or the universe] was generated in words, there were idea and matter, and God the Demiurgus.” For that he fashions the generation of the universe in words, he clearly manifests in what he says. Moreover, with respect to *the smooth and the even*, they manifest, as we have before observed, the one comprehension in the world, and the greatest aptitude to the participation of a divine soul. But the words, “*every where from the middle equal*,” define the peculiarity of the spherical figure. For this is every where equidistant, according to all intervals. And the words “*whole, and*

* Instead of *καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ λέγειν, τὸ εἶδεν αἰετὸν γινόμενος* in this place, it is necessary to read, *καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ λέγειν τὸ εἶδεν, αἰετὸν γινόμενος*.

perfect from perfect bodies," establish the world in the highest degree of similitude to all-perfect animal; for that was in all respects perfect; and, likewise, to the Demiurgus himself. For as he is the father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, thus also the world is the most perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may likewise say that the world is smooth, as not being in want of any motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs. For this was proximately demonstrated. But "it is every where equal from the middle," as having a spherical figure, and "a whole and perfect," as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing external to itself: for this is properly a whole and perfect. And it consists of perfect bodies, as being composed from the four elements. It is also said to be in the singular number *a body*, as being only-begotten. And thus Plato beginning from the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to perfection, he again converts it through the above-mentioned particulars to the same thing [i. e. to the only-begotten]; imitating the progression of the world from its paradigm, and its perfect conversion to it.

END OF VOL. I.

B Proclus Diadochus
387 The commentaries of
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